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ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
Ahmed M. El Far 
 
While international arbitration offers the prominent scheme for resolution of 
transnational disputes, the arbitration community must constantly examine areas of 
concern. 
 
Any system of justice, including the arbitration system, is not meant for abuse. Thus, 
it would be paradoxical to support a mischief that the arbitration system seeks to 
obviate. This could cast doubts as to the system’s efficiency and induce distrust in a 
system formed to accommodate parties’ interests and uphold their common 
intentions. 
 
In recent years, international arbitration has been plagued by different forms of 
procedural abuse. Abusive practices developed by parties may undermine the fair 
resolution of disputes and frustrate the administration of arbitral justice. 
 
There are pre-existing tools and legal rules at the disposal of arbitrators that can be 
utilised to prevent abuse and administer arbitral justice. However, these tools are 
inherently rigid in their application.  
 
The thesis introduces the principle of abuse of rights in international arbitration and 
argues for its application as a general principle of law to prevent the 
transmogrification of international arbitration into a process profoundly tainted with 
abuse. The virtue and efficacy of a single theory with a wide scope of application 
and an overarching premise, is that it can be used to address different abusive 
behaviours, and equally enjoys the flexibility of general principles of law. 
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I. SETTING OUT THE FRAMEWORK OF DISCUSSION 
 
1. Referring existing or future disputes to international arbitration primarily rests 
on the will of the parties. In that sense, international arbitration has a clear 
contractual and consensual nature.1 This implies that international arbitration is 
regarded as an exceptional mechanism for the settlement of disputes.2 While 
this was the prevalent perception of international arbitration, it has drastically 
changed.3 It is now generally recognised that international arbitration is the 
preferred method for resolving disputes in international trade,4 and comprises 
the normal means for resolving commercial and investment disputes.5 
 
2. As the size and complexity of international commercial and investment 
transactions continue to grow, so will transnational business disputes. Thus, 
the dire need for appropriate and efficient dispute resolution schemes remains a 
global reality. 
 
                                                          
1 Gary B. Born “International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements: Drafting and 
Enforcing”, (Third Edition), (Kluwer Law International 2010), 2. 
2 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Challenge No. 86, Judicial Year 70, Session held on 26 November 
2002, 1095. 
3 Simon Greenberg, Christopher Kee and J. Romesh Weeramantry, “International Commercial 
Arbitration: An Asia Pacific Perspective”, (Cambridge University Press 2011), 3. 
4 Richard Garnett, “National Court Intervention in Arbitration as an Investment Treaty Claim”, 60 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 485, 485 (2011); Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, 
“International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms – Choosing Between Institutionally Supported and 
Ad Hoc; and Between Institutions”, in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed), “Arbitration Under International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues”, (Oxford University Press 2010), 64; L. Yves 
Fortier, “Arbitrating in the Age of Investment Treaty Disputes”, 31 The University of Southern 
Wales Law Journal 1, 2 (2008); M. I. M. Aboul-Enein, “Arbitration of Foreign Investment 
Disputes: Responses to the New Challenges and Changing Circumstances”, in Albert Jan Van Den 
Berg (ed), “New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond”, (Kluwer Law 
International 2010), 181. 
5 Jean-François Poudret and Sébastien Besson, “Comparative Law of International Arbitration”, 
(Second Edition), (Sweet & Maxwell 2007), 24; Joseph T. McLaughlin, “Arbitration and 
Developing Countries”, 13 The International Lawyer 211, 211 (1979). 
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3. Any major concern that is left un-remedied may grow to become an arbitral 
nightmare that can adversely impact the arbitral process and induce distrust 
and disbelief in the system. 
 
4. In recent years, international arbitration has been plagued by different forms of 
procedural abuse. Abusive practices developed by parties may not only cause 
paramount prejudice to their opposing parties, but can also undermine the fair 
resolution of disputes and frustrate the administration of arbitral justice. 
 
5. Thus, we have witnessed cases where parties restructure their investments in 
an abusive manner by altering one of its features, not for commercial purposes 
but to gain access to ICSID arbitration.6 Similarly, the rise of abusive parallel 
arbitral proceedings and the undesirable risk of inconsistent decisions may 
pose an impediment to standards of fairness, requirements of due process and 
the broader notion of administration of justice.7 
 
6. There are pre-existing classic tools and legal rules at the disposal of arbitrators 
that can be utilised to prevent abuse and administer arbitral justice. However, 
these tools have a defined and narrow scope, are inherently rigid in their 
application and fail to remedy different forms of abuse. 
 
7. A general principle of abuse of rights is vital in international arbitration. The 
virtue of a single theory with a wide scope and an overarching premise, is that 
it is a principle which involves equity considerations, enjoys the flexibility of 
general principles of law, and can be used to address different abusive 
behaviours. 
 
8. The importance of endorsing a general principle of abuse of rights in order to 
ensure the good administration of justice, is not only appealing because of its 
comprehensiveness and its ability to remedy forms of abuse that other rules fail 
to remedy. As shall be discussed, its potency stems equally from the fact that it 
                                                          
6 CME Czech Republic B. V. vs. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Final 
Award of 14 March 2003. 
7 ST-AD GmbH v. Republic of Bulgaria, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-06, Award on Jurisdiction 
dated 18 July 2013, para. 423. 
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is a general principle that can also remedy any form of abuse that is not 
currently regulated by a specific rule. 
 
II. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
 
9. The thesis generally discusses the principle of abuse of rights in international 
arbitration. Specifically, the thesis explores the possibility of developing and 
applying the principle of abuse of rights as a general principle of law in 
international commercial and investment arbitration, to tackle different forms 
of substantive and procedural abuse. 
 
10. The principal research issues/questions that will be addressed in this study are: 
 
 The meaning of abuse of rights; 
 The recognition, or lack thereof, of a principle of abuse of rights in 
different legal systems; 
 The essential elements of abuse of rights and the conditions sine qua 
non for its application; 
 Limitations/concerns of the principle of abuse of rights; 
 Justification for the principle’s application in international arbitration 
and its importance in ensuring the administration of arbitral justice; 
 An examination of how it ensures the administration of arbitral justice; 
 The legal basis of abuse of rights in international arbitration and 
whether it is applied as a general principle of substantive and 
procedural law; 
 Whether it is considered an overriding principle of substantive and 
procedural law in international arbitration. 
 
11. After discussing the above-mentioned issues and questions, the thesis shall 
suggest that the principle of abuse of rights is a significant general principle of 
law that is vital in international arbitration to ensure the administration of 
arbitral justice. 
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III. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
12. The study of abuse of rights has not been subject to much legal analysis in 
English legal literature. This is frustrating, given that a principle so pivotal in 
the civil legal systems, and equally an intrinsic part of international law, has 
not stimulated the interest of jurists in that part of the world. 
 
13. Moreover, the study of the principle of abuse of rights and its application in 
international arbitration is far from being a recognised topic of discussion in 
the law and practice of international arbitration. While recent trends in arbitral 
practice may reveal a frequent, albeit scattered, use of the principle as shall be 
discussed in this thesis, its application has been left to the judicial whim of 
arbitral tribunals, especially in the absence of any sufficiently detailed analysis 
where the principle’s core elements have been addressed or its application in 
international arbitration scrupulously discussed. 
 
14. In this section one endeavours to provide an abridged overview of the existing 
theoretical background on the principle of abuse of rights in general, and a 
succinct overview on its application in international arbitration in particular.  
 
15. Whilst the relevant literature is analysed in each section of the thesis, this 
prefatory section is important to grasp the current discussion of the issues 
addressed, to highlight the originality of the thesis, and to pinpoint its 
theoretical and practical significance. 
 
A. Abuse of Rights: Demystifying the Principle 
 
16. Individuals possess substantive and procedural rights in every legal system. 
The law protects and enforces any normal exercise of a right.8 However, the 
question arises whether an exercise of a right in an abusive manner may trigger 
                                                          
8 Viktor Knapp, “International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law”, (Part I, Chapter 2), (Springer 
1983), 105. 
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the right holder’s liability. This posits the question: when does an exercise of a 
right become an abuse of a right? 
 
17. In broad terms, abuse of rights denotes the malicious or unreasonable exercise 
of an otherwise lawful right, or an exercise of a right for a purpose other than 
that for which it was granted.9 According to Hersch Lauterpacht, an abuse of 
right occurs when a right is exercised in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, 
in a way that inflicts upon another harm that cannot be legitimately justified.10 
 
18. Many legal systems sought to design rules to prohibit the abusive exercise of 
rights.11 Such sanctions are not necessarily imposed for the mere wrongdoing 
of the individual, but rather to preserve another more important right.12 Thus, it 
seems that the gist of abuse of rights comprises the constructive analysis and 
evaluation of various competing legal rights, where the legislator and/or court, 
upon prudent consideration, decides to sacrifice one right to preserve another.13 
 
19. Although abuse of rights is not generally acknowledged in the common law, it 
                                                          
9 Anna Di Robilant, “Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug and the Common Law”, 61 Hastings 
Law Journal 687, 688 (2010); David Angus, “Abuse of Rights in Contractual Matters in the 
Province of Quebec”, 8 McGill Law Journal 150, 151 (1962); Glenda Redmann, “Abuse of Rights: 
An Overview of the Historical Evolution and the Current Application in Louisiana Contracts”, 32 
Loyola Law Review 946, 946-947 (1987); Tobi Goldoftas, “Abuse of Process”, 13 Cleveland-
Marshall Law Review 163, 163 (1964); Robert Kolb, “General Principles of Procedural Law”, in 
Andreas Zimmermann et al. (eds), “The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary”, (Oxford University Press 2006), 831. 
10 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Function of Law in the International Community”, (Oxford University 
Press 2011), 294. For a similar definition, see Michael Byers, “Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A 
New Age”, 47 McGill Law Journal 389, 406 (2002). F. A. Mann equally recognised the importance 
of abuse of right: Francis A. Mann, “The Legal Aspects of Money”, (Fifth Edition), (Oxford 
University Press 1992), 476. 
11 Byers (2002), (note 10) 406. 
12 In some cases, damages are granted even though the right holder is found to have not committed 
any fault, given the harm caused to another individual as a result of the exercise of the right. Albert 
Mayrand, “Abuse of Rights in France and Quebec”, 34 Louisiana Law Review 993, 1000-1002 
(1974); John H. Crabb, “The French Concept of Abuse of Rights”, 6 Inter-American Law Review 1, 
19-20 (1964); Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 303-304. 
13 Ernest J. Weinrib, “Corrective Justice”, (Oxford University Press 2012), 112-115. 
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is widely recognised in civil law jurisdictions.14 As shall be discussed below, 
while some states adopt a strict approach to the principle and limit its 
application to certain areas of law, others tend to encompass a broader scope, 
and further extend its application to different legal areas.15 
 
20. Scholars have different views regarding abuse of rights. Those who deny the 
validity of the principle argue that it is a vague concept that lacks defined 
content capable of application.16 Moreover, as its application traditionally rests 
on the determination of the motive of the right holder (the subjective element), 
many have opposed the principle and argued that one’s motive is immaterial.17 
Some also oppose its adoption owing to the fact that it grants extensive 
discretionary power to decision makers. In this regard, Gutteridge opined that 
a principle, which leaves it to the discretion of the decision maker to determine 
the purpose of a right, is subject to “grave objection”.18 
 
21. Those who support the need for the prohibition of abuse of rights argue that it: 
grants courts/arbiters the flexibility needed to deal with the uncertainties and 
undeterminable variable parameters of which any right bears, aids decision 
makers in reaching a fair and equitable outcome,19 and is employed to defeat 
any attempt to utilise a rule of law for an improper purpose.20 Herch 
Lauterpacht noted that the prohibition of abuse of rights “must exist in the 
background in any system of administration of justice in which courts are not 
                                                          
14 For example, Article (2) of the Swiss Civil Code; Articles (226) and (242) of the German Civil 
Code, Article (281) of the Greek Civil Code; Article (6.1) of the Luxembourgish Civil Code, Article 
(3:13) of the Dutch Civil Code, Article (833) of the Italian Civil Code; Article (1295.2) of the 
Austrian Civil Code; Article (334) of the Portuguese Civil Code, Article, (7.2) of the Spanish Civil 
Code, Article (334) of the Portuguese Civil Code; Article (7) of the Quebec Civil Code; Article (10) 
of the Russian Civil Code; Article (107) of the Bolivian Civil Code; Article (840) of the Mexican 
Civil Code; Article (372) of the Paraguayan Civil Code; Article (5) of the Egyptian Civil Code; 
Article (106) of the UAE Federal Civil Code; Article (30) of the Kuwaiti Civil Code; and Article 
(63) of the Qatari Civil Code. 
15 Byers (2002), (note 10) 392. 
16 G. D. S. Taylor, “The Content of the Rule Against Abuse of Rights in International Law”, 46 
Yearbook of International Law 323, 324 (1973); Shael Herman, “Classical Social Theories and the 
Doctrine of “Abuse of Right””, 37 Louisiana Law Review 747, 747 (1977). 
17 The Mayor, Aldermen And Burgesses of the Borough of Bradford v. Edward Pickles, [1895] A. C. 
587, 594. 
18 Harold C. Gutteridge, “Abuse of Rights”, 5 Cambridge Law Journal 22, 42 (1935). 
19 Angus (1962), (note 9), 157. 
20 Redmann (1987), (note 9), 947; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18), 42. 
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purely mechanical agencies”.21 To its proponents, it is a potent legal tool 
which precludes ‘summum ius’ (supreme justice) becoming ‘summa iniuria’ 
(supreme injustice),22 given that it ameliorates the rigidity of legal rules and 
advocates reasonableness.23 
 
22. A prudent review of scholarly writings and decisions/awards dealing with 
abuse of rights reveal that it functions either as a curative mechanism or, more 
prominently, as a corrective mechanism, and aims to ensure the administration 
of justice.24 
 
23. Firstly, whilst all legal systems have articulated legal rules to ensure fairness 
and the good administration of justice, there exists no legal system that has 
exhaustive legal rules to govern an infinite number of cases and all diversified 
issues that may arise. In this regard, while rights may be effectively defined in 
scope and qualified in their reach, it is tenuous to presume that legislators are 
omniscient; can predict all exceptions and qualifications covered by a given 
right.25 In these exact cases, abuse of rights may act as a curative mechanism, 
as it may be employed to grant courts/arbiters the flexibility needed to deal 
with the uncertainties and undeterminable variable parameters of which any 
right bears. As stipulated by Joseph Voyame, Bertil Cottier and Bolivar Rocha: 
 
[T]he great majority of commentators agree on 
the usefulness of the remedial function of the rules 
forbidding abuse of rights. Indeed, the legislator 
is no more infallible today than he was in the 
past. While the rules he promulgates are 
becoming increasingly precise and detailed, he 
cannot foresee every eventuality. Only the 
                                                          
21 Herch Lauterpacht, “The Development of International Law by the International Court”, 
(Cambridge University Press 1982), 165. 
22 A legal maxim which denotes cases where justice may turn into injustice if one strictly follows the 
legal rule. María José and Falcón Tella, “Equity and Law”, (Martinus Nijhoff 2008), 192; Alexandre 
Kiss, “Abuse of Rights” in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), “Encyclopedia of Public International Law”, 
(Volume 1) (North-Holland, 1992) para. 1. 
23 Wim Decock, “Theologians and Contract Law: The Moral Transformation of the Ius Commune”, 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1983), 292. 
24 Chester Brown, “The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals”, 76 British Yearbook 
of International Law 195, 231 (2005). 
25 Frederick Schauer, “Can Rights be Abused?”, 31 The Philosophical Quarterly 225, 229 (1981); 
Pannal A. Sanders, ““At Will” Franchise Terminations and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine”, 42 
Louisiana Law Review 210, 223 (1981). 
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proscription of abuse of rights makes it possible 
to establish the connection between the justice 
ostensibly guaranteed by positive law and 
genuine justice.26  
 
24. Accordingly, it serves to fill the lacuna that may exist in all legal systems.27 
Thus, as shall be discussed below, abuse of rights has been utilised in certain 
cases to create new contractual obligations to avoid an unjust or inequitable 
outcome.28 
 
25. Secondly, abuse of rights functions as a corrective mechanism, as it softens and 
ameliorates the rigidity of strict legal rules.29 
 
26. The principle has arguably presented elements that were peculiar to the 
positivistic legal school: courts are bestowed with a parochial right to apply an 
existing legal provision on a given set of facts.30 With the introduction of abuse 
of rights, courts are conferred with a rather broad role; to ameliorate the 
harshness of positive law or contractual provisions.31  
 
27. The corrective function of abuse of rights is further fortified by the words of 
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court where it provided that: 
 
The fundamental theory of this article is the 
recognition that positive legislation is unable to 
affect in detail all the controversies which may 
arise in the society of men, and it is equally 
impossible for it to regulate these controversies in 
                                                          
26 Joseph Voyame, Bertil Cottier and Bolivar Rocha, “Abuse of Right in Comparative Law” in Abuse 
of Rights and Equivalent Concepts: The Principle and Its Present Day Application (Proceedings of 
the 19th Colloquy on European Law, Luxembourg, 6-9 November 1989) (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, 1990) 48. 
27 Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10), 308. 
28 Quebec Superior Court in Posluns v. Enterprises Lormil Inc., [1990] Quebec 200-05-001584-858, 
J.E. 90-1131 (C.S.), cited in Rosalie Jukier, “Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle (S.C.C.): 
Implications of an Expanded Doctrine of Abuse of Rights in Civilian Contract Law”, 37 McGill Law 
Journal 221, 235 (1992) where the court applied abuse of rights to create a contractual provision of a 
guarantee of exclusivity which was not part of the contract. 
29 A. N. Yiannopoulos, “Civil Liability for Abuse of Right: Something Old, Something New...”, 54 
Louisiana Law Review 1173, 1195 (1994). 
30 Julio Cueto-Rua, “Abuse of Rights”, 35 Louisiana Law Review 965, 972 (1975). 
31 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29), 1195; James Gordley, “The Abuse of Rights in the Civil Law 
Tradition”, in Rita de la Feria and Stefan Vogenauer (eds.), “Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New 
General Principle of EU Law?”, (Hart Publishing), (2011), 35. 
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advance. However much the legislator may try to 
build up a legal structure that shows no gaps in 
the laws, there will always be special cases in 
which a rigid application of the statutory 
principles would lead to injustice, and this the 
judge is not permitted to tolerate. This happens in 
particular if individual rights are exercised 
contrary to good faith. Section 2 of article 2, 
which denies legal protection to the manifest 
abuse of a right, forms the necessary amendment 
to the duty which is set down in section 1 of 
article 2, namely, to act always in good faith. The 
purpose of this provision is to either limit or to 
annul the formal validity of positive laws 
whenever the judge deems this to be in the 
interests of substantive justice.32 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
28. On a different note, as a term of art, characterising and labelling abuse of rights 
is not an easy task. Scholars have engaged in a futile logomachy in this regard.  
 
29. Some, influenced by the views of Marcel Planiol, have rejected the use of the 
words ‘abuse’ and ‘right’, holding that it is a ‘contradiction in terms’ as a right 
ceases to be given such status when tainted with abuse and consequently, it is 
futile to speak of it as the abuse of a right:33  
 
This new doctrine is based entirely on language 
insufficiently studied; its formula “abusive use of 
rights” is a logomachy, for if I use my right, my 
act is licit; and when it is illicit it is because I 
exceed my right and act without right.34  
 
                                                          
32 Judgment of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, BGE 72.2.39 (1946), cited and translated in Vera 
Bolgar, “Abuse of Rights in France, Germany, and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in 
Legal Doctrine”, 35 Louisiana Law Review 1015, 1034 (1975). 
33 Robilant (2010), (note 9) 83, citing Marcel Planiol, “Traité Élémentaire De Droit Civil”, v. 2 n. 870 
(Paris, 1907): “The formula abuse of rights is a logomachy, since if I use my own right, my act is 
licit and when it is illicit it is because I have exceeded my right and acted sine jus, iniuria as the Lex 
Aquilia says. To reject the category abuse of rights is not to try to hold licit the various damaging 
activities repressed by our courts. It is only to note that an abusive act to the extent that it is illicit is 
not the exercise of a right and that abuse of rights is not a category distinct from illicit act. In other 
words, the right ends where the abuse begins”; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 24; Herman (1977), 
(note 16) 747; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 974-975; Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 993. 
34 Marcel Planiol, “Treatise on the Civil Law”, Translated by Louisiana State Law Institution, (1959), 
477; Redmann (1987), (note 9) 949. 
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30. This emanates from the perception that one who abuses his rights is no longer 
within the formal limits of the right, but has necessarily exceeded the limits of 
that right. Others prefer to use other terms such as ‘distortion of rights’, 
‘competitive rights’, or ‘conflict of rights’.35 
 
31. Regardless of such terminological juxtaposition, it is submitted that, for 
reasons of convenience and given the scope of the thesis, the best term to be 
used is ‘abuse of rights’.  
 
32. As a term of art, one may argue that there is no contradiction in terms given the 
distinction between one’s subjective right (droits subjectifs) and the objective 
law (droit objectif); the abuse “is in accord with such a right, but is against the 
law in its entirety”.36 
 
33. Finally, one’s choice to employ such terminology equally emanates from 
reasons of convenience, as it is the term used in the existing literature and it 
easily depicts the principle’s legal concept and purpose. From a pure logical 
stance, the main purpose of words is to indicate a specific meaning to those in 
receipt. If such purpose is effectively satisfied, any debate regarding the use of 
the words seems of a pure linguistic nature and is futile from a strict legal point 
of view.  
 
34. Despite its historical imbroglio, ‘abuse of right’, as a term of art, largely 
satisfies its main purpose by alluding its characteristic elements, as a legal 
construct, to the readers. 
 
B. Scope of Application 
 
35. An examination of the principle of abuse of rights in different legal systems 
reveals that the principle’s conditions of application comprise: the existence of 
                                                          
35 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30), 976; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 24-25. 
36 Annekatrien Lenaerts, “The General Principle of the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights: A Critical 
Position on Its Role in a Codified European Contract Law”, 18 European Review of Private Law 
1121, 1122 (2010); José & Tella (2008), (note 22) 191-192; Josserand, “De l'esprit des droits et de 
leur relativitd”, cited in Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 24. 
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a right; and that such right ceases legal protection given that it has been 
abused.37 
 
36. In relation to what conduct constitutes an abuse, courts and scholars rely on 
different criteria. It is generally recognised38 that abuse is established if any of 
the following criteria is fulfilled: 
 
37. Firstly, abuse is established if a right is exercised with an intent to cause harm. 
Most scholars and legal systems that recognise abuse of rights endorse this 
criterion.39 Professor Scholtens held that abuse is established whereby the right 
holder exercises his/her right with an intention to cause harm to another, and 
this may be presumed where the exercise brings no advantage to the right 
holder, or where the benefit derived is minimal and the detriment caused 
thereby is great.40 Other scholars opposed endorsing the subjective element of 
malice because of the difficulty in proving it.41 
 
38. Secondly, abuse is established if a right is exercised for a purpose other than 
that for which it was granted. The supporters of this criterion of abuse note that 
it presupposes that rights do not exist in a vacuum; they are conferred upon the 
right holder for a specific social purpose. If the holder of the right derogates 
from its purpose, it may be tantamount to an abuse of right.42 
                                                          
37 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1195; Kiss (1992), (note 22) para. 2; Gianluigi Palombella, “The 
Abuse of Rights and the Rule of Law”, in András Sajó (ed), “Abuse: The Dark Side of Fundamental 
Rights”, (Eleven International 2006), 9-10; Babatunde O. Iluyomade, “The Scope and Content of a 
Complaint of Abuse of Right in International Law”, 16 Harvard International Law Journal 47, 48 
(1975); Qatari Court of Cassation, Session held on 7 January 2014, Challenge No. 176, Judicial 
Year 2013. 
38 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 985-1003; Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1180; Joseph M. Perillo, 
“Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept”, 27 Pacific Law Journal 37, 47 (1996); James C. 
Exnicios, “Abuse of Rights: An Overview of the Historical Evolution and the Current Application in 
Louisiana Contracts”, 32 Law Review 946, 946-949 (1987). 
39 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30), 991; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 13; Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 994; 
Article (226) of the German Civil Code. 
40 J. E. Scholtens, “Abuse of Rights”, 75 South African Law Journal 39, 43 (1958). 
41 B. Edmeades, “Abuse of Rights”, 24 McGill Law Journal 136, 137 (1978); Pierre Catala & John A. 
Weir, “Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel, Part II”, 38 Tulane Law Review 221, 224 (1964); 
Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 26. 
42 F. P. Walton, “Motive as an Element in Torts in the Common and in the Civil Law”, 22 Harvard 
Law Review 501, 501 (1909); Louis Josserand, “De I ‘esprit des droits et de leur Relativité: Théorie 
dite dès l'Abus des Droits”, (2d ed. 1925), cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 1001; Prest v. 
Petrodel Resources Ltd., [2013] 2 A.C. 415, 17; Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 
39, Judgment of 5 February 1970, 56. 
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39. Thirdly, abuse may be established if one exercises his/her right unreasonably. 
It is often held that unreasonableness is determined where the right holder 
exercises the right with minimal serious or legitimate interest,43 or where there 
is disparity between the interests which are served by its effectuation, and the 
interests which are, or could be, damaged as a result thereof.44 
 
40. Finally, some also note that abuse may be established if a right is exercised in 
violation of good faith.45 
 
41. On a different note, the application of abuse of rights has clearly developed 
throughout the years. While its scope of application was limited to the area of 
property law, it subsequently extended to other areas and is now said to have a 
general application.46  
 
42. As noted by John Crabb, abuse of rights has been applied in cases pertaining 
to contract law, law of procedures, including the legal process, the process of 
appeal and the execution of judicial decisions, and to family law.47 Other 
                                                          
43 Karaha Bodas Co. v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Das Gas Bumi Negara 364 F.3d 274 (5th 
Cir. 2004), (“An action violates abuse of rights doctrine if […] the action is totally unreasonable 
given the lack of any legitimate interest in the exercise of the right and its exercise harms another”); 
Gutteridge (1935), (note 18, 32. 
44 Edmeades (1978), (note 41), 138; Perillo (1996), (note 38), 47; Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10), 303-
304; Kiss (1992), (note 22) para. 4; CJEU, 23 Mar. 2000, Case C-373/97, Diamantis [2000] ECR I-
1705, para. 43; Weinrib (2012), (note 13) 112-115, discussing that courts may award damages in 
lieu of an injunction on the basis of abuse of right. If monetary compensation is adequate for the 
plaintiff, while issuing an injunction would be oppressive to the defendant and the plaintiff would 
derive no substantial benefit therefrom, courts may use abuse of right to balance the competing 
interests and reach equipoise (remedial fairness). 
45 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 996; Michael Joachim Bonell, “An International Restatement of 
Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts”, (Third Edition), 
(Transnational Publishers 2005), 133; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 27 April 2006, 
Challenge No. 3473, Judicial Year 75. 
46 Walton (1909), (note 42) 505; Byers (2002), (note 10) 392, it is widely applied in (“property law, 
labour law, contractual obligations, and legal proceedings”); Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 967; F. 
P. Walton, “Delictual Responsibility in the Modern Civil Law (More Particularly in the French 
Law) as Compared with the English Law of Torts”, 49 Law Quarterly Review 70, 87 (1933); M. S. 
Amos, “Abusive Exercise of Rights According to French Law”, 2 Journal of  the Society of 
Comparative Legislation 453, 453-454 (1900). 
47 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 3-4; Walton (1909), (note 42) 508; Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 225-
226; Walton (1933), (note 46) 87. 
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scholars equally note that abuse of rights applies in every department of the 
law.48 
 
C. Abuse of Rights in the Context of International Arbitration 
 
43. Whilst the application of abuse of rights in international arbitration has not 
been addressed in detail, the growing phenomenon of abuse and procedural 
misconduct in the context of arbitration is acknowledged by many.  
 
44. Parties principally refer their disputes to international arbitration owing to the 
presumed advantages and benefits that the arbitration system aspires to offer, 
including procedural efficiency and obtaining a fair resolution of the dispute.49 
However, the arbitral system is currently subject to challenges and criticism,50 
owing to the perception that it is failing to accommodate the needs of its 
users.51 In recent surveys and empirical studies, users have complained 
primarily because of the costs, delays and procedural misconduct during the 
arbitration process.52  
 
                                                          
48 Walton (1909), (note 42) 505. 
49 William W. Park, “Arbitrators and Accuracy”, 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 25, 27 
(2010). 
50 Bernard Hanotiau, “International Arbitration in a Global Economy: The Challenges of the Future”, 
28 Journal of International Arbitration 89, 99 (2011). 
51 Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides, “Law and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration”, (Fourth Edition), (Sweet & Maxwell 2004), paras 1-46; 
Irene Welser & Susanna Wurzer, “Formality in International Commercial Arbitration – For Better 
or for Worse?”, in Gerold Zeiler, Irene Welser, et al. (eds) “Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 2008”, 
(Manz’sche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung 2008); Irene Welser & Christian Klausegger, 
“Fast Track Arbitration: Just Fast or Something Different?”, in Gerold Zeiler, Irene Welser, et al. 
(eds) “Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 2009”, (Manz’sche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung 
2009), 260; Piero Bernardini, “International Arbitration: How to Make it More Effective”, in 
Laurent Levy and Yves Derains (eds.), “Liber Amicorum En l’Honnour de Serge Lazareff”, (ICC 
Publication 2011); Klaus Peter Berger, “The Need for Speed in International Arbitration”, 25 
Journal of International Arbitration 595, 595 (2008); Jeffrey Waincymer, “Promoting Fairness and 
Efficiency of Procedures in International Commercial Arbitration – Identifying Uniform Model 
Norms”, 3 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 25, 45 (2010); William K. Slate II, “Cost and 
Time Effectiveness of Arbitration”, 3 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 185, 186 (2010); Jorg 
Risse, “Procedural Risk Analysis: An ADR-Tool in Arbitration Proceedings”, 2009 Austrian 
Arbitration Yearbook 461, 461 (2009). 
52 Queen Mary University of London and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP: “2015 International 
Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration”, (2015), 7. 
Page | 23  
 
45. Scholars have noted that different forms of abuse in arbitration may be 
detrimental to the arbitral system,53 if an effective remedy is not established. 
To that effect, one scholar emphasised that the arbitral system will self-destruct 
unless there is recourse against procedural abuse.54 Equally, Professor 
Emmanuel Gaillard acknowledged the rising phenomenon of abuse in 
international arbitration. He emphasised that parties have developed an 
exceptional array of procedural abuse, and noted that specific tools need to be 
developed to prevent procedural misconduct.55 
 
46. The problem of abuse in arbitration is significant owing to the fact that it is 
frequently resorted to56 and can be employed during any phase in international 
arbitration.57 
 
47. This was also confirmed by another scholar who acknowledged that abuse is 
becoming widespread, is negatively impacting the arbitration system, and may 
pertain to any right conferred upon the parties by the applicable arbitration 
rules or laws.58 
 
48. There is general consensus in legal discourse that the frequent abuse of the 
arbitral system is detrimental to arbitration and that finding a principle to 
remedy such abuse would be serving the parties’ interests, the integrity of the 
                                                          
53 Jan Paulsson, “International Arbitration is Not Arbitration”, 2 Stockholm International Arbitration 
Review 1, 3 (2008). 
54 Patrick M. Lane, “Dilatory Tactics: Arbitral Discretion”, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.) 
“Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the 
New York Convention”, (Kluwer Law International, 1999), 425. 
55 Emmanuel Gaillard, “Abuse of Process in International Arbitration”, 32 ICSID Review 17, 17 
(2017). 
56 Edward R. Leahy and Kenneth J. Pierce, “Sanctions To Control Party Misbehavior in International 
Arbitration”, 26 Virginia Journal of International Law 291, 299 (1986). 
57 Günther J. Horvath, Stephan Wilske, et al., “Categories of Guerrilla Tactics”, in Stephan Wilske 
and Günther J. Horvath (eds.), “Guerrilla Tactics in International Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law 
International 2013), 4-5. 
58 Klaus Sachs, “Time and Money: Cost Control and Effective Case Management”, in Julian Lew and 
Loukas Mistelis (eds.), “Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law 
International 2006), 113. 
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arbitral system, and the overall administration of justice.59  
 
49. Whilst scholars have carefully accentuated the problem, they did not enunciate 
the procedural principle that can operate effectively to tackle the different 
forms of abuse.  
 
50. Despite this, there have been clear attempts by commentators and arbitral 
tribunals to introduce, or revive, the principle of abuse of rights to tackle 
specific forms of abuse in arbitration, particularly in investment arbitration.60 
 
51. For example, it is generally acknowledged that the principle is vital to deal 
with abusive subsequent proceedings in arbitration. Eminent scholars confirm 
the need to apply abuse of rights to bar subsequent proceedings that fall 
outside the scope of res judicata.61 Thus, Audley Sheppard stipulated that: 
 
[W]here the conditions for res judicata are not 
met, I would suggest that a tribunal nevertheless 
should consider whether it should not allow the 
second claim from proceeding, on grounds of 
abuse of process or abuse of rights.62 
 
                                                          
59 Stephan Wilske, “Crisis? What Crisis? The Development of International Arbitration in Tougher 
Times”, 2 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 187, 208 (2009); Martin Raible and Stephan 
Wilske, “The Arbitrator as Guardian of International Public Policy: Should Arbitrators go Beyond 
Solving Legal Issues”, in Catherine A. Rogers and Roger P. Alford, “The Future of Investment 
Arbitration”, (Oxford University Press 2009), 269; Leahy & Pierce (1986), (note 56) 293; Nadia 
Darwazeh and Baptiste Rigaudeau, “Clues to Construing the New French Arbitration Law”, 28 
Journal of International Arbitration 381, 383 (2011). 
60 Hervé Ascensio, “Abuse of Process in International Investment Arbitration”, 13 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 763, 764-765 (2014); Eric De Brabandere, “’Good Faith’, ‘Abuse of Process’ and 
the Initiation of Investment Treaty Claims”, 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 609 
(2012); John P. Gaffney, “’Abuse of Process’ in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, 11 Journal of 
World Investment & Trade 515 (2010); Phoenix Action v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/5, Award dated 15 April 2009; Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of 
Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 17 December 
2015, under UNCITRAL Rules. 
61 Yuval Shany, “The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals”, (Oxford 
University Press 2003), 259; Vaughan Lowe, “Overlapping Jurisdiction in International Tribunals”, 
20 Australian Yearbook of International Law 191, 269 (1999); Campbell Mclachlan, “Lis Pendens 
in International Litigation”, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009), 420-432; Gary B. Born, 
“International Commercial Arbitration”, (Second Edition), (Kluwer Law International 2014), 3736-
3737; International Law Association, Resolution No. 1/2006, Recommendation 5, (2006), 5.  
62 Audley Sheppard, “Res Judicata and Estoppel”, in Bernardo M. Cremades and Julian D.M. Lew, 
“Parallel State and Arbitral Procedures in International Arbitration”, (ICC Institute of World 
Business Law 2005), 235. 
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52. Similarly, in the context of parallel arbitral proceedings, Professor Gaillard 
recently noted that a principle of abuse of rights is the most promising tool to 
tackle the problem of abusive parallel proceedings in arbitration, and equally 
advocated for this in a number of ICSID arbitration proceedings.63 
 
53. Based on the above, it appears conspicuous that abuse of rights has lately 
gained a pivotal role in the context of international arbitration and its 
application is slowly gaining momentum. Commentators have raised the 
application of the principle and arbitrators have been willing to apply it to 
preclude certain forms of abuse in international arbitration. 
 
IV. ORIGINALITY AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
54. The above analysis reveals that there is an apparent lacuna in this context, 
where no substantial legal work has been undertaken to: carefully establish the 
core elements of abuse of rights; determine if it elevates to a general or 
transnational principle of law, and shed light on its multifaceted functions 
when applied in international arbitration.  
 
55. Moreover, one aims to examine its application as a general principle of law in 
international arbitration. A careful analysis of the possibility to approach abuse 
of rights as a general principle of law has serious legal manifestations. 
Particularly, it enables arbitrators to utilise it to address all procedural tactics, 
and different forms of abuse, designed to undermine the arbitral process, and 
dispenses with the current compartmentalised approach to abusive conduct, 
where different abusive behaviours fit into different rules or doctrines that are 
generally rigid and fail to effectively tackle the panoply of abusive practices. 
 
56. Additionally, this thesis aims to address a novel aspect of abuse of rights in the 
context of arbitration. Whilst some may have advocated the applicability of the 
principle in arbitration, it appears that the legal basis, or the justification for its 
                                                          
63 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 32-34; Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016; Orascom TMT 
Investments S.à.r.l. v. Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/35, Award dated 31 May 2017. 
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application in arbitration has not been discussed before. The thesis argues that 
the principle is vital not merely because it is considered, as shall be discussed, 
a general principle of law, but more importantly, as it functions to ensure the 
administration of arbitral justice. Thus, the principle’s interrelation with, and 
its effect on, the administration of arbitral justice shall be carefully addressed. 
 
57. Moreover, the status of the principle in international arbitration is of particular 
importance. While abuse of rights may be applied as part of the applicable law, 
or as a general substantive and procedural principle of law, it is of theoretical 
and practical significance to examine if it constitutes a principle of 
transnational public policy that remains applicable irrespective of the lex 
arbitri and lex causae. 
 
58. In light of the above, the significance of this thesis not only stems from the 
importance of the issues covered and their theoretical and practical 
significance and ramifications, or the relative scarcity of specialised resources. 
Equally important is the fact that it represents a comprehensive study on abuse 
of rights in international arbitration and amongst the few examples, if any, that 
address the principle’s core elements, question its legitimacy in international 
arbitration, and discusses its nature and/or function when applied to different 
legal areas in arbitration law. 
 
59. The thesis is divided into four chapters. 
 
60. Chapter one provides a comparative overview of the principle of abuse of 
rights and its application in national legal systems. In order to provide that 
abuse of rights is a general principle of law, this chapter examines its 
recognition and application in different legal systems. Thus, epitomes of its 
application in a number of civil and common law systems are discussed to 
establish the generality/universality of the principle. 
 
61. Chapter two addresses the particulars of abuse of rights and aims to distil the 
concept to its essential elements. This chapter aims to articulate the principle’s 
Page | 27  
 
conditions of application and to shed light on any concerns that may arise from 
its application. 
 
62. Chapter three examines the importance of applying abuse of rights in 
international arbitration. It analyses how the principle’s application in 
arbitration ensures the administration of arbitral justice. Particularly, this 
chapter discusses how the principle functions to achieve fairness during 
arbitral proceedings, fetters the effective resolution of disputes, enables 
arbitrators to reach equitable outcomes, and preserves the integrity of the 
arbitration system. 
 
63. Chapter four is devoted to discerning the nature of abuse of rights in 
international arbitration. It aims to determine the legal basis of abuse of rights, 
questions the transnational nature of the principle, and examines whether it 
comprises a principle of transnational public policy. 
 
64. Finally, the thesis provides a general conclusion that summarises the legal 
questions discussed and the findings of each question examined. 
 
V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
65. In examining the issues raised in this thesis, descriptive, comparative and 
analytical approaches are employed. 
 
66. The descriptive approach is utilised to elucidate the gist of the principle of 
abuse of rights, its scope of application and to examine the status quo of the 
field and of the issues raised.  
 
67. A comparative approach is equally indispensable to the study of abuse of rights 
in international arbitration. The thesis examines the application of abuse of 
rights as a general principle of law in international arbitration. Generally, for a 
principle to be considered transnational or a general principle of law, one 
should examine: (1) its generality and universality; (2) distil the concept to its 
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essential elements; and (3) ascertain whether the principle is suitable to be 
transposed into international arbitration.64 
 
68. Thus, in order to ascertain the universality of abuse of rights, an examination 
of the principle in different legal systems is crucial. In this regard, it is 
generally acknowledged that the principle’s recognition in all systems of law is 
not required.65 Thus, the study aims to ascertain the prevailing trend within 
legal systems and establish wide recognition of the principle in question, rather 
than unanimous recognition.66  
 
69. As the recognition of abuse of rights, its function and its legal basis are 
questioned, the comparative analysis and the functional approach being utilised 
shall focus on the principle’s mechanism of operation in a number of civil 
legal systems, including French law, German law, Swiss law, the law of 
Louisiana and Egyptian law. This method will generally focus on: (1) outlining 
the statutory and/or judicial formation of the principle; (2) the policy adopted, 
i.e. a restrictive policy or endorsement of a general principle of abuse of rights; 
(3) the application of the principle; and (4) the criteria adopted to determine if 
there is an abuse of right. This comparative methodology aims to assess 
whether the mentioned legal systems apply abuse of rights in the same manner 
or, at least, if there exists sufficient elements of commonality in its application. 
 
70. Whilst abuse of rights is not readily recognised in the common law legal 
systems, as shall be discussed, this derogation does not necessarily deprive it 
                                                          
64 Charles T. Kotuby and Luke A. Sobota, “General Principles of Law and International Due 
Process”, (Oxford University Press 2017), 17-27; Jaye Ellis, “General Principles and Comparative 
Law”, 22 The European Journal of International Law 949, 955-959 (2011); International Status of 
South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 128, 148, Separate Opinion of Lord McNair, 
discussing general principles of law.  
65 Emmanuel Gaillard, “Legal Theory of International Arbitration”, (Martinus Nijhoff 2010), 48-51. 
66 Harold C. Gutteridge, “Comparative Law”, (Second Edition), (Cambridge University Press 1949), 
65; Ellis (2011), (note 64) 949, 953-954 (“This methodology […] is the object of a reasonably solid 
doctrinal and jurisprudential consensus”); L. C. Green, “Comparative Law as a “Source” of 
International Law”, 42 Tulane Law Review 52, (1968); Emmanuel Gaillard, “General Principles of 
Law in International Commercial Arbitration – Challenging the Myths”, 5 World Arbitration & 
Mediation Review 161, 162 (2011). 
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from its status as a transnational or general principle.67 This study employed a 
functional approach to identify and discuss other existing rules and principles 
in order to establish elements of commonality, i.e. tertium comparationis.  
 
71. In parts related to the application of abuse of rights in international arbitration, 
the thesis employed an international comparative perspective. Thus, national 
court decisions and arbitral case law of various jurisdictions are reviewed and 
analysed.  
 
72. Furthermore, the analytical method is equally employed throughout the thesis 
in order to examine the elements of abuse of rights, the limitation of its scope 
of application, its relation to the administration of justice, its function, 
transnational nature and application in the context of international arbitration. 
 
73. In doing so, one shall analyse the operation of the principle of abuse of rights 
in international arbitration as acknowledged by prominent scholars; as 
reflected in international legal instruments such as uniform laws; and as 
applied by arbitral tribunals. This methodology is particularly used in the arena 
of international arbitration.68 
 
74. The analysis of the mentioned legal issues shall be attained by examining the 
law and practice of commercial and investment arbitration. However, emphasis 
may be given to investment arbitration materials in relation to some issues and 
to commercial arbitration materials in others. In doing so, one is mandated and 
restricted by the existence and availability of materials for the relevant issue. 
That said, it is submitted that any conclusion reached in relation to the nature 
and application of the principle should extend to, and apply in, international 
commercial and investment arbitration. 
  
                                                          
67 Thus, whilst the principle of good faith is not recognised as a general principle under English law, it 
constitutes a general principle of law: Michael Nolan, “Issues of Proof of General Principles of Law 
in International Arbitration”, 3 World Arbitration & Mediation Review 505, 510-512 (2009). 
68 Note, “General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration”, 101 Harvard Law 
Review 1816, 1824-1825 (1988). 
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75. To determine if abuse of rights may constitute a general principle of law, one is 
to first examine its recognition in the different legal systems to establish its 
generality69 and subsequently distil the concept to its essential elements. This 
is necessary to determine if there is a need to modify its conditions of 
application, in order to make it suitable for the particularities of international 
arbitration.70 
 
76. One shall briefly discuss the application of the principle in civil legal systems 
(II): mainly in (A) French law, (B) German Law, (C) Swiss Law, (D) 
Louisiana Law and (E) Egyptian Law. 
 
77. Subsequently, an abridged discussion of the recognition, or lack thereof, of 
abuse of rights in the common law legal systems is undertaken (III). By doing 
so, one aims to highlight the general view shared in this context, and discuss 
the existence of functional equivalents that achieve the same purpose as that of 
abuse of rights.  
 
78. For obvious spatial-temporal considerations, the author chose these particular 
legal systems given: the influence they had on other legal systems; the 
important role they played in establishing and developing the principle; the 
different policy they adopt; and given that they represent epitomes of legal 
systems from different regions in the world. 
                                                          
69 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, “An Introduction to Comparative Law”, (Third Edition), (Oxford 
University Press 1998), 34-36; Ralf Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, in 
Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), “The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law”, 
(Oxford University Press 2008), 342 and 346. 
70 Ellis (2011), (note 64) 955-959; International Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) 
[1950] ICJ Rep 128, 148, Separate Opinion of Lord McNair, discussing general principles of law. 
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II. ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN CIVIL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
A. French Law 
 
79. Abuse of rights was formulated in France by jurisprudence and legal literature, 
and was further developed by French courts. The principle emanated from the 
general rules on civil liability enshrined in Article (1382) of the French Civil 
Code.71 The said Article is the normative foundation of delictual liability. It 
fixes the responsibility of any harm on the author, whether he/she deliberately 
inflicted such harm, or if it was because of his/her negligence or imprudence. 
 
80. While, from a purely vernacular perspective, Article (1382) does not refer 
explicitly to abuse of rights, French courts have used the sufficiently broad 
terms of the Article to apply the principle and extend it to different areas of the 
law.72 Moreover, Article (32.1) of the French Code of Civil Procedure 
acknowledges abuse of procedural rights.73 
 
81. Although the acknowledgment of the principle in French law and its 
application by French courts is unequivocal, the conditions of application may 
seem ambiguous, as the French case law and jurisprudence have adopted 
different criteria of abuse.74  
 
82. A review of the conditions under French law reveals that French courts 
establish an abuse of right if a right is exercised: (a) to cause harm to another; 
or (b) in bad faith; or (c) unreasonably; or (d) contrary to its social purpose. 
The satisfaction of one of the mentioned criteria warrants the application of the 
                                                          
71 Redmann (1987), (note 9) 948; Article (1382) of the French Civil Code stipulates that “Tout fait 
quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est 
arrivé à le réparer”. Article (1383) provides that “Chacun est responsable du dommage qu'il a 
causé non seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa négligence ou par son imprudence”. 
72 Mateusz Krauze, “English Law and the Doctrine of Abuse of Rights”, 1 Oxford University 
Undergraduate Law Journal, (2012), 2; Byers (2002), (note 10) 392; Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1019-
1020. 
73 Article (32.1) of the French Code of Civil Procedures; and Articles (118), (123), (550), (559) and 
(560); Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 33. 
74 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 32. 
Page | 32  
 
principle. However, French courts prefer certain criteria to others. One shall 
discuss this in more details as follows. 
 
83. 1855 saw one of the first cases where the French courts explicitly applied the 
principle. The case involved the owner of some land and a house built thereon, 
who had built a chimney on the top of the house, without any legitimate or 
serious interest, but for the sole purpose of harming his neighbour. The owner 
argued that property rights are absolute and are not subject to limitations, that 
his motive is irrelevant and cannot render a legal act into an illegal one. 
However, in endorsing the principle, the French Court of Appeal of Colmar 
stipulated that:  
 
[I]t is a principle of law that the right of 
ownership is, in a fashion, an absolute right, 
entitling the owner abuse of his thing; however, 
the exercise of this right, as the exercise of any 
other right, ought to be limited by the satisfaction 
of a serious and licit interest […] Principles of 
morals and equity prevent the court from 
protecting an action motivated by ill will, 
performed under the sway of a wicked passion, 
which while not providing any personal benefit to 
the performer, causes serious damages to 
another.75 [Emphasis added]. 
 
84. Thus, while acknowledging that the right holder was merely exercising a right 
conferred by the law, such a right is not conferred without restrictions. The 
right holder must have a legitimate and serious interest to exercise his right, 
and cannot be acting solely to harm his neighbour. It is important to note that 
the Court’s decision pertains to an ownership right, which was considered to 
be the epitome of unrestricted and absolute rights. The decision further fortifies 
the submission that the term absolute right is an oxymoron: the language used, 
per se, negates the very characteristics of an absolute right, as the Court clearly 
limited the extent of the exercise of the right by the satisfaction of a serious 
and licit interest. It was thus clear that French law will not extend its protection 
to an act which is performed in malevolence, and that a right holder may not 
                                                          
75 Colmar, 2 May 1855, D.P. 1856.2.9, 10, cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 965; Gordley (2011), 
(note 31) 34. 
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attempt to inflict harm on another and evade legal liability by hiding behind 
the defence of exercising a ‘legal right’. 
 
85. The above case demonstrates the classic form of conduct tainted with abuse. 
When the right holder exercises his/her right with a malicious intent; for no 
other purpose but to inflict harm on another individual, he/she is held liable for 
abusing his/her right.76  
 
86. The case in question also demonstrates how courts deduce an intent to inflict 
harm. As evident from the decision, the Court deduced malice, ‘ill will’, by the 
fact that the right holder did not have a serious interest to exercise the right. 
Thus, the lack of a legitimate or serious interest may be evidence of malice.  
 
87. The Court of Appeal of Lyon confirmed the above submission in a case 
regarding adjacent springs producing mineral water. The owner of the spring 
had installed a powerful pump, which had the effect of decreasing the water 
yielded by the spring owned by his neighbour. The owner argued that he may 
not be found accountable for any damages caused as a result of his exercise of 
a right: nemo injuria facit qui jure suo utitur.77 While the factual matrix of the 
case did not reveal or evince a palpable intention to harm another, the court 
concluded that such intention was presumed, given that the owner did not 
benefit by the additional water yielded because of the installed pump, and that 
it was merely wasted. Thus, the Court decided that the lack of a legitimate or 
serious interest proves that the action was inspired by an intention to inflict 
harm on another.78 
 
88. In the seminal case of affaire Clément-Bayard, which is generally considered 
to be the decisive authority on this matter, the French Court of Cassation was 
caught on the horns of a dilemma, in that there were complex/mixture of 
motives involved and the court had to decide whether abuse could be 
established notwithstanding the existence of a legitimate motive. The case 
                                                          
76 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 13. 
77 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 966. 
78 Redmann (1987), (note 9) 948; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 33. 
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involved an owner, Coquerel, of land adjoining other land owned by Clément-
Bayard, who had built hangars for storing dirigibles. Coquerel wanted to sell 
his land to Clément-Bayard, but the latter refused to buy at the proposed price. 
Accordingly, Coquerel had built wooden scaffolds and installed steel spikes, 
which negatively impacted upon Clément-Bayard’s dirigibles. In fact, one of 
Clément-Bayard’s aircraft had collided with the structures built by Coquerel, 
and was manifestly damaged.79 
 
89. In a suit brought by Clément-Bayard, requesting the removal of the spikes and 
the payment of damages, Coquerel vehemently argued that he was exercising a 
legally acknowledged right. Precisely, he was simply seeking an economic 
advantage by attempting to exert pressure on Clément-Bayard to buy the land 
and to obtain the highest profit from the sale thereof. 
 
90. In its decision, the French Court of Cassation held that Coquerel was liable, 
ordered the removal of the scaffolds and spikes, and granted the damages 
requested by Clément-Bayard. The Court held that Coquerel’s actions were 
abusive. It acknowledged that his primary intention was to force Clément-
Bayard to buy the land, and to obtain an economic advantage. In doing so, 
Coquerel’s conduct was abusive, as he necessarily expected the possible 
damages that might occur to the aircraft, and accepted such damages, with the 
purpose of reaching his ends on capitalising his profits, to the detriment of 
Clément-Bayard. Thus, it was held that, despite the existence of more than one 
motive, the dominant motive was to inflict harm on another.80 
 
91. This decision clearly supports the principle of abuse of rights from a practical 
perspective. Any other conclusion would lead to rendering its viability vacuous 
in content as any right holder may evade liability by having any secondary, 
albeit legitimate, purpose for exercising his right. To that end, Josserand 
stipulated that “if we were to admit that a few good grains would purify the 
weeds, we would be opening the doors to human malice. In the great majority 
                                                          
79 The case of affaire Clément-Bayard, Req., August 3, 1915, D.P.III.1917.1.79, cited in Cueto-Rua 
(1975), (note 30) 981; and Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 33. 
80 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 34. 
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of cases, the holder of the right could invoke an acceptable motive, a 
legitimate interest […]”.81 It would thus encourage right holders to circumvent 
their legal obligations, and escape liability, by hiding behind a secondary 
motive. Granting courts the power to examine the motives of the right holder, 
as demonstrated by his conduct, and discerning the primary motive that shall 
be considered decisive in establishing any liability, greatly prevents the 
manipulation of the principle. 
 
92. Based on the above, it seems evident that French courts apply abuse of rights 
where the right holder exercises the right with an intent to inflict harm on 
another. This intention is presumed if there is no legitimate or serious interest 
to exercise the right. Additionally, intention to cause harm is not negated 
where it is associated with another secondary legitimate intention.  
 
93. The cases referred to above are the leading authority on abuse of rights. Recent 
cases confirm that French courts predominantly rely on the right holder’s 
primary intention to cause harm, as deduced from the lack of a legitimate and 
serious interest, in relation to substantive as well as procedural rights.82 
 
94. The second alternative criterion that French courts apply is good/bad faith. 
Where the conduct of the right holder does not strictly demonstrate malice, 
French courts rely on the principle of bad faith to establish abuse.83 In a case 
pertaining to one’s right to appeal, the French court provided that abuse is 
established where the conduct of the right holder constitutes: “an act of malice 
                                                          
81 Louis Josserand, “De I ‘esprit des droits et de leur Relativité: Théorie dite dès l'Abus des Droits”, 
(2d ed. 1925), cited in Crabb (1964), (note 12) 13 and Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 990. 
82 French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 1re, 24 June 2015, no. 14-17795; French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 
2nd, 13 November 2015, no. 13-28180; French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 3re, 8 October 2015, no. 14-
16216; French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 2re, 25 June 2015, no. 14-19745; French Cour de Cassation, 
Civ. 3rd, 7 July 2015, no. 14-17644; French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 3rd, 7 July 2015, no. 14-15211; 
Montpellier Cour d’Appel, 1re Chambre, Section C2, 21 October 2015, no. 14.06363 (regarding 
right of an action). 
83 French Cour de Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 3 November 2015, no. 14-19191 (inconsistent 
behaviour may constitute an abuse of right and contrary to good faith); French Cour de Cassation, 
Civ. 3rd, 7 July 2015, no. 14-17644; Montpellier Cour d’Appel, 1re Chambre, Section C2, 21 October 
2015, no. 14.06363 (right of an action may be abusive on grounds of malice or bad faith). 
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or of bad faith or, at least, a gross error equivalent to wantonness”.84 It is to 
be mentioned that one shall discuss good faith/bad faith as a criterion of abuse, 
as well as its relation to abuse of rights in another section. 
 
95. Reasonableness is another criterion that French courts may use to establish an 
abuse of right. This is precisely the situation in the case of a service contract, 
such as a business agency, that has no stipulation as to the contract duration. 
From a strictly contractual perspective, either party has the right to terminate 
the contract without being liable. However, the principle operates to possibly 
indemnify the dismissed party if he/she proves that it was unreasonable.85 
 
96. Ex analogia, a promise of marriage is treated by French courts and 
jurisprudence as un contrat à durée indéterminée. While a promise of marriage 
does not constitute an enforceable contract, French courts engage in a 
balancing exercise and evaluate the competing interest of the parties, to 
determine if the revocation of the promise was unreasonable.86 Amos & Walton 
provide that: 
 
[T]he defendant has the right to revoke his 
promise, but he must not, on pain of damages, 
exercise this right unreasonably; if he does so, he 
commits an abus de droit and makes himself 
liable in delict.87 [Emphasis added]. 
 
97. A case brought before the French courts against the Benetton Group88 involved 
an advertising campaign including pictures of human torso relating to HIV 
individuals. An AIDS charity and three HIV positive individuals brought a suit 
                                                          
84 The Case of Berjont v. Andre de Giraud d’Agay and Rousset, Req. 8 June 1931, Sirey 1931.1.332, 
cited by Crabb (1964), (note 12) 12-13; French Cour de Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 3 
November 2015, no. 14-19191 (inconsistent behaviour may constitute an abuse of right and contrary 
to good faith); Montpellier Cour d’Appel, 1re Chambre, Section C2, 21 October 2015, no. 14.06363 
(regarding right of an action). 
85 Amos (1900), (note 46) 457-458. 
86 Amos & Walton, “Introduction to French Law”, (Oxford University Press), (Third Edition), (1967), 
58; Amos (1900), (note 46) 458. 
87 Ibid, 58. 
88 Case of X … et autres v. Sté Benetton Group SpA autres, Recueil Dalloz-Sirey 1995 J 569 ; the case 
was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal, Recueil Dalloz-Sirey 1996 J 617. This case is 
referred to in Elspeth Reid, “Abuse of Rights in Scots Law”, 2 Edinburgh Law Review 129, 139 
(1998). 
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against the Benetton Group, and requested damages on the grounds that the 
Benetton Group used sensational issues to promote its brand. Despite the fact, 
acknowledged by the court, that there was no intention to inflict harm upon the 
plaintiffs or any other individual, the court used the criterion of reasonableness 
and prudence to establish an abuse of right to freedom of expression. In this 
regard, it appears that the court established fault from the fact that the Benetton 
Group expected that possible damages might have occurred, and accepted such 
damages, with the purpose of reaching its end. 
 
98. On a related note, French courts have extended the application of abuse of 
rights and granted damages in cases that not only lacked any malice or bad 
faith, but that equally involved no fault from the right holder.89 An Example of 
this is where abuse of rights applies, given the gravity of damages caused to an 
individual from the exercise of a right “notwithstanding the absence of fault”.90 
In doing so, courts justify their decision on the criterion of reasonableness in 
the exercise of rights. 
 
99. In a case that involved a company engaged in operating a refinery and refining 
oil, fumes were emitted which caused pollution in the air and a nuisance to its 
neighbours. While the company did not commit any wrongdoing in the 
conduct of its business, the Court concluded that damages caused exceeded the 
limits that the neighbours were expected to endure.91 This case demonstrates 
that abuse of rights may even extend to cases where no fault is strictly 
established and, a fortiori, no malice or bad faith is alleged.92 
 
100. Finally, another test that is invoked in the realm of abuse of rights under 
French law pertains to the deviation from the social-economic purpose of the 
                                                          
89 Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1000-1002; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 19-20. 
90 Epoux Vullion v. Société immobilière Vernet- Christophe Subsequent Developments, JCP 1971. 2. 
16781, translated by Tony Weir, available at: https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-
translations/french/case.php?id=1204 (last accessed 1 February 2018). 
91 Mayrand (1974), (note 10) 1000-1001. 
92 Another French case is Epoux Vullion v. Société immobilière Vernet- Christophe Subsequent 
Developments, JCP 1971. 2. 16781, translated by Tony Weir. Cases have been decided similarly in 
Quebec, Canada. The Supreme Court decided that, while the defendant has exercised utmost 
prudence in the exercise of his rights, he was nevertheless responsible for the damages caused 
thereby. Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1001.  
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right. This criterion of abuse presupposes that rights are conferred upon the 
right holder for a specific social-economic purpose, and the exercise of the 
right is merely a means to satisfy such purpose. Any deviation from the 
purpose amounts to an abuse of right.93 The main protagonist of this criterion 
is Louis Josserand, who produced his seminal work on the theory of relativity 
of rights, which links the extent of the exercise of a right to its social 
purpose.94 However, due to the difficulty in applying this criterion, as shall be 
discussed in another section, French courts rarely rely on it to establish 
abuse.95  
 
101. While it may seem, prima facie, that abuse of rights is primarily applied in 
relation to property rights, the principle extended to other areas and is now said 
to have a general application.96 It has been constantly applied by French courts 
in cases pertaining to, inter alia, contract law, law of procedures, including the 
legal process, the process of appeal and the execution of judicial decisions, and 
to family law.97 Moreover, one submits that the essence of abuse of rights 
equally applies in administrative law, as manifested in the concept of 
détournement de pouvoir, which sanctions the use of discretion/power for a 
purpose other than that for which it was conferred.98 
 
102. In relation to abuse of procedural rights, French courts rely on the same criteria 
of abuse discussed above. Thus, courts have used the test of malice and lack of 
legitimate interest, as well as good faith, and reasonableness in relation to 
                                                          
93 Walton (1909), (note 42) 501; Louis Josserand, “De I ‘esprit des droits et de leur Relativité: 
Théorie dite dès l'Abus des Droits”, (2d ed. 1925), cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 1001. 
94 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1018; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 27-28. 
95 Knapp (1983) (note 8), 114; Pirovano, “La fonction sociale des droits : Réflexions sur le destin des 
théories de Josserand”, in Recueil Dalloz Sirey, sec. Chronique 67, 70 (1972), cited and translated 
in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 1001-1002. 
96 Walton (1909), (note 42) 505; Byers (2002), (note 10) 392, it is widely applied in (“property law, 
labour law, contractual obligations, and legal proceedings”); Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 967; 
Walton (1933), (note 46) 87; Amos (1900), (note 46) 453-454. 
97 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 3-4; Walton (1909), (note 42) 508; Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 225-
226; D. J. Devine, “Some Comparative Aspects of the Doctrine of Abuse of Rights”, 1964 Acta 
Juridica 148, 154 (1964); Amos & Walton (1967), (note 86) 219; Articles (32.1), (559), and (581) of 
the French Code of Civil Procedures. 
98 Iluyomade (1975), (note 37) 55; Taylor (1973), (note 16) 324-325. 
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different procedural rights, including: right to bring an action, right of defence, 
and right to appeal.99 
 
103. As to the legal basis of the principle under French law, one who abuses his 
right commits a delict, which triggers the delictual liability for the 
wrongdoer.100 Courts constantly base abuse of rights decisions on Article 
(1382) of the civil code,101 which states that: “anyone who, through his act, 
causes damage to another by his fault shall be obliged to compensate the 
damage”. Moreover, while the principle equally applies to contracts; i.e. abuse 
of contractual rights, any abuse of a contractual right is “generally considered 
as a delictual or a quasi-delictual fault”.102 
 
104. On a related note, one submits that abuse of contractual rights may constitute a 
contractual breach and trigger one’s contractual liability.103 To that end, based 
on Article (1134.3) of the French civil code, which mandates performance of 
agreements in good faith, one holds that any abusive exercise of a contractual 
right is a contractual breach. Thus, if a “party acts maliciously in the 
performance of a contract, he violates a rule of law and he therefore commits 
a fault”.104 The scope of abuse of rights extends to sanction the abusive 
exercise of rights associated with contracts, but not stemming from a contract, 
such as the right to refuse to conclude an agreement.105 In this case, the right 
holder’s liability is based on delictual fault (Articles 1382 and 1383 of the 
French Civil Code).106 Thus, it appears that the principle of good faith can be 
                                                          
99 Montpellier Cour d’Appel, 1re Chambre, Section C2, 21 October 2015, no. 14-06363; French Cour 
de Cassation, Civ. 1re, 24 June 2015, no. 14-17795; French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 2re, 25 June 
2015, no. 14-19745; French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 3rd, 7 July 2015, no. 14-17644; French Cour de 
Cassation, Civ. 2nd, 13 November 2015, no. 13-28180 (seizure procedures). 
100 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 7; Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1011; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 966. 
101 French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 2nd, 13 November 2015, no. 13-28180. 
102 Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1011. The position in Quebec in Canada is divided. However, the 
prevailing view is that an abuse of a contractual right constitutes a contractual breach. Marcotte v. 
Assomption Cie mutuelle d'assurancevie, [1981] C.S. 1102; Macaulay v. Imperial Life Assurance 
Co. of Canada, Sup. Ct. Montréal, No. 50005015231804, 19 April 1984; Drouin v. Électrolux 
Canada Ltée Division de les Produits C.F.C. Ltée, [1988] R.J.Q. 950, 952-953, all summarised and 
translated in Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122, 50-57. 
103 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, “Good Faith in European Contract Law”, 
(Cambridge University Press 2000), 35; Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1010-1011. 
104 Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1010. 
105 Reid (1998), (note 88) 139-140. 
106 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 35. 
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utilised with the principle of abuse of rights to address different forms of 
abuse. 
 
B. German Law 
 
105. The adoption of abuse of rights (Rechtmissbrauch) in German law differs from 
the French approach. German law explicitly acknowledges and regulates the 
principle of abuse of rights. Its legal basis is multifaceted: while it is found 
under Section (226), other scattered Sections of the Civil Code equally relate 
to the principle, which broadens its scope of application, and extends its reach 
to different legal areas. 
 
106. Section (226) of the German Civil Code (Schikaneverbot) stipulates that “the 
exercise of a right is forbidden if it can have no other purpose than to harm 
some other person”.107 This testifies to the effect that German law opted for a 
restrictive approach to abuse of rights.108 
 
107. Only where it is established that a right holder has exercised his right for the 
sole purpose of inflicting harm will the principle’s application be triggered. 
Thus, it seems sensible and logical to assume that cases where acts are driven 
by a complexity of motives, some serious and other(s) illegitimate, such as in 
the French case of affaire Clément-Bayard, no abuse can be established. Even 
in cases where the right holder’s dominant motive was to inflict harm on 
another, he may easily escape liability by asserting the existence of another 
legitimate motive, notwithstanding how ancillary it is.109 This is vindicated by 
the choice of words “have no other purpose than to harm some other person”. 
 
108. Opting for such a narrow scope was primarily driven by the fear of adopting a 
general application of the principle, given its serious limitation on the exercise 
                                                          
107 Article (226) of the German Civil Code, translated in Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 36. 
108 Some held that the narrowness of Section (226) renders it practically inoperative. H. Foster, 
“Abuse of Rights – Civil Law – Legal Reasoning: Bradford v. Pickles Revisited”, 8 University of 
British Columbia Law Review 343, 346 (1973). 
109 Knapp (1983) (note 8), 109; V.E. Greaves, “The Social-Economic Purpose of Private Rights: 
Section 1 of the Soviet Civil Code. A Comparative Study of Soviet and Non-communist Law”, 12 
New York University Law Quarterly Review 439, 446 (1935). 
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of individual rights.110 While it is held that the aforementioned Section was 
adopted to cover cases of abuse related to proprietary rights, it was later 
expanded on, and extended, to have a general application, and to effectively 
address all forms of abuse.111 However, unlike French law, some hold that 
abuse of rights as embodied in Section (226) of the civil code, does not apply 
to procedural rights.112 
 
109. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, it is important to consider the 
provisions of Section (226) in conjunction with Section (242) of the German 
Civil Code, Treu und Glauben (Faith and Credit) provision, which 
encompasses the general obligation of good faith.113 Given the narrow scope of 
Section (226), the prohibition against abuse of rights is held to fall within the 
scope of the good faith obligation.114 In this regard, Wolfgang Siebert supports 
the view that the abusive exercise of rights that do not fall within the narrow 
terms of Section (226), can still be seen to be contrary to the duty to act in 
good faith. He submitted that those who fail to expediently exercise their rights 
in a timely manner may lose such rights on the basis of abuse of right: “a 
person can lose rights by sleeping on them or by leading others to believe he 
will not exercise them”.115 Thus, abuse may be established if one fails to 
exercise/use the right in a timely manner. 
 
110. It is worth mentioning that abuse of rights as a constituent element of Section 
(242) governs the exercise of any right and thus extends to all areas of the law, 
                                                          
110 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1024. 
111 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 36. 
112 German Supreme Court, Judgment of 10 February 1940, 162 RGZ 65, (1940), cited in Bolgar 
(1975), (note 32) 1028. 
113 The Treu und Glauben concept is said to be tested by objective standards. Greaves (1935), (note 
109) 445. 
114 Willi E. Joachim, “The “Reasonable Man” in United States and German Commercial Law”, 15 
Comparative Law Yearbook of International Business 341, 353 (1992); Zimmermann & Whittaker 
(2000), (note 103) 694; BGH, 29 April 1959, BGHZ 30, 140; Bernardo M. Cremades, “Good Faith 
in International Arbitration”, 27 American University International Law Review 761, 773 (2012); 
Herman (1977), (note 16) 747-748; Krauze (2012), (note 72) 3; Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1024; 
Knapp (1983), (note 8) 109; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 38. According to Gutteridge, Article (157) 
and Article (242) of the German Civil Code oblige parties to a business contract to perform their 
contractual undertaking in accordance with good faith as understood by men of affairs. 
115 Gordley (2011), (note 31) 41. 
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including the law of procedures.116 
 
111. Accordingly, the various other applications of abuse of rights that do not fall 
within the ambit of the narrow provisions of Section (226) remain legally 
proscribed by the overarching principle of good faith.117 This stems from the 
fact that abuse of rights is intertwined to the concept of good faith, where acts 
of the former are necessarily contrary to the latter.118 Exempli gratia, an 
exercise of a right with a mixture of motives is not deemed abusive as per 
Section (226) given that it is not exercised for the sole purpose of harming 
another individual. However, it has been held that such an exercise remains 
abusive as it is contrary to the good faith obligation enshrined in Section 
(242).119 This demonstrates the different policy adopted in Germany: the 
divergent abusive conduct will be tackled, not merely by the explicit abuse of 
rights provision, but may equally be barred by relying on similar provisions 
such as that of good faith. 
 
112. On a related note, some scholars hold the view that abuse of rights may also 
fall under the ambit of Sections (138) and (826) of the German Civil Code, 
which pertain to acts that are contra bonos mores.120 Particularly, the said 
Articles address respectively: legal transactions that contravene with public 
policy; and the liability of individuals who inflict harm on another in a manner 
contra bonos mores.121  
 
113. The test utilised to determine if there is an abuse of right based on Section 
(242) or if the act is contra bonos mores, is that of the ‘reasonable man’; that 
                                                          
116 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 694-695; Krauze (2012), (note 72) 3, referring to Z. 
Prebble and J. Prebble, “Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income Tax Law with the 
Civil Law Doctrine of Abuse of Law”, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 151, 158 (2008). 
117 Reid (1998), (note 88) 135. 
118 Saul Litvinoff, “Good Faith”, 71 Tulane Law Review 1645, 1660-1661 (1997); Yasuhei 
Taniguchi, “Good Faith and Abuse of Procedural Rights in Japanese Civil Procedure”, 8 Tulane 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 167, 173-175 (2000). 
119 Cases include acts of an economic nature done to harm a competitor and buy his shares were found 
contrary to good faith and thus abusive. Cases cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 991-992, 
footnote 88. 
120 Joachim (1992), (note 114) 353. 
121 Herman (1977), (note 16) 748. 
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the act will be abusive if found contra bonos mores to the general popular 
conscience.122  
 
114. According to Gutteridge: “it is difficult to conceive of any case in which the 
malevolent exercise of a right could not be checked by the application of the 
principle of boni mores”.123  
 
115. Filtering the exercise of rights by applying the said provisions overcomes a 
number of limitations, namely: (a) the narrow scope of Section (226); (b) 
dispenses with the enigmas associated with a subjective criterion; and (c) 
adopts an objective test to establish abuse: acts that are regarded as contra 
bonos mores by the average German citizen are abusive.124  
 
116. Thus, Julio Cueto-Rua noted that: “typical cases of abuse of rights have been 
decided, instead, by application of article (826) of the same Code, where proof 
of the intent to harm is not required”.125 
 
117. While the sufficiently broad terms of the general good faith provision grant 
decision makers the power to prohibit any abusive act, certain acts have been 
consistently rendered abusive. German courts established abuse where: (a) a 
right is exercised to inflict harm; (b) rights exercised in a manner contrary to 
equity; (c) rights exercised without any regard to the interests of third parties; 
(d) an exercise of right is contrary to former conduct; (e) a right is established 
or acquired as a result of a wrongdoing or in bad faith.126 
 
118. Thus, German courts generally rely on good faith in finding an abuse of right, 
unless malice is palpable. The leading case on abuse of rights based on the 
criterion of malice was where a father prohibited his son from visiting the 
                                                          
122 Joachim (1992), (note 114) 353; Ludwig Enneccerus, Martin Wolff, Theodor Kipp, “Tratado De 
Derecho Civil: Derecho De Obligaciones”, (1950), 2666, cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 998. 
123 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 38. 
124 Ibid, 37-38. 
125 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 995, footnote 92. 
126 For a list of cases providing the said legal rules based on abuse of rights, see Bolgar (1975), (note 
32) 1027-1028. 
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grave of his mother which was situated on the father’s property. The German 
Supreme Court found that this was a manifest abuse of ownership rights.127 
 
119. Where malice is not evident, courts generally rely on the general principle of 
good faith. In one case involving the liability of a member of a limited liability 
company, the German court held that it would be contrary to the principle of 
good faith, and thus an abuse of right, if it upheld the separation of the assets 
of the company from its members, given the circumstances of the case.128 In 
another case, the court noted that while a services contract provided for 
rescission at will, the circumstances of the case may render such rescission 
contrary to the principle of good faith and thus abusive.129 Similarly, the court 
found that the delaying of proceedings by presenting meritless defences was 
deemed abusive and contrary to good faith.130 
 
120. Based on the above, abuse of rights forms a fundamental legal principle under 
German law.131 While its scope may appear limited given the narrowness of 
Section (226), other provisions equally encompass the principle, broaden its 
scope and extend its application to, inter alia, contractual obligations, 
corporate law, public law, and law of procedures.132 Thus, in any abuse of 
rights allegation, German courts may either grant relief based on Section (226) 
of the civil code, if malice is palpable, or establish an abuse of right and grant 
relief based on the more general provisions of Sections (242) and (826).133 
 
C. Swiss Law 
 
121. Abuse of rights is an integral part of Swiss law. It is mentioned in the 
introductory section of the civil code. This testifies to the effect that there is a 
                                                          
127 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1028. 
128 Judgment of 29 November 1956, 22 BGHZ 226, 230 (1957) translated and cited in Bolgar (1975), 
(note 32) 1029-1030; Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 515-516. 
129 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1027. 
130 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 991-992, footnote 88. 
131 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1026-1027.  
132 Krauze (2012), (note 72) 3; Judgment of 30 January 1956, 20 BGHZ 4 (1956); Judgment of 9 
October 1956, 21 BGHZ 378, (1956); Judgment of 29 November 1956, 22 BGHZ 226, (1957); 
Judgment of 20 May 1968, 50 BGHZ 191 (1969), cited in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1029-1030. 
133 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1026-1027. 
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general prohibition against the abuse of rights under Swiss law and it is not 
limited to a specific area of the law.134 Thus, Swiss law acknowledges that any 
right, whether substantive or procedural, is susceptible of abuse.135  
 
122. Unlike most national laws, the Swiss perception is to minimise, to a large 
extent, the extensive regulation of the abuse of rights principle.136 By merely 
incorporating under Article (2.2) that “the manifest abuse of a right is not 
protected by law”,137 it is evident that the Swiss legislator aims to ensure the 
proper exercise of all rights, without attempting to specify certain elements that 
constitute abuse. Thus, Swiss law seems to grant courts and tribunals a wide 
discretionary power to decide on the scope, criteria and application of abuse of 
rights.138 
 
123. The Swiss legislator went further than its German counterpart and directly 
linked abuse of rights to the principle of good faith.139 Article (2.1) reads: 
“every person must act in good faith in the exercise of his or her rights and in 
the performance of his or her obligations”. From a mere vernacular 
perspective, it is argued that Article (2.1) equally pertains to the principle of 
abuse of rights, given the terms: “in the exercise of his or her rights”. 
 
124. The relationship between the good faith principle and the prohibition against 
abuse of rights, as encompassed in Article (2), has been subject to heated 
debates. Specifically, there are different views as to whether they are different 
principles or if abuse of rights is merely an emanation of the good faith 
principle.140 The predominant view holds that a contextual analysis of Article 
(2) in its entirety reveals that abuse of rights is merely an illustration and an 
application of the principle of good faith.141  
 
                                                          
134 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 51. 
135 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 40; Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1032-1033. 
136 Gaffney (2010), (note 60) 517. 
137 Article (2.2) of the Swiss Civil Code. 
138 W. T. Tête, “Tort Roots and Ramifications of the Obligations Revision”, 32 Loyola Law Review 
47, 67 (1987); Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1032; Gaffney (2010), (note 60) 517. 
139 Also see Article (2) of the Turkish Civil Code. 
140 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 51. 
141 Ibid, 51; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 40. 
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125. It is submitted that this representation of abuse of rights is similar to the 
juridical basis of the principle under German law. As previously mentioned, 
Section (242) of the German Civil Code governs the exercise of any right and 
extends to all areas of the law. It has been stipulated that a German observer 
“cannot fail to be struck by the fact that Art. 2 ZGB appears to perform a very 
similar function, and to be applied in a very similar way, to § 242 BGB”.142 
 
126. A prudent review of the Swiss legal practice reveals that courts often rely on 
the criterion of “good faith” to establish abuse of substantive143 or procedural 
rights.144  
 
127. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court stipulated that an abuse of right is 
committed if: 
 
[I]ndividual rights are exercised contrary to good 
faith. Section 2 of article 2, which denies legal 
protection to the manifest abuse of a right, forms 
the necessary amendment to the duty which is set 
down in section 1 of article 2, namely, to act 
always in good faith. The purpose of this 
provision is to either limit or to annul the formal 
validity of positive laws whenever the judge 
deems this to be in the interests of substantive 
justice.145 [Emphasis added]. 
 
128. This further confirms that Swiss courts adopt the criterion of good faith to 
determine whether abuse has taken place. To the same effect, in discussing 
abuse of rights under Swiss law, A. Von Tuhr writes: 
 
The exercise of rights, as the law indicates, is 
subject to the postulates of good faith, that is to 
say, those exigencies should be respected which 
are proper of the circumstances, and that the 
                                                          
142 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103), 51-52. 
143 BGE 95.2.157 (1970), Journal des Tribunaux 344 (1970), (finding the decision of the general 
assembly of a corporation abusive) cited in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1036. 
144 BGE 94.1.659, Journal des Tribunaux 216 (1970); BGE 86.2.417 (1961), Journal des Tribunaux 
325 (1961), (regarding the abuse of legal institutions if used for a purpose contrary to that 
prescribed by the law) cited in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1036. 
145 Judgment of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, BGE 72.2.39 (1946), translated in Bolgar (1975), 
(note 32) 1034. 
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holder of the right, correctly behaving, owes to 
the interests of the other party. Otherwise, he will 
be responsible for an abuse of right.146 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
129. Despite the sufficiently broad terms of good faith, which grants decision 
makers the power to prohibit any abusive act, certain acts have been 
consistently rendered abusive as contrary to good faith. This includes: (a) the 
exercise of a right without a serious or legitimate interest; (b) the unreasonable 
exercise of rights; (c) the exercise of rights without any regard to the interests 
of third parties; (d) any exercise of right that is contrary to former conduct in 
application of the well-established principle of allegans contraria non est 
audiendus; and (e) if the right is exercised for a purpose other than that for 
which the right was granted.147 
 
130. In application to the above, in a case involving the dismissal of a member of an 
association, the Swiss court applied the criterion of good faith and held that it 
would be an abuse of right, if the exclusion of such a member was not 
motivated by the interests of the association.148 In a similar case, the court held 
that a decision of the general assembly of a company is abusive, and contrary 
to good faith, where it does not serve a principal interest to the majority and 
damages the interests of the minority.149 
 
131. It is of particular interest to note the manifestation of abuse of rights in the 
realm of Swiss arbitration law and practice. Swiss courts utilise the principle of 
abuse of rights to correct the rigidity of consent rules in arbitration, particularly 
in relation to the extension of arbitration agreements to non-signatories.150 It is 
predominantly held that Swiss law accepts piercing the corporate veil of 
                                                          
146 A. Von Tuhr, “Tratado De Las Obligaciones”, 270 (1934), translated in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 
30) 998. 
147 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1033 and 1036. 
148 BGE 85.2.525 (1965), Journal des Tribunaux 538 (1960); BGE 90.2.346, Journal des Tribunaux 
258 (1965), cited in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1036. 
149 BGE 95.2.157 (1970), Journal des Tribunaux 344 (1970), in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1036. 
150 Marc Bauen and Robert Bernet, “Swiss Company Limited by Shares”, (Bruylant and Schulthess 
2007), 226; Andrea Meier, “Multi-party Arbitrations”, in Manuel Arroyo (ed.), “Arbitration in 
Switzerland”, (Kluwer Law International 2013), 1330; Bernhard Berger & Franz Kellerhals, 
“International and Domestic Arbitration in Switzerland”, (Third Edition), (Stämpfli Publishers 
2015), 199.  
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companies (Durchgriff) only if there is an abuse of right.151 The Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court, as well as arbitral tribunals applying Swiss law, often decide 
to extend an arbitration clause to a non-signatory, by applying abuse of rights 
and the principle of good faith as enshrined in Article (2) of the Swiss Civil 
Code.152  
 
132. The existence, scope, and application of the abuse of rights in Switzerland is 
founded on, and greatly influenced by, the concept of justice and equity.153 
Article (4) provides that where the law confers discretion on the courts, the 
“courts must reach its decision in accordance with the principles of justice and 
equity”. Given that the Swiss Code refrained from carefully defining the scope 
of abuse of rights or expressing a specific test to be used, leaving it to courts 
and tribunals, one submits that Article (2) must be read and construed in pari 
materia with Article (4).154 Therefore, in exercising such discretionary power, 
the decision maker is to decide based on considerations of equity and justice. 
 
133. One may criticise the broad terms of Article (2) given that there seems to be no 
guidance on what constitutes a manifest abuse and the fact that the provision 
grants wide discretionary power to decision makers.155 
 
                                                          
151 Ad-hoc Interim Award, in the case of F.R. German Engineering Company v. Polish buyer, 9 
September 1983, 12 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 63, 72 (1987); Swiss Federal Tribunal, 24 
November 2006, 4C.327/2005; Ad-hoc Award of 1991, in the case of SA v. Alpha Beta & Co, 10 
ASA Bulletin 202, (1992); Swiss Federal Tribunal, 16 October 2003, 22 ASA Bulletin 364, (2004); 
Bernard Hanotiau, “Complex Arbitrations, Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-issue and Class 
Actions”, (Kluwer Law International 2005), 79-80; Werner Wenger, “Art. 178 SPILA”, in Stephen 
V. Berti (ed.), “International Arbitration in Switzerland: An Introduction to and a Commentary on 
Articles 176-194 of the Swiss Private International Law Statute” (Helbing & Lichtenhahn and 
Kluwer International 2000), 350-351, para. 56. 
152 Swiss Federal Tribunal 4A_450/2013 of 7 April 2014, ground 3.5.5.1.1, available at: 
http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com (last accessed 1 February 2018); Swiss Federal Tribunal, 
First Civil Division, 29 January 1996, 14 ASA Bulletin 496, (Kluwer Law International), (1996); 
Stephan Wilske, Laurence Shore & Jan-Michael Ahrens, “The “Group of Companies Doctrine” – 
Where is it Heading?”, 17 American Review of International Arbitration 1, 3 (2006); Ad-hoc 
Interim Award, in the case of F.R. German Engineering Company v. Polish buyer, 9 September 
1983, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), 12 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 63, 72 (1987); 
Westland Helicopters Ltd. V. Arab Organization, et al., Interim Award, ICC Case No. 3879 of 1984, 
XI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 127, 132 (1986). 
153 Judgment of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, BGE 72.2.39 (1946), cited and translated in Bolgar 
(1975), (note 32) 1034. 
154 Tête (1987), (note 138) 80-81. 
155 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1032. 
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134. While the Swiss law adopts a broad approach to abuse of rights and there is no 
statutory limitation on acts that may be abusive, from a practical stance, this 
corrective tool has not been abused by the courts. A contrario, courts have 
exercised prudence and caution when dealing with abuse of rights and only 
resorted to it in cases of manifest abuse.156  
 
135. Accordingly, where the law necessitates strict adherence to specific legal form 
for certain transactions, Swiss courts emphasise the importance of legal 
certainty and security. In such cases, courts tend to reject allegations of abuse, 
even when it is alleged that the exercise of the right is contrary to the purpose 
prescribed by the law.157  
 
136. Thus, where an employee of the plaintiff witnessed the conclusion of the 
contract, it was held that no abuse of rights is established if the plaintiff 
himself is responsible for the formal defect.158 Moreover, in a case regarding a 
request for the rescission of a long-term contract because of an increase in the 
price, the court found no abuse of rights if the party refused to amend the 
provisions of the contract given the change of circumstances.159 
 
137. Accordingly, it is submitted that Swiss law recognises a general principle of 
abuse of rights. Its application is neither limited to certain rights, nor confined 
to a specific legal area. Moreover, a prima facie examination of the judicial 
and legal opinion seem to hold that good faith comprises the criterion of abuse 
under Swiss law. However, as shall be discussed in Chapter 2, one shall 
challenge this approach given that good faith is broader than abuse of rights 
and cannot be an effective criterion of abuse. It will be submitted that the 
criterion of good faith, as applied by courts and tribunals, is not a stand-alone 
criterion, but emulates one of the other criteria of abuse (malice, 
reasonableness, or deviation of the purpose). 
 
                                                          
156 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 40. 
157 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1034-1035. 
158 BGE 72.2.39 (1946) cited in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1035. 
159 BGE 47.2.440 (1921) cited in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1035-1036. 
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D. Law of Louisiana  
 
138. The law of Louisiana is based on a variety of legal sources. It has been greatly 
influenced by the Justinian legislations, the French and Spanish laws.160 While 
the Louisiana Civil Code does not explicitly refer to the principle of abuse of 
rights, it is unequivocally acknowledged, scrupulously regulated and applied 
by the Louisiana courts. 
 
139. At the outset, the Louisiana Civil Code clearly establishes liability, on the basis 
of abuse of rights, in relation to ownership rights.161 
 
140. Aside from the statutory confirmation, Louisiana courts have often adopted an 
abuse of rights analysis on cases before it. This was evident from its seminal 
decision rendered in 1919, in a case pertaining to property rights. As this was 
one of the first decisions related to abuse of rights, the court primarily relied on 
French authorities, albeit not overlooking the scattered provisions of the 
Louisiana Civil Code which equally endorse the principle. In its decision, the 
Court provided: 
 
[C]ases like the present one are not to be decided 
by the application of any broad or inflexible rule, 
but by a careful weighing of all the circumstances 
attending them, by diagnosing them, to use the 
expression of Baudry- Lacantinerie and Chaveau, 
with the aid and guidance of two principles, that 
the owner must not injure seriously any right of 
his neighbour, and, even in the absence of any 
right on the part of the neighbour, must not in an 
unneighbourly spirit do that which, while of no 
benefit to himself causes damage to the 
neighbour.162 
 
                                                          
160 A. N. Yiannopoulos, “The Civil Codes of Louisiana”, 1 Civil Law Commentaries 1, 8 (2008); 
Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1173. 
161 This is evident from Articles (667), (668) and (669) of the Louisiana Civil Code; Yiannopoulos 
(1994), (note 29) 1174. 
162 Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919), 211; Yiannopoulos 
(1994), (note 29) 1177; Sanders (1981), (note 25) 232-233. 
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141. While the application of abuse of rights was first limited to ownership rights163 
and property disputes, the Louisiana courts later extended its application to all 
legal matters. To that effect, in 1975164 the Louisiana Supreme Court explicitly 
adopted the principle, endorsed the terminology and, while acknowledging that 
the principle was primarily premised on Article (667), which pertains to 
ownership rights, the Court extended its scope and reach, ex analogia, to all 
legal matters165: “Louisiana adopts a general theory or principle of law that in 
all areas of legal relationships a legal right can be exercised in such a manner 
as to constitute a legal abuse”.166 [Emphasis added]. 
 
142. In relation to the scope of the principle and the criteria of abuse, it is well 
established that abuse of rights is not limited to cases of mala fide. It applies 
whenever the right holder fails to show a serious and/or a legitimate interest in 
exercising his/her right. To that effect, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that 
“the exercise of a right […] without legitimate and serious interest, even where 
there is neither alleged nor proved an intent to harm, constitutes an abuse of 
right which courts should not countenance”.167 
 
143. However, in the case of Illinois Cent. Gulf v. International Harvester of 1979, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court went further and engaged in a scrupulous 
analysis of the principle, examined its scope in other jurisdictions and set out 
what constitutes an abuse of right. The Court stipulated that an abuse of right is 
not limited to acts which are done to inflict harm on another, but is equally 
established if the right holder’s predominant motive was to cause harm; or if 
there was no serious and/or legitimate interest worthy of judicial protection, 
                                                          
163 Redmann (1987), (note 9) 950. 
164 It must be noted that earlier decisions pertaining to contractual disputes were rendered on the basis 
of an abuse of rights analysis and equitable considerations, but without an explicit reference thereto. 
Onorato v. Maestri, 173 La. 375, 137 So. 67 (1931); and Lawton v. Smith, 146 So. 461 (La. App. 2d 
Cir. 1933); Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1178. 
165 Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1353 (La. 1977); Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. 
International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hunt, 371 So. 
2d 342 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 657 (1979); Cox v. Kirkpatrick, 404 So. 2d 999 
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984); Breland v. 
Louisiana Hospital Services, Inc., 488 So. 2d 1215 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), vacated on rehearing, 
468 So. 2d 1223 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Redmann (1987), (note 9) 958-968. 
166 Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So. 2d 93, 99 (La. 1975). 
167 Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1353 (La. 1977), 1369; Byers (2002), (note 10) 
394; Redmann (1987), (note 9) 960. 
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regardless of the motive associated with the conduct.168 Additionally, the Court 
went further to include cases where one exercises a right in a way which is 
considered contrary to moral rules, good faith or elementary fairness, or if the 
right is exercised for a purpose other than that for which the right was 
granted.169 
 
144. Following the above decision, Louisiana courts have continually examined the 
conduct of the parties to establish an abuse based on any of the following 
criteria:  
 
[I]f the predominant motive for it was to cause 
harm; (2) if there was no serious or legitimate 
motive for refusing; (3) if the exercise of the right 
to refuse is against moral rules, good faith, or 
elementary fairness; (4) if the right to refuse is 
exercised for a purpose other than that for which 
it is granted.170 
 
145. Based on the above, it seems that Louisiana courts have adopted broad criteria 
of what constitutes an abuse of right. While the Swiss approach is highlighted 
by the minimal regulation of the principle’s scope of application, Louisiana 
stands as a relative antinomy, in terms of its regulation and its expressed 
criteria of what constitutes an abuse. 
 
146. Driven by the desire to avoid applying a stringent positivistic rule, the courts 
tend to carefully examine the factual matrix of the case and weigh any 
conflicting interests to determine whether the act or conduct in question is 
abusive.171  
 
                                                          
168 Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979). 
169 Ibid. 
170 Trushinger v. Pak, 513 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1987); Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. 521 
So. 2d 481 (La. 1988); Ouachita National Bank in Monroe v. Palowsky, 554 So. 2d 108 (La. 1989); 
Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220 (La. 1989); Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. Hammons, 540 So. 
2d 461 (La. 1989); 210 Baronne St. Ltd. Partnership v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 543 So. 2d 
502, 507 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1219 (1989). 
171 Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919), 211; Langlois v. 
Allied Chemical Corporation, 249 So. 2d 133, 258 La. 1067 (1971). 
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147. In essence, while it may appear that the courts apply an objective standard of 
what constitutes abuse, i.e. standard of reasonableness, it remains evident that 
emphasis is given to the state of mind of the right holder. This is particularly 
true in cases where courts have refused to grant remedies on the ground of a 
negligent, or non-negligent, albeit non intentional abuse of right.172 This 
defies the corrective nature of abuse of rights which should entail emphasis on 
the repercussions of one’s action/conduct, rather than fishing in one’s state of 
mind in order to discern motive: “there are some circumstances where a 
person who, in the course of exercising a right, has inadvertently caused 
damage to another would be in bad faith, in effect at fault, in failing to repair 
the damage even though not caused by negligence”.173 [Emphasis added]. It is 
submitted that in such cases, bad faith in the exercise of rights, or abuse of 
rights, is merely presumed, however such presumption becomes irrebuttable if 
the right holder fails to repair, or refrain from causing, the damage. 
 
148. On a related note, one submits that the criteria adopted by the courts may seem 
of tenuous character and nebulous in scope. The mentioned criteria greatly 
overlap, where some clearly fall under the ambit of others, which arguably 
render some of these criteria superfluous. For example, if one examines the 
criterion that prohibits the exercise of a right that violates moral rules, good 
faith and/or elementary fairness, it is self-evident that it is broad enough to 
encompass, a fortiori, the one which forbids an exercise merely to cause harm 
to another, or that which precludes the exercise of a right with no serious or 
legitimate motive. 
 
149. Thus, the Louisiana courts are vested with a potentially praetorian authority; 
unprecedented discretionary power to determine what constitutes an abuse of 
right, which emanates from the multiplicity and scope of the mentioned 
criteria. However, from a practical stance, this corrective tool has not been 
abused by the courts. A contrario, courts have exercised prudence and caution 
when dealing with the abuse of rights principle and only resorted to it in cases 
                                                          
172 McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932); Yiannopoulos (1994), 
(note 29) 1196-1197. 
173 Tête (1987), (note 138) 72. 
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of manifest abuse.174 This is particularly evident in contractual disputes that 
have been dominated by claims of abuse of rights.175 In this regard, courts 
often examine the four criteria of the principle’s application, and reach the 
decision that no abuse is established.176  
 
150. This is clearly demonstrated in a case heard before the Louisiana Supreme 
Court, where it carefully weighed the interests at stake, examined the four 
criteria of abuse, and decided that, given the factual matrix of the case, there 
was no abuse of rights.177 The case pertained to an insurance dispute which 
involved an employee who suffered severe damages and was quadriplegic due 
to an accident which was unrelated to work. Subsequently, the employer 
terminated the employment contract and thus, the employee was not covered 
by the insurance group policy. Although consistent with the contractual 
provisions, the employee argued that it would be an abuse of a contractual 
right to terminate the insurance coverage. The trial judge and the court of 
appeal confirmed that termination of the insurance policy was consistent with 
the contractual provision and held that abuse of rights was not applicable. 
 
151. The Louisiana Supreme Court recognised the principle of abuse of rights, but 
expressed that it should only apply in limited circumstances given the possible 
encroachment to individual rights and interests. Upon a prudent examination of 
all criteria of abuse, the Court held that it was inapplicable. 
 
152. The case is significant as it clearly reflects that the principle is narrowly 
construed and applied in cases of blatant abuse, despite the adopted criteria 
which may seem, prima facie, extensively broad. Precisely, it is to be 
                                                          
174 Mcinnis v. Mcinnis, 618 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993), 676 (“Because the “abuse of rights” 
approach would render unenforceable a party's otherwise judicially protected rights, the doctrine is 
sparingly invoked in Louisiana”); Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. Hammons, 540 So. 2d 461 (La. 
1989); Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Steven F. Nails, 549 So. 2d 826 (La. 
1989); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979) (“the 
doctrine of abuse of rights has been invoked sparingly in Louisiana ”); 
175 Redmann (1987), (note 9) 947. 
176 For a detailed examination of how Louisiana courts have acknowledged the application of the 
principle, yet did not find any abuse, in relation to lease disputes, employment disputes, insurance 
disputes, lender liability and other contractual and non-contractual disputes, see Yiannopoulos 
(1994), (note 29). 
177 Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Steven F. Nails, 549 So. 2d 826 (1989).  
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highlighted that the court did not find the termination of the policy contrary to 
considerations of moral rules, good faith or elementary fairness. The latter 
criterion obviously could have entertained the action given its broad and 
undetermined scope.178 The court, upon weighing the interests at stake, 
decided that the words of the contract are clear and explicit, and thus, the 
paramount principle of sanctity of contracts prevailed over a potential abuse of 
right.  
 
153. Even in cases where abuse might be flagrant, courts tend to rely on other legal 
principles to grant relief. For example, in a lease dispute, the parties agreed 
that no sub-lease can take place unless the lessor agreed in writing, which 
would not be unreasonably withheld. The trial judge decided that the lessor has 
abused his right by unreasonably refusing to permit the sublease. Precisely, the 
trial judge held that the lessor’s refusal to permit the sublease was contrary to 
moral rules, good faith and/or elementary fairness. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeal affirmed the decision but refrained from basing it on abuse of rights. 
The court relied on the contractual provisions, the parties’ common intention 
and the reasonableness provision to uphold the appealed decision.179 
 
154. It is especially interesting to note that the Court was sceptical of applying 
abuse of rights. In the words of the Court: “while we express no opinion as to 
the trial court's use of the equitable abuse of rights doctrine, we decline to 
follow his reasoning because we find no need to resort to equity here”. Thus, 
refraining from applying the principle stemmed from the rather moot view of 
the court that abuse of rights is an equitable principle and thus, courts need not 
to resort to equity, unless the application of existing law fails to remedy the 
victim and serves the ends of justice.180  
 
                                                          
178 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1187. 
179 Maurin-Ogden-1978 Pinhook Plaza v. The Wiener Corporation, 430 So. 2d 747, (La. App. 5th 
Cir.1983). 
180 Article (21) of the Louisiana Civil Code stipulates: “in all civil matters, where there is no express 
law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is 
to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent”. 
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155. The view that the principle of abuse of rights is an equitable principle under 
Louisiana law is shared by scholars and hailed by some courts.181 Given that it 
is perceived as an equitable principle, some courts provide that remedies based 
on abuse of rights would only be granted where the aggrieved party has acted 
reasonably and was blameless. In other words, some courts submit that the 
adage he who comes to equity must come with clean hands constitutes a 
condition sine qua non under the law of Louisiana.182 Similarly, some authors 
stipulate that the principle applies in contractual disputes only where there is 
an unequal bargaining power between the parties.183 
 
156. However, one disagrees with such a proposition. While abuse of rights could 
be considered equitable in the sense that it corrects the law and clearly reflects 
equitable considerations, it is not based on equity, which is often resorted to in 
the absence of law.184 This is confirmed by the fact that its legal basis stems 
from various provisions that are of an equitable character in the Louisiana 
Civil Code and its scope has been delineated by the courts.185 
 
157. However, this does not negate the fact that courts should take into 
consideration the bargaining power between the parties, the blameworthy 
conduct of the parties, as well as all other factual particulars of the case to 
assist courts in finding if there is an abuse of right.186 
 
158. Courts often resort to, and find it more appropriate to grant remedies based on, 
                                                          
181 Maurin-Ogden-1978 Pinhook Plaza v. The Wiener Corporation, 430 So. 2d 747, (La. App. 5th 
Cir.1983); Cataldie v. Louisiana Health Services & Indemnity Co., 456 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1984); 
Redmann (1987), (note 9) 968. 
182 Fox v. City of Monroe, 15 La. App. 192, 131 So. 483 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930); City of New Orleans 
v. Levy, 233 La. 844, 98 So. 2d 210 (1957); Dipuma v. Dipuma, 136 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 1st Cir. 
1961); Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984); Lambert v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d 553 (La. 1982); Cox v. Kirkpatrick, 404 So. 2d 999 (La. App. 1st Cir. 
1981); Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979); 
Sanders (1981), (note 25) 237; Redmann (1987), (note 9) 972. 
183 Redmann (1987), (note 9) 977. 
184 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1192-1195. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid, 1194; Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 781-782. 
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the notion of good faith which is stipulated under the Louisiana Civil Code.187 
In doing so, courts reach the same outcomes that would otherwise be reached 
on the basis of abuse of rights.188 That said, not only does the good faith 
provision under the Louisiana Civil Code embrace the prohibition against 
abuse of right,189 but it is submitted that any provision pertaining to good faith 
includes a prohibition against the abuse of rights: good faith in the exercise of 
rights.190  
 
159. It remains questionable as to why courts opt to rely on good faith rather than 
on abuse of rights, particularly given that the former notion is broader and far 
vaguer than the latter. The only plausible and sensible explanation seems to 
stem from the courts’ belief that unlike the notion of good faith, abuse of rights 
is an equitable principle rather than a legal one, and precedence is thus given to 
applying good faith rather than resorting to the concept of equity, as 
abovementioned. 
 
160. By and large, it appears that abuse of rights triggers one’s delictual liability 
under Louisiana law. However, it is submitted that in relation to contractual 
disputes, the principle of good faith may equally operate as abuse of rights and 
be used to dismantle forms of abuse of contractual rights.191 
 
E. Egyptian Law 
 
161. Many of the legal systems in the Middle East and North Africa have adopted 
the principle of abuse of rights. In this regard, prior to the enactment of the 
Egyptian Civil Code of 1948, there was no explicit reference to abuse of rights, 
                                                          
187 Article (1759) of the Louisiana Civil Code; Irina Petrova, “Stepping on the Shoulders of a 
Drowning Man” The Doctrine of Abuse of Right as a Tool for Reducing Damages for Lost Profits: 
Troubling Lessons from the Patuha and Himpurna Arbitrations”, 35 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 455, 466 (2004). 
188 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1185 and 1190. 
189 Tête (1987), (note 138) 65; Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1185. 
190  Bin Cheng, “General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals”, 
(Cambridge University Press), (2006), 121. 
191 Tête (1987), (note 138) 89. 
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however there were scattered provisions that embraced the principle.192 Given 
its potency, the Egyptian legislator opted to include a specified Article in the 
new Civil Code to that effect. It is worth pinpointing that many of the Arab 
legal systems have been greatly influenced by the Egyptian approach in this 
regard and adopted similar provisions.193 
 
162. Article (5) of the Egyptian Civil Code reads:  
 
Usage of right shall be illicit in the following 
cases: (a) if it was only intended to harm a third 
party; (b) if the interests pursued are of minor 
importance, so that they are manifestly 
disproportionate to the harm caused to others; (c) 
if the interests pursued are illicit.194 
 
163. The principle forms a fundamental part of Egyptian law, and is mentioned in 
the introductory section of the Civil Code under the general provisions.195 This 
vindicates the fact that: (a) it comprises a sacrosanct tenet under Egyptian law; 
(b) it dominates all legal relationships, tortious and contractual; (c) it is not 
limited to a specific area of the law, but applies to public law and private law; 
and (d) it acts as a limitation to the exercise of rights in rem as well as rights in 
personam.196 Thus, Egyptian law recognises that any right is susceptible of 
abuse.197 This includes, inter alia, substantive rights such as those pertaining to 
                                                          
192 Soliman Morcos, “Al Wafi Fi Sharh Al Qanun Al Madani (A Treatise on the Explanation of the 
Civil Code)”, Vol. 2, (1988 ed.), 363. 
193 Article (106) of the Civil Code of the United Arab Emirates, Article (30) of the Kuwaiti Civil 
Code, Article (66) of the Jordanian Civil Code; Article (19) of the Civil Code of Yemen; Article (6) 
of the Syrian Civil Code; Article (5) of the Libyan Civil Code, Articles (6) and (7) of the Iraqi Civil 
Code; Article (63) of the Qatari Civil Code; Article (124) of the Algerian Civil Code; Article (28) of 
the Bahraini Civil Code; Anis Al-Qasem, “The unlawful exercise of rights in the Civil Code of the 
Arab Countries of the Middle East”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 396, 401-402 
(1990); Mohamed S. Abdelwahab, “The Nuts and Bolts of Construction Arbitration in the MENA: 
Principles and Practice”, in Stavros Brekoulakis and David Thomas (eds), “The Guide to 
Construction Arbitration”, (Global Arbitration Review 2017). 
194 Article (5) of the Egyptian Civil Code. (Translated by the Author) 
195 Abd El-Razzak El Sanhouri, “Al Wasit Fi Sharh Al Qanun Al Madani (A Treatise on the 
Explanation of the Civil Code)”, Vol. 1, (2010 ed.), 753. 
196 The Explanatory Memorandum of the Egyptian Law No. 131 of 1948 Promulgating the Civil 
Code, 31-35; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 10 March 2003, Challenge No. 2803, 
Judicial Year 71; Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 753; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 368; Egyptian Court 
of Cassation, Session held on 24 March 1991, Challenge No. 1238, Judicial Year 56; Egyptian 
Court of Cassation, Session held on 25 April 1981, Challenge No. 2, Judicial Year 46.  
197 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 10 March 2003, Challenge No. 2803, Judicial Year 
71. 
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a contract between the parties,198 and procedural rights,199 such as the right of 
access to the courts. 
  
164. While it is acknowledged that the Egyptian legal system was largely 
influenced by the French law, a review of court decisions and scholarly 
contributions reveal that the generality of the principle under Egyptian law is 
largely inspired by the Shari’a law200 and Islamic jurisprudence.201 Precisely, 
the Egyptian Court of Cassation has confirmed that the principle is primarily 
premised on the following sacrosanct adages of Shari’a law: (a) the prohibition 
of infliction of harm; (b) prevention of harm/damage takes precedence over 
reaping benefits; and (c) in case of inevitable damages to all parties, one shall 
prevent the more serious damage.202 
 
165. The Egyptian legislator has identified three criteria of what constitutes an 
abuse of right. 
                                                          
198 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 27 February 2005, Challenge No. 871, Judicial Year 
74; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 8 May 2000, Challenge No. 8388, Judicial Year 
64; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 2 January 1997, Challenge No. 1481, Judicial 
Year 62; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 7 November 1993, Challenge No. 1468, 
Judicial Year 57; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 28 June 1989, Challenge No. 143, 
Judicial Year 52; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 28 April 1983, Challenge No. 1710, 
Judicial Year 52; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 17 May 1980, Challenge No. 633, 
Judicial Year 46. 
199 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 27 February 2012, Challenge No. 266, Judicial Year 
71; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 13 February 2010, Challenge No. 3317, Judicial 
Year 67; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 26 October 2008, Challenge No. 15487, 
Judicial Year 77; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 26 May 2004, Challenge No. 5036, 
Judicial Year 72; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 4 May 1999, Challenge No. 4464, 
Judicial Year 68; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 13 July 1999, Challenge No. 2886, 
Judicial Year 68; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 9 June 1997, Challenge No. 11865, 
Judicial Year 65; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 29 April 1993, Challenge No. 306, 
Judicial Year 59; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 15 January 1989, Challenge No. 
132, Judicial Year 56; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 30 December 1982, Challenge 
No. 1834, Judicial Year 51; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 1 April 1982, Challenge 
No. 1739, Judicial Year 51. 
200 According to Shari’a law, rights were first perceived as absolute: it was held that rights conferred 
upon individuals by God are meant to be unqualified, and that one shall not bear the consequences 
of the exercise of an acknowledged right. However, this liberalistic individualism philosophy was 
later set aside by the Hanafi school of thought, and the essence of abuse of rights was acknowledged 
in Islamic jurisprudence in the year of 6 AH (Anno Hegirae) which equates to 628 AD; Morcos 
(1988), (note 192) 357-358. 
201 The Explanatory Memorandum of the Egyptian Law No. 131 of 1948 Promulgating the Civil 
Code, 31-35; Sanhuri (2010), (note 195) 750; Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, “Arbitration with the Arab 
Countries”, (Second Edition) (Kluwer Law International 1999), 573; Mohamed K. Abdelaziz, “The 
Civil Code in Light of the Jurisprudence and Doctrine”, (Volume 1) (1985), 83. 
202 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 14 April 2008, Challenge No. 18318, Judicial Year 
76; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 10 March 2003, Challenge No. 2803, Judicial 
Year 71. 
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166. Firstly, abuse is established if the right holder exercises his/her right to inflict 
harm on another.203 While it may appear that courts apply a subjective standard 
of an abuse, courts tend to apply the reasonable person construct to establish if 
there is an abuse, i.e. examining the conduct of the right holder as opposed to 
that of a reasonable individual.204 Moreover, the intention to inflict harm is 
often presumed if the right holder fails to show a serious and/or a legitimate 
interest in exercising his/her right.205 Finally, in cases of a right holder who is 
driven by plurality of motives, Egyptian courts follow the French approach in 
determining abuse on the basis of the predominant and primary motive in the 
exercise of the right.206 
 
167. The second criterion denotes disproportionality between the benefit(s) and 
prejudice(s) resulting from the exercise of the right. The reasonable person 
construct is the applicable standard in relation to this criterion as well.207 It 
assumes and presupposes that reasonableness and unrestricted egoism are 
antinomies. If a reasonable person, acting in the same circumstances, 
envisages/expects that his/her exercise of a right may cause serious damage, 
equity, justice, reason, and sensibility mandate the right holder to refrain from 
exercising the right in such manner to prevent harm caused thereby. However, 
he who envisages the possible damage that may occur and accepts it in order to 
materialise his minimal interests, defies reasonableness and commits an abuse 
of right. 
                                                          
203 Ibid. 
204 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 12 July 1997, Challenge No. 4338, Judicial Year 61; 
Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 757. 
205 The Explanatory Memorandum of the Egyptian Law No. 131 of 1948 Promulgating the Civil 
Code, 32-33; Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 759-760; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 371; Egyptian Court 
of Cassation, Session held on 9 February 2012, Challenge No. 15906, Judicial Year 80; Egyptian 
Court of Cassation, Session held on 26 May 2004, Challenge No. 5036, Judicial Year 72; Egyptian 
Court of Cassation, Session held on 22 April 2003, Challenge No. 2633, Judicial Year 72; Egyptian 
Court of Cassation, Session held on 4 May 1999, Challenge No. 4464, Judicial Year 68; Egyptian 
Court of Cassation, Session held on 13 July 1999, Challenge No. 2886, Judicial Year 68 
206 Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 757-759. 
207 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 24 March 1991, Challenge No. 1238, Judicial Year 
56, confirming that even in cases where the right holder shows a legitimate and serious interest in 
exercising his/her right, courts are obliged to weigh the competing interests and consider the 
potential harm caused thereby to establish whether there is an abuse; Egyptian Court of Cassation, 
Session held on 4 April 1985, Challenge No. 1244, Judicial Year 54; Egyptian Court of Cassation, 
Session held on 25 April 1985, Challenge No. 2, Judicial Year 46; Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 760-
761; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 372-373. 
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168. The potency of this criterion emanates from its nature: a thermometer that 
effectively measures the potential prejudice that may be caused as a result of 
the exercise of right. This ‘balancing factor’ criterion grants wide 
discretionary power to courts/tribunals.208 It entails that courts shall engage in 
an interest and justice-oriented analysis of the competing interests to discern 
which right ought to prevail given the factual matrix of the dispute. In 
engaging in such analysis, Egyptian courts disregard the individualistic 
circumstances of the parties and engage in a rather abstract justice-oriented 
analysis. Courts weigh the competing interests and risks objectively regardless 
of the subjective circumstances of the parties. It is often held that this approach 
emanates from the perception that abuse of rights is premised on 
considerations of equity and justice and not a reflection of pity for the 
aggrieved party.209 
 
169. Thirdly, the principle applies whenever the right holder fails to show a 
legitimate interest in exercising his/her right.210 Again, abuse on the basis of 
this criterion is ascertained objectively and primarily entails investigating the 
conduct of the right holder as opposed to that of the reasonable person.211 
 
170. An element of commonality between the above three criteria is the 
examination of the right holder’s external behaviour rather than the quest of 
examining his/her internal belief to deduce an intent. While deducing the right 
                                                          
208 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 27 February 2005, Challenge No. 871, Judicial Year 
74; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 10 March 2003, Challenge No. 2803, Judicial 
Year 71; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 8 May 2000, Challenge No. 8388, Judicial 
Year 64. 
209 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 9 February 2012, Challenge No. 15906, Judicial 
Year 80; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 14 December 2004, Challenge No. 1302, 
Judicial Year 73; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 30 April 2001, Challenge No. 1193, 
Judicial Year 69; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 23 November 1995, Challenge No. 
2845, Judicial Year 59; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 28 June 1989, Challenge No. 
143, Judicial Year 52; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 26 January 1980, Challenge 
No. 108, Judicial Year 45. 
210 Abdelaziz (1985), (note 201) 79-80. 
211 This is further confirmed by the fact that the Egyptian legislator opted for the term ‘illegitimate 
interest’ rather than ‘illegitimate purpose’, as the latter was seen to shift the test of abuse to a 
subjective standard which was not preferable. Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 726; Egyptian Court of 
Cassation, Session held on 27 December 1993, Challenge No. 2451, Judicial Year 57; Egyptian 
Court of Cassation, Session held on 4 April 1985, Challenge No. 1244, Judicial Year 54. 
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holder’s intention remains a potent element in abuse of rights, a constructive 
analysis of the criteria as applied by the courts demonstrates that abuse is often 
presumed by objectively evaluating the conduct of the right holder as opposed 
to that of a reasonable person.212 
 
171. In relation to the legal basis of the principle, it is the predominant view that 
one who abuses his right commits a delict, which triggers the delictual liability 
for the wrongdoer.213 Moreover, eminent scholars and courts regularly hold 
that any abuse of a contractual right is equally tantamount to an abuse of 
right214 and triggers the tortfeasor’s delictual liability.215 
 
172. In conclusion, Egyptian law embraces the abuse of rights principle and extends 
its application to all areas of law. The Egyptian approach is featured by its 
relative adoption of an objective standard of abuse. 
 
III. ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN THE COMMON LAW 
 
173. This section aims to discuss the recognition, or lack thereof, of the principle of 
abuse of rights in the common law. 
 
174. It is widely recognised that the principle of abuse of rights is alien to the 
common law systems.216 However, as shall be discussed hereunder, it is 
submitted that the essence of the principle has crystallised its potent 
manifestations in various rules and principles endorsed in the common law 
systems. Thus, it is argued that while the principle does not exist, there are 
various principles and rules that have common elements and may achieve the 
same purpose.  
                                                          
212 A review of court decisions testifies to the fact that bad faith is often presumed and objectively 
ascertained. Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 14 December 2004, Challenge No. 1302, 
Judicial Year 73; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 12 July 1997, Challenge No. 4338, 
Judicial Year 61. 
213 Morcos (1988), (note 192) 353; Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 755-756. 
214 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 2 January 1997, Challenge No. 1481, Judicial Year 
62. 
215 Morcos (1988), (note 192) 45; Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 756. 
216 Byers (2002), (note 10) 395. However, some authors advocate that abuse of rights exist in the 
United States. Perillo (1996), (note 38) 40. 
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175. For obvious spatial-temporal reasons, it is not the purpose of this section to 
engage in a detailed comparative analysis of equivalent rules and principles. In 
order to reach the conclusion that the essence of abuse of rights is not entirely 
foreign to the common law systems, one aims to merely highlight particular 
fields of law where the essence of the principle has crystallised and gained 
acceptance. 
 
176. Prior to embarking on an analysis of some of the those rules/principles, in an 
attempt to highlight the elements of commonality between them and abuse of 
rights, it is in order to first shed light on the generally acknowledged rejection 
of abuse of rights in the common law. In doing so, one shall focus on English 
law and US law. 
 
A. Rejection of Abuse of Rights 
 
177. It is the predominant view that the principle of abuse of rights forms no part of 
English law.217 The case of Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles,218 a case decided in 
1895, is often cited to support the view that the principle has been decisively 
rejected. 
 
178. In this case, Pickles, the respondent, was the owner of land which contains 
underground water and percolates through channels to the land of a neighbour, 
the appellant. It was undisputed that the appellant had no legal right to the 
water. Pickles used his right to divert the water on his own land in an alleged 
attempt to improve the value of his land and minerals. In doing so, Pickles’ 
apparent motive was to deprive his neighbours of the water in order to induce 
them to purchase his land or give him some other compensation. 
 
                                                          
217 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 22; Chapman v. Honig, [1963] 2 Q.B. 502, 520, where the majority 
noted that contractual rights can be exercised for good reason or a bad reason or no reason at all. 
However, Lord Denning dissented and recognised that it is an abusive exercise of right and held that 
the tenant should be remedied. 
218 The Mayor, Aldermen And Burgesses of the Borough of Bradford v. Edward Pickles, [1895] A. C. 
587. 
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179. In rejecting the appeal, the Court provided that the state of mind of the person 
exercising the right is irrelevant and does not affect the status of the right. The 
Court stipulated that:  
 
If it was a lawful act, however ill the motive might 
be, he had a right to do it. If it was an unlawful 
act, however good his motive might be, he would 
have no right to do it. Motives and intentions in 
such a question […] seem to me absolutely 
irrelevant.219  
 
180. The endorsement of an absolutist view of rights was further manifested by the 
Court as it stated that while Pickles has deliberately deprived his neighbour of 
the water, conduct which “may be churlish, selfish, and grasping”, does not 
violate English law. However, it may only be frowned upon from a moral 
perspective: “His conduct may seem shocking to a moral philosopher”.220 
 
181. Moreover, it was stated in Pickles that Scottish law is consistent with English 
law in that it does not endorse abuse of rights and that the motive is 
irrelevant.221 This conclusion is flawed as it failed to examine the well-
established Scottish law principle of aemulatio vicini.222  
 
182. According to the latter principle, a landowner has the right to use his land in 
the way he desires except if his use is solely motivated by an intention to cause 
harm to another. The aemulatio vicini principle is a limitation on the exercise 
of rights founded on equity and elementary fairness.223 While it is not 
frequently used, it is the predominant view that it forms part of Scottish law.224 
However, it should be noted that the aemulatio vicini principle differs from 
                                                          
219 Ibid, 594. 
220 Ibid, 601. 
221 Ibid, 598. 
222 Michael Taggart, “Private Property and Abuse of Rights in Victorian England: The Story of 
Edward Pickles and The Bradford Water Supply”, (Oxford University Press 2002), 149-150; 
Elspeth Reid, “The Doctrine of Abuse of Rights: Perspective from a Mixed Jurisdiction”, 8 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, 9 (2004); Reid (1998), (note 88) 153. 
223 Henry Home, “Principles of Equity”, (Bell & Bradfute, Manners & Miller, A. Constable & Co., 
and John Fairbairn), Edinburgh), (1825), 36. 
224 David Johnston, “Owners and Neighbours: From Rome to Scotland”, in R. Evans-Jones (ed.),”The 
Civil Law Tradition in Scotland”, (Stair Society 1995), 176; Reid (1998), (note 88); Taggart (2002), 
(note 222) 149-150. 
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abuse of rights in that the former is limited to cases of property law and applies 
only in cases of malice.225 
 
183. While some scholars have received such decision with equanimity,226 others 
have criticised the decision.227 Gutteridge rightly provided that the decision is 
a palpable manifestation of the adage ‘dura lex sed lex’ (the law is harsh but it 
is the law).228 He further stipulated: 
 
The possibility that a legal right may be exercised 
with impunity in a spirit of malevolence or 
selfishness is one of the unsatisfactory features of 
our law, and there would appear to be a prima 
facie case to reform in this direction, a belief 
which is strengthened by the fact that ours is the 
only modern system which has not endeavoured 
to evolve some means by which it may be ensured 
that a rule of law shall not be transformed into an 
instrument for the gratification of private spite or 
the promotion of chicanery.229 
 
184. Subsequently, in the English case of Allen v. Flood, a trade union delegate 
persuaded the employer to stop employing the plaintiff’s shipwrights. While 
there was no breach of contract as the plaintiffs were employed “for the job” 
and were liable to be discharged at any time, the plaintiffs alleged that this 
conduct gave rise to tortious liability given that the defendant interfered with 
their contracts of employment and maliciously induced the employer to 
discharge them. The fact that the defendant (trade union delegate) acted 
maliciously was immaterial to the outcome of the case. The court provided that 
the “existence of a bad motive, in the case of an act which is not in itself 
illegal, will not convert that act into a civil wrong for which reparation is 
due”.230  
                                                          
225 Reid (1998), (note 88) 155. 
226 John W. Salmond, “The Law of Torts”, (Sweet & Maxwell), (1936), 8. 
227 Alfred Denning, “Freedom Under the Law”, (Stevens & Sons 1949), 68-69; Crabb (1964), (note 
12) 2; Wolfgang Friedmann, “Legal Theory”, (Second Edition), (Stevens & Sons 1949), 355-356; 
James Reid, “The Law and the Reasonable Man”, 54 Proceedings of the British Academy 189, 198 
(1968); Foster (1973), (note 108) 351; Glanville L. Williams, “The Foundation of Tortious 
Liability”, 7 Cambridge Law Journal 111, 127 (1939). 
228 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 22. 
229 Ibid, 22-23. 
230 Allen v. Flood, [1898] App. Cas. 1, 92. 
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185. The position adopted in this case is not prevailing in other common law 
systems. Thus, some American cases illustrate that at-will employees may be 
granted a cause of action if they were discharged maliciously.231 
 
186. It is worth mentioning that the early cases in America were similar to the 
English position mentioned above.232 However, while not endorsing a general 
principle of abuse of rights, some American courts subsequently denied the 
recognition of property rights which were exercised maliciously, under the 
notion of nuisance.233 As stated by one court:  
 
A landowner has a right to build a fence along the 
boundary or division line of his property […] But 
the right is not absolute; this is to say that it is 
not unfettered or exercisable without reference 
to its impact upon others. On the contrary, a 
right to fence, like so many other species of 
property rights, is not exercised in a vacuum and 
the law is not indifferent to the impact which that 
exercise may have on others.234 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
187. In this regard, some note that the common law’s avoidance of endorsing a 
general principle of abuse of rights is primarily premised on the perception that 
the principle’s determination involves an examination of one’s state of mind, 
which renders the principle difficult to apply.235 Moreover, some submit that 
the common law’s rejection of the principle stems from the fact that it bears 
undeterminable variable parameters, as it relies on an individual assessment of 
each decision maker, which would necessarily defy legal certainty.236 
 
                                                          
231 For a case that was decided in America at the same time as Allen v. Flood, see Lucke v. Clothing 
Cutters & Trimmers, 77 Md. 396, 26 A. 505, 509 (1893). 
232 Jenkins v. Flower, 24 Pa. 308 (1855), 310. 
233 Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W. 838 (Mich. 1888); Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. 117 (1836); Perillo 
(1996), (note 38) 44; James B. Ames, “How Far An Act May be a Tort Because of the Wrongful 
Motive of the Actor”, 18 Harvard Law Review 411, 414 (1905); Reid (1998), (note 88) 144. 
234 Brittingham v. Robertson, 280 A.2d 741 (Del. 1971). 
235 Taggart (2002), (note 222) 156; Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 996. 
236 Allen v. Flood [1898] ACT, 118; Arthur L. Goodhart, “English Law and the Moral Law”, (Stevens 
& Sons Ltd, 1955), 145. 
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188. While these may seem to be logical arguments, one submits that they are 
questionable given that: (a) abuse of rights does not merely rely on the right 
holder’s intent; (b) the principle’s scope of application is broader than the 
element of malice; and (c) the element of intent is not only a constituent of 
abuse of rights, but is equally an element in other rules that are endorsed by the 
common law legal systems,237 including, inter alia, the obligation to perform 
in good faith under US law,238 nuisance,239 and the tort of malicious 
prosecution.240  
 
189. Moreover, such concerns seem misplaced if the principle of abuse of rights is 
defined objectively; by examining one’s external behaviour and the particulars 
of the dispute to decide if the exercise of a right is reasonable.241 
 
B. Functional Equivalents in the Common Law 
 
190. As previously stated, it is evident that a general principle of abuse of rights has 
no place in the common law. However, it would be disingenuous to claim that 
the essence of the principle is peculiar to the common law.242 
 
191. Thus, it is submitted that the common law systems have effectively 
implemented other rules/principles in different legal areas to limit cases of 
manifest substantive and procedural abuse. This is conspicuous, for example, 
when one recognises the interrelation between abuse of rights and the broader 
                                                          
237 Walton (1909), (note 42) 518-519; Ames (1905), (note 233) 412 and 416; Secretary of State for 
Employment v. Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Fireman (No. 2), [1972] 2 Q.B. 
455, 492 (Lord Denning) “There are many branches of our law when an act which would otherwise 
be lawful is rendered unlawful by the motive or object with which it is done”. 
238 Robert S. Summers, ““Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code”, 54 Virginia Law Review 195 (1968). 
239 Robilant (2010) (note 9), 704; G. H. L. Fridman, “Motive in the English Law of Nuisance”, 40 
Virginia Law Review 583, 586-587 (1954); Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v. Emmett [1936] 2 KB 
468; Christie v. Davey, [1893] 1 Ch. 316; Reid (1998), (note 88) 145; Williams (1939), (note 227) 
128. 
240 Walton (1933), (note 46) 88. 
241 Ibid, 87-89. 
242 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 30. 
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notion of equity,243 the prohibition against abuse of process and malicious 
prosecution to limit abuse of procedural rights.244 Moreover, the role of 
reasonableness in: limiting landlords’ right to refuse renewing lease 
agreements, retaliatory eviction in tenancy disputes,245 and in the common law 
rules relating to nuisances further strengthen this submission.246 
 
1. Substantive Abuse: the Notion of Reasonableness and Good 
Faith 
 
192. The notion of reasonableness, or the reasonable man construct, is a flexible 
standard for guiding conduct.247 It is a legal fiction that allows the evaluation 
of conduct, and enables an objective and balanced approach to legal issues in 
order to reach an acceptable outcome.248 As noted by one scholar, the conduct 
in question can be labelled reasonable “if the activities can be valued as fair, 
just, or equitable”.249  
 
                                                          
243 Taggart (2002), (note 222) 152-155; Tony Weir, “The Common Law System”, in R. David et al. 
(eds.), “International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law”, (Volume II), “The Legal Systems of the 
World: Their Comparison and Unification”, (Martinus Nijhoff 1975); David Anderson, “Abuse of 
Rights”, 11 Judicial Review 348, 350 (2006). The interrelation is also manifested by the critiques of 
equity. Equity is often criticised for its vagueness, flexibility, broadness and for the discretionary 
power it grants to the decision maker. John Selden, “Table-Talk: Being the Discourses of John 
Selden, Esq.”, (Second Edition), (London J. M. Dent & Co. 1819), 45-46; Henry E. Smith, 
“Property, Equity and the Rule of Law”, in Lisa M. Austin and Dennis Kilmchuk (eds.), “Private 
Law and the Rule of Law”, (Oxford University Press 2014), 13; David Lieberman, “The Province of 
Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain”, (Cambridge University Press 
1989), 80 and 167; Michael Levenstein, “Maxims of Equity: A Juridical Critique of the Ethics of 
Chancery Law”, (Algora 2014), 44-45; Roscoe Pound, “Jurisprudence”, (Volume 1), (West 
Publishing Co. 1959), 407; Alfred William Brian Simpson, “A History of the Common Law of 
Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit”, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975), 396-402; José & 
Tella (2008), (note 22) 64-65; Roscoe Pound, “The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and 
Doctrines”, 27 Harvard Law Review 195, 226-227 (1914); Roscoe Pound, “The Spirit of the 
Common Law”, (Marshall Jones Company 1921), 185-186. 
244 Kotuby & Sobota (2017), (note 64) 110. 
245 George M. Armstrong and John C. LaMaster, “Retaliatory Eviction as Abuse of Rights: A Civilian 
Approach to Landlord-Tenant Disputes”, 47 Louisiana Law Review 1, 18 (1986); Perillo (1996), 
(note 38) 58. 
246 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 30; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 1; Byers (2002), (note 10) 396-397; 
William Prosser, “Law of Torts”, (Third Edition), (West Publishing Co. 1964), 618-619, discussing 
that US law recognises that acting maliciously may trigger one’s liability for nuisance; Krauze 
(2012), (note 72) 2. 
247 Rath Packing Company v. Joseph W. Jones, 530 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1975). 
248 Joachim (1992), (note 114) 341. 
249 Ibid, 342. 
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193. The common law’s predilection for, and its pervasive reference to, 
reasonableness arguably permeates various areas of the law (contractual and 
tortious).250 It is submitted that the standard of reasonableness often operates to 
limit different forms of abuse, as it arguably defies fairness, justice and equity 
to allow rights to be exercised maliciously or in a 
disproportionate/unreasonable manner.251 
 
194. Thus, while no unitary concept of abuse of rights exists in the common law, 
courts have employed functional equivalents of abuse of rights, such as the 
standard of reasonableness, in their quest for tackling different forms of 
abuse.252 It is said that the term ‘reasonable’ encompasses criteria “that are the 
same as or similar to those invoked in assessing ‘abuse of rights’”.253 In 
further demystifying the analogy, a distinguished scholar noted that while the 
principle of abuse of rights imposes a limitation to the exercise of private 
property rights, common law advocates that “everyone has the right to the 
reasonable use of his or her property”.254 
 
195. In practice, this may be conspicuous, ex analogia, in the law of torts such as 
water disputes as well as the tort of nuisance under English and US law.255 
Whilst disputes arising out of the unreasonable erection of fences were 
manifestations of abuse of rights in civil law, they were deemed as a nuisance 
that may trigger one’s tortious liability in the common law: 
 
                                                          
250 George P. Fletcher, “The Right and the Reasonable”, 98 Harvard Law Review 949, 949-950 
(1985). For an overview for the principle’s application in different legal areas, see Joachim (1992), 
(note 114). 
251 Ugo Mattei, “Basic Principles of Property Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic 
Introduction”, (Greenwood Press 2000), 149, (“the doctrine of abuse of right as such is absent in 
the common law, where it is perfectly well substituted for by the reasonableness limit”); Joachim 
(1992), (note 114) 353. 
252 Robilant (2010), (note 9) 698; Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 696. 
253 Fletcher (1985), (note 250) 953. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 303 (“It is believed that there is in this respect no difference of 
substance between English law and other legal systems. The major part of the law of torts is nothing 
else than the affirmation of the prohibition of abuse of rights”); Amos & Walton (1967), (note 86) 
219; Reid (1998), (note 88) 145; David Campbell, “Gathering the Water: Abuse of Rights After the 
Recognition of Government Failure”, 7 Journal Jurisprudence 487, 523 (2010); Fridman (1954), 
(note 239) 586-587; William Prosser, Dan Dobbs et al., “Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts”, 
(Fifth Edition), (West Publishing Co. 1984), 626-627, noting that unreasonable interference is the 
basis for the law of nuisance. 
Page | 70  
 
In systems of law derived from the Digest a great 
deal is said about abuse of rights; and the law is 
certainly made simpler and more patently 
straightforward by provisions in codes and case 
law developments therefrom, dealing with jus 
abutendi, abus des droits, or schikanerverbot. 
Such ideas are not to be found as part of the 
common law. But it should not be thought that the 
common law provides no remedy for such wrongs. 
There is an ample provision in the present law 
relating to the tort nuisance for control of 
activities envisaged by the continental codes.256 
 
196. In the case of Horan v. Byrnes, a dispute arose where the defendant maintained 
a fence on his land allegedly to harm the occupant of the adjoining premises. 
An applicable statute precluded a landowner from erecting a fence exceeding 
five feet in height, if the purpose of such erection is the annoyance of the 
adjoining occupant. The claimant asserted that the statute is unconstitutional as 
it interferes with one’s inherent right of protecting his property and deprives 
him from its enjoyment. In upholding the statute, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire noted: 
 
While one may in general put his property to any 
use he pleases not in itself unlawful, his 
neighbour has the same right to the undisturbed 
enjoyment of his adjoining property. What 
standard does the law provide? Whatever may be 
the law in other jurisdictions, it must be regarded 
as settled in this state that the test is the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the 
business in question under all the 
circumstances. The common law right of the 
ownership of land […] does not sanction or 
authorize practical injustice to one landowner by 
the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the 
right of dominion by another (Franklin v. 
Durgee), but makes the test of the right the 
reasonableness of the use under all 
circumstances. In such case the purpose of the 
use, whether understood by the landowner to be 
necessary or useful to himself, or merely intended 
to harm another, may be decisive upon the 
question of right. It cannot be justly contended 
                                                          
256 Fridman (1954), (note 239) 586. 
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that a purely malicious use is a reasonable 
use.257 [Emphasis added]. 
 
197. One may infer from the above decision that the standard of reasonableness is 
broad and includes certain elements that parallel the criteria of abuse found in 
the civil legal systems, i.e. malice, reasonableness and the purpose of the 
exercise of the right. Moreover, the standard of reasonableness is as flexible as 
the principle of abuse of rights. There is no set of rigid rules of what is 
considered reasonable, as this will largely depend on the particulars of each 
case.258 
 
198. The role of the reasonableness test/criterion to preclude different forms of 
abuse is also apparent in contractual disputes. Whilst the prevailing view is 
that there is no general duty to perform the contract in good faith under English 
law, the abuse of contractual rights may be typically avoided whereby the 
“content of right is cut down from within by the implication of 
“reasonableness,” with reference to the intention of the parties, in much the 
same way as is done with statutory rights”.259  
 
199. This may be demonstrated in cases where one refuses to consent to the 
assignment of a contract. Courts apply the test of reasonableness to determine 
if refusal to consent is arbitrary or abusive.260 This was the case in Cohen v. 
Ratinoff, whereby the California Court of Appeal addressed whether the lessor 
can abusively withhold consent to an assignment, and held that: 
 
[W]here […] the lease provides for an 
assignment or subletting only with the prior 
consent of the lessor, a lessor may refuse consent 
only where he has a good faith reasonable 
objection to the assignment or sublease, even in 
                                                          
257 Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N.H. 93, 100 (N.H. 1903); Robilant (2010), (note 9) 705-706. 
258 Fletcher (1985), (note 250) 980. 
259 Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 258. 
260 Byron R. Lane, “Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.: Landlords May Not Unreasonably Withhold 
Consent to Commercial Lease Assignments”, 14 Pepperdine Law Review 81 (1986); Lovelock v. 
Margo [1963] 2 All E.R. 13 (C.A.); Schweiso v. Williams, 150 Cal. App. 3d 883, 886, (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984); Prestin v. Mobil Oil Corp., 741 F.2d 268, 271 (9th Circ. 1984); Basnett v. Vista Village 
Mobile Home Park, 699 P.2d 1343, 1346-1347 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 
So. 2d 1171, 1173-1174 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981). 
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the absence of a provision prohibiting the 
unreasonable or arbitrary withholding of 
consent to an assignment.261 [Emphasis added]. 
 
200. Similarly, in the case of Larese v. Creamland, a dispute arose out of a 
franchise agreement that provided that the agreement shall not be assigned 
without the prior consent of the franchisor. In refusing to consent, the 
franchisor asserted that this contractual right is absolute and unqualified, 
which is an assertion often raised in cases of abuse of rights as previously 
mentioned. The US Courts of Appeal did not agree with the franchisor, 
imposed a duty of reasonableness, and held that the franchisor’s conduct was 
abusive/unreasonable.262 
 
201. Finally, in the case of Eastleigh BC v. Town Quay Developments Ltd, a piece 
of land was transferred from the claimant’s predecessor to the defendant 
subject to a reservation of a right for itself and/or its successors to enter the 
transfer land to do works subject to the consent of the defendant. There was no 
express qualification that such right (consent) shall not be unreasonably 
withheld. Given that the claimant, the owner of an adjacent land, wished to 
develop his land, he required access onto the land; however the defendant 
withheld its consent. The issue before the English Court of Appeal was 
whether there was an implied term that the defendant should not unreasonably 
refuse consent. The Court confirmed that implying the qualification of 
reasonableness was necessary as a matter of business efficacy.263 
 
202. In this regard, it is submitted that the element of reasonableness acts in a 
manner similar to abuse of rights.264 This becomes evident if one considers that 
the same type of disputes are dealt with under the principle of abuse of rights 
in civil law. Thus, in France265 as well as in Louisiana, courts have regularly 
assessed whether such refusal constituted an abuse of right.266 
                                                          
261 Cohen v. Ratinoff, 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 330, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983). 
262 Larese v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 767 F.2d 716, 718 (10 Cir. 1985). 
263 Eastleigh BC v. Town Quay Developments Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1391. 
264 Fridman (1954), (note 239) 594-595, stating that the element of reasonableness may determine 
whether one’s conduct amounts to a nuisance. 
265 Perillo (1996), (note 38) 78. 
266 Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979). 
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203. Another concept that may equally limit the abusive exercise of rights is the 
principle of good faith under US law. The interrelation between abuse of rights 
and the broader principle of good faith shall be discussed in another section. 
However, suffice it to mention that such interrelation has serious practical 
implications. The perception that a general principle of good faith embodies 
the prohibition against abuse of rights, indicates that jurisdictions that do not 
explicitly endorse the principle of abuse of rights may still limit the exercise of 
rights on the basis of the principle of good faith.267 It has been rightly 
expressed that: 
 
Be that as it may, where a duty of good faith is 
recognized and redress granted for its violation, 
there is at least an implied recognition that the 
abuse of a right is an actual wrong since, in 
essence, such an abuse is necessarily a violation 
of the overriding obligation of good faith.268 
 
204. The above submission may be illustrated in cases of abusive discharge of at-
will employees under US law, where courts rely on the obligation to act in 
good faith to preclude the abusive dismissal of at-will employees. In Fortune v. 
National Cash Register Co., the employer dismissed a sales representative 
after the employer received a 5 million dollar order procured by the sales 
representative. The employer exercised his right to dismiss the sales 
representative to avoid granting him a bonus commission. The court found that 
the termination was contrary to the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing which applied to all contracts, and thus constituted a breach of the 
contract.269 In civil legal systems, the same result may be achieved by applying 
the principle of abuse of rights.270  
 
205. Moreover, courts often engage in an analysis or reasoning which greatly 
parallels that of abuse of rights. In one case regarding an employee that was 
                                                          
267 Lauterpacht (1982), (note 21) 163-164; Lenaerts (2010), (note 36) 1145-146. 
268 Litvinoff (1997), (note 118) 1661. 
269 Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (Mass. 1977), 1252-1253. 
270 Clark v. Glidden Coating & Resins, 666 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. La. 1987); Sanborn v. Oceanic 
Contractors Inc., 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984). 
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dismissed because he filed a case against the employer, the court noted that 
while dismissing employees at-will is a recognised legal right, it should not be 
used for a “purpose ulterior to that for which the right was designed”.271 
 
206. The obligation to act in good faith was used by US courts in a manner similar 
to that of abuse of rights to address the issue of abusive exercise of discretion 
as well. In the case of Tymshare v. Covell, the employer had the right to keep a 
portion of sales representatives’ earnings in a fund. These earnings were 
calculated on the basis of a quota that can be changed by the employer at any 
time at their sole discretion. The plaintiff submitted that the employer’s 
decision to retroactively change the quota after the plaintiff’s termination was 
in bad faith. While the employer argued that the exercise of such discretionary 
power is not affected by his motives, even if he acted unreasonably, the court 
found that it cannot mean that it can be used “for any reason whatsoever, no 
matter how arbitrary or unreasonable”.272 The court further noted that an act 
that is permissible may constitute a contractual breach if performed in bad 
faith. 
 
207. Similarly, in Daitch Crystal v. Neisloss, a lease agreement granted the tenant 
the right to operate a supermarket in a shopping centre. A dispute then arose 
after the landlord attempted to build a supermarket on an adjacent land for a 
competitor. The court found that the landlord breached the lease agreement. 
The court recognised that it is not empowered to make a new contract between 
the parties, however, it emphasised that “in every contract there exists an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”.273  Scholars have noted that 
the court did not rely on the terms of the lease, but has applied the principle of 
good faith to limit an abuse of right.274 
 
208. Based on the above, it is submitted that while there is no overarching general 
principle of abuse of substantive rights in the common law, the latter has 
                                                          
271 Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Services Inc., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Circ. 1981), 1062; Perillo (1996), 
(note 38) 56-57. 
272 Tymshare Inc. v. Covell 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
273 Daitch Crystal Dairies v. Neisloss, 190 N.Y.S.2d 737 (App. Div. 1959), aff'd mem., 167 N.E.2d 
643 (N.Y.1960), cited in Perillo (1996), (note 38) 76. 
274 Perillo (1996), (note 38) 76. 
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devised and applied different rules and principles to avert manifest abuse and 
unfairness. This is particularly conspicuous under US law. By and large, these 
rules/principles operate in a manner similar to abuse of rights and achieve the 
same purpose. 
 
2. Procedural Abuse: Abuse of Process 
 
209. The right to bring legal action in court is a sacred right expressed in most 
constitutions.275 Nevertheless, one who uses this right for a purpose other than 
that contemplated by the law or to harm the other litigant, commits a tort of 
abuse of process,276 which is nothing short of an abuse of a procedural right.277 
 
210. The courts’ inherent power/jurisdiction to preclude the abuse of procedural 
rights has long been established in the common law,278 to maintain the 
integrity of the legal system.279 In 1885, Lord Blackburn noted:  
 
[F]rom early times (I rather think, though I have 
not looked at it enough to say, from the earliest 
times) the Court had inherently the right to see 
that its process was not abused by a proceeding 
without reasonable grounds, so as to be 
vexatious and harassing – the Court had the right 
to protect itself against such an abuse.280 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
                                                          
275 Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 765. 
276 Attorney General v. Barker, [2000] 1 F.L.R. 759; Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods Inc., 427 A.2d 
385, 387 (Conn. 1980); John D. Lawson, “The Action for the Malicious Prosecution of a Civil Suit”, 
30 The American Law Register 353, 365-366 (1882). 
277 Kolb (2006), (note 9) 831; Brabandere (2012), (note 60) 619; Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 225-
226; Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 999; Chris Brunner, “Abuse of Rights in Dutch Law”, 37 Louisiana 
Law Review 729, 743-745 (1977); Shany (2003), (note 61) 256; Robert Kolb, “The International 
Court of Justice”, (Hart Publishing 2013), 947; Walton (1909), (note 42) 508; Nathan Tamblyn, 
“Lawful Act Conspiracy: Malice and Abuse of Rights”, 2013 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
158, 166 (2013); Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell and James Munro, “Legal Responses to Corporate 
Manoeuvring in International Investment Arbitration”, 5 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 
41, 61 (2014); Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 764-765; Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 4 August 2011, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 647. 
278 M.S. Dockray, “The Inherent Jurisdiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings”, 113 Law Quarterly 
Review 120, 123 (1997). 
279 Mark Crosswhite, “Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution in Alabama”, 38 Alabama Law 
Review 99, 99 (1987). 
280 Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley [1885] 10 App. Cas. 210, 220. 
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211. The principle of abuse of process is an intrinsic part of the common law.281 
The principle’s interrelation to the broader principle of abuse of rights is 
acknowledged by scholars, and is evident by its terminology, function, and 
application. 
 
212. Abuse of process generally denotes the use of procedural rights for a purpose 
other than that for which such procedural rights were established,282 and 
applies to “all categories of cases in which the processes and procedures of the 
court, which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be 
converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness”.283 Section (682) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines abuse of process as follows:  
 
One who uses a legal process, whether criminal 
or civil, against another primarily to accomplish 
a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject 
to liability to the other for harm caused by the 
abuse of process.284 
 
213. The above demystification of the principle is consistent with that found in 
other common law jurisdictions. Thus, in Canada and Australia the principle is 
said to operate to preclude any abuse that violates the principles of fairness and 
justice and that may bring the administration of justice into disrepute.285 
  
214. Similar to the operation of abuse of rights, abuse of process is not restricted to 
rigid categories or defined circumstances, but its application is warranted 
whenever the factual matrix of the case reveals unfairness, unreasonable 
conduct, or injustice.286 It equally limits the abuse of any procedural right and 
is not limited to a category of rights. As highlighted by the California Court of 
                                                          
281 In England, the court’s inherent power in this regard is stipulated in Rule (3.4) of the English Civil 
Procedure Rules. 
282 Goldoftas (1964), (note 9) 163; Kolb (2006), (note 9) 831; Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 34; Gaffney 
(2010), (note 60) 516; Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
283 Peter Barnett, “Res Judicata, Estoppel, and Foreign Judgments”, (Oxford University Press 2001), 
para. 6.06; Walton v. Gardiner [1993] 177 CLR 378, 395 (Australia). 
284 Section (682) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977). 
285 Toronto City v. C.U.P.E., [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77; R. v. Scott, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979, 1007; Rogers v. The 
Queen [1994] HCA 42. 
286 Ashmore v. British Coal Corp., [1990] 2 Q.B. 338; Lord Justice Maurice Kay, “Blackstone’s Civil 
Practice 2013”, (Thirteenth Edition), (Oxford University Press 2012), para. 33.12. 
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Appeal: “The term “process” as used in the tort of abuse of process has been 
broadly interpreted to encompass the entire range of procedures incident to 
litigation”.287 
 
215. Courts have occasionally expressed the opinion that restricting the application 
of abuse of process to fixed categories is unwise, and that it should be left as a 
broad tool to be applied by courts when warranted.288 As stated by the English 
Court of Appeal in the case of Ashmore v. British Coal Corp.:  
 
A litigant has a right to have his claim litigated, 
provided it is not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse 
of the process. What may constitute such conduct 
must depend on all the circumstances of the case; 
the categories are not closed and considerations 
of public policy and the interests of justice may be 
very material.289 
 
216. It functions in a manner that ameliorates the rigidity of the common law and 
maintains the fairness and reasonableness of procedures.290 In elaborating 
abuse of process, the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) noted: 
 
It concerns the inherent power which any court of 
justice must possess to prevent misuse of its 
procedure in a way which, although not 
inconsistent with the literal application of its 
procedural rules, would nevertheless be 
manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before 
it, or would otherwise bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute among right-thinking 
people. The circumstances in which abuse of 
process can arise are very varied […]. It would, 
in my view, be most unwise if this House were to 
use this occasion to say anything that might be 
taken as limiting to fixed categories the kinds of 
circumstances in which the court has a duty (I 
disavow the word discretion) to exercise this 
salutary power.291 [Emphasis added]. 
                                                          
287 Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 296 (1974); Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 426 Pa. 
Superior Ct. 376 (1993), 627 A. 2d 190, 192. 
288 Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] AC 529, 536. 
289 Ashmore v. British Coal Corp., [1990] 2 Q.B. 338, 348. 
290 Barnett (2001), (note 283) paras 6.03-6.06. 
291 Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] AC 529, 536. 
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217. Its application in the common law resembles the application of abuse of rights 
to limit abuse of procedural rights in civil legal systems.292 Typically, courts 
engage in a balancing process of the competing interests,293 and tend to find an 
abuse on the basis of objective criteria, mainly relying on the purpose for 
which the right was exercised and the reasonableness of exercising the right in 
question.294 As stated by the English Court of Appeal, in a case that involved 
proceedings brought to harass the opponent: 
 
A claimant’s motive for asserting a legal right 
was irrelevant. Accordingly, the institution [of] 
proceedings with an ulterior motive was not of 
itself enough to constitute an abuse of process. An 
action was only an abuse if the court’s processes 
were being misused to achieve something not 
properly available to the claimant in the course of 
properly conducted proceedings.295 
 
218. An interesting application of abuse of process pertains to the issue of res 
judicata, whereby the principle is utilised to remedy the rigidity of the triple 
identity test, and is known in English law as the ‘rule in Henderson v. 
Henderson’.296 In this case, the court held that parties are required to bring 
forward their whole case, and that the court will not “permit the same parties 
to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter[s] which might have 
been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not 
brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or 
even accident, omitted part of their case”.297 The crux in the rule in Henderson 
                                                          
292 Sheppard (2005), (note 62) 236-237. 
293 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co., [2002] 2 AC 1: “whether an action was an abuse of process […] 
should be judged broadly on the merits taking account of all the public and private interests 
involved and all the facts of the case”. 
294 Broxton v. McClelland and Another [1995] E.M.L.R. 485, 496-498. 
295 Wallis v. Valentine [2002] EWCA Civ 1034, [2003] E.M.L.R. 8. 
296 This is equally applied in Australia and Canada: International Law Association, “Interim Report: 
“Res Judicata” and Arbitration”, Berlin Conference (2004), 8; Paul M. Perell, “Res Judicata and 
Abuse of Process”, 24 Advocates Quarterly 189, 192-193 (2001); Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union 
of Public Employees, [2003] S.C.J. No. 64 (Sup Ct); Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, 2001 SCC 44, para. 18; Port of Melbourne Authority v. Anshun Pty Ltd, (1981) 
147 CLR 589 (Australian High Court); Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co., [2002] 2 AC 1. Where the 
House of Lords noted that the Henderson Rule falls under the ambit of abuse of process. 
297   Henderson v. Henderson, [1843] 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313, 319. 
Page | 79  
 
is the element of reasonableness required by the parties when bringing an 
action before the court.298 
 
219. Accordingly, courts establish an abuse of process where a procedural right is 
exercised for a purpose other than that for which the right was granted,299 or 
where bringing the claim is unreasonable.300 
 
220. On a related note, the application of abuse of process confers wide 
discretionary power upon courts, whom are bestowed with the role of 
balancing of interests in order to determine if there is any abuse. Thus, even if 
the conditions of its application are satisfied, courts may still find no abuse 
given the competing interests at stake. To that effect, in the case of  Attorney 
General v. Barker, the court noted that:  
 
Whether, where the condition is satisfied, the 
court will exercise its discretion to make an 
order, will depend on the court’s assessment of 
where the balance of justice lies, taking account 
on the one hand of a citizen’s prima facie right to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the civil courts and on 
the other the need to provide members of the 
public with a measure of protection against 
abusive and ill−founded claims.301 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
221. Scholars acknowledge that abuse of process is an application of the principle 
of abuse of rights.302 While the existence of a functional equivalent to abuse of 
rights is controversial in relation to substantive rights, all main systems, 
including the common law systems, “apply or, at least are willing to 
recognize, some kind of ‘abuse of rights’ rule in relation to the exercise of 
rights during adjudication”.303 As rightly stated by Professor Gaillard: “while 
                                                          
298  The criterion applied by the court was ‘reasonable diligence’ of the party. Ibid; Fidelitas Shipping 
Co. Ltd. v. V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 Q.B. 630, 640. 
299 Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. and Others [1977] 1 W.L.R. 478, 489; Goldoftas (1964), (note 9) 163. 
300 Jameel v. Dow Jones and Co. Inc. [2005] EWCA Civ 75, [2005] QB 946; Henderson v. 
Henderson, [1843] 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313, 319; Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v. V/O Exportchleb 
[1966] 1 Q.B. 630, 640. 
301 Attorney General v. Barker, [2000], 1 F.L.R. 759. 
302 Kolb (2006), (note 9) 831. 
303 Shany (2003), (note 61) 256. 
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common law systems do not recognize any general principle of abuse of rights, 
English courts have long upheld their inherent jurisdiction to sanction a 
party’s exercise of its procedural rights in an abusive manner”.304  
 
222. The view that abuse of process is a clear manifestation of abuse of rights is not 
limited to English law, but is equally recognised in other common law systems. 
For example, in the US, scholars note that abuse of process is a “narrowly 
circumscribed version of the doctrine of abuse of rights”,305 and in Australia it 
is acknowledged that the tort of abuse of process is “the clearest illustration in 
our law of what civilians call an ‘abuse of right’”.306 
 
223. Finally, it is worth mentioning that other torts found in the common law 
equally function in a manner similar to abuse of procedural rights, including 
the tort of malicious prosecution under English and US law.307  
 
224. As provided by the English Supreme Court, the tort of malicious prosecution 
requires providing proof that the defendant was actuated by malice, that he had 
no reasonable and probable cause for bringing the claim, and that the claimant 
suffered damages.308 Thus, whilst the tort of abuse of process mainly rests on 
the ulterior purpose of exercising the right (deviation of purpose), the tort of 
malicious prosecution appears to emphasise the element of malice, which may 
be inferred objectively from the lack of probable/reasonable cause.309  
 
                                                          
304 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 33. 
305 Perillo (1996), (note 38) 64. 
306 John Fleming, “The Law of Torts”, (Eighth Edition), (The Law Book Company 1992), 623. 
307 Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section (382) of 1965; Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 33; Lawson 
(1882), (note 276) 365-366.  
308 Willers v. Joyce [2016] UKSC 43, 52-56, where the English Supreme Court confirmed that claims 
for malicious prosecution of civil proceedings can be brought under English law, and noted that the 
“ingredients of the tort of malicious prosecution were that the injury had been suffered in 
consequence of the malicious use of legal proceedings brought without a reasonable basis”; CFC 
26 Ltd v. Brown Shipley and Co. Ltd [2016] EWHC 3048 (Ch); Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd. 
v. Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd. [2013] UKPC 17. Unlike abuse of process, the tort of 
malicious prosecution also requires the termination of the original proceedings in the plaintiff’s 
favour; Goldoftas (1964), (note 9) 164; Crosswhite (1987), (note 279) 120. 
309 Devine (1964), (note 97) 167-169; Crosswhite (1987), (note 279) 110 and 113; S.S. Kresge Co. v. 
Ruby, 348 So. 2d 484, 489 (Ala. 1977); Juman v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and 
another [2017] UKPC 3, providing that the element of malice may be implied from gross 
negligence. 
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225. That said, it is submitted that both torts are manifestations of the broader 
principle of abuse of rights and demonstrate the different criteria of abuse: 
malice, reasonableness and deviation of purpose. 
 
226. Just as the case in relation to the abuse of rights, where an abuse of process is 
established, courts will intervene to put an end to it by, for example, staying 





227. The omnipresence of the principle of abuse of rights in civil legal systems is 
evident. The above review testifies that civil legal systems endorse a general 
principle of abuse of rights. While it originated in, and was limited to, the 
sphere of property law, now it is endorsed as a principle with general 
application.311 Thus, the generality of the principle, as required in general 
principles of law, is to a certain extent satisfied.312 
 
228. However, a review of the discussed legal systems conveys that such ubiquity 
of the principle does not necessarily reflect a uniform legal basis of the 
principle’s existence, or a uniform method of how it is utilised to prohibit 
abuse. 
 
229. Its scope of application seems rather indefinite. Some legal systems have 
explicitly spelled out the conditions sine qua non for its application. This 
approach is arguably advantageous as it may assist the courts in their 
determination of an abuse of right. Other laws preferred to merely indicate that 
an abuse of right is prohibited, leaving it to the decision maker to establish 
guidelines and criteria of what constitutes abuse. 
 
                                                          
310 Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. and Others [1977] 1 W.L.R. 478, 489. 
311 Walton (1933), (note 46) 87; Walton (1909), (note 42) 505 
312 Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 300-305. 
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230. Finally, the legal basis upon which abuse is established may differ depending 
on the scope of abuse of rights in the respective law. Some systems use the 
principle to preclude any form of abuse, whereas other systems may equally 
invoke the broader principle of good faith to tackle different forms of abuse. 
 
231. Despite such variation, it seems plausible to infer that all reviewed systems 
have intrinsic rules to preclude the abusive exercise of any right (substantive or 
procedural).  
 
232. In relation to the common law, the principle’s application to limit abuse of 
procedural rights appears conspicuous. As to substantive abuse, while it 
appears that the common law is more restrictive in its limitation on rights, 
certain principles may operate as a qualification/limitation to the exercise of 
rights. As such, it is submitted that under common law, abuse of rights does 
not generally give rise to a cause of action unless it falls under the scope of a 
pre-existing tort. 
 
233. On a different note, many advocate that the common law is influenced by 
international law and generally accepted principles.313 As stated by Lord 
Denning in the case of Trendtex: “the rules of international law, as existing 
from time to time, do form part of our English law”.314 Given that abuse of 
rights is generally considered part of international law, and has emerged as a 
general principle of law as shall be discussed below,315 it is submitted that such 
recognition may bring the principle of abuse of rights into the common law.316 
  
                                                          
313 See Michael Kirby, “The Growing Impact of International Law on the Common Law”, 33 Adelaide 
Law Review 7, 11-12 and 15 (2012); Malcolm N. Shaw, “International Law”, (Sixth Edition), 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) 138. 
314 Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q.B. 529, 554. 
315 Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 300-306; Byers (2002), (note 10) 397. 
316 It is worth mentioning that the United Kingdom argued for the application of abuse of rights in the 
Fisheries arbitration case. United Kingdom v. Iceland, Memorial of the Merits of the Dispute 
submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom [1973] I.C.J. Pleadings 267, paras 153-154; 
Byers (2002), (note 10) 397.  
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CHAPTER 2 – COMMENTARY ON THE PRINCIPLE: 




234. A review of the application of abuse of rights in the above-mentioned legal 
systems makes it feasible to draw the conditions sine qua non for its 
application. Such a review equally confirms that legal systems apply different 
criteria to establish an abuse of right.317 
 
235. In this section one shall endeavour to distil the concept of abuse of rights to its 
essential elements. This shall be undertaken by shedding light on: (II) the 
conditions necessary for its application; and the principle’s areas of concern 
(III). 
 
236. In doing so, one aims to examine general convergence in relation to the 
elements of the principle, delineate any limitations or challenges in its 
application (in its conditions or as a result of its application), and highlight 
responses to such challenges prior to seeking its introduction/application as a 
general principle in international arbitration. 
 
237. In discussing the conditions of application, including the different criteria 
adopted to establish an abuse of right, one aims to highlight the limitations of 
each criterion. It shall be submitted that focusing on the ‘balancing factor’ 
criterion (reasonableness) qualifies as the most solid and sound criterion of 
abuse. 
 
238. While focus remains on the legal systems reviewed above, one endeavours to 
refer to a wider range of laws in order to suggest further consensus in relation 
to certain issues regarding the principle’s conditions and its application.  
                                                          
317 Petrova (2004), (note 187) 463. 
Page | 84  
 
 
239. International law material is also used as it often discusses abuse of rights as 
applied in the domestic law of the civil legal systems. Such material is also 
indispensable given that abuse of rights, from a strict municipal law 
perspective, has not been subject to much analysis in English legal literature.318 
 
II. CONDITIONS OF APPLICATION 
 
240. An examination of the principle’s application reveals that there is consensus 
among the different laws on the principal elements of abuse of rights.  
 
241. Precisely, the application of abuse of rights assumes the existence of an 
acknowledged legal right (A); and that such right ceases legal protection given 
that it has been abused by the right holder (B). 
 
242. Moreover, the act in question must have caused harm to the other party. The 
damage or loss sustained may be material or moral damages.319 Once a court is 
satisfied that an abuse is established, it will either award damages to the 
aggrieved party, or will grant specific performance, i.e. order the right-holder 
to refrain from, or cease, the abusive action.320 
 
A. The Existence of a Legal Right 
 
243. Abuse of rights presumes the existence of a right and presupposes that the 
conduct/act in question is exercised within the formal limits of the right.321  
 
                                                          
318 Moreover, it is acknowledged that those general norms, rules and legal principles that exist in most 
national legal systems equally become an intrinsic part of international law. Article (38.1.c) of the 
ICJ statute; Cheng (2006), (note 190); Byers (2002), (note 10) 391-392. 
319 Reid (1998), (note 88) 131; Iluyomade (1975), (note 37) 75; Cementownia S.A. v. Republic of 
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/06/2, Award dated 17 September 2009, para. 171 where the 
tribunal acknowledged the possibility to award moral damages in cases of abuse of rights. 
320 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 991; Article (7.2) of the Spanish Civil Code. 
321 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1195; Kiss (1992), (note 22) para. 2; Palombella (2006), (note 37) 
9-10; Iluyomade (1975), (note 37) 48. 
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244. This condition raises three issues that merit clarification. It merits a brief 
outline on: (1) the definition and concept of a ‘right’; (2) the meaning of acting 
within the formal limits of a right; as well as elaborating (3) the different rights 
covered by the principle of abuse of rights. 
 
1. The Definition of a Right in the Context of Abuse of Rights 
 
245. Much has been said regarding the definition and scope of a right.322 On the one 
hand, Bernhard Windscheid, influenced by the writings of Savigny, advocated 
an individualistic perception of a right and emphasised the superiority of the 
will.323 According to this view, a right is regarded as the sphere of the right 
holder’s absolute and unlimited will. Windscheid provided that a right “assigns 
each individual the sphere in which his will posits law for all other 
individuals; if the individual is not respected in this sphere, he may complain 
to the state”.324  
 
246. The above ideology of rights corresponds to the ‘will theory of rights’ 
advocated by Hart,325 whereby he viewed legal rights in terms of the law 
granting the right holder the “exclusive control, more or less extensive, over 
another person’s duty”.326 To Hart, the conception of rights is significantly 
individualistic, as he believed that the purpose of rights is to foster the 
individual autonomy.327 
 
                                                          
322 For a detailed account of the different definitions of a ‘right’, see Roscoe Pound, “Legal Rights”, 
26 International Journal of Ethics 92 (1915). 
323 Bernhard Windscheid, “Lehrbuch Des Pandektenrechts”, (1862), cited in Robilant (2010), (note 9) 
670; Robert Alexy, “Individual Rights and Collective Goods”, in Carlos Nino (ed.), “Rights”, (New 
York University Press 1992), 164; David M. Rabban, “Law’s History: American Legal Thought and 
the Transatlantic Turn to History”, (Cambridge University Press 2013), 112 (discussing Savigny’s 
theory that possession is “protected as a manifestation of individual will, the intent to hold property 
against the world”); Roscoe Pound, “The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence”, 25 
Harvard Law Review 140, 143 (1911). 
324 Helge Dedek, “From Norms to Facts: The Realization of Rights in Common and Civil Private 
Law”, 56 McGill Law Journal 77, 99 (2010), citing Bernhard Windscheid, “Die Actio des römischen 
Civilrechts, vom Standpunkte des heutigen Rechts”, (Düsseldorf: Julius Buddeus), (1856), 3. 
325 Herbert Adolphus Hart, “Legal Rights”, in “Essays on Bentham’, (Oxford University Press 1982), 
181-182. 
326 Hart (1982), (note 325) 183. 
327 In this regard, Hart equates the right holder to a sovereign. Ibid; William E. Edmundson, “An 
Introduction to Rights”, (Second Edition), (Cambridge University Press 2012), 98.  
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247. This depiction of rights serves to grant the right holder the ultimate possible 
scope for free action.328 However, it is very individualistic, formal, and fails to 
take into consideration the social needs, purpose of rights, or the ends aimed at 
by conferring rights.329 Thus, such an individualistic conception of rights 
would not accommodate the principle of abuse of rights, as the latter draws 
clear limitation to one’s exercise of his subjective rights and advocates that 
one’s freedom is limited by the rights and interests of others.330 It has been 
stated that an “utterly individualistic notion of right, as the one maintained by 
Windscheid, leaves no room for abuse of right”.331 
 
248. On the other hand, Rudolph von Jhering, who was regarded as one of the most 
reputable legal scholars in the nineteenth century, equated rights to individual 
interests.332 To this school of legal thought, a right denotes an interest, 
recognised and protected by the law to fulfil a certain purpose:333 “power 
allocated for the purpose of satisfying interests worth protecting”.334 
According to Jhering, perceiving a right in an abstract way, without looking at 
the social purpose behind conferring it upon the right holder, materially defies 
“social reality”.335  
 
                                                          
328 The definitions given by Savigny, Kant and Puchta in Pound (1911), (note 323) 143. 
329 N. M. Korkunov, “General Theory of Law”, English Translation by W. G. Hastings, (Second 
Edition), (The Macmillan Company 1922), 107-108; James Harrington Boyd, “Socialization of the 
Law”, 22 American Journal of Sociology 822, 824 (1917). 
330 Byers (2002), (note 10) 397; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 18. 
331 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1195, footnote 114. 
332 Rudolph V. Jhering, “Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedened Stufen seiner 
Entwicklung”, (Part 3), (5th Edition), (Leipzig 1906), 339, cited in Alexy (1992), (note 323) 164; 
John H. Hallowell, “The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology”, (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & 
Co., Ltd 1946), 65. 
333 Hasso Hofmann, “From Jhering to Radbruch: On the Logic of Traditional Legal Concepts to the 
Social Theories of Law to the Renewal of Legal Idealism”,  in Damiano Canale, Paolo Grossi and 
Hasso Hofmann (eds.), “A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600-1900”, 
(Springer 2009), 307; Pound (1911), (note 323) 143; René David, “The Legal Systems of the World: 
Their Comparison and Unification”, in “International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law”, 
(Volume 2), (Martinus Nijhoff 1975), 22; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 995-996; Hofmann (2009), 
(note 333) 308; Iredell Jenkins “Rudolf Von Jhering”, 14 Vanderbilt Law Review 169, 172 (1961). 
334 Rabban (2013), (note 323) 111-112. 
335 Ibid, 106. Moreover, it is submitted that the ‘will theory’ has serious flaws in explaining duty 
rights, inalienable rights and rights of children. George W. Rainbolt, “The Concept of Rights”, 
(Springer 2006), 34-38; Corsin Bisaz, “The Concept of Group Rights in International Law: Groups 
as Contested Right-Holders, Subjects and Legal Persons”, (Nijhoff 2012), 14; Hallowell (1946), 
(note 332) 63-65. 
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249. Defining rights in terms of securing the interests socially accepted and legally 
protected equally corresponds to Bentham336 and MacCormick’s337 perception 
of rights, namely the ‘benefit theory of rights’.338 The ‘interest’ or ‘benefit’ 
theory of rights has been criticised by some legal jurists in terms of failing to 
carefully define interests.339 Despite such criticism, such understanding of 
rights influenced many scholars, including Roscoe Pound340 and David Lyons, 
who advocated that this conception of rights has universally superseded the 
rather individualistic and abstract ideology of rights.341 
 
250. A prudent reading of the interest theory of ‘rights’ implies that if there is no 
interest, or such interest is not a legitimate one reflecting an acknowledged 
purpose, there is no right.342 
 
251. One is persuaded to endorse this definition of rights as it clearly illustrates the 
rationale of abuse of rights. It defines rights in terms of interests/benefits and 
acknowledges that each right is conferred upon an individual by the legal 
authority to fulfil a certain purpose.343 It is submitted that defining rights in 
terms of interests legally protected and acknowledging that rights are conferred 
upon individuals for the satisfaction of a certain purpose “sets outer limits for 
the exercise of rights”.344 
                                                          
336 Edmundson (2012), (note 327) 97; Jeremy Bentham “Of Laws in General”, in H. L. A. Hart (ed.) 
“The Works of Jeremy Bentham”, (Athlone Press 1970); Jeremy Bentham, “An Introduction of the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation”, (Athlone Press, London 1970), 206; Joseph Raz’s definition 
of rights in Joseph Raz, “The Morality of Freedom”, (Oxford University Press, 1986), 166. 
337 Neil MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation”, in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), “Law, Morality 
and Society, Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart”, (Oxford University Press, 1977), 189. 
338 Amongst the other related definitions of rights is that of Regelsberger where rights denote the 
authority of the will that is recognised by the law for the satisfaction of certain interests. Ferdinand 
Regelsberger & George S. Maridakis, “General Principles of the Law of Pandects”, (1935), 99 
translated and cited in Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1195, footnote 114. 
339 Korkunov (1922), (note 329) 112-115; James Gordley, “The Jurists: A Critical History”, (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 289. 
340 Rabban (2013), (note 323) 107. 
341 Pound (1911), (note 323) 143; David Lyons, “Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries”, 6 American 
Philosophical Quarterly 173 (1969). However, other authors have attempted to defend the ‘will 
theory’ of rights. Paul Graham, “The Will Theory of Rights: Defence”, 15 Law & Philosophy 257 
(1996). 
342 Jenkins (1961), (note 333) 172; Neil Duxbury, “Jhering’s Philosophy of Authority”, 27 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 23, 32-33 (2007). It has been submitted that the law does not protect any 
interest, but only interests that the right holder is ought to have according to the legislator or the 
legal authority conferring the right in question. Bisaz (2012), (note 335) 15. 
343 Pound (1911), (note 323) 140-141. 
344 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1195, footnote 114. 
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252. Thus, acknowledging interests as the ultimate idea behind rights, and 
subsequently, placing emphasis on social or collective interests rather than 
individual interests, led to introducing and accepting the principle of abuse of 
rights.345 Roscoe Pound declared that this ideology of rights has led legal 
systems to limit the exercise of property rights and prohibit the anti-social 
and/or the abusive exercise of rights.346 
 
253. Moreover, this description of rights greatly resembles that of Josserand who 
provided, in the context of abuse of rights, that:  
 
[R]ights are bestowed by the State on a human 
being taking into consideration the satisfaction of 
his interests, not any interest, but legitimate 
interests […] when the holder of the right 
exercises his right without any interest, or for the 
satisfaction of an illegitimate interest […] that it 
can be said that he abuses and therefore ceases to 
have the power to request the protection of the 
law.347  
 
254. Based on the above, understanding the ideology of rights as a power conferred 
by the legal authority upon the right holder, to advance legally protected 
interests in order to satisfy a certain purpose, seems to be the best depiction of 
rights that can accommodate the essence of the principle of abuse of rights.348 
As stated by the prominent Bin Cheng:  
 
[E]very right is the legal protection of a 
legitimate interest. An alleged exercise of a right 
not in furtherance of such interest, but with the 
malicious purpose of injuring others can no 
longer claim legal protection of the law. Malitiis 
non est indulgendum [malice must not be 
indulged].349 
 
                                                          
345 Roscoe Pound calls this stage the “socialisation of law” in Pound (1914), (note 243) 226. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Louis Josserand, “De L’esprit des droits et de leur relativité: Théorie dite de l’abus des droits”, 
(2nd Edition), (1939), 388 cited and translated in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 996. 
348 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1195, footnote 114. 
349 Cheng (2006), (note 190) 122. 
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2. An Act within the Formal Limits of the Right 
 
255. Abuse of rights presupposes that the act in question is done within the formal 
limits of a given right. This necessarily excludes from the ambit of abuse of 
rights two types of conduct often confused with abuse of rights: acts done 
without a right, and acts in excess of the scope of the right. 
 
256. Where an individual’s action is undertaken without a right, this is purely an 
illicit act, or an ultra vires, but not an abuse of a right; it is impossible to speak 
of an abuse of a right which does not exist.350 
 
257. Additionally, where the conduct of an individual deviates from the official 
limits of a right and demonstrates conduct outside or in excess of the scope of 
the right, this is simply an excessive act: acts beyond the boundaries of the 
right, but not an abuse of the right.351 A contrario, abuse of rights is an act 
done within the formal limits of a right, but fails to enjoy legal protection given 
the circumstances in which the right was exercised.352 
 
258. If one enjoys a pedestrian path easement over another’s land,353 and if the 
easement right holder decides to drive his car across the property, this is not an 
abuse of right, but is rather an act in excess of, and outside the scope of, the 
right. The right is defined and qualified and does not include the right to use an 
automobile. Thus, such conduct simply demonstrates acts beyond the 
boundaries of the right and may comprise a different tort, such as trespass.354 
Moreover, it is not an abuse of right, if the individual does not have the right to 
enter onto the adjoining property in the first place (does not enjoy a pedestrian 
path easement in the first place). 
 
259. A contrario, if the right holder exercised his right within its formal limits albeit 
unreasonably, or for a purpose other than that for which the right was granted, 
                                                          
350 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 983; Walton (1909), (note 42) 505. 
351 Angus (1962), (note 9), 151; Devine (1964), (note 97) 148. 
352 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 983; Angus (1962), (note 9), 151. 
353 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 11. 
354Ibid. 
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this may constitute an abuse. For example, if the right holder constantly 
walked across the property for no legitimate or serious reason, other than to 
annoy the neighbours or to harass them, this may qualify as an abuse of 
right.355 
 
260. The above distinction reveals that the scope of application of abuse of rights as 
opposed to excessive acts may depend on the nature and the 
limitation/qualification imposed on the right in question. Rights that are 
defined in general terms, conferred in an abstract manner, and do not have a 
priori statutory or judicial qualification may be more subject to the possibility 
of being abused. For such rights, the principle serves as a tool to introduce a 
posteriori judicial qualification.356 On the other hand, acts done outside of, or 
in excess of, the scope of rights seem to relate more to rights that are carefully 
defined and qualified.357 Thus, abuse of rights enables the decision maker to 
articulate more detailed rules, or qualifications, with regard to a right conferred 
in general terms.358 
 
261. The presumption that one must have a right in order to speak of an abuse of 
rights is often emphasised by scholars and courts/arbitral tribunals.359 This is 
fortified by the case of State Bank of Commerce v. Demco of Louisiana,360 
which pertained to lender liability. In this case, an officer of the lending 
institution has written a letter pertaining to the debtor and sent it to a third 
                                                          
355 Ibid. 
356 Palombella (2006), (note 37) 11. 
357 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 17; Kazuaki Sono and Yasuhiro Fujioka, “The Role of the Abuse of Right 
Doctrine in Japan”, 35 Louisiana Law Review 1037, 1046-1047 (1975); Palombella (2006), (note 
37) 11; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 355. This conclusion is further manifested by the fact that civil 
legal systems, as well as international law, often confer rights in general terms and thus embrace the 
principle of abuse of rights, unlike common law systems where rights are rather defined and 
qualified, and hence it is usually provided that an abuse of rights principle is not necessary. Catala 
& Weir (1964), (note 41) 237-238. 
358 Sono & Fujioka (1975), (note 357) 1046-1047. 
359 Robert Biever, “Speech” in Council of Europe “Abuse of Rights and Equivalent Concepts: The 
Principle and its Present Day Application”, (Strasbourg 1990) 21; Brabandere (2012), (note 60) 
619-620; Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1195; Petrova (2004), (note 187) 469; George A. 
Rosenberg, “The Notion of Good Faith in the Civil Law of Quebec”, 7 McGill Law Journal 2, 21 
(1960); ConocoPhillips v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits dated 3 September 2013, para. 273; Chevron Corporation 
(USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 34877, Interim Award dated 1 December 2008, para. 137. 
360 State Bank of Commerce v. Demco of Louisiana, 483 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986). 
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party. The debtor filed a case and sought damages given that the letter caused 
damages to his business and to his reputation. The court refused to apply abuse 
of rights given that the lending institution (State Bank) did not have the right to 
send this letter in the first place, and thus it was futile to speak of an abuse of 
rights.361 
 
3. Rights Susceptible of Abuse 
 
262. A review of the different civil legal systems testify to the historic evolution of 
abuse of rights. While it first began operating in the domain of property law,362 
its scope and reach then extended to all legal matters, and it became 
established that there is a general principle of abuse of rights that limits the 
abusive exercise of any right.363 
 
263. Thus, the scope of abuse of rights includes both substantive364 and procedural 
rights.365 It is interesting to note a Dutch case that involved the question of 
whether the right to appeal was abusive.366 In this case, a husband has 
appealed against a decree of separation. It was provided that the husband had 
no serious interest in appealing the decree, but appealed for the purpose of 
harming his wife. The husband’s attorney served the writ of appeal late in 
order to prevent the wife from cross-appealing the separation decree. 
According to Dutch law, if such appeal was allowed, the wife would have been 
precluded from the alimony. The court found that this procedural right has 
                                                          
361 Ibid, 1122. 
362 Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 994. 
363 Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So. 2d 93, 99 (La. 1975); Walton (1909), (note 42) 505; Byers 
(2002), (note 10) 392; Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 222-225; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 967. 
364 Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984); Redmann (1987), (note 9) 964; 
Kawaguchi v. Mizunoya, 24 Minshu 2015 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 11, 1970); Obonai v. Orizume Sangyo 
Co., 19 Minshu 2212 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1965) cited in Sono & Fujioka (1975), (note 357) 1044-
1045 (applying abuse of rights in contractual disputes in Japan). 
365 Taniguchi (2000), (note 118); Walton (1909), (note 42) 508; Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1033; Byers 
(2002), (note 10) 392; Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 225; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 967; 
Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 999 (regarding French law and law of Quebec); Brunner (1977), (note 
277) 743-745 regarding Dutch law; Devine (1964), (note 97) 154; Egyptian Court of Cassation, 
Session held on 27 February 2012, Challenge No. 266, Judicial Year 71; Egyptian Court of 
Cassation, Session held on 13 February 2010, Challenge No. 3317, Judicial Year 67; Egyptian Court 
of Cassation, Session held on 26 May 2004, Challenge No. 5036, Judicial Year 72; Egyptian Court 
of Cassation, Session held on 4 May 1999, Challenge No. 4464, Judicial Year 68. 
366 H.R. 26 June 1959, N.J. 1961, no. 553 cited in Brunner (1977), (note 277) 743. 
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been exercised for a purpose other than that for which it was granted and was 
exercised without a legitimate interest.367 
 
264. Moreover, it is submitted that any right is susceptible of being abused.368 In 
this regard, one partially disagrees with the distinction made by Josserand and 
the consequences he reached based on such distinction. According to 
Josserand, certain rights may be regarded as absolute rights.369 
 
265. Absolute rights are those sacrosanct rights that are conferred by the law upon 
the individual to be exercised without any limitation. Absolute rights, 
according to Josserand, are not susceptible of being abused given that the 
interests of the society lies in the uncontrolled exercise of those rights. A 
parents’ right to oppose their child’s marriage was often referred to as the 
epitome of an absolute right.370  
 
266. However, it is difficult to identify a set of legal rights that are not susceptible 
of being subject to statutory/judicial qualifications and limits, or not 
susceptible of abuse.371  
 
267. In this regard, while Josserand expressly provides that the right of a parent to 
oppose the child’s marriage is the epitome of absolute rights, this submission is 
rather questionable given that there are cases, including a case examined by 
Josserand himself, where it was held that the father’s refusal of his son’s 
                                                          
367 Brunner (1977), (note 277) 743. 
368 This equally applies to any arbitration-related right: ICC Case No 13209/DK/RCH, dated 25 
November 2005, referred to in Wilske (2009), (note 59) 207; Phoenix Action v. The Czech Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award dated 15 April 2009, para. 107; (“every rule of law includes an 
implied clause that it should not be abused”); Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of 
Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 17 December 
2015, under UNCITRAL Rules, para. 404; Karel Daele, “Challenge and Disqualification of 
Arbitrators in International Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2012), 103-104; Christoph 
Brunner, “Note – Federal Supreme Court, 28 April 2000”, 18 ASA Bulletin 566, 576 (2000). 
369 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 28. 
370 Ibid; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 354. 
371 Paolo Grossi, “Legal Absolutism and Private Law in the XIX Century”, in Alessandro Pizzorusso 
(ed.), “Italian Studies in Law”, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 8 (“the absolutist house of cards crudely 
appeared as what in large part it had really been: an intelligent, very clever fiction”; Morris R. 
Cohen, “On Absolutisms in Legal Thought”, 84 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 681 
(1936); Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 235; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 16-18. 
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marriage was abusive.372 Accordingly, the sanctity of rights and absolutism 
theory may appear vacuous in content. 
 
268. Rather than advocating the existence of absolute rights, it is submitted that a 
more coherent conclusion would be that rights which are carefully defined, 
limited and qualified in their scope are less susceptible to abuse,373 and that 
certain rights may have thus far successfully resisted being subject to an abuse 
test.374 
 
269. Abuse of rights is not limited to private rights, but equally applies to prevent 
the abuse of public law rights.375 In an arbitration held under the auspices of 
the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration 
(CRCICA), the application of abuse of rights in administrative law and to 
administrative contracts was addressed.376 An administrative contract was 
concluded for the provision of paper for printing from an Asian company. 
Pursuant to the contract, claimants were required to issue a letter of guarantee 
of 5% of the value of products to be reduced after each shipment. The 
respondent then requested a new letter of guarantee of 20% of the value of one 
of the shipments. Although this was not stipulated in the contract, claimants 
submitted it. A force majeure existed due to the civil war that occurred in the 
country of the Asian company. The respondent claimed the value of the two 
letters of guarantee, did not pay the price of other shipments and started 
another procurement. Claimants initiated arbitration proceedings. 
 
270. The arbitral tribunal, sitting in Egypt and applying Egyptian law, recognised 
first that all contracts, civil and administrative, are subject to the principle of 
                                                          
372 B. v. C., Lyon, 23 January 1907, Dalloz 1908.2.73, note Josserand, Sirey 1909.2.310, cited in 
Crabb (1964), (note 12) 16; Walton (1909), (note 42) 507-508. 
373 Perillo (1996), (note 38) 48-49. 
374 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 16. 
375 It is submitted that abuse of rights is an intrinsic part of administrative law: the concept of 
détournement de pouvoir. Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1002 citing Josserand, “De L’esprit des Droits 
Et De Leur Relativité”, (2d.), (1939), (“when a public administrator commits a distortion (or 
misuse, “détournement” of power, it is also at the same time an abuse of right for which he is liable, 
with only this difference that the abuse concerns a right related to the public function and not to a 
private function.”). 
376 Two African printing companies v. An African printing authority, Final Award, CRCICA Case No. 
154 of 2000, 3 August 2000, in M. E. I. Alam Eldin (ed), “Arbitral Awards of the Cairo Regional 
Centre for International Commercial Arbitration II”, (Kluwer Law International 2003), 45-50. 
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good faith. Furthermore, the tribunal provided that the respondent had 
breached the good faith principle and had abused its rights.377 In reaching this 
conclusion, the tribunal relied on several judgments of the Egyptian 
Administrative Courts (State Council), whereby abuse of rights was applied to 
administrative contracts to limit the abusive exercise of rights by 
administrative authorities. 
 
271. The principle is recognised as a general principle of international law,378 and 
has been used to limit the abuse of rights under public international law, such 
as: the right to expel aliens, the state’s right to close its ports to foreign 
commerce, to assess the reasonableness of the discretionary power of states, 
and to the question of interference with or diversion of waters of rivers that 
flows from one state to another.379  
 
272. The principle equally applies to limit the abusive exercise of rights conferred 
upon the courts/arbitrators.380 
 
273. In the ICSID case of Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, the tribunal had to examine 
whether the Bangladesh court committed an abuse of rights. The Bangladesh 
court exercised its right of supervisory jurisdiction over an ICC arbitral 
tribunal and decided to revoke the tribunal’s authority. Upon examining the 
factual matrix of the case, the ICSID tribunal found that such decision lacked 
any sound legal or factual grounds.381 After acknowledging that national courts 
may have the right to revoke arbitral tribunals’ authority in cases of 
misconduct, the tribunal found that such discretionary power has been 
exercised for reasons other than that for which they were conferred. The 
tribunal stated: “the standard for revocation used by the Bangladesh courts 
and the manner in which the judge applied the standard to the facts indeed 
constituted an abuse of right”.382 
                                                          
377 Ibid, 46. 
378 Kotuby & Sobota (2017), (note 64) 108. 
379 Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 297-299. 
380 Award in Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, 30 June 2009, paras 149-161; 
Taniguchi (2000), (note 118) 174. 
381 Ibid, paras 154-155. 
382 Ibid, para. 159. 
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274. In conclusion, while one acknowledges that certain rights may have not, 
hitherto, been subject to the principle of abuse of rights, it is submitted that this 
emanates from the view that such rights have been: 
 
[A]lready modified by exclusions embracing most 
of those factors that would otherwise have been 
looked upon as abuses. That doesn’t amount to 
much of an absolute right if its absoluteness 
depends on conceding in advance those things 
that would be most liable to be condemned as 
abuses, whereby doing those things then falls into 
the category of excesses [excessive use of right or 
acts beyond the scope of a right] rather than 
abuses.383 
 
B. Abuse of the Right 
 
275. The second condition for the principle’s application is that the right holder 
must have exercised his right in an abusive manner. However, for this 
condition to be fulfilled, one must determine what conduct/behaviour 
constitutes an abuse. In other words, courts need certain criteria to determine 
whether one’s conduct is abusive. 
 
276. Courts do not generally rely on one test. They endorse a number of different 
tests/criteria and establish abuse if any of the tests is fulfilled. 
 
277. That said, an abuse of right is established if one of the following criteria is 
fulfilled: (1) exercise of the right with an intent to harm; (2) exercise of the 
right for a purpose other than that for which it was granted; (3) if the right 
holder could not reasonably have decided to exercise it, given the disparity 
between the interests pursued and the potential harm caused thereby; or (4) 
exercise of the right contrary to the principle of good faith.384 
 
                                                          
383 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 17. 
384 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 985-1003; Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1180; Perillo (1996), (note 
38) 47; Exnicios (1987), (note 38) 946-949. 
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278. In this next section, one will briefly shed light on the different criteria applied 
by courts. In doing so, one attempts to emphasise: the manifest interrelation 
between the different criteria; highlight that the criteria often overlap which 
renders some of them superfluous and pinpoint any limitations associated 
thereto. 
 
1. Exercise of the Right with an Intent to Harm 
 
279. Abuse is established if the right holder exercises the right for the purpose of 
harming another individual. This demonstrates the classic form of conduct 
tainted with abuse.385 
 
280. This criterion of abuse is endorsed by most laws that acknowledge the 
principle.386 Legal systems that adopt a restrictive approach to abuse of rights, 
such as Germany387 and Italy,388 tend to limit the principle’s application to 
rights exercised for the purpose of inflicting harm on another individual. 
 
281. In relation to rights that are exercised for more than one purpose, it is the 
predominant view that abuse is still established based on this criterion if the 
primary purpose/motive for exercising the right was to inflict harm.389 
 
                                                          
385 Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 994 and 1000; Articles (226) of the German Civil Code; Article (833) 
of the Italian Civil Code; Article (1295.2) of the Austrian Civil Code; Article (7) of the Spanish 
Civil Code; Colmar, 2 May 1855, D.P. 1856.2.9, 10, cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 965; 
Crabb (1964), (note 12) 13; Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 
1009 (La. 1979); Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 4 April 1985, Challenge No. 1244, 
Judicial Year 54; Article (30) of the Kuwaiti Civil Code. 
386 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 991; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 13; French Cour d’Appel de 
Montpellier, 1e Chambre section c2, 21 October 2015, No. de RG: 14/06363; French Court of 
Cassation, 24 June 2015, First Civil Chamber, Appeal No. 14-17795. 
387 Article (226) of the German Civil Code. 
388 Article (833) of the Italian Civil Code limits the abuse of rights principle to the malicious intention 
of the right holder. Similarly, it is often stated that Austrian courts tend to limit the application of 
the principle to cases of malicious intention. Voyame, Cottier and Rocha (1990), (note 26) 28-30. 
389 This is the case in French law, Swiss law, Louisiana law and Egyptian law. Affaire Clément-
Bayard, Req., August 3, 1915, D.P.III.1917.1.79, cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 981; Crabb 
(1964), (note 12) 13; Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1033 and 1036; Trushinger v. Pak, 513 So. 2d 1151, 
1154 (La. 1987); Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. 521 So. 2d 481 (La. 1988); Sanhouri (2010), 
(note 195) 757-759. 
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282. This criterion entails a subjective test and may thus comprise an intricate 
criterion of abuse; one which is problematic from a pure evidentiary legal 
stance.390 To that end, Julio Cueto-Rua rightly stipulates that:  
 
Whoever seeks recovery of damages caused by 
abusive use of rights and has to prove the 
presence of the intent to harm faces the 
troublesome question of producing clear evidence 
of a psychological process. This difficulty may 
defeat the aims which the doctrine of abuse of 
rights has sought to achieve.391 
 
283. The subjective criterion of an intent to harm has the advantage of a definitive 
test of abuse. It is definitive from a theoretical legal stance in terms of carefully 
drawing a line between acts that are abusive and acts that are not, by limiting 
the latter by proof of malice.392 However, as articulated by Gutteridge, the fact 
that it primarily relies on investigating a psychological element (motive), as 
well as introducing a largely ethical component in the evaluation of the act in 
question, may render it ineffective.393 
 
284. The same conclusion has been reached by Pierre Catala and John Weir, where 
they provided that proving the “malicious intention may present a difficult 
problem for the plaintiff. As questions of intention belong to the category of 
inward mental and emotional processes, there is no means of establishing with 
scientific accuracy the defendant’s ill will or malice (apart from his own 
admission or pentothal)”.394 
 
285. This difficulty is evident in the context of international arbitration, where 
parties allege an abuse of right but tribunals do not find an abuse for the lack of 
proof of an intention to cause harm.395 In this regard, in the case of Saluka 
                                                          
390 Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 224; Edmeades (1978), (note 41) 137-138; Cueto-Rua (1975), 
(note 30) 988. 
391 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 995, footnote 92. 
392 Rosenberg (1960), (note 359) 21; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 25. 
393 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 26. 
394 Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 224-225. 
395 Atlantic Triton Company Limited v. People’s Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/1, Award dated 21 April 1986, 3 ICSID Reports 13; Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 770. 
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Investments v. the Czech Republic,396 the respondent claimed that in initiating 
the arbitral proceedings, the claimant had ulterior motives. Specifically, it was 
alleged that bringing the proceedings was abusive since its purpose was to take 
advantage of the delay which would take place during the arbitration, and take 
advantage of the running of the statute of limitation to prevent the respondent 
State to bring civil or criminal actions.397 While acknowledging that the 
existence of such ulterior motive may be abusive, the tribunal held that such 
allegation is unsubstantiated as no proof of malice had been provided.398 
 
286. The difficulty in applying a purely subjective criterion of abuse is further 
fortified by the fact that German courts rarely rely on Section (226) of the 
German Civil Code, which expressly adopts the intent to harm as the criterion 
of abuse,399 to the extent that some hold it inoperative.400 A contrario, courts 
tend to rely on Sections (242) and (826) of the Code pertaining to acts contrary 
to good faith and acts exercised in a manner contra bonos mores, given that the 
latter provisions comprise an objective test of abuse and do not require proof of 
malice.401 
 
287. It is worth noting that some scholars provide that an exercise of the right 
without a legitimate or serious interest is another, stand-alone, criterion of 
abuse.402 While one does not attempt to refute this, it seems that the ‘legitimate 
or serious interest’ criterion rather comprises an objective imperative indicium 
used by courts to prove and determine an intent to harm.403 To that effect, it 
has been rightly stated that “the objective test of a person not deriving any 
                                                          
396 Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award, registered by the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, dated 17 March 2006. 
397 Ibid, para. 184. 
398 Ibid, para. 236. 
399 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 694, note 145; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 995, 
footnote 92. 
400 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 37. 
401 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 694, note 145; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 995, 
footnote 92. 
402 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 992. 
403 Knapp (1983) (note 8) 110; Scholtens (1958), (note 40) 43; Brunner (1977), (note 277) 739; 
Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 32; Rosenberg (1960), (note 359) 21-22. 
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benefit from the act serves as a presumption for the existence of the malicious 
intention”.404 [Emphasis added]. 
 
288. Accordingly, it is submitted that embracing such an indicium is an attempt to 
deviate from the extreme subjective nature of the intent to harm criterion, 
given its inherent perplexities from an evidentiary point of view. In this regard, 
it seems that: 
 
Plaintiffs have been rescued from this difficulty 
[proving an intent to harm] by the judges who, 
starting from the facts of the case, presume an 
intention to cause damage. In this inquiry, there 
is one very weighty piece of evidence: the lack of 
any real interest or benefit for the defendant. 
Where the author of an act which harms his 
neighbor has acted without seeking any material 
advantage for himself, without deriving any 
personal benefit from his action, one is justified in 
supposing that he was inspired by the sole motive 
of causing damage to another person. This 
complete absence of any motive of material self-
interest for the performance of the harmful act, 
allows the court to deduce as a psychological 
certainty (though not a scientific one) the 
existence of an intention to cause harm.405 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
289. Thus, the legitimate/serious interest indicium has been adopted by the courts as 
a presumption of malice and may comprise a rule of evidence: res ipsa 
loquitur.406 This conclusion can be equally inferred from the decisions of the 
courts where evincing an intent to harm is often presumed where it is shown 
that there is no serious or legitimate interest on the part of the right holder.407 
 
                                                          
404 Scholtens (1958), (note 40) 43; Amos & Walton (1967), (note 86) 219. 
405 Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 224-225. 
406 Res ipsa loquitur entails an evidentiary rule where a plaintiff establishes a rebuttable presumption 
of fault/negligence on the part of the defendant/right holder. Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 225. 
407 Amos & Walton (1967), (note 86) 220. 
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290. For example, in the French Saint Galmier case,408 which involved adjacent 
springs yielding mineral water, where an owner of one of the springs installed 
and operated a pump which greatly diminished the water yielded from the 
adjacent spring owned by another individual. The plaintiff requested the court 
to order the defendant to reduce the operation of the installed pump. Despite 
the defendant’s assertion that he was merely exercising his right, the court 
provided that the right-holder cannot exercise his right if it is exclusively 
inspired by an intent to inflict harm on another.409 While there was no proof of 
malice, the court inferred such intention from the fact that the defendant 
obtained no serious benefit from his act.410 
 
291. This is also the case in the Egyptian jurisprudence, where malice is established 
if it is proven that the right holder has no legitimate or serious interest in 
exercising the right in question.411 In this regard, the Egyptian Court of 
Cassation often provides that an exercise of a right is abusive where the right 
holder exercises it with an intent to harm, which is established if the right is 
exercised with no serious or legitimate interest.412 The term “which is 
established only if the right is exercised with no serious or legitimate interest” 
is regularly found in the rulings of the courts, and clearly testifies to the fact 
that the serious/legitimate interest test is used by courts merely as an indicium 
of malice, rather than as a stand-alone criterion of abuse. 
 
292. Accordingly, the criterion of intent to harm and that of serious and legitimate 
interest are not necessarily separate, but are greatly intertwined from a 
                                                          
408 Saint Galmier case, Lyon, April 18, 1856, D.P. 1856.2.199 cited in Robilant (2010), (note 9) 69-
70; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 965-966; French Court of Cassation, 8 October 2015, Third Civil 
Chamber, Appeal No. 14-16216. 
409 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 965-966. 
410 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 33. 
411 Explanatory Memorandum of the Egyptian Law No. 131 of 1948 Promulgating the Civil Code, 32-
33; Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 759-760; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 371. 
412 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 9 February 2012, Challenge No. 15906, Judicial 
Year 80; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 26 May 2004, Challenge No. 5036, Judicial 
Year 72; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 22 April 2003, Challenge No. 2633, Judicial 
Year 72; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 4 May 1999, Challenge No. 4464, Judicial 
Year 68; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 13 July 1999, Challenge No. 2886, Judicial 
Year 68. 
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practical point of view.413 
 
2. Exercise of the Right for a Purpose other than that for which 
it was Granted 
 
293. This criterion of abuse is of concrete importance as its rationale and 
application differed over time. This variation helps elucidate and depict the 
transformation of abuse of rights: from having a clear social perception 
(preserving the interests of the society and/or State), to emphasising its 
corrective role in balancing the competing/conflicting interests of the parties. 
 
294. During the nineteenth century, abuse of rights was of potency in French law as 
a response to the then rampant absolutism of possessive individualism.414 The 
individualistic school of legal thought was vehemently attacked, and it was 
submitted that legal rights are not absolute; they are conferred on an individual 
to achieve a certain purpose. Defying the said purpose renders the exercise of a 
right abusive.415 To that effect, some provided that “to abuse a right is to 
proceed, intentionally or unintentionally, against the purpose of the institution 
of which one has misunderstood the finality and the function”.416 Thus, a 
functional and teleological approach to rights has emerged, where rights are 
exercised in accordance with their function. 
 
295. Accordingly, this criterion of abuse presupposes that rights do not exist in a 
vacuum or in stasis; they are conferred upon the right holder for a specific 
social purpose, and the exercise of the right is merely a means to satisfy such 
                                                          
413 In this regard, Amos & Walton noted that “in practice, the [courts] do not search for the 
subjective intention to do harm, but infer that from the commission of acts consistent with no other 
intention” [Emphasis added], Amos & Walton (1967), (note 86) 220. 
414 Post the French revolution, the political-social philosophy of liberalistic individualism was 
prevalent. According to this, individual interests prevailed over the collective interests of the 
community, as an individual was perceived as the supreme entity. Individuals were immune from 
any responsibility for damages caused in the exercise of rights. András Sajó, “Abuse: The Dark Side 
of Fundamental Rights”, (Eleven International Publishing 2006) 29; Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1016-
1017; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 5 and 18; Reid (1998), (note 88) 133. 
415 Greaves (1935), (note 109) 443-444. 
416 Louis Josserand, “De I ‘esprit des droits et de leur Relativité: Théorie dite dès l'Abus des Droits”, 
(2d ed. 1925), cited in Gordley (2011), (note 31) 36; Herman (1977), (note 16) 754. 
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prescribed purpose. If the holder of the right derogates from the very purpose 
of its existence, it may be abusive given the factual matrix of the case.417 
 
296. Moreover, according to this criterion, rights are conferred upon individuals for 
the satisfaction of certain ends, which do not necessarily benefit the right 
holder, but more importantly, benefit the whole society.418 That said, one 
submits that this social emphasis of the criterion demonstrates that the role of 
abuse of rights was to prioritise the interests shared by the society, rather than 
the interests of another individual. To that end, in defining abuse based on this 
criterion, it was submitted that abuse of rights is inspired from “clearly social 
conceptions”,419 and that a right has: 
 
[A] function to perform in its social setting, and 
must be considered in relation to the needs and 
rights of society at large. The key to interpreting 
rights is to place them in their social milieu, and 
as so placed, determine what rationally must be 
their function or range of functions. If the right is 
being exercised for a purpose at variance with the 
nature and function of the right, then there is 
abuse and resulting liability.420 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
297. Emphasis on the social element of abuse of rights was clearly evident in the 
Soviet Code of 1923, which was prefaced by a clause that read: “civil rights 
are protected by the law except in those cases in which they are exercised in a 
sense contrary to economic and social purposes”.421  
 
                                                          
417 Walton (1909), (note 42) 501; Louis Josserand, “De I ‘esprit des droits et de leur Relativité: 
Théorie dite dès l'Abus des Droits”, (2d ed. 1925), cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 1001; Prest 
v. Petrodel Resources Ltd., [2013] 2 A.C. 415, 17, providing that abuse of rights in the civil legal 
systems extends not just to the illegal and improper invocation of a right, but also to its use for a 
purpose other than that for which it exists; Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 39, 
Judgment of 5 February 1970) 56; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hunt, 371 So. 2d 342 (La. Ap. 4th 
Cir.), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 657 (1979), 343-344; Exnicios (1987), (note 38) 963-964. 
418 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1018; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 27-28; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 18; 
Byers (2002), (note 10) 393; Robilant (2010), (note 9) 93-94. 
419 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 18. 
420 Ibid, 19-20. 
421 Greaves (1935), (note 109) 454; Byers (2002), (note 10) 393; Article (30) of the Kuwaiti Civil 
Code.  
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298. This implies an overly socialist approach/conception of rights which, arguably, 
may not reconcile with the currently prevailing economic and/or political 
environment. Moreover, delineating the social purpose and the function of the 
right in question is not an easy task. Such difficulty is confirmed by the fact 
that some legal systems opted to totally abandon the ‘purpose of the right’ as a 
criterion of abuse. In this regard, the Egyptian law and the French law appear 
to be good epitomes to illustrate this issue. 
 
299. A review of the legislative history of abuse of rights under Egyptian law 
demonstrates that, in codifying the criteria of abuse, the Egyptian legislator has 
considered, and deliberately refrained from referring to: the social purpose of 
the right.422 In setting this criterion aside, the Egyptian legislator 
acknowledged its theoretical flaws and its practical pitfalls. 
 
300. From a purely theoretical stance, it seems difficult to carefully ascertain the 
precise socio-economic function of each right. The limitation of the social 
purpose criterion is further manifested in its implementation.423 Given its 
inherently broad terms and its relative nature, the social purpose test bears 
undeterminable variable parameters, as it primarily relies on an individual 
assessment of each decision maker.424 This may be precarious as it may 
dangerously shift the prevalent role of courts/tribunals, from merely applying 
the law to capriciously affecting its creation. Thus, it arguably defies the legal 
certainty needed in a criterion of abuse. 
 
301. A similar approach has been taken in French law. While it was the 
predominant view that the social function of rights constitutes a criterion of 
abuse under French law,425 it is often advocated that this is no longer the case. 
Pirovano, who carefully examined the decisions of French courts in this 
                                                          
422 The legislative history of Article (5) of the Egyptian Civil Code testifies to that effect. Prior to 
opting for the ‘legitimate interest’ criterion, the social purpose criterion was considered: 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Egyptian Law No. 131 of 1948 Promulgating the Civil Code, 33. 
However, some judges refer to the social purpose criterion in applying abuse of rights: Egyptian 
Court of Cassation, Session held on 27 February 2005, Challenge No. 871, Judicial Year 74. 
423 Morcos (1988), (note 192) 348; Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 762-763.  
424 Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 762-763; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 348. 
425 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 1001-1002. 
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regard, concluded that the social purpose criterion, as developed by Josserand, 
is not generally accepted by the courts.426 In his view, determining the social 
function of rights may be a difficult matter to be left to judicial discretion, 
given that it comprises a political question which the decision maker is not 
well-prepared to decide.427 
 
302. This approach is equally shared by other prominent scholars, who submit that 
the social purpose criterion is difficult to identify.428 To that effect, Gutteridge 
provided that: 
 
It may perhaps also be observed that a rule which 
leaves it to the discretion of a judge to determine 
the social or economic purpose of a statute, is 
open to grave objection. The political prejudices 
of the individual cannot fail to tincture his 
interpretation of a rule of this kind, and no judge 
should be placed in the invidious position of being 
compelled to adjudicate in such circumstances.429 
 
303. Moreover, the social element of this criterion is difficult to grasp and appears 
to lack juridical explanation. It affords no explanation as to why an anti-social 
exercise of right is deemed unlawful.430 Notwithstanding the above, the 
‘purpose of the right’ criterion remains applicable in a number of legal 
systems. For example, Article (281) of the Greek Civil Code emphasises the 
social function of the right, as it states that “the exercise of a right is prohibited 
where it manifestly exceeds the bounds of good faith, morality or the economic 
or social purpose of that right”.431 Additionally, Article (124) of the Lebanese 
Civil Code of Obligations stipulates that an exercise of a right is abusive if it 
exceeds the aim on account of which such right was conferred.432 Similarly, 
                                                          
426 Pirovano, “La fonction sociale des droits : Réflexions sur le destin des théories de Josserand”, in 
Recueil Dalloz Sirey, sec. Chronique 67, 70 (1972), cited and translated in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 
30) 1001-1002. 
427 Ibid; Reid (1998), (note 88) 137; Greaves (1935), (note 109) 464. 
428 Tête (1987), (note 138) 81-83; Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 230; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 
1002; Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1000. 
429 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 42. 
430 Cheng (2006), (note 190) 131. 
431 Article (281) of the Greek Civil Code, translated in Alexandros Kefalas and Others v. Elliniko 
Dimosio (Greek State) and Organismos Oikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon AE (OAE)., Case 
C-367/96, (1998) ECR I-02843, para. 12. 
432 Article (124) of the Lebanese Civil Code. 
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Article (1071) of the Argentine Civil Code provides that “the regular exercise 
of one’s right or the performance of a legal obligation cannot make illicit any 
act. The law does not protect the abusive exercise of rights. Such will be 
considered the exercise which is contrary to the ends which [the law] took into 
account when they [the rights] were recognized […]”.433 The Belgian law 
equally endorses the purpose of the right amongst the criteria of abuse.434 
Finally, this is fortified by the Louisiana jurisprudence which often refers to 
rights exercised for a purpose other than that for which it was granted, as a 
clear application of abuse of rights.435 
 
304. However, from a practical stance, it appears that in applying this criterion 
some courts do not necessarily engage in a detailed analysis of the social 
and/or economic purpose of the right. A contrario, reference is often made to 
the general purpose of the right conferred and greatly focuses on the 
reasonableness of the act in question, without any explicit reference to, or 
analysis of, the social-economic purpose.436 This conclusion may be inferred 
from decisions rendered by the Louisiana courts. 
 
305. In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hunt,437 the case involved an indemnity 
agreement whereby Hunt (appellant) was obliged to indemnify Travelers 
Indemnity Company (appellee), in consideration for apellee’s agreement to 
provide bonds pertaining to construction works done by another party. The 
appellant’s contractual obligation pertained to indemnification against any 
                                                          
433 Article (1071) of the Argentine Civil Code; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 997; Article (7) of the 
Spanish Civil Code and Article (1185) of the Venezuelan Civil Code. 
434 Voyame, Cottier and Rocha (1990), (note 26) 34; Michelangelo Temmerman, “The Legal Notion 
of Abuse of Patent Rights”, NCCR Trade Regulation, Working Paper No 2011/23, May 2011, 6. 
435 Trushinger v. Pak, 513 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1987); Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. 521 
So. 2d 481 (La. 1988); Ouachita National Bank in Monroe v. Palowsky, 554 So. 2d 108 (La. 1989); 
Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220 (La. 1989); Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. Hammons, 540 So. 
2d 461 (La. 1989); 210 Baronne St. Ltd. Partnership v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 543 So. 2d 
502, 507 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1219 (1989). 
436 Article (30) of the Kuwaiti Civil Code stipulates that an abuse is established where the right is 
exercised for a purpose other than that for which it was granted or if the right holder deviates from 
the social function of the right in question. Notwithstanding the reference to the social purpose of 
the right, Article (30) goes on to provide certain examples of abusive conduct, i.e. where a right is 
exercised with no legitimate interest; if exercised maliciously; if exercised unreasonably; or if the 
damage caused exceeds the normal or reasonable harm that may be endured. 
437 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hunt, 371 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 657 
(1979). 
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claim relating to the issuance of the bonds. The contract granted the appellee 
the “exclusive right to determine for itself and the Indemnitors whether any 
claim or suit brought against the Company or the Principal upon any such 
bond shall be settled or defended and its decision shall be binding and 
conclusive upon the Indemnitors”.438 
 
306. Proceedings were initiated by the appellee to recover certain legal fees that it 
incurred as a result of defending claims related to the issuance of the bonds. 
Given that the attorney’s fees amounted to $10,140.00, while the value of that 
claim was only $2,184.23 (case was heard by the District Court, Court of 
Appeals, and Supreme Court), the appellant argued that the appellee could 
have decided to settle rather than incurring all such legal costs. 
 
307. The court acknowledged that such contention pertains to the principle of abuse 
of rights. It then provided that determining if there is an abuse in this case 
depends on the examination of the purpose for which the right is granted: “If 
the holder of the right exercises the right for a purpose other than that for 
which the right was granted, the right may have been abused”.439 Rather than 
mentioning any social or economic purpose of the contractual right in question, 
the court merely attempted to investigate whether the right was exercised 
solely to benefit the right-holder, the appellee, or to defend the interests of the 
appellant.440 In its decision, the Court stated that:  
 
We therefore find that the appeal of the adverse 
judgment by Travelers did not constitute an abuse 
of a right. The evidence simply does not indicate 
that Travelers pursued this litigation for its own 
purposes while misleading appellants as to the 
ultimate cost, but rather that the actions of 
appellants’ attorney left Travelers with no other 
choice than to appeal. The trial judge ruled in 
accordance with the evidence and we affirm.441 
[Emphasis added). 
 
                                                          
438 Ibid, 343. 
439 Ibid, 343-344. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid, 344. 
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308. The right in question relates to the right to decide whether to defend or settle 
the claim. That said, it appears evident that the court did not necessarily engage 
in any detailed analysis of the social and/or economic function of the 
contractual right. Moreover, it is submitted that the decision of the court and its 
rationale primarily rests on the element of reasonableness of the conduct in 
question. In its decision, the court relied on: (a) whether the appellee exercised 
its contractual right to merely advance its interests or with regard to the 
interests of the appellant; and (b) if there was an alternative option for the 
appellee or whether this constituted the only, or most, effective option. 
 
309. This case is also interesting in conveying that even when examining the 
purpose of the right in question, courts often focus on the individual interests 
of the parties, rather than examining any interests of the society. This may 
demonstrate that while the application of this criterion was originally perceived 
as a tool to protect the interests of the society, it now focuses on balancing the 
competing interests of the individuals.442 
 
310. The case of Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. International Harvester Co.,443 further 
evinces the above submission. This case pertained to a lease agreement that 
provided that the lessee may not sublet the leased premises without the written 
consent of the lessor. Harvester requested Illinois Central’s permission to 
sublease the premises, however, Illinois Central refused. Notwithstanding such 
refusal, Harvester sub-leased the premises. After unsuccessful negotiations, 
Illinois Central initiated proceedings and alleged that Harvester violated the 
lease contract by subletting the premises. Harvester contended that the lessor’s 
exercise of its right to withhold its consent was tantamount to an abuse of 
rights.444 
 
311. After acknowledging the ‘purpose of the right’ as a criterion of abuse,445 the 
court examined whether the lessor’s right to withhold its written consent was 
                                                          
442 Armstrong & LaMaster (1986), (note 245) 18. 
443 Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979). 
444 Ibid, 1013. 
445 Ibid, 1014. In doing so, the Court referred to 1000-1003 of Julia Cueto-Rua Article which pertains 
to the criterion of ‘social purpose of the right’. Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 1000-1003. 
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exercised for a purpose other than that for which it was granted. The court 
provided that:  
 
We cannot say that Illinois Central exercised its 
right to withhold consent to a sublease for a 
purpose other than that for which it was granted. 
The record is devoid of evidence of the parties’ 
intention in placing the clause in the leases. It 
cannot be assumed that the lessor merely sought 
by the clause to protect itself against an 
objectionable subtenant. The parties likely would 
have limited the interdiction to subleases with 
objectionable sublessees if this had been the 
lessor’s only concern.446 [Emphasis added]. 
 
312. This decision testifies to the fact that: (a) the court did not undertake a 
scrupulous analysis of the purpose of the right; (b) the court’s perception and 
understanding of the ‘purpose of the right’ criterion was to examine the 
interests of the individuals and not that of the society. The court’s only proof 
that there was no deviation of the right’s purpose, was that there was no 
evidence of the parties’ intention in placing the clause in the lease agreement.  
 
313. In the case of Modernfold (Bas St-Laurent) Ltée v. New Castle Products,447 the 
Canadian court decided that the use of a contract for purposes other than those 
envisaged by the contracting parties constituted an abuse right. In that case, 
abuse was established given that the manufacturer ended his exclusive 
distribution contract with his agent for the sole purpose of earning the profits 
for himself.448 This decision further confirms that courts tend to focus on the 
individual interests of the parties, rather than examining any social interests. In 
deciding the purpose of the contract, the court focused on the common 
intention of the parties. 
 
314. The above demonstrates that applications of abuse of rights is generally 
concerned with balancing the interests of individuals, rather than focusing on 
the social purpose of rights. This is consistent with French law, where it is 
                                                          
446 Ibid, 1015. 
447 Modernfold (Bas St-Laurent) Ltée v. New Castle Products (Canada) Ltd., [1973] C.S. 220. 
448 Ibid. 
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submitted that the “notion of abus de droit in French Law is a doctrinal 
expression symbolizing a balance of private interests”.449 
 
315. It is worth mentioning that the purpose of the right criterion is regularly used 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) to determine if there 
is an abuse of right in matters of the European Union (“EU”) law.450 In the 
case of Emsland-Stärke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas,451 a German 
company transported goods to Switzerland for the sole purpose of benefiting 
from an export refund provided for in another legislation. Upon doing this, the 
German company returned the goods to Germany and still requested the export 
refund. The CJEU acknowledged that this conduct constitutes an abuse of 
rights. In its decision, the CJEU provided that a “finding of an abuse requires, 
first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal 
observance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of 
those rules has not been achieved”.452 
 
316. Accordingly, it is submitted that this criterion was first adopted to link the 
exercise of a right to the right’s social and economic purpose, and to give the 
principle a social dimension: evaluating the interests of the right holder against 
the interests of the community.453 However, one submits that due to its 
practical difficulty, the application of this criterion now does not necessarily 
have a social element, but is rather applied to determine if the exercise of the 
right was reasonable by examining the legal purpose of the right (such as the 
                                                          
449 Devine (1964), (note 97) 158. 
450 It is worth mentioning that abuse of rights is recognised by the CJEU as a general principle of EU 
law. CJEU case of Hans Markus Kofoed v. Skatteministeriet, 5 July 2007, Case C-321/05, [2007] 
ECR I-5795, para. 38; Lenaerts (2010), (note 36) 1138. 
451 Emsland-Stärke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, CJEU, 14 December 2000, Case C-
110/99, [2000] ECR I-1569 
452 Ibid, para. 52. 
453 In this formulation of abuse of rights, it applied to benefit the society and not necessarily to benefit 
the individual. Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 27-28 (“Law is brought into being for the benefit of the 
community and not for the advantage of the individual”); Greaves (1935), (note 109) 464. 
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common intention of the parties of the contract or the purpose of a treaty),454 
and the interests of the individuals implicated in the dispute.455 
 
3. The Unreasonable Exercise of the Right: the Balancing 
Factor 
 
317. Rights must be exercised reasonably. The exercise of a right is unreasonable 
where the right holder exercises it with minimal serious or legitimate 
interest,456 or where there is disparity between the benefit(s) and prejudice(s) 
resulting from the exercise of the right.457 
 
318. The researcher opts for the term ‘balancing factor’ as investigating the degree 
of reasonableness of a given interest requires a prudent investigation of all 
other relevant interests and balance them in order to determine whether the 
exercise of the right in question is abusive. 
 
319. This conforms to the ‘interest theory’ of rights, which entails that disputes 
generally comprise different competing interests, and the state/decision maker 
must engage in an equipoise in order to “select what interests it regards as 
most worth of protection.”458 
                                                          
454 Yael R. Borman, “Treaty Shopping Through Corporate Restructuring of Investments: Legitimate 
Corporate Planning or Abuse of Rights?”, 24 Hague Yearbook of International Law 359, 368-370 
(2011); Phoenix Action v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award dated 15 April 
2009, para. 142; Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 780. 
455 Tête (1987), (note 138) 70-71. 
456 Karaha Bodas Co. v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Das Gas Bumi Negara 364 F.3d 274 (5th 
Cir. 2004), (“An action violates abuse of rights doctrine if […] the action is totally unreasonable 
given the lack of any legitimate interest in the exercise of the right and its exercise harms another”); 
Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 32. 
457 Edmeades (1978), (note 41) 138; Perillo (1996), (note 38) 47; Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 303-
304, providing that abuse is established, not because of the intention, but because the interests 
injuriously affected are more important; Kiss (1992), (note 22) para. 4; CJEU, 23 Mar. 2000, Case 
C-373/97, Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1705, para. 43; Weinrib (2012), (note 13) 112-115, discussing 
that courts may award damages in lieu of an injunction on the basis of abuse of rights. If monetary 
compensation is adequate for the plaintiff, while issuing an injunction would be oppressive to the 
defendant and the plaintiff would derive no substantial benefit therefrom, courts may apply abuse of 
rights to balance the competing interests and reach equipoise (remedial fairness). 
458 Boyd (1917), (note 329) 824; Pound (1915), (note 322) 104; A. Javier Trevino, “Classic Writings 
in Law and Society”, (Second Edition), (Transaction Publishers 2011), 89-90; Michael Willrich, 
“City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago”, (Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 109; Gordley (2013), (note 339) 289; Brunner (1977), (note 277) 731; Morcos (1988), (note 
192) 372-373. 
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320. The balancing factor presupposes that reasonableness and unrestricted egoism 
are antinomies. If a reasonable person, acting in the same circumstances, 
envisages or expects that his/her exercise of right may cause serious damage to 
another individual, reason and sensibility mandates the right holder to refrain 
from exercising the right in such a manner.459 However, he who envisages the 
possible damages that may occur, accepts such damages, in order to 
materialise his minimal interests defies reasonableness and thus commits an 
abuse of right.460 Accordingly, it is submitted that applying this criterion of 
abuse primarily relies on examining the act in question based on the reasonable 
man construct.461 
 
321. As one acknowledges and endorses the depiction of rights as legally protected 
interests, one submits that adopting the proposed balancing factor in applying 
abuse of rights regards the latter a tool to seek and maintain a fair balance 
between the competing interests of the parties involved. One finds it utmost apt 
to refer to the renowned Bin Cheng who illustrated this in the context of 
international law, so one quotes him in extenso: 
 
The theory of abuse of rights, while protecting the 
legitimate interests of the owner of the right, 
imposes such limitations upon the right as will 
render its exercise compatible with […] the 
legitimate interests of the other contracting party. 
Thus a fair balance is kept between the respective 
interests of the parties and a line is drawn 
delimiting their respective rights. Any 
overstepping of this line by a party in the exercise 
of his right would constitute a breach of good 




                                                          
459 Reid (1998), (note 88) 137; Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 760-761. 
460 Japanese case of Mitamura v. Suzuki, 26 Saiko Saibansho minji hanreishu. 1067 (Sup. Ct., June 27, 
1972), cited in Sono & Fujioka (1975), (note 357) 1037. 
461 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1182. 
462 Cheng (2006), (note 190) 129. 
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(i) The Balancing Factor is an Effective Criterion of Abuse 
 
322. The effectiveness of this criterion emanates from the fact that: (1) it covers 
certain applications of abuse of rights which may not necessarily be covered if 
other criteria are adopted; (2) it is widely used in different legal systems; (3) it 
encompasses other criteria; (4) it is widely used by arbitral tribunals when 
applying abuse of rights as a general principle of law; and (5) it comprises an 
objective standard of abuse. 
 
323. Firstly, courts may establish an abuse of right despite the fact that no fault has 
been committed or proven. As previously mentioned, courts may extend the 
principle to such cases given the gravity of damages caused to an individual 
from the exercise of a right, despite the fact that the right holder is not at 
fault.463 
 
324. The French Court of Cassation rendered a decision expressly adopting such an 
extensive application of abuse of rights.464 In this case, the construction of 
buildings have caused damage to a neighbour who subsequently sought 
compensation. The French Court of Appeal dismissed the case and held that in 
the absence of any fault proven against the right holder, the court cannot order 
compensation based on abuse of rights. However, the Court of Cassation 
vacated the decision and ruled that the right holder may be held liable, 
notwithstanding the absence of fault, if the harm caused exceeds the normal or 
reasonable harm that may be endured by neighbours.465 While it may appear 
that such extension of abuse of rights primarily pertains to the right of property 
or ownership, scholars submit that this was only the starting point of the 
principle’s extension to cases where no fault has been committed.466 
                                                          
463 In some cases, damages are granted even though the right holder is held to not have committed any 
fault, given the harm caused to another individual as a result of the exercise of the right. Mayrand 
(1974), (note 12) at 1000-1002; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 19-20; Reid (1998), (note 88) 131. Article 
(63) of the Qatari Civil Code provides that abuse may also be established if the exercise of right 
causes uncommon extravagant harm/damage to another person. 
464 Epoux Vullion v. Société immobilière Vernet- Christophe Subsequent Developments, JCP 1971. 2. 
16781, translated by Tony Weir. 
465 Ibid. 
466 Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1000-1002, where similar cases in French law and Quebec law are 
provided. 
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325. It is worth mentioning that this is also the case under Shari’a law, where the 
predominant view is that the intention of the right holder is irrelevant, and that 
the principle is primarily concerned with the gravity of damages caused as a 
result of the exercise of the right.467 
 
326. While this extensive application of the principle must be used with great 
caution, one submits that all other criteria of abuse fail to justify this outcome. 
If one presumes that no fault has been committed by the right holder, how can 
one establish an abuse of rights based on malice, deviation of the purpose of 
the right or bad faith? That being said, adopting the balancing factor allows 
courts to extend the application of abuse of rights to cases where no fault was 
committed.468 
 
327. Moreover, in certain cases, abuse of rights may be used by courts to create a 
new contractual right/obligation rather than merely ameliorate the harshness of 
an existing right/obligation (the curative role of abuse of rights). In these 
instances, the principle appears in its most extensive reach and acts more as a 
sword than a shield. In the Canadian case of Posluns v. Enterprises Lormil 
Inc.,469 a contract of lease was concluded whereby the lessee had a right to use 
the leased premises to serve a limited list of food. The lessor then decided to 
open a competing restaurant, which serves some of the listed food in the same 
shopping mall. The contract did not contain any provision restricting the lessor 
from doing this. In an action regarding the payment of the rent, the lessee 
invoked abuse of rights and successfully argued that reasonableness mandates 
that a guarantee of exclusivity be implicitly read into the contract.470 One 
                                                          
467 Nabil Saleh, “The Role of Intention (Niyya) Under Saudi Arabian Hanbali Law”, 23 Arab Law 
Quarterly 347, 349-350 (2009); Sobhi Mahmassani, “The General Theory of the Law of Obligations 
and Contracts under Islamic Jurisprudence”, (Beirut 1972), 35-55. 
468 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), Ad-hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Final award of 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11 (2000); Patuha 
Power Ltd. (Bermuda) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (Indonesia), 14 Mealey’s Int'l 
Arb. Rep. B-1, B-44 (Dec. 1999), where the tribunal used the criterion of reasonableness to establish 
an abuse of right given the unreasonable amount of damages sought by the claimants, despite the 
fact that the claimants were not acting in bad faith. 
469 Quebec Superior Court in Posluns v. Enterprises Lormil Inc., [1990], Quebec 200-05-001584-858, 
J.E. 90-1131 (C.S.), cited in Jukier (1992), (note 28) 235. 
470 Ibid. 
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submits that the balancing factor covers the curative role of abuse of rights. If 
one uses the criterion of malice, proving it does not necessarily justify adding 
or implying a new contractual provision to remedy the victim of abuse. 
Similarly, the derogation of the purpose as a criterion fails to substantiate the 
outcome of the decision in Posluns. If the parties freely chose not to have a 
guarantee of exclusivity, it seems logical to presume that he who invokes the 
absence of such provision is not deviating from the purpose of his contractual 
right, but is rather abiding by it. 
 
328. Secondly, it is submitted that this criterion has gained the widest support in 
national legal systems,471 and is equally endorsed by the CJEU as part of EU 
law and in international law.472 
 
329. As previously mentioned, Article (5) of the Egyptian law explicitly endorses 
the balancing factor and provides that an exercise of right is abusive “if the 
interests pursued are of minor importance, so that they are manifestly 
disproportionate to the harm caused to others”.473  
 
330. This is consistent with the position taken in the Netherlands and Quebec. 
Article (13.2) of the Civil Code of the Netherlands stipulates that abuse of 
rights is established where the right holder could not reasonably have decided 
                                                          
471 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1027-1028; Brunner (1977), (note 277) 731; Trushinger v. Pak, 513 So. 
2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1987); Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. 521 So. 2d 481 (La. 1988); 
Ouachita National Bank in Monroe v. Palowsky, 554 So. 2d 108 (La. 1989); Addison v. Williams, 
546 So. 2d 220 (La. 1989); Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. Hammons, 540 So. 2d 461 (La. 1989); 
210 Baronne St. Ltd. Partnership v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 543 So. 2d 502, 507 (La. App. 
4th Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1219 (1989); Des Cheneaux v. Morin Inc. (1987), 20 Q.A.C. 157; 
Caisse populaire de Baie St-Paul v. Simard, Sup. Ct. Saguenay, No. 24005000043845, 9 September 
1985; Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122; Egyptian Court of Cassation, 
Session held on 24 March 1991, Challenge No. 1238, Judicial Year 56; Egyptian Court of 
Cassation, Session held on 4 April 1985, Challenge No. 1244, Judicial Year 54; Sanhouri (2010), 
(note 195) 760-761; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 372-373; Article (3.13) of the Dutch Civil Code; 
Article (7) of the Spanish Civil Code; ICC Case No. 12456 of 2004, in Jean-Jacquez Arnaldez, Yves 
Derains and Dominique Hascher (eds), “Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 2008-2011”, (Kluwer 
Law International 2013) 826; Nicholae Gradinaru, “Abuse of Rights”, 4 Contemporary Readings in 
Law and Social Justice 1010, 1011 (2012), (discussing the law of Romania); Betul Tiryaki, “The 
Legal Results of the Abuse of Rights in Case of Contradiction to the Formal Rules of Contracts”, 1 
Ankara Bar Review 30, 36 (2008), (discussing Turkish law); Article (30) of the Kuwaiti Civil Code. 
472 CJEU, 23 Mar. 2000, Case C-373/97, Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1705, para. 43; Cheng (2006), 
(note 190) 129; Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 764-765. 
473 Article (5) of the Egyptian Civil Code. 
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to exercise it, given the disproportion between the interests pursued and the 
harm caused thereby.474 Similarly, Article (7) of the Quebec Civil Code 
provides that rights exercised unreasonably constitute an abuse of right.475 
 
331. This proportionality test is precisely what the balancing factor entails. 
According to this criterion, abuse is not defined by an inflexible or rigid 
criterion, but by a careful examination of the factual matrix of the case, and by 
balancing all competing interests.476 
 
332. Other laws do not explicitly refer to the balancing factor. However, a 
comparative synthesis of most laws, including those examined above, reveals 
that the balancing factor comprises an effective criterion of abuse, depicts the 
rationale of the principle, and constitutes the core of all other criteria. Albert 
Mayrand rightly stated that the “theory of the abuse of rights is penetrating our 
law through the combined action of the legislators and of the tribunals. It 
promotes the idea of reasonableness without which justice would disagree 
with the law: summum jus, summa injuria”.477 [Emphasis added]. 
 
333. As previously mentioned, the element of reasonableness is neither peculiar to, 
nor inconsistent with, French law.478 In measuring the degree of 
reasonableness, courts take into consideration the interests served by the 
right’s effectuation and the damage caused by the exercise of the right as shall 
be discussed below. 
 
334. The Egyptian eminent scholars, El Sanhouri and Morcos, confirm that this 
criterion depicts the rationale of abuse of rights.479 Finding an abuse of right 
depends on the degree of reasonableness of the conduct in question, which is 
                                                          
474 Article (13.2) of the Netherlands Civil Code of 1992, translated in Byers (2002), (note 10) 395; 
Netherland’s Supreme Court in Kuipers v. De Jongh, H.R. April 17, 1970, N.J. 1971, no. 89, 
translated in Brunner (1977), (note 277) 739. 
475 Article (7) of Quebec Civil Code, translated in Byers (2002), (note 10) 395. 
476 Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919), 211; Greaves (1935), 
(note 109) 441; Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1182. 
477 Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1012-1013. 
478 Devine (1964), (note 97) 157; French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 2nd, 13 November 2015, no. 13-
28180 discussed below; Reid (1998), (note 88) 137; but cf. Knapp (1983), (note 8) 111. 
479 Morcos (1988), (note 192) 375; Sanhouri (2010), (note 195) 756-761. 
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determined upon the balancing of the competing interests of the right holder 
and the interests of the other individual(s).480 To that effect, Morcos rightly 
stated that in all cases where abuse is established (regardless of which criterion 
is used to establish an abuse), courts engage in a process of balancing the 
competing interests, and finding an abuse necessarily entails that the interests 
of those who oppose the exercise of the right were more important to 
uphold.481 This clearly depicts that the balancing factor, by infusing the 
element of reasonableness, comprises the raison d’être and the basis of abuse 
of rights. 
 
335. A case in Argentina demonstrates that the court may bar one from exercising 
his right if such an exercise is unreasonable or may cause greater damage to 
the other individual.482 The case involved a potential buyer interested in 
acquiring two adjacent apartments in a building. Between both apartments 
there was an internal corridor, which was not owned by anyone, but was to be 
used by all owners of the building. The seller told the potential buyer that he 
might use part of the corridor to enhance the communication between both 
apartments. Following such representation, the buyer bought both apartments. 
Based on Argentinian law, the ownership is transferred to the buyer once a 
formal deed is signed before the notary, and the particulars and extent of the 
ownership rely on the information stated in the deed. There was no mention in 
the deed in relation to the use of the corridor. Following the sale, the buyer 
modified part of the corridor and thereafter, other owners of the building 
brought a suit against him on the grounds that they have a right to use the 
corridor. While it remains evident that the buyer had no right to modify the 
corridor to benefit his apartments, and the owners did possess the right to use 
it, the court analysed the interests at stake; it provided that while such 
modification is important to the buyer, it does not cause any serious damage to 
the other owners. The court concluded that while the other owners have the 
right to use the full corridor, it would be an abuse of rights given that unlike 
                                                          
480 Ibid; Egyptian Court of Cassation, Session held on 26 October 2008, Challenge No. 15487, 
Judicial Year 77, applying the balancing factor to determine if the initiation of proceedings were 
abusive. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Case of Diario La Ley, 22 October 1974, Case No. 71031, cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 
993. 
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the buyer, the other owners did not have a serious interest in exercising their 
right. 
 
336. In Germany, courts use the test of reasonableness to establish whether there is 
an abuse of rights. It is provided that the “notion of reasonableness implies a 
reasonable use of rights. The reasonable man would not carry a legal interest 
to an extreme. The reasonable man test is, therefore, employed by judges as a 
means against abuse of rights”.483 
 
337. The test of reasonableness as a criterion of abuse is neither peculiar to, nor 
inconsistent with, Louisiana law,484 where it is often held that analysing “a 
claim of abuse of rights requires a careful balancing of competing policies”.485 
Moreover, it is submitted that the balancing process is utilised by the courts 
irrespective of the criterion upon which they base their decisions on claims of 
abuse of rights.486 
 
338. Belgian law equally recognises the principle of abuse of rights as an 
application of the general principle of good faith.487 In relation to the criteria of 
abuse, it is well acknowledged that reasonableness, and balancing of the 
competing interests, comprises a criterion of abuse.488 In defining abuse of 
rights, Belgian courts often provide that it is an exercise of a right in a manner 
that a prudent person would not undertake.489 In applying abuse of rights, the 
                                                          
483 Joachim (1992), (note 114) 354. 
484 State Ex Rel. Bailey v. City of W. Monroe, 418 So. 2d 570 (La. 1982). 
485 Armstrong & LaMaster (1986), (note 245) 16. 
486 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hunt, 371 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 657 
(1979), 343-344, as previously mentioned, while this case pertained to the “purpose of the right” as 
a criterion of abuse, the decision of the Court and its rationale were primarily premised on the 
element of reasonableness of the conduct in question; McCastle v. Rollins Envtl. Serv., 456 So. 2d. 
612, 618 (La. 1984); Equipements Select Inc. v. Banque Nationale du Canada, Sup. Ct. Québec, No. 
20005003613820, November 18, 1986 translated in Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle, [1990] 
3 S.C.R. 122, 41, where the court applied the ‘reasonableness’ test, even though it based its decision 
on bad faith as a criterion of abuse: “a thorough analysis of the facts of those cases indicates that 
reasonableness was a determinative factor of ‘bad faith’ or ‘malice’.” 
487 Article (1134.3) of the Belgian Civil Code; Temmerman (2011), (note 434) 6. 
488 Voyame, Cottier and Rocha (1990), (note 26) 34; Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 
521. 
489 Belgian Court of Cassation, 8 February 2001 (A.C. 2001, no. 78); Belgian Court of Cassation, 1 
February 1996 (A.C. 1996, no. 66); Belgian Court of Cassation 21 June 2000 (A.C. 2000, no. 392); 
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Belgian Court of Cassation often holds that an exercise of a right is deemed 
abusive where it appears that the right was exercised without a reasonable 
interest, which is established if there is disparity between the interests which 
are served by the exercise of the right and the interests which could be 
damaged as a result of such exercise.490 
 
339. It is interesting to note a case decided by the Canadian Supreme Court that 
dealt with abuse of rights and the criterion of reasonableness. The case pertains 
to a bank’s right to take possession and liquidate the company’s held assets.491 
In this case, the Court scrupulously examined the principle of abuse of rights in 
the Canadian jurisprudence, evaluated the different criteria adopted by the 
courts in contractual and extra-contractual matters, and concluded that the 
objective criterion of reasonableness is suitable in determining an abuse of 
rights. Applying the law of Quebec, the Court stated that: 
 
The time has come to assert that malice or the 
absence of good faith should no longer be the 
exclusive criteria to assess whether a contractual 
right has been abused [...] there can no longer be 
a debate in Quebec law that the less stringent 
standard of ‘the reasonable exercise’ of a right, 
the conduct of the prudent and reasonable 
individual, as opposed to the more stringent test 
of malice and the absence of good faith, can 
ground liability resulting from an abuse of 
contractual rights.492 [Emphasis added]. 
 
340. In South Africa, it is acknowledged that the criterion used to find an abuse of 
rights is reasonableness. In doing so, South African courts consider other 
elements including the existence of malice, legitimate/serious motive and the 
damages suffered by the exercise of the right.493 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Belgian Court of Cassation, 11 June 1992 (A.C. 1991-92, no. 534); Belgian Court of Cassation, 10 
September 1971 (A.C., 1972, 42), cited in Temmerman (2011), (note 434) 7. 
490 Belgian Court of Cassation, 18 June 1987 (A. C., 1986-1987, 1441); Belgian Court of Cassation, 
19 September 1983 (A.C., 1983-1984, 53-54), cited in Temmerman (2011), (note 434) 7. 
491 Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122, 3-4. 
492 Ibid, 44-45. 
493 Gien v. Gien, 1979 (2) SA 1121 (South Africa); Reid (1998), (note 88) 151. 
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341. Moreover, the balancing factor is not peculiar to the common law’s depiction 
of abuse.494 The English case of Jameel v. Dow Jones illustrates this 
submission. The claimant brought defamation proceedings in relation to an 
alleged defamatory internet article that has been accessed by five people. The 
Court dismissed the claim and, upon considering all the competing interests, 
decided that the claim constitutes an abuse of process. Precisely, the court 
applied the criterion of reasonableness. The court engaged in a balancing 
process between one’s right of freedom of expression under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the protection of one’s reputation. Given the 
minimal damage caused by the publication, the court found the claim 
unreasonable, disproportional and thus constituted an abuse of process.495  
 
342. Thirdly, not only does the balancing factor depict the basis of abuse of rights 
but it is submitted that this criterion is sufficiently broad to encompass the 
other criteria as well. This causes the other criteria to become imperative 
factual elements; indices, which assist courts/tribunals in establishing whether 
the exercise of right was reasonable.496 
 
343. In relation to the exercise of a right with an intent to inflict harm, it is 
submitted that this unequivocally falls under the ambit of the unreasonable 
exercise of rights. If an exercise of a right is abusive where there is disparity 
between the interests and harm caused, the exercise of a right to merely inflict 
harm is, a fortiori, abusive given that the malicious intent is neither a 
legitimate nor a serious interest.497 
 
                                                          
494 Attorney General v. Barker, [2000], 1 F.L.R. 759, where the court noted: “The hallmark of a 
vexatious proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible 
basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to 
inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the 
claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the 
court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and 
proper use of the court process”. 
495 Jameel v. Dow Jones and Co. Inc. [2005] EWCA Civ 75, [2005] QB 946. 
496 Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 780-781, providing that an ‘intent to harm’ should not be a condition, 
but “it should be assessed by tribunals in connection with other criteria – objective ones”). 
497 Walton (1909), (note 42) 502; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 995-996; Milward v. Glaser (1949) 4 
SA 931 (South African case providing that malice necessarily means that the exercise of the right 
was unreasonable); Reid (1998), (note 88) 151. 
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344. A contextual analysis of the different competing interests at stake must be 
conducted in order to establish abuse. Whilst such analysis is not necessary 
where the right holder has no legitimate or serious interest at all, it is 
indispensable in cases where the right is exercised for a pretext of a fictitious 
or minimal interest that is outweighed by the harm caused. 
 
345. In this regard, cases that involve a mixture of motives do not seem to be 
challenging if courts adopt the balancing factor. Where a right holder is driven 
by plurality of motives, some legitimate or serious, such as to seek an 
economic advantage, (as was the case in the affaire Clément-Bayard), the 
balancing factor enables decision makers to examine all the particulars of the 
case, any motives associated with the exercise of the right, and decide if the 
conduct in question is unreasonable. As stated in the affaire Clément-Bayard, 
the Court found an abuse given that the right holder expected the possible 
damages that may occur, accepted such damages, with the purpose of reaching 
his ends on capitalising his profits, to the detriment of Clément-Bayard. In 
reaching its decision, it seems palpable that the Court indirectly adopted the 
balancing factor. While a legitimate motive existed, and the right holder was 
not acting directly to cause harm to another, the analysis of the competing 
interests at stake revealed to the court that the predominant motive was an 
illegitimate one and the exercise was unreasonable. 
 
346. Additionally, in relation to the exercise of a right for a purpose other than that 
for which it was granted, this equally falls under the ambit of the balancing 
factor and constitutes an indicium to assist courts in finding an abuse. 
Measuring the reasonableness of the act in question necessarily entails an 
investigation of the purpose of the exercise of the right and how it impacted 
others.498 The leading Japanese case of Mitamura v. Suzuki clearly illustrates 
the interrelation between the balancing factor and the social purpose of the 
right in question.499 In this case, the Japanese Supreme Court held that: 
 
                                                          
498 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 22; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 375; Armstrong & LaMaster (1986), (note 
245) 18. 
499 Byers (2002), (note 10) 393. 
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In all cases a right must be exercised in such a 
fashion that the result of the exercise remains 
within a scope judged reasonable in the light of 
the prevailing social conscience. When a conduct 
by one who purports to have a right to do so fails 
to show social reasonableness and when the 
consequential damages to others exceed the limit 
which is generally supposed to be borne in the 
social life, we must say that the exercise of the 
right is no longer within its permissible scope. 
Thus, the person who exercises his right in such a 
fashion shall be held liable because his conduct 
constitutes an abuse of right.500 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
347. This is further confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
where it was explicitly stated that the criterion of reasonableness may 
“encompass a number of situations, including the use of a contract for 
purposes other than the ones contemplated by the parties”.501 
 
348. In 2015, the French Court of Cassation applied the balancing factor. The Court 
also implicitly demonstrated how the balancing factor may operate by 
encompassing other criteria of abuse as factual indices. The case502 pertains to 
a mortgage debt assignment agreement concluded between M.P (assignee) 
and FGI (assignor) whereby the latter transferred to the former its entitlement 
to the debt it had towards SCI (the real estate promoter of the mortgaged 
building). The initial creditor of SCI was not the assignor but a bank that later 
assigned its debt to FGI. The assignee attempted to exercise its seizure right 
against the residents of the building. The Court of Appeal nullified the seizure 
procedures on the basis that they constituted an abuse of right. The French 
Court of Cassation reiterated the Court of Appeal’s findings and concluded 
that there is an abuse of right. 
 
349. The Court held that the right of seizure conflicts with real-estate property right 
which is a constitutional right. Accordingly, it may not be invoked unless 
properly exercised. 
                                                          
500 Sono & Fujioka (1975), (note 357) 1037. 
501 Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122, 57. 
502 French Cour de Cassation, Civ. 2nd, 13 November 2015, no. 13-28180. 
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350. In assessing the proportionality and reasonableness of the seizure procedures, 
one submits that the Court considered the intention of exercising the right and 
the purpose of the assignment agreement. The Court deduced that an intent to 
inflict harm motivated the assignee to attempt the seizure procedures. The 
Court highlighted the presence of a dispute between the assignee and the 
residents of the building in relation to the former’s easement of a right of way. 
The Court concluded that the presence of such dispute was the primary reason 
behind the seizure proceedings. The assignee’s intention to cause harm was 
also deduced from the correspondences issued by the assignee’s counsel, 
which included explicit terms referring to the assignee’s intention of revenge. 
 
351. Thus, the Court explained that the assignee concluded the assignment 
agreement on its ‘subsidiary’ intention and that the recovery of the debt was 
only a pretext advanced by the assignee to justify the seizure procedures. 
 
352. Further, the Court implicitly considered the deviation of purpose criterion. The 
court emphasised that the purpose of exercising the seizure proceedings 
attempted by the assignee greatly differs from the parties’ common intention 
(purpose shared by the parties when concluding the assignment agreement).503 
 
353. This reflects the balancing process required by courts. The Court considered 
the weight of property rights, together with the fact that the assignee has 
exercised the right of seizure to inflict harm, and has deviated from the 
common intention of the parties at the time of concluding the agreement. 
Based on all of this, the Court concluded that this constituted an abuse of right. 
 
354. Based on the above, it is submitted that defining abuse in terms of 
reasonableness effectively includes all the other ‘criteria’ as factual elements to 
measure the degree of reasonableness. As stated by Bin Cheng:504 
 
                                                          
503 Ibid. 
504 It is to be noted that Bin Cheng’s statement relates to the principle of abuse of rights in the context 
of international law. 
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[R]ights must be reasonably exercised. The 
reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right 
implies an exercise which is genuinely in pursuit 
of those interests which the right is destined to 
protect and which is not calculated to cause any 
unfair prejudice to the legitimate interests of 
another […]. The exact line dividing the right 
from the obligation, or, in other words, the line 
delimiting the rights of both parties is traced at a 
point where there is a reasonable balance 
between the conflicting interests involved. This 
becomes the limit between the right and 
obligation, and constitutes, in effect, the limit 
between the respective rights of the parties. The 
protection of the law extends as far as this limit 
[…]. Any violation of this limit constitutes an 
abuse of right and a breach of the obligation - an 
unlawful act.505 [Emphasis added]. 
 
355. It becomes clear that embracing the balancing factor as a criterion of abuse 
enables decision makers to take into consideration whether the right holder 
exercised the right: (i) with an intent to harm; (ii) with legitimate and serious 
interests; or (iii) against the purpose intended by the right. Thus, it is more 
accurate to state that the balancing factor comprises the criterion of abuse, and 
that all other ‘criteria’ comprise sub-factors, indices, to be used and 
investigated as factual elements in order to measure the degree of 
reasonableness of the right in question.506 
 
356. Fourthly, a review of the principle’s application as a general principle of law, 
as shall be discussed below, reveals that arbitral tribunals do not restrict 
themselves to a strict criterion of abuse but rather assess all the factual matrix 
of the case and often endorse the balancing factor. As provided by one tribunal, 
the criterion of abuse should strike a fair balance between the need to 
safeguard one’s rights and the need to deny protection to abusive conduct.507 
 
                                                          
505 Cheng (2006), (note 190) 131-132. 
506 Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 780-781. 
507 Renée Rose Levy and Gremcitel S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, Award 
dated 9 January 2015, para. 185. 
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357. In the recent case of Teinver and Autobuses v. Argentine,508 the investors 
claimed that the host State abused its right in starting criminal investigations. 
Claimants alleged that the State had threatened criminal prosecution to the 
claimants and their legal representatives for their role in the arbitration, and 
used the State media to disseminate inflammatory statements about the 
claimants and their legal counsel. In claimants’ view, these abusive actions 
were motivated by the State’s attempt to aggravate the dispute, to mount a 
smear campaign before the arbitral tribunal, to prevent the enforcement of the 
tribunal’s eventual award, to undermine the integrity of the arbitration, and 
thus constituted “an abuse of Argentine’s domestic criminal process for the 
purpose of avoiding the payment of compensation required under international 
law for the admitted expropriation of Claimants’ investments in Argentine”.509 
Respondent asserted that such claims were unsubstantiated, and that without 
concrete evidence of abuse, provisional measures cannot be justified.510 
 
358. Claimants’ adoption of the balancing factor to prove an abuse of right, as well 
as its application by the tribunal is conspicuous. Claimants based their claim of 
an abuse of the State’s rights on that their request to suspend the criminal 
proceedings would not unreasonably burden the state: “While Claimants would 
suffer irreparable harm if the provisional measures are not granted, 
Respondent would not incur any meaningful harm”.511 This reflects an explicit 
application of the balancing factor. As shall be mentioned, an imperative 
element of the balancing factor is that courts/tribunals should also 
investigate/consider the personal interests of the parties by conducting a 
comparative impairment test: comparing the gravity of damages between the 
parties and the benefits potentially realised from the exercise of the right.512 
 
                                                          
508 Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanias S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Provisional Measures dated 8 April 2016. 
509 Ibid, paras 74-76, 101 and 131. 
510 Ibid, para. 115. 
511 Ibid, para. 108. 
512 Morcos (1988), (note 192) 375; Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1000-1002; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 19-
20; Epoux Vullion v. Société immobilière Vernet- Christophe Subsequent Developments, JCP 1971. 
2. 16781, translated by Tony Weir; Netherland’s Supreme Court in Kuipers v. De Jongh, H.R. April 
17, 1970, N.J. 1971, no. 89, translated in Brunner (1977), (note 277) 739. 
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359. Similarly, in deciding that there is no abuse of rights and rejecting claimants’ 
request, the tribunal first acknowledged that the State has a sovereign right to 
conduct criminal investigations. However, it was equally recognised that if 
such right is abused, provisional measures may be granted, as well as a 
potential award for damages. The tribunal balanced the above considerations 
against the fact that the remaining step in the arbitration proceedings was the 
rendering of the award, and concluded that there was no pending harm from 
any abuse.513 However, the tribunal found that using the media to publicise the 
dispute is abusive as it has aggravated the dispute and thus, a provisional 
measure ordering respondent to refrain from the aggravation of the dispute in 
this regard was issued.514 
 
360. In another case, Quilborax v. Bolivia, the claimants requested provisional 
measures ordering the respondent to discontinue criminal proceedings relating 
to the arbitration.515 It was the claimants’ submission that the State abused its 
right to investigate criminal behaviour, as it used its right solely to influence 
the current arbitration, as an abusive tactic to avoid the arbitration on the 
merits, and to force claimants to give up their claims.516 
 
361. The tribunal noted that Bolivia has an inherent right to conduct criminal 
investigations. The tribunal then highlighted that this right is not absolute, 
cannot be abused, and must be balanced against claimants’ right to pursue the 
arbitration, and to have their claims fairly considered.517 By balancing 
Bolivia’s interest to pursue criminal investigations against claimants’ interest 
in resolving their dispute before the tribunal, and their right to have access to 
evidence and the integrity of the evidence (the criminal proceedings had a 
material effect on potential witnesses), the tribunal found that there is an abuse 
and issued provisional measures. It is of particular interest to note that the 
                                                          
513 Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanias S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Provisional Measures dated 8 April 2016, paras 
190-191. 
514 Ibid, para. 210. 
515 Quilborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Provisional Measures, dated 26 February 2010. 
516 Ibid, para. 46. 
517 Ibid, paras 123 and 148. 
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tribunal equally considered and balanced the potential harm caused by the 
exercise of right, and concluded that: “the harm that such a stay would cause 
to Bolivia is proportionately less than the harm caused to Claimants if the 
criminal proceedings were to continue”.518 This is an explicit application of the 
reasonableness criterion of abuse. 
 
362. The proposition that arbitral tribunals generally adopt the balancing factor to 
establish any abuse of right is further fortified if one recognises cases where 
arbitrators have considered the conduct of the aggrieved party, and whether it 
was equally tainted with any abuse.519 As mentioned earlier, the evaluation of 
the conduct of the aggrieved party should be taken into consideration when 
assessing the existence of abuse. The fact that tribunals rightly consider the 
reasonableness of the aggrieved party’s conduct as well, confirms that 
reasonableness comprises the raison d'être of the principle’s foundation and 
that it is an effective criterion of abuse. No other criteria justifies considering 
the conduct of the aggrieved party in assessing claims of abuse of rights. 
 
363. Finally, the balancing factor comprises an objective test which enables 
decision makers to examine one’s external behaviour and the particulars of the 
dispute rather than the never-ending legal quest of fishing in one’s internal 
belief to deduce an intent and to unveil one’s veiled will.520 The corrective role 
of abuse of rights, to ameliorate the harshness of law, further fortifies that 
abuse should not necessarily be linked to the state of mind of the right-holder, 
but rather to his/her conduct which reveals his/her interests as opposed to the 
other conflicting interests at stake.521 In this regard, it has been stated that:  
 
[I]t is not the will or intent of the holder of the 
right that counts, but the results of his acts. In this 
situation, a balancing of interests is necessary for 
the determination of the questions of the type of 
                                                          
518 Ibid, para. 165. 
519 Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, 
Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016, para. 329. 
520 Walton (1909), (note 42) 501; Devine (1964), (note 97) 148; O’Sullivan, “Abuse of Rights”, 8 
Current Legal Problems, (1955), 66; Walton (1933), (note 46) 87-89. 
521 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1197; Saleh, (2009), (note 467) 349; Tête (1987), (note 138) 79-
80. 
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redress that should be accorded, namely, an 
award of damages, restoration of a previous 
situation, or injunctive relief for the future.522 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
364. The ‘balancing factor’ criterion may be seen as a double edged sword: it 
grants wide discretionary power to courts/tribunals. However, one submits that 
such discretionary power is indispensable for a principle such as the abuse of 
rights. The very existence of the principle rests on its function as a corrective 
tool, to ameliorate the harshness of positive law. This role primarily relies on 
the discretionary power of decision makers. 
 
(ii) Applying the Balancing Factor to Find an Abuse of Rights 
 
365. While it is apparent that the balancing factor is generally used, explicitly or 
implicitly, by courts and arbitrators, there is no guidance on how such a 
balancing exercise is to be undertaken and how to identify the competing 
interests involved. However, one does not purport to lay down a strict or rigid 
path that should be followed by courts/tribunals. A contrario, it is submitted 
that the application of a principle, which attempts to ameliorate the harshness 
and inflexibility of the law, should be left as a flexible tool to be utilised by the 
decision maker given the specificities of the dispute in question.523 In this 
regard, it has been rightly stated by Lauterpacht that the “determination of the 
point at which the exercise of a legal right has degenerated into an abuse of a 
right is a question which cannot be decided by an abstract legislative rule, but 
only by the activity of courts drawing the line in each particular case”.524 
 
                                                          
522 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1197; Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 
82 So. 206 (1919), 211 (“cases like the present one are not to be decided by the application of any 
broad or inflexible rule, but by a careful weighing of all the circumstances attending them, by 
diagnosing them”); Moss v. Burke & Trotti, Inc., 198 La. 76, 81, 3 So. 2d 281, 283 (1941). 
523 Borman (2011), (note 454) 389; Mobil Corp., v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 10 June 2010, paras 177 and 184; Renée Rose Levy and 
Gremcitel S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, Award dated 9 January 2015, para. 
186; Transglobal Green Energy LLC and Transglobal Green Panama S.A. v. Republic of Panama, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/28, Award dated 2 June 2016, para. 118. 
524 Lauterpacht (1982), (note 21) 162. 
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366. It is submitted that establishing abuse requires courts/arbitrators to deduce 
whether there exists a ‘true conflict’ of interests or a ‘false conflict’.525 The 
extent of ‘balancing’ of competing interests required will necessarily depend 
on whether there is a true conflict of interests, or if the appearance of such is 
false. 
 
367. At first, courts need to examine if the act in question is exercised without any 
legitimate interest, i.e. solely to inflict harm to another. If it is proven that the 
right holder had no other purpose but to inflict harm, abuse is established and 
there is no need to further investigate or dwell upon the issue.526 In these cases, 
one submits that the illicit interest to inflict harm vitiates all other interests.527 
Thus, there is no true conflict of interests, as the law does not confer a right to 
be exercised for an illicit purpose and thus legal protection is extended to the 
aggrieved, by ordering the demolishment and/or compensation for the damages 
caused.528 Example of false conflict cases include the case where a party 
initiates judicial proceedings not to safeguard or enforce a particular right, but 
solely to damage the reputation of his opponent, to prolong litigation, or to 
force the adversary to incur legal costs of litigation.529 It is submitted that in 
these cases there exists no true conflict of interests and thus, no material 
balancing of interests is required to establish abuse. 
 
368. In the majority of cases it will be difficult to deduce malice given its inherent 
evidentiary limitation. Furthermore, in most cases, rights are exercised for a 
multiplicity of purposes, primary and secondary, making it difficult to decide 
the predominant one. 
 
                                                          
525 The terms ‘true conflict’ and ‘false conflict’ are terms that the researcher introduces to differentiate 
between cases where decision makers are faced with legitimate competing interests that require a 
balancing exercise to decide which interest(s) ought to be upheld; and cases that involve one-sided 
acknowledged interests versus illegitimate interest(s), which does not strictly require a balancing 
exercise. 
526 Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 225-226. 
527 Cheng (2006), (note 190) 122. 
528 Pound (1914), (note 243) 228. 
529 Catala & Weir (1964), (note 41) 225-226; Nadja Erk, “Parallel Proceedings in International 
Arbitration: A Comparative European Perspective”, (Kluwer Law International 2014), 11; 
Rosenberg (1960), (note 359) 20; Foster (1973), (note 108) 349; Walton (1909), (note 42) 508; 
Tamblyn (2013), (note 277) 166. 
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369. In such cases courts/tribunals are required to look further in order to determine 
if there is an abuse of rights. Courts are to examine all interests at stake. If it is 
the case that each party has a legitimate interest prescribed by the law and is 
thus requesting the court’s assistance to protect it, this amounts to a case of 
true conflict of interests, where the courts must utilise the balancing factor to 
solve it.530 
 
370. Decision makers are to carefully investigate the competing interests weighing 
for and against finding an abuse. Some of the interests against finding an abuse 
may include, inter alia, the interest to give effect to clear legal 
rules/contractual provisions, and treat it as a decisive reflection of one’s rights, 
to advance legal certainty and security between individuals;531 the interest of 
safeguarding autonomy of the will and freedom of contract.532 
 
371. On the other hand, there is an equally potent legal interest that rights are to be 
exercised for a legitimate purpose and not comprise an instrument for the 
promotion of chicanery,533 the right not to be damaged,534 the exercise should 
not deviate from the purpose intended by the law,535 the interest of reaching 
fair and equitable decisions.536  
 
372. Moreover, one submits that an imperative element of the balancing factor is 
that courts are to also investigate the personal interests of the parties by 
conducting a comparative impairment test: comparing the gravity of damages 
between the parties and the benefits potentially realised from the exercise of 
                                                          
530 Sanders (1981), (note 25) 223, providing that there is often a conflict/tension between several 
interests and policies in contractual arrangements: (“Security of transactions, freedom of contract, 
supremacy of the will, and fundamental fairness”). 
531 Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122, 33; Jukier (1992), (note 28) 234; 
Crabb (1964), (note 12) 22-23. 
532 Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1004; Jukier (1992), (note 28) 233. 
533 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 23; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 22-23. 
534 Williams (1939), (note 227) 116. 
535 Morcos (1988), (note 192) 375; 26; Sono & Fujioka (1975), (note 357) 1037; Cheng (2006), (note 
190) 125. 
536 Aselford Martin Shopping Centres Ltd v. A.L. Raymond Ltée, [1990] R.J.Q. (C.S.), 1974-1976, 
where the court disregarded an explicit contractual provision on the basis of abuse of rights, and 
decided that principles such as fairness, justice and equity override the freedom of contract and 
autonomy of the will, cited in Jukier (1992), (note 28) 236-237; Banque Nationale du Canada v. 
Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122, 33; Cheng (2006), (note 190) t 125. 
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the right.537 In a dispute regarding the construction of garage between the lands 
of the disputants, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands referred to the 
principle of abuse of rights and utilised the balancing factor by conducting a 
comparative impairment test:  
 
This, however, does not exclude the possibility 
that De Jongh would have abused her right by 
demanding the removal of the garage from her 
land, instead of accepting a reasonable 
compensation, in case the loss Kuipers would 
suffer by its removal, considered both 
independently and in comparison to De Jongh's 
interests, would be so heavy that De Jongh could 
not reasonably have decided to exercise her right 
to demand the removal. [Emphasis added].538 
 
373. Based on all the above, which shall be deduced from the factual particulars of 
the case, decision makers are to decide which interest ought to be legally 
protected. These interests will necessarily vary from one legal area to another 
(abuse of contractual terms raises different competing interests from abuse of 
initiating parallel proceedings) and the weight given to each interest will 
necessarily differ based on the factual matrix of the case.539 
 
374. Cases of true conflict dominate the arena of abuse of rights and are manifested 
in all legal areas. On such account, exempli gratia, where a party initiates 
parallel judicial or arbitral proceedings regarding interrelated issues, his 
opposing party may argue that such conduct is tantamount to an abuse of 
right.540 Given that in many cases, the party who initiates parallel proceedings 
does so in pursuit of many legal and personal interests, it is submitted that 
courts may effectively utilise the balancing factor to resolve such complex 
issues. 
                                                          
537 Morcos (1988), (note 192) 375; Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1000-1002; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 19-
20; Epoux Vullion v. Société immobilière Vernet- Christophe Subsequent Developments, JCP 1971. 
2. 16781, translated by Tony Weir; Netherland’s Supreme Court in Kuipers v. De Jongh, H.R. April 
17, 1970, N.J. 1971, no. 89, translated in Brunner (1977), (note 277) 739. 
538 Netherland’s Supreme Court in Kuipers v. De Jongh, H.R. April 17, 1970, N.J. 1971, no. 89, 
translated in Brunner (1977), (note 277) 739. 
539 Cheng (2006), (note 190) 124-125. 
540 Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Final Award of 3 September 2001; CME v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award of 13 September 2001, where abuse of process was argued 
albeit rejected by the arbitral tribunal. 
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375. In the prevailing normative scenario, some of the interests for initiating the 
parallel proceedings comprise: forum shopping, to gain certain substantive 
and/or procedural benefits;541 cases of pathological jurisdiction or arbitration 
clauses;542 for the location of the debtor’s assets;543 as a dilatory tactic,544 to 
exert financial pressure or to force a settlement etc.545 On the other hand, the 
opposing party equally has interests that may comprise, inter alia, the need for 
procedural harmonisation; economy of justice and fairness;546 aversion of early 
access to one’s arguments in the parallel proceedings in revealing a party’s 
defence strategy; and promoting legal coherence and aversion of conflicting or 
duplication of awards.547 
 
376. That said, courts may effectively use the balancing factor to weigh the relevant 
competing interests and measure the degree of reasonableness of the act of 
initiating the parallel proceedings.548 Evidently, the seriousness and 
reasonableness of any of the interests stated above will primarily depend on the 
factual matrix of the case. For example, while forum shopping is not 
necessarily an illegitimate interest,549 it may be found unreasonable if the 
subject matter of the parallel proceedings is greatly intertwined, as in such a 
                                                          
541 Richard Kreindler, “Parallel Proceedings: A Practitioner’s Perspective”, in Michael Waibel and 
Asha Kaushal (eds.), “The Backlash against Investment Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 
2010), 128; Erk (2014), (note 529) 12-13; Richard Kreindler, “Arbitral Forum Shopping”, in 
Bernardo M. Cremades and Julian D M Lew (eds.), “Parallel State and Arbitral Procedures in 
International Arbitration”, (ICC Publishing 2005), 159,166 and 178; Shany (2003), (note 61) 259.  
542 Erk (2014), (note 529) 11-12. 
543 Stephen Cromie, “International Commercial Litigation”, (Second Edition), (Butterworths 1997), 
473; Erk (2014), (note 529) 11 (“a creditor, by contrast, may be forced to institute parallel 
proceedings in different jurisdictions if the debtor’s assets are situated in different countries”). 
544 Parallel proceedings may be initiated as a dilatory tactic in order to gain time and hide one’s assets. 
Erk (2014), (note 529) 11 
545 McLachlan (2009), (note 61) 37-40; Erk (2014), (note 529) 11. 
546 Philippe Leboulanger, “Multi-Contract Arbitration”, 13 Journal of International Arbitration 43, 54-
55 and 62-64 (1996); Jamie Shookman, “Too Many Forums for Investment Disputes?”, 27 Journal 
of International Arbitration 361, 362 (2010); Erk (2014), (note 529) 15. 
547 Shookman (2010), (note 546) 362; Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 62-64; Erk (2014), (note 529) 
15; Gilles Cuniberti, “Parallel Litigation and Foreign Investment Dispute Settlement”, 21 ICSID 
Review 381, 414 (2006). 
548 Shany (2003), (note 61) 258-259, providing that abuse of rights in the context of parallel 
proceedings enables a balance of interests to determine if the initiation of the parallel proceedings is 
reasonable or abusive. 
549 Erk (2014), (note 529) 12-13; Franco Ferrari, “Forum Shopping in the International Commercial 
Arbitration Context: Setting the Stage”, in Franco Ferrari (ed), “Forum Shopping in the 
International Commercial Arbitration Context”, (Sellier European Law Publisher 2013), 1-21. 
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case, the conundrum of having conflicting judgments/awards regarding 
intertwined issues is augmented. 
 
377. Similarly, cases of abuse of contractual rights may involve a true conflict of 
interests.550 In the Houle case mentioned above, the Canadian Supreme Court 
acknowledged that finding an abuse entails disregarding the autonomy of the 
will and pacta sunt servanda. However, upon examining the competing 
interests, the court decided that reasonableness, fairness and reaching an 
equitable outcome prevail over the other interests.551  
 
378. To conclude, the balancing factor requires courts to examine all competing 
interests involved in the case in order to determine if an abuse of right is 
established. Such interests will greatly vary depending on the legal dispute and 
the particulars of each case. 
 
4. The Exercise of the Right in Good Faith 
 
379. Bad faith as a criterion of abuse raises a number of issues that warrant 
elaboration. While some legal systems endorse bad faith as a criterion of 
abuse, such position is questionable given that abuse of rights is an application 
of the broader concept of good faith. 
 
380. Prior to embarking on an analysis of bad faith as a criterion of abuse (iii); and 
highlight the interrelation between good faith and abuse of rights (ii); it seems 
in order to first shed light on the meaning of good faith (i).  
 
381. An abridged examination of the meaning of good faith and its relation to the 
principle of abuse of rights is of paramount importance in order to demonstrate 
that good faith should not be regarded as a criterion of abuse. 
                                                          
550 For an analysis of applying abuse of rights on the basis of the proposed balancing factor in the 
context of landlord-tenant disputes, see Armstrong & LaMaster (1986), (note 245) 14-18; Sté Fiat 
Auto France v. SA Cachia Holding et autres, Recueil Dalloz-Sirey 1995 J 355, cited in Reid (1998), 
(note 88) 139-140. 
551 A similar conclusion was reached by the Canadian Court in Drouin v. Electolux Canada Ltée, 
[1988] R.J.Q. 950 (C.A.); and in Posluns v. Enterprises Lormil Inc., [1990], Quebec 200-05-
001584-858, J.E. 90-1131 (C.S.), cited in Jukier (1992), (note 28) 235-236. 
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(i) Definition of Good Faith 
 
382. The term “faith” in the terms ‘good faith’ or ‘bad faith’ refers to purpose or 
intent.552 Both ‘good faith’ and ‘bad faith’ are by definition antonyms, they are 
inherently two irreconcilable concepts, where the existence of one excludes the 
existence of the other.553 
 
383. The principle of good faith is a principle that eludes a priori definition.554 It is 
recognised that the meaning of good faith, in domestic or international law, 
varies with the context.555  Such confusion is exacerbated when one 
acknowledges that it may equally vary within one legal system.556 It is often 
questioned whether the principle is a concept with a general meaning that 
applies to different situations that fall within its purview, or if it is more than 
one concept sharing the same name.557 
 
384. Given its various applications, its hybrid manifestations and its broad scope, it 
is often said that any definition of the principle of good faith either spirals 
“into the Charybdis of vacuous generality or collide with the Scylla of 
restrictive specificity”.558 Thus, some argue that it is more efficient to focus on 
forms and elements of good faith rather than attempt to define it. 
 
                                                          
552 Definition as given by Black’s Law dictionary, (Fourth Edition), (West Publishing Co. 1968), 719. 
553 Tête (1987), (note 138) 59-60. 
554 Russel v. Russel [1897] A. C. 436, providing that terms such as good faith and honesty can be 
illustrated but not defined. 
555 Richard E. Speidel, “The “Duty” of Good Faith in Contract Performance and Enforcement”, 46 
Journal of Legal Education 537, 540 (1996); Section (205) Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
comment (a) (1981); Robert Kolb, “Principles as Sources of International Law: With Special 
Reference to Good Faith”, 53 Netherlands International Law Review 1, 13-14 (2006); Wintershell et 
al. v. The Government of Qatar, Ad hoc award of 1988, 15 Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 30 
(1988); John Honnold, “Documentary history of the uniform law for international sales: the studies, 
deliberations, and decisions that led to the 1980 United Nations Convention with introductions and 
explanations”, (Kluwer Law 1989), 298; Michael Bridge, “Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law 
Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?”, 9 Canadian Business Law Journal 385, 407 (1984). 
556 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 690. 
557 Litvinoff (1997), (note 118) 1649; Summers (1968), (note 238) 199; B. J. Reiter, “Good Faith in 
Contracts”, 17 Valparaiso University Law Review 705 (1983). 
558 Summers (1968), (note 238) 206. 
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385. Similarly, its scope is rather elusive.559 It is difficult to provide what acts 
contravene the principle.560 The difficulty emanates from the fact that the 
constituents of good faith are various and equally vague. 
 
386. In attempting to illustrate the concept, some emphasise the subjective element 
of the principle: the psychological element of investigating one’s state of 
mind.561 However, the predominant view focuses on objective elements.562 
Thus, it is said that it imposes an obligation of “playing fairly”, “coming 
clean” or “putting one’s cards on the table”, observing the standards of 
“honesty”, “reasonableness”, “a duty of cooperation”, and “protecting 
reasonable expectations”.563 In using such terms, it is often said that these 
terms are equally difficult to define which render “those definitional attempts 
into mere substitutions of words that fail to provide the clarity warrantedly 
expected from either a definition or an explanation”.564 
 
387. Some argue that good faith means one should not frustrate legitimate and 
                                                          
559 Ewan McKendrick, “Contract Law”, (9th Edition), (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 221–222; 
Cremades (2012), (note 114) 761; Paul J. Powers, “Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the 
United Nations Convention on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods”, 18 Journal of 
Law and Commerce 333, 334 (1999). 
560 Reiter (1983), (note 557) 706. 
561 Robert Kolb, “Principles as Sources of International Law: With Special Reference to Good Faith”, 
53 Netherlands International Law Review 1, 14 (2006). 
562 A. S. Hartkamp, “Judicial Discretion under the New Civil Code of the Netherlands”, 40 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 551, 554-555 (1992); Bonell (2005), (note 45) 131. 
563 Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) 121-145; the 
Australian New South Wales Court of Appeal in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty v Minister for 
Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234; Cremades (2012), (note 114) 767-768; Lord Johan Steyn, 
“Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men”, 113 Law Quarterly Review 
433, 438-439 (1997); Shaw (2008), (note 313) 103-104; Nuclear Tests Cases, ICJ Reports, 1974, 
pp. 253, 267; E. Allan Farnsworth, “Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code”, 30 University of Chicago Law Review 666 (1963); Jane 
Stapleton, “Good Faith in Private Law”, 52 Current Legal Problems 1, 7 (1999); Russel A. 
Eisenberg, “Good Faith under the Uniform Commercial Code – A New Look at an Old Problem”, 
54 Marquette Law Review 1 (1971); Andrew Terry and Cary Di Lernia, “Franchising and the Quest 
for the Holy Grail: Good Faith or Good Intentions”, 33 Melbourne University Law Review 542, 
556-569 (2009). 
564 Litvinoff (1997), (note 118) 1664. 




388. Other scholars argue that good faith has no general meaning, but functions as 
an ‘excluder’; it is a term that is used to exclude conduct tainted with bad 
faith.566 However, one cannot accept this definition alone as it turns good faith 
to a vacuous shell that lacks actual content.567 Not only does it lack certainty, 
but it fails to cover important aspects of the duty to act in good faith.  
 
389. Good faith entails more than absence of bad faith, it comprises acts and 
omissions.568 It presumes a co-operative obligation, an honest and reasonable 
conduct, and to have regard to the reasonable expectations and legitimate 
interests of the other party(ies).569 
 
390. Finally, one finds it apt to refer to the definition of good faith adopted in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. While taking into consideration that the 
meaning may vary depending on the context in which it is used, it is submitted 
that good faith: 
 
                                                          
565 JM Paterson, “Duty of Good Faith: Does it Have a Place in Contract Law?”, 74 Law Institute 
Journal 47, 48 (2000); Woo Pei Yee, “Protecting Parties’ Reasonable Expectations: A General 
Principle of Good Faith”, 1 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 195, 223 (2001); 
Pound (1914), (note 243) 215; Pound (1959), (note 243) 413-415; Steven Burton, “Breach of 
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith”, 94 Harvard Law Review 369, 
(1980) 
566 Summers (1968), (note 238) 199-207; Robert S. Summers, “The General Duty of Good Faith – Its 
Recognition and Conceptualization”, 67 Cornell Law Review 810, 818-819 (1982). 
567 Alan D. Miller and Ronen Perry, “Good Faith Performance”, 98 Iowa Law Review 689, 704 
(2013). 
568 Harold Dubroff, “The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and Gap-
Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic”, 80 St. John’s Law Review 559, 594-595 (2006); Tête (1987), 
(note 138) 59-60; Roger Brownsword, “Positive, Negative, Neutral: the Reception of Good Faith in 
English Contract Law”, in Roger Brownsword, Norma Hird and Geraint Howells (eds.), “Good 
Faith in Contract”, (Ashgate 1999), 17; Litvinoff (1997), (note 118) 1665; Abdelwahab (2017), 
(note 193); Michael Bridge, “Doubting Good Faith”, 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 426, 
429 (2005). 
569 Anthony Mason, “Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing”, 116 Law 
Quarterly Review 66, 69 (2000); J. Edward Bayley, “A Doctrine of Good Faith in New Zealand 
Contractual Relationships”, (Thesis, University of Canterbury), (2009), 101-102, providing that 
there must be a balance between preserving a party’s self-interest and giving effect to the other 
party’s reasonable expectations; Brownsword (1999), (note 568) 17; E. Allan Farnsworth, 
“Contracts”, (Second Edition), (Little, Brown and Company 1990), 550-551; Terry & Lernia 
(2009), (note 563) 551-552; Elisabeth Peden, “Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts”, 
(LexisNexis Butterworths 2003), 170; Tête (1987), (note 138) 81. 
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[E]mphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common 
purpose and consistency with the justified 
expectations of the other party; it excludes a 
variety of types of conduct characterized as 
involving “bad faith” because they violate 
community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness. The appropriate remedy for a 
breach of the duty of good faith also varies with 
the circumstances.570 
 
391. The above definition finds a balance between the different views stated above. 
While it endorsed the ‘excluder’ view, it equally gave effect to other aspects of 
good faith. Namely, preserving the parties’ reasonable expectations, and acting 
reasonably and fairly.  
 
392. On a related note, it is submitted that the meaning of the principle of good faith 
encompasses the prohibition against abuse of rights. In the case of Yam Seng 
Pte Limited v. International Trade Corporation, which discussed whether 
English law does or should recognise a general duty to perform contracts in 
good faith, Leggatt J emphasised that good faith covers many situations 
including that a power conferred by a contract on one party must be exercised 
“for the purpose for which it was conferred, and must not be exercised 
arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably”.571 In this regard, it appears that the 
principle of good faith covers different aspects of abuse of rights, i.e. that 
rights must be exercised reasonably and for the purpose for which the right 
was conferred.572 
 
393. Similarly, another attempt to delineate the principle of good faith accentuates 
that part of the principle’s role is seeking to restrain one’s pursuit of self-
interest where it is unreasonable given the factual matrix of the case.573 By and 
large, there is no one clear definition of the principle of good faith. It is 
                                                          
570 Section (205) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Comment (a), (1981). 
571 Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) 145; Abu 
Dhabi National Tanker Company v. Product Star Shipping Limited, [1993] L1 Rep 397, 404; 
Socimer International Bank Ltd v. Standard Bank London Ltd [2008] 1 L1 Rep 558, 575-577; 
Summers (1982), (note 566) 813. 
572 Terry & Lernia (2009), (note 563) 560. 
573 Stapleton (1999), (note 563) 7; Knapp (1983), (note 8) 115 
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submitted that the different definitions of the principle encompasses the 
different aspects of the principle of abuse of rights.574 
 
(ii) The Relation between Good Faith and Abuse of Rights 
 
394. The good faith obligation is both substantive and procedural; it is a general 
principle explicitly endorsed by most legal systems.575 It governs the 
substantive and procedural rights/obligations of the parties.576 
 
395. Whilst it is explicitly enshrined in the codes of the civil law jurisdictions, the 
essence and spirit of the good faith duty arguably constitutes an intrinsic part 
of the common law legal systems.577  
 
                                                          
574 A right exercised with a malicious intention is contrary to good faith. Litvinoff (1997), (note 118) 
1665. 
575 Cremades (2012), (note 114) 767-769; Edward Thomas, “Good Faith in Contract: A Non-
Sceptical Commentary”, 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 391, 392 (2005); Taniguchi 
(2000), (note 118) 173-174; Cairo Court of Appeal, 5 February 2013, Case No. 35, 41, 44 and 45, 
Judicial Year 129; Brabandere (2012), (note 60) 609; Kuwaiti Court of Cassation, Session held on 
12 December 1995, Challenges no. 59, 64, 65 and 72, Judicial Year 1995. 
576 Bernard Hanotiau, “Complex Multicontract-Multiparty Arbitration” 14 Arbitration International 
369 (1998); V. V. Veeder, “The Lawyer’s Duty to Arbitrate in Good Faith”, 18 Arbitration 
International 431, 439 (2002). 
577 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989] Q.B. 433 (CA), 439, Lord 
Justice Bingham: “English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding 
principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness”; ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 25 September 1983, X Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
61, (Kluwer Law International 1985), 69, providing that “estoppel is based on the fundamental 
requirement of good faith, which is found in all systems of law, national as well as international”; 
Aubrey Laine Thomas, “Nonsignatories in Arbitration: A Good-Faith Analysis”, 14 Lewis & Clark 
Law Review 953, 964 (2010) (“The concept of good faith in contractual dealings is pervasive in 
both common law and civil law systems”); Speidel (1996), (note 555) 537; Klaus Peter Berger, “The 
International Arbitrator’s Dilemma: Transnational Procedure versus Home Jurisdiction: A German 
Perspective”, 25 Arbitration International 217, 234 (2009); W Tetley, “Good Faith in Contract 
Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Chartering”, 35 Journal of Maritime Law & 
Commerce 561, 572 (2004), (“equity has played a major role as a stand-in for good faith in English 
commercial law”); Bonell (2005), (note 45) 130-131; Roy Goode, “International Restatements of 
Contract and English Contract Law”, 2 Uniform Law Review 231, 240 (1997). In the case of Yam 
Seng Pte Limited v. International Trade Corporation mentioned above, the court provided an 
extensive explanation of the good faith principle and recognised that it is now endorsed by most 
common law systems, including the United States, Australia and New Zealand. After attempting to 
shed light on the particulars of good faith, Leggatt J concluded that there is nothing foreign to 
English law in recognising an implied duty of good faith, and he suggested that the traditional 
hostility towards the principle of good faith is misplaced, Yam Seng Pte Limited v International 
Trade Corporation [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) 145 and 153. However, this view was later challenged 
and rebuked by the Court of Appeal in Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v. Compass Group 
UK and Ireland Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 200; Bristol Groundschool Ltd v. Intelligent Capture and 
others [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch); MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. v. Cottonex Anstalt 
[2016] EWCA Civ 789, para. 45. 
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396. Moreover, good faith is considered an inherent part of the lex mercatoria,578 a 
general principle of law,579 and is explicitly referred to as a mandatory 
principle under the UNIDROIT principles of International Commercial 
Contracts of 2010 (“UNIDROIT Principles”),580 and under other 
internationally recognised legal instruments.581 
 
397. While the interrelation between the general principle of good faith and abuse 
of rights is unequivocal,582 the demarcation between both concepts is not 
always conspicuous. 
 
398. One submits that abuse of rights is an application of the principle of good faith, 
and thus the latter may not comprise an effective criterion of abuse. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the principle of good faith is broader than abuse of 
rights; the latter is confined to the exercise of rights.583 This submission is 
strengthened by the views shared by scholars and is recognised by courts and 
tribunals. 
                                                          
578 Thomas E. Carbonneau, “A Definition of and Perspective upon the Lex Mercatoria Debate”, in 
Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed.), “Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law 
Merchant”, (Kluwer Law International 1998), 17; Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic, (ICSID 
Case No ARB/06/5, Award of 15 April 2009), para. 107; ICC Case No. 3131 of 1979, IX Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 109 (1984); Tetley (2004), (note 577) 591-592, 596; ICC Case No. 5721 of 
1990, in Yves Derains, Sigvard Jarvin and J.J. Arnaldez (eds.), “ICC Arbitral Awards 1986-1990” 
(ICC Publications 1994), 404-405; Filip De Ly, “International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria”, 
(North Holland 1992), 264; Lorena Carvajal Arenas, “Good Faith in the Lex Mercatoria: An 
Analysis of Arbitral Practice and Major Western Legal Systems”, (PhD Thesis), (University of 
Portsmouth 2011). 
579 Bonell (2005), (note 45) 142; Klaus Peter Berger, “The Creeping Codification of the Lex 
Mercatoria”, (Kluwer Law International 1999), 165; Shaw (2008), (note 313) 103-104; UNCITRAL 
Arbitral Award, Case No. SCH-4318, 15 June 1994, applying the prohibition of venire contra 
factum proprium as an application of good faith as a general principle of law; ICJ case of Certain 
Norwegian Loans (France v Norway), Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, [1957] 
ICJ Rep 9, 53; Franco Ferrari, “The CISG's Interpretative Goals, Its Interpretative Method and Its 
General Principles in Case Law (Part II)”, 13 Internationales Handelsrecht 181, 190 (2013); John 
O’Connor, “Good Faith in International Law”, (Dartmouth Publishing Co. 1991), 2; Robert Kolb, 
“Principles as Sources of International Law: With Special Reference to Good Faith”, 53 
Netherlands International Law Review 1, 17 (2006); Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 765. 
580 Article (1.7) of the UNIDROIT Principles of 2010. (“(1) Each party must act in accordance with 
good faith and fair dealing in international trade. (2) The parties may not exclude or limit this 
duty”). 
581 Article (7.1) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods; 
Article (3) of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, (1993); Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
582 Litvinoff (1997), (note 118) 1660. 
583 Rosenberg (1960), (note 359) 17. 
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399. Given its inherently broad scope, it is submitted that the bona fides principle 
constitutes a standard and a source from which more defined rules and 
doctrines can be deduced and derived.584 In this regard, abuse of rights, a 
principle embodying the element of reasonableness in the exercise of rights,585 
is one of the applications of the bona fides principle.586 However, this 
submission does not negate or detract from abuse of rights its current legal 
standpoint in many jurisdictions as an autonomous principle with its own 
specific contours and concerns.587 Both concepts are not redundant,588 but are 
rather supplementary.589 
 
400. The relation between the two concepts is equally clear under Egyptian law, as 
well as other laws in the MENA region.590 The Egyptian Court of Cassation 
has explicitly provided that good faith encompasses the prohibition against 
abuse of rights.591 
 
401. Such correlation between good faith and abuse of rights is not merely an 
important theoretical observation, but has serious practical ramifications. The 
perception that a general principle of good faith embodies the prohibition 
                                                          
584 Shaw (2008), (note 313) 103; Litvinoff (1997), (note 118) 1652; Tetley (2004), (note 577) 566; 
Robert Kolb, “Principles as Sources of International Law: With Special Reference to Good Faith”, 
53 Netherlands International Law Review 1, 17-19 (2006); O’Connor (1991), (note 579) 124; 
Anthony D’Amato, “Good Faith”, in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), “Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law” (Volume 2), (Elsevier 2003) 599. 
585 Mayrand (1974), (note 12) 1012-1013. 
586 Cheng (2006), (note 190) 121; Andreas Zeigler and Jorun Baumgartner, “Good faith as a General 
Principle of (International) Law”, in Andrew Mitchell, Tania Voon et al. (eds) “Good Faith and 
International Economic Law” (Oxford University Press 2015) 30; Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech 
Republic, (ICSID Case No ARB/06/5, Award of 15 April 2009), para. 107; Brabandere (2012), 
(note 60) 618-620; Cremades (2012), (note 114) 768-769; Lauterpacht (1982), (note 21) 163-164; 
Taniguchi (2000), (note 118) 174; Lenaerts (2010), (note 36) 1146-1145; Shany (2003), (note 61) 
256; Lorena Carvajal Arenas, “Good Faith in the Lex Mercatoria: An Analysis of Arbitral Practice 
and Major Western Legal Systems”, (PhD Thesis), (University of Portsmouth 2011), 99; Voon, 
Mitchell & Munro (2014), (note 277) 61; Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 777; Robert Kolb, “Principles 
as Sources of International Law: With Special Reference to Good Faith”, 53 Netherlands 
International Law Review 1, 19 (2006). 
587 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 676. 
588 Anthony D’Amato, “Good Faith” in Rudolf Bernhard, (ed.), “Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law”, (Volume 2), (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995) 600; Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, 
“International Law and the Environment”, (Oxford University Press 1992), 126. 
589 Byers (2002), (note 10) 411. 
590 Abdelwahab (2017), (note 193). 
591 Egyptian Court of Cassation, Hearing session dated 27 April 2006, Challenge No. 3473, Judicial 
Year 75. 
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against abuse of rights indicates that jurisdictions that do not explicitly endorse 
abuse of rights may still limit the exercise of rights on the basis of the principle 
of good faith.592 
 
402. An example of this is found in US law which recognises the principle of good 
faith. In this regard, it has been stated that good faith acts as a safety valve “to 
which judges may turn to fill gaps and qualify or limit rights and duties 
otherwise arising under rules of law and specific contract language”.593 
 
403. The UNIDROIT Principles clearly recognises that abuse of rights is an 
application of the broader principle of good faith. The Principles, after 
providing the overarching principle of good faith, go on to demonstrate certain 
rules/doctrines that fall within the purview of good faith, including abuse of 
rights.594 It is of particular interest to note that the provision regarding abuse of 
rights was originally intended as a separate provision under the Principles, but 
it was decided to locate it under the good faith principle, as one of its important 
applications.595 Such recognition of the relation between both concepts under 
the Principles is further confirmed by scholars.596 
 
404. In the case of Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, the arbitral tribunal 
discussed the relation between the principle of good faith and abuse of rights, 
and expressed that abuse of rights is a fundamental principle applicable in 
investment law as a manifestation of the principle of good faith.597 
 
                                                          
592 Lauterpacht (1982), (note 21) 163-164; Lenaerts (2010), (note 36) 1146-1145; Litvinoff (1997), 
(note 118) 1661 
593 Summers (1982), (note 566) 812; Dubroff (2006), (note 568) 570; David Stack, “The Two 
Standards of Good Faith in Canadian Contract Law”, 62 Saskatchewan Law Review 201, 210-211 
(1999); Arthur Hartkamp, “The Concept of Good Faith in the UNIDROIT Principles for 
International Commercial Contracts”, 3 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law 65, 
65-66 (1995); but see M. P. Ellinghaus, “In Defense of Unconscionability”, 78 Yale Law Journal 
757, 779-780 (1969), using unconscionability to reach the same result. 
594 Comment (2) to Article (1.7) of the UNIDROIT Principles of 2010, which provides that a typical 
example of behaviour contrary to the principle of good faith and fair dealing is abuse of rights.  
595 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Report by the Working Group for the 
Preparation of Principles of International Commercial Contracts,  6 June 2003, 58-60; Bonell 
(2005), (note 45) 58. 
596 Bonell (2005), (note 45) 133. 
597 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction 
And Admissibility, 4 August 2011, para. 646. 
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405. The WTO decision in the case of United States Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products further illustrates the relationship between abuse 
of rights and the principle of good faith.598 In this case, the tribunal explicitly 
stipulated that: 
 
The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one 
expression of the principle of good faith. This 
principle, at once a general principle of law and 
a general principle of international law, controls 
the exercise of rights by states. One application 
of this general principle, the application widely 
known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits 
the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins 
that whenever the assertion of a right “impinges 
on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it 
must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, 
reasonably.”. [Emphasis added].599 
 
406. Whether abuse of rights can always be perceived as an application of the 
principle of good faith necessarily depends on one’s definition of good faith. If 
one purports to endorse a broad definition of good faith, including standards 
such as fairness and reasonableness,600 then it is submitted that the prohibition 
against abuse of rights is nothing but a manifestation of the principle of good 
faith. 
 
(iii) Good Faith as a Criterion of Abuse 
 
407. As previously mentioned, good faith is sometimes used as a test to determine if 
                                                          
598 Decision rendered by the WTO Appellate Body in the case of United States – Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998; Andrew D. Mitchell, 
“Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement”, 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 339, 371 
(2006). 
599 Ibid, para. 158. 
600 By and large, it is submitted that all definitions of good faith pertain to the notion of 
reasonableness, honesty and fairness. Mason (2000), (note 569) 69; Adam Wallwork, “A 
Requirement of Good Faith in Construction Contracts?”, 20 Building and Construction Law 257 
(2004); Australian case of Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 (21 June 
2001), where the court applied the principle of good faith to limit the party’s exercise of its rights; 
Elisabeth Peden, “When Common Law Trumps Equity: The Rise of Good Faith and Reasonableness 
and the Demise of Unconscionability”, The University of Sydney, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
06/57, (2006), 2. 
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there is an abuse of rights. 601 
 
408. However, the particulars of what constitutes an abuse based on the principle of 
good faith is not clear. In many instances, it appears that the criterion of good 
faith is not a stand-alone criterion, but is rather an emulation of one of the 
other criteria of abuse.  
 
409. In a case involving the liability of a member of a limited liability company, the 
German court acknowledged the validity of the company, but held that it 
would be contrary to the principle of good faith, and thus an abuse of right, if 
it upheld the separation of the assets of the company from its members given 
the circumstances of the case. In justifying its decision, the court held that it 
would be contrary to, and deviation from, the purpose of the law, if such 
separation was upheld.602 It seems palpable that the court’s ruling is based on 
the ‘deviation from the purpose’ criterion but it is disguised and cloaked under 
the principle of good faith. 
 
410. Similarly, Swiss courts often rely on good faith to establish an abuse of right. 
In doing so, decisions of Swiss courts, in essence, rely on other criteria of 
abuse. For example, Swiss courts have found an abuse of rights based on the 
criterion of good faith, where legal institutions are used for a purpose contrary 
to that prescribed by the law;603 and in another case, it was held that the 
decisions of the general assembly of a corporation are abusive if such decisions 
were against the interests of the minority and do not serve a serious interest to 
the majority.604 Here again, it is evident that while the decisions establishing an 
abuse relied on the principle of good faith, abuse was actually premised either 
on the reasonableness of the act in question (disparity between the interests) or 
that of the purpose of the law. 
 
                                                          
601 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 996. 
602 Judgment of 29 November 1956, 22 BGHZ 226, 230 (1957) translated and cited in Bolgar (1975), 
(note 32) 1029-1030. 
603 BGE 94.1.659, Journal des Tribunaux 216 (1970); BGE 86.2.417 (1961), Journal des Tribunaux 
325 (1961), cited in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1036. 
604 BGE 95.2.157 (1970), Journal des Tribunaux 344 (1970), cited in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1036. 
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411. Additionally, in discussing abuse of rights under Swiss law, A. Von Tuhr 
wrote: 
 
The exercise of rights, as the law indicates, is 
subject to the postulates of good faith, that is to 
say, those exigencies should be respected which 
are proper of the circumstances, and that the 
holder of the right, correctly behaving, owes to 
the interests of the other party. Otherwise, he will 
be responsible for an abuse of right, and will not 
be protected by the law; the abusive exercise of a 
right is an illicit act and obliges him to redress 
the damages caused thereby.605 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
412. Again, the criterion of good faith appears as a general constraint rather than a 
defined or a clear criterion of abuse. More precisely, it seems to be a synonym 
of the notion of reasonableness in the exercise of rights. Thus, in jurisdictions 
where the law does not explicitly endorse specific criteria of abuse, as in the 
case of Swiss law606 and German law,607 courts tend to rely on the general 
notion of good faith to find an abuse of right. 
 
413. In discussing good faith as a criterion of abuse, it has been provided that it is 
premised on the rules of positive morality and elementary fairness.608 In 
adopting the good faith criterion, it appears that decision makers are expected 
to determine if there is an abuse based on moral norms and their perceived 
sense of fairness.609 Given that good and bad are relative concepts, adopting 
such an open-ended test of abuse may cause serious prejudice to individuals. It 
invites decision makers to resort to their personal preferences when 
determining whether a right should be protected or sacrificed.610 Thus, given 
                                                          
605 A. Von Tuhr, “Tratado De Las Obligaciones”, 270 (1934), translated in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 
30) 998. 
606 Given that the Swiss legislator linked abuse of rights with the principle of good faith, this explains 
the regular reference to good faith in cases of abuse, despite the fact that examining the rulings in 
these cases demonstrate that the decisions are generally premised on more specific criteria, such as 
the deviation of purpose. 
607 As previously mentioned, the restrictive approach of the German Civil Code reflected in Article 
(226) explains why German courts tend to rely on the broader principle of good faith stipulated 
under Articles (242) and (826). 
608 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 996-997. 
609 Litvinoff (1997), (note 118) 1650. 
610 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 22-23; Litvinoff (1997), (note 118) 1661. 
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its inherently broad terms, one submits that the good faith criterion bears 
undeterminable variable parameters, which fails to make it a sound criterion of 
abuse.611 
 
414. However, it is important to note that by challenging the effectiveness of good 
faith as a criterion of abuse, one does not attempt to disregard the importance 
and indispensability of the principle of good faith to the principle of abuse of 
rights. For some legal systems, as in the case of Germany, good faith is 
regularly used by courts to sanction the abusive exercise of rights, given the 
inherent narrow terms of Section (226) of the German Civil Code, and to 
prevent dealing with its evidentiary limitation.612 In this regard, it has been 
rightly stated that Section (242) of the German Civil Code has played a pivotal 
role in limiting the exercise of rights.613 
 
415. In a case study prepared by Reinhard Zimmermann and Dirk Verse,614 the case 
pertained to a lessee who had to pay a monthly rent amounting to DM 1,000. 
However, given that the lessee regarded this amount to be excessive, he only 
paid DM 900. While the lessor did not protest, three years later he requested 
the lessee to pay the remaining amount for the previous three years. This case 
study pertained to what may be called ‘sitting on one’s rights’. After 
acknowledging that the lessee cannot succeed on grounds of waiver or 
modification of contractual terms, it was stated that he may have a claim on the 
basis of abuse of rights: “loss (Verwirkung) in these kind of cases is based 
upon an abuse of right in the specific form of venire contra factum proprium. It 
                                                          
611 Joseph Thompson, “Good Faith in Contracting: A Sceptical View”, in Angelo Forte (ed.), “Good 
Faith in Contract and Property Law” (Hart Publishing 1999), 75. 
612 BGH, 29 April 1959, BGHZ 30, 140; Steven Reinhold, “Good Faith in International Law”, Bonn 
Research Papers, Paper No. 2/2013, (2013), 3; Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 694; 
also in Belgium, while limitation on the exercise of rights is based on abuse of rights, the Belgian 
Supreme Court held that in cases of contractual rights, abuse is established on the basis of good 
faith. Belgian Supreme Court, 19 September 1983, Bull. Cass., 1983-1984, 52, RDC., 1984, 276; 
Belgian Supreme Court, 18 June 1987, R.W., 1987-1988, 503, J.T., 1988, 8, cited in De Ly (1992), 
(note 578) 154-155. 
613 Cremades (2012), (note 114) 773; Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 24-25; Berger 
(2009), (note 577) 233; Joachim (1992), (note 114) 354. 
614 Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 515-516. 
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constitutes a subcategory of behaviour not in accordance with the 
requirements of good faith”.615 
 
416. This case is of interest as it (a) shows how German courts may use the broad 
principle of good faith to limit the unreasonable exercise of rights; (b) provides 
evidence that abuse of rights is an application of the principle of good faith; 
and (c) demonstrates that the prohibition against inconsistent conduct is 
perceived as a manifestation of abuse of rights. 
 
III. ABUSE OF RIGHTS: AREAS OF CONCERN 
 
417. The application of abuse of rights raises certain issues that warrant 
clarification. A review of its scope reveals its elasticity and extensiveness. As 
previously mentioned, there is no substantive or procedural right that may not 
a priori be brought within the purview of the principle’s operation.616 This 
comprehensiveness, while not worrying, calls for additional prudence from 
courts and tribunals as its misuse may undermine substantial legal interests.617 
 
418. At the outset, one must note that an abuse of right cannot be presumed by 
courts/tribunals, but must be proved by the party.618 This is also the same in 
international law.619 In the case concerning certain German interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) held: 
“such misuse [abuse of right] cannot be presumed, and it rests with the party 
who states that there has been such misuse to prove his statement”.620 
 
419. Given that it is a deviation from clear legal rules, and imposes a 
limitation/restriction on rights ex post facto, some argue that abuse of rights 
                                                          
615 Ibid, 516; Berger (2009), (note 577) 233. 
616 Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 312-313. 
617 Georg Schwarzenberger, “Uses and Abuses of the “Abuse of Rights” in International Law”, 42 
Transactions of the Grotius Society, Problems of Public and Private International Law 147, 152 
(1956); Tête (1987), (note 138) 78. 
618 Byers (2002), (note 10) 399; Lauterpacht (1982), (note 21) 163. 
619 Kiss (1992), (note 22) para. 33. 
620 Germany v. Poland (1926), PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 7, 30; France v. Switzerland (1932), PCIJ (Ser. A/B) 
No. 46, 167;  
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defies the necessary legal certainty required in business transactions.621 
Understandably, the more legal rules can be a reflection of one’s rights and 
duties, the more legal certainty is achieved. In this regard, in the RomPetrol 
case, the arbitral tribunal stated that it would “have great difficulty in an 
approach that was tantamount to setting aside the clear language agreed upon 
by the treaty Parties in favour of a wide-ranging policy discussion”.622 
 
420. However, it is submitted that the principle’s possible defiance of legal certainty 
does not appear to be compelling criticism of abuse of rights. Any equitable 
principle, like abuse of rights, may introduce some uncertainties to the law.623 
Also, while legal certainty is a virtue, it should not be overstated in the face of 
reaching an equitable and fair outcome: 
 
Certainty should not be over-valued. Rules which 
aim to be too prescriptive in order to promote 
certainty will often fail to do justice to unique 
circumstances that might require unique 
solutions. Certainty is always opposed to 
flexibility. The latter is also a value often 
supported in isolation.624 
 
421. Moreover, such uncertainty is no different than applying any general principle 
of law, which equally introduces uncertainty.625 That said, adopting an 
objective criterion of abuse, such as the balancing factor, relatively limits much 
of the uncertainties associated with abuse of rights.626 This was similarly 
                                                          
621 Catherine LaLumiere, “Speech”, in Council of Europe “Abuse of Rights and Equivalent Concepts: 
The Principle and its Present Day Application”, (Proceedings of the 19th Colloquy on European 
Law, Luxembourg, 6-9 November 1989) (Strasbourg 1990) 12; Petrova (2004), (note 187) 481. 
622 RomPetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/03, Decision on Preliminary 
Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 18 April 2008, 85. However, there are 
investment arbitration cases which demonstrate that tribunals are willing to prohibit the abuse of the 
arbitral process and to preclude bad faith conduct, despite of the express terms of a treaty/contract. 
Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award 
dated 18 June 2010, 123-124; Libananco Holding Ltd v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 
Decision on Preliminary Issues dated 23 June 2008, 78; Millicom International Operations BV and 
Sentel GSM SA v. Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/20, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 
16 July 2010, 84; Voon, Mitchell & Munro (2014), (note 277) 63-64. 
623 Perill (1996), (note 38) 96. 
624 Waincymer (2010), (note 51) 32. 
625 Foster (1973), (note 108) 352. 
626 Tête (1987), (note 138) 79-80; Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 999; Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 27.  
Page | 147  
 
adopted in relation to the notion of public policy which equally bears 
undeterminable variable parameters.627 
 
422. Additionally, what is being argued here is not an open-ended application of 
abuse of rights with no restraints. Rather, one posits that a reasonable balance 
should be found: where one should be able to ascertain his/her respective 
rights/obligation by examining the legal instrument in question 
(law/contract/treaty); however, one must additionally recognise that such rights 
are not absolute, but must be exercised reasonably.628  
 
423. Moreover, as the principle’s application arguably encroaches on individual 
rights, some scholars criticise that its application confers a wide discretionary 
power upon courts/arbitrators, contravenes the notion of laisser-faire, and 
possibly invites a high degree of judicial law making.629 
 
424. While such critique is logical and sensible, it seems that it is not directed 
against the principle per se, but rather demonstrates scepticism from the 
misuse of the principle given its broad scope and its reliance on the 
determination of the decision maker rather than on strict codified rules. It must 
be pinpointed that “any judicial or arbitral decision, as a human activity, has a 
strong discretionary content subject to personal valuation”.630 Additionally, 
the discretionary power granted to decision makers in applying abuse of rights 
is not greater than that conferred in relation to established principles and 
                                                          
627 Public policy was first assessed subjectively. Besant v. Wood, [1879] 12 Ch 605, 620 (“public 
policy must be, to a certain extent, a matter of individual opinion”). This was criticised and an 
objective standard was then established: P. E. Nygh, “Foreign Status, Public Policy and 
Discretion”, 12 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39, 51 (1964); Boys v. Chaplin, 
[1971] AC 356, 378; Fender v. St. John-Mildmay, [1938] AC 1, 12; Louks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 
N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 198 202 [1918], referred to in Lawrence Collins, “Dicey and Morris on the 
Conflict of Laws”, (Volume 1), (13th Edition), (Sweet & Maxwell 2000), 81 (“the courts are not free 
to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of judges, to suit the individual notion of 
expediency or fairness”); Explanatory Memorandum of the Egyptian Law No. 131 of 1948 
Promulgating the Civil Code, (volume 2), 223, providing that public policy should be based on 
objective criteria. 
628 Crabb (1964), (note 12) 22-23. 
629 Gutteridge (1935), (note 18) 40. 
630 Cremades (2012), (note 114) 785. 
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overarching notions such as good faith, reasonableness,631  and public 
policy.632 To that effect, it is rightly stated that the discretionary power granted 
to courts in applying abuse of rights “is obviously the same with the criteria of 
fault, proper conduct and good faith. Yet experience shows that the judges 
show no tendency whatever to make bad use of the powers which they have 
been given in this area”.633  
 
425. Accordingly, rather than criticising the discretionary power upon which abuse 
of rights relies, it seems necessary to focus on the calibre of the 
judge/arbitrator upon whom the law confers discretionary power to decide 
many factual and legal intrinsic issues: 
 
But no formula, however wisely drafted, can 
control the exercise of judicial discretion under 
the rubric of “good faith” or “abuse of right” 
independent of the character of the judge. If 
“what good faith requires” is the conduct of a 
just man in the circumstances, the judge must 
himself be a just man in order to determine it. 
Therefore the maintenance of the highest caliber 
of the judiciary becomes increasingly important 
as the discretion of the judge is broadened 
[…].634 
 
426. The legal certainty desired in business transactions can be maintained, and the 
discretionary power granted can be confined, if one acknowledges that 
decision makers need not to apply the principle except in cases of flagrant 
abuse.635 
                                                          
631 E. P. Belobaba, “Good Faith in Canadian Contract Law”, in “Special Lectures of the Law Society 
of Upper Canada, Commercial Law: Recent Developments and Emerging Trends”, (Toronto, De 
Boo 1985) 77-78; Crabb (1964), (note 12) 23; Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 689-
699; Fletcher (1985), (note 250) 953. 
632 Kojo Yelpaala, “Restraining the Unruly Horse: The Use of Public Policy in Arbitration, Interstate 
and International Conflict of Laws in California” 2 The Transnational Lawyer 379, 380-381 and 
394 (1989); Nygh (1964), (note 627) 49-50; Russ v. Russ, [1962] 3 W. L. R. 930, 939, regarding the 
court’s discretionary power not to apply the lex domicilii on grounds of public policy. 
633 Knapp (1983), (note 8) 118. 
634 Tête (1987), (note 138) 83. 
635 For e.g. in relation to investment arbitration disputes, it is generally acknowledged that arbitral 
tribunals rarely find an abuse of right. Voon, Mitchell & Munro (2014), (note 277) 64-65; Chevron 
Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Interim Award dated 1 December 2008, paras 143 and 146. 
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427. To conclude, abuse of rights – as all equitable principles – grants a broad 
discretionary power to decision makers. Thus, it must be applied with utmost 
prudence and should rely on objective criteria to preclude any prejudice as a 
result of the personal preferences of the courts/arbitrators. Decision makers 
must resort to, and utilise, such principle in exceptional matters where abuse is 
flagrant.  
 
428. However, one need not to introduce an inflexible criterion to preclude the 
principle’s misapplication.636 This would necessarily defy the raison d’être of 
the principle which was created, a fortiori, to ameliorate the rigidity of the 
law.637 One submits that abuse of rights is similar, in this regard, to the notion 
of reasonableness in that: 
 
[N]o set of rules can determine what is 
reasonable in all situations. Nor does 
reasonableness lend itself to definitive 
specification on the basis of custom or of market 
practices. We do not always know what the 
reasonable requires, but working with this open-
ended concept at the core of our legal system 
saves us from the constricting effects of 
positivism.638 
 
429. While the balancing factor proposed in this thesis equally demands a broad 
discretionary power vested in the courts/arbitrators, one submits that such 
crucial power is to be confined to the legal particulars and factual matrix of the 
case, regarding interests emanating from an acknowledged legal relationship 
between those implicated in the dispute, and is not linked to specific moral 
norms or beliefs of the decision maker. 
 
                                                          
636 Finding an abuse depends on the factual matrix of each case. Mobil Corp., v. Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 10 June 2010, paras 177 and 
184; Borman (2011), (note 454) 389. 
637 Lauterpacht (1982), (note 21) 162; Byers (2002), (note 10) 406; Robert Kolb, “Principles as 
Sources of International Law: With Special Reference to Good Faith”, 53 Netherlands International 
Law Review 1, 16 (2006); Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 764-765. 
638 Fletcher (1985), (note 250) 980. 
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430. Thus, the concerns discussed above, while not taking credit from the viability 
and necessity of abuse of rights, do necessarily call for decision makers to be 
prudent in applying the principle to avert its unwarranted abuse.639 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
431. To not endorse abuse of rights, jurisdictions would be swimming against the 
tide.640 
 
432. In this section, one attempted to demarcate and delineate the characteristic 
elements of abuse of rights. Precisely, based on reviewing its application in a 
number of legal systems, one endeavoured to highlight the principle’s 
conditions of application, and shed light on the primary concerns associated 
with the principle.  
 
433. In doing so, it was clear that the principle assumes the existence of an 
acknowledged legal right and that such a right ceases legal protection given 
that it has been abused by the right holder. Upon a discussion on the different 
tests/criteria regularly used to establish an abuse of right, and based on the 
inherent limitation of each criterion, one submitted that the balancing factor 
constitutes an effective criterion of abuse. 
 
434. It is reasonable to submit that there is some sort of general acceptance that any 
right cannot be unreasonably exercised, and that such unreasonableness is not 
to be decided by any rigid rule or test, but by a flexible balancing exercise of 
the existing competing interests involved.641 Such balancing creates a proper 
limit on each right and further advances “the smooth and proper functioning of 
the legal system”.642  
 
                                                          
639 Lauterpacht (1982), (note 21) 164. 
640 This statement was used by Leggatt J in the case of Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade 
Corporation [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), discussing the common law approach to the principle of 
good faith. 
641 Tidewater Inc. et al v. the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision 
on Jurisdiction dated 8 February 2013, para. 147. 
642 Cheng (2006), (note 190) 136. 
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435. The potency of the balancing factor stems from its nature as a device that seeks 
and maintains a fair balance between the competing interests of the parties 
involved. While it is submitted that no rigid rules shall be adopted to guide 
decision makers, the balancing factor should contain sub-factors to guide 
decision makers. These sub-factors include inter alia the indices applied by 
courts as criteria of abuse (such as existence of malice, the purpose of the right, 
and legitimate interest). The sub-factors shall also comprise all competing 
interests at stake, which will necessarily vary from one legal dispute to 
another. Another sub-factor entails conducting a comparative impairment test 
to assess the reasonableness of the act in question. 
 
436. The universal acknowledgment of this scintillating corrective device in 
different legal systems begs the question as to whether it can be considered a 
general principle of law in international arbitration. One endeavours to discuss 
this issue in the next sections. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE IMPORTANCE OF APPLYING ABUSE 




437. Parties resort to arbitration to resolve their disputes efficiently and to obtain a 
final and enforceable award.643 Any system of justice, including the arbitration 
system, is not meant for abuse.644 Thus, it would be paradoxical to support a 
mischief that the arbitration system seeks to obviate. This could cast doubts as 
to the system’s efficiency and induce distrust in the system that was formed to 
accommodate parties’ interests and uphold their common intentions. 
 
438. In this regard, it is argued that the principle of abuse of rights is necessary in 
international arbitration as it ensures the good administration of arbitral justice.  
 
439. As shall be scrutinised below, abuse of rights operates in a manner that: 
achieves fairness during the arbitration proceedings; incentivises efficiency; 
enables arbitrators to reach an equitable and reasonable outcome; and 
preserves the integrity of the arbitration system. 
 
440. It is submitted that the application of abuse of rights equally serves 
fundamental interests pertaining to the substantive part of the dispute (such as 
fairness, reasonableness, and equitable outcomes).645 Thus, in ICC Case No. 
3276 of 1979, the issue of applying abuse of rights and its connection with the 
power of arbitrators to decide as amiable compositeur, or ex aequo et bono, 
was discussed.646 In this case, the tribunal established a connection between 
                                                          
643 Born (2014), (note 61) 73-91. 
644 Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 765; Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/8, Decision on Preliminary Issues, 23 June 2008, para. 78.  
645 ICC Case No. 8547 of 1999, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), “Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
2003 Volume XXVIII”, (Kluwer Law International 2003), para. 19; ICC Case No. 3276 of 1979, in 
Sigvard Jarvin and Yves Derains, “Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985”, (Kluwer Law 
1990), 86. 
646 ICC Case No. 3276 of 1979, in Sigvard Jarvin and Yves Derains, “Collection of ICC Arbitral 
Awards 1974-1985”, (Kluwer Law 1990), 76-87. 
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equity, fairness, and the exercise of rights. It was provided that considerations 
of fairness and equity necessitate the prohibition of abuse of rights. More 
importantly, the tribunal provided that where the conditions sine qua non for 
the application of abuse of rights are not established (if the exercise of right 
was not malicious, exercised for a legitimate purpose and was reasonable), 
equitable considerations may still preclude the exercise of a right if the 
consequences of such exercise were not fair.647 
 
441. However, given that international arbitration is inherently procedural,648 this 
section shall mainly examine those arbitration related interests/principles that 
warrant the application of a general principle of abuse of rights in international 
arbitration. 
 
442. Thus, in this chapter one aims to demonstrate how the principle of abuse of 
rights is important for the good administration of justice given its advancement 
of paramount interests. However, it is acknowledged that the notion of good 
administration of justice eludes a priori meaning and that its essence is rather 
undeterminable. 
 
443. Accordingly, prior to embarking on how the principle operates to advance the 
aforementioned interests, it is necessary to first shed light on the notion of 
good administration of arbitral justice by delineating its relevant constituent 
elements. Once this is achieved, it becomes possible to examine the 
interrelation of abuse of rights to, and its effect on, the administration of 
justice. 
 
II. GOOD ADMINISTRATION OF ARBITRAL JUSTICE 
 
444. As a dispute resolution process, international arbitration operates in accordance 
with a number of guiding principles. Arbitrators arguably have a fundamental 
                                                          
647 Ibid, 86. 
648 Alexandre Meyniel, “That Which Must Not be Named: Rationalizing the Denial of U.S. Courts 
with Respect to the Group of Companies Doctrine”, 3 The Arbitration Brief 18, 29 (2013). 
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duty to ensure the good administration of arbitral justice.649  
 
445. Ascertaining the meaning of good administration of arbitral justice is not an 
easy task. Whilst the term may be used by scholars and arbitrators/judges, 
there appears to be no clear definition of the notion in arbitration doctrine.650 
 
446. The notion is often used to refer to the fairness of the proceedings, 
considerations of due process/equality, efficiency and integrity of the arbitral 
process.651 These principles are also described as the magna carta of 
international arbitration.652 The potency of these principles, particularly 
fairness and due process, stems from the fact that they are deemed the core of 
procedural guarantees conferred upon the parties, and thus parties cannot 
waive such procedural guarantees.653 
 
447. Filip De Ly held that the notion of good administration of arbitral justice 
includes the requirements of due process, fairness and efficiency.654 Similarly, 
                                                          
649 Bernardo M. Cremades and David J. A. Caims, “Trans-national Public Policy in International 
Arbitral Decision-making: The Cases of Bribery, Money Laundering and Fraud”, in Andrew 
Berkeley and Kristine Karsten (eds), “Arbitration: Money Laundering, Corruption and Fraud”, 
(Kluwer Law International 2003), 80; William W. Park, “The Four Musketeers of Arbitral Duty: 
Neither One-For-All nor All-For-One”, in Yves Derains and Laurent Lévy (eds), “Is Arbitration 
only As Good as the Arbitrator? Status, Powers and Role of the Arbitrator”, (Kluwer Law 
International 2011), 26; Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 94, arguing that the notion of good 
administration of justice is not merely an obligation on the part of the arbitrators, but may equally 
require the assistance of arbitral institutions; Utku Topcan, “Abuse of the Right to Access ICSID 
Arbitration”, 29 ICSID Review 627, 633 (2014).  
650 Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) 47-48; Labinal Case, Paris Court of Appeal, 1st Chambers A, 1993 
Review Arbitrage 645, referred to in Bernard Hanotiau “Problems Raised by Complex Arbitrations 
Involving Multiple Contracts-Parties-Issues – An Analysis”, 18 Journal of International Arbitration 
253, 309 (2001); Willian W. Park, “Private Disputes and the Public Good: Explaining Arbitration 
Law”, 20 American University International Law Review 903, 904 (2005). 
651 Park (2011), (note 649) 26; Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1973, 166, 179; Georgios Petrochilos, 
“Three Pillars of International Public Policy”, in Photini Pazartzis, Maria Gavouneli et al. (eds), 
“Reconceptualising the Rule of Law in Global Governance, Resources, Investment and Trade”, 
(Hart Publishing 2016), 317; Thomas W. Walde, “Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration 
under the Shadow of the Dual Role of the State”, 26 Arbitration International 3, 11 and 30 (2010). 
652 Petrochilos (2016), (note 651) 317; Abba Kolo, “Witness Intimidation, Tampering and Other 
Related Abuse of Process in Investment Arbitration”, 26 Arbitration International 43, 61 (2010). 
653 S. I. Strong, “Limits of Procedural Choice of Law”, 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
1027, 1101 (2014); Aleksandar Jaksic, “Arbitration and Human Rights”, (Peter Lang Publishing 
2002), 9. 
654 Filip De Ly, “Paradigmatic Changes – Uniformity, Diversity, Due Process and Good 
Administration of Justice: The Next Thirty Years”, in Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian D.M. Lew, et al. 
(eds), “The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2016), 
37. 
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Philippe Leboulanger noted that good administration of justice is a 
fundamental principle which aims to secure justice and fairness between the 
parties, and “serve procedural efficiency and to save time and costs”.655 
 
448. Thus, the notion’s importance stems from the vital interests it aims to secure. 
One agrees with those who advocate that it is a principle of a mandatory 
nature, part of international public policy, and should not be sacrificed in the 
face of other potent principles such as party autonomy: 
 
From a procedural viewpoint, the sacrosanct 
principle of autonomie de la volonté should thus 
be soothed by mandatory principles such as the 
proper administration of justice, […] which are 
part of international public policy as conceived 
by most national legal systems and by the law of 
international arbitration.656 
 
449. One shall provide an outline of the relevant pillars that fall under the umbrella 
of good administration of arbitral justice. These comprise: (A) fairness; (B) 
due process; and (C) efficiency. This discussion is of potency, as one shall go 
on to examine how the principle of abuse of rights operates within these pillars 
and how it advances or affects them.  
 
A. Fairness  
 
450. Parties principally refer their disputes to international arbitration owing to the 
presumed advantages and benefits that the arbitration system aspires to offer. 
Obtaining a fair resolution of the dispute is one of the principal purposes of 
international arbitration.657  
 
                                                          
655 Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 54. 
656 Ibid, 97. 
657 Park (2010), (note 49) 27; David C. Sawyer, “Revising the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: Seeking 
Procedural Due Process Under the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules for Arbitration”, 1 International 
Commercial Arbitration Brief 24, 26 (2011); Nana Japaridze, “Fair Enough? Reconciling the 
Pursuit of Fairness and Justice with Preserving the Nature of International Commercial 
Arbitration”, 36 Hofstra Law Review 1415, 1415-1416 (2008). 
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451. One empirical study658 found that the majority of arbitration users (81%) rated 
a ‘fair and just result’ above all other considerations, including obtaining 
favourable monetary award.659 It equally comprises a sacrosanct principle, the 
satisfaction of which is an integral prerequisite for the good administration of 
arbitral justice.660 
 
452. The fairness factor has a substantive as well as a procedural element. 
Substantive fairness implies receiving the ‘right’ decision and procedural 
fairness entails receiving it in the ‘right’ manner.661 In this regard, some rightly 
advocate that regardless of how accurate and fair the substantive outcome is, 
procedural fairness is of paramount importance: “even a good and correct 
result does not compensate for a bad and unfair procedure”.662 
 
453. The good administration of arbitral justice requires the highest standard of 
fairness.663 Arbitration laws and institutional rules emphasise the duty of 
arbitrators to provide a fair means for the resolution of the dispute,664 and that 
it comprises a fundamental principle in international arbitration.665 That said, 
Section 1(1)(a) of the English Arbitration Act stipulates that “the object of 
arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal 
without unnecessary delay or expense”.666 The French arbitration law equally 
                                                          
658 This study was conducted by Richard W. Naimark, the Vice President of the American Arbitration 
Association and Stephanie Keer. 
659 Richard W Naimark and Stephanie E Keer, “International Private Commercial Arbitration: 
Expectations & Perceptions of Attorneys & Business People”, 30 International Business Lawyer 
203, 205 (2002). 
660 De Ly (2016), (note 654) 37-38; Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 89-91. 
661 Naimark & Keer (2002), (note 659) 205; Japaridze (2008), (note 657) 1416; Waincymer (2010), 
(note 51) 31. 
662 Fabricio Fortese & Lotta Hemmi, “Procedural Fairness and Efficiency in International 
Arbitration”, 3 Groningen Journal of International Law 110, 116 (2015); Matti S. Kurkela & Santtu 
Turunen, “Due Process in International Commercial Arbitration”, (Second Edition), (Oxford 
University Press 2010), 202-203. 
663 Gillian Eastwood, “A Real Danger of Confusion? The English Law Relating to Bias in 
Arbitrators”, 17 Arbitration International 287, 290 (2001). 
664 Section 33(1) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996. It is acknowledged that the primary aim of 
the ICC Rules is to ensure fairness and efficiency in the dispute resolution process: ICC Rules of 
Arbitration of 2012 (Foreword); Article (22.4) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration of 2012; Article 
(14.4) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules of 2014; Article (17.1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
(2013). 
665 De Ly (2016), (note 654) 27-28. 
666 Section 1(a) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996. 
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recognises the potency of fairness, and provides that it must be honoured by 
the arbitral tribunal and the parties.667  
 
454. Whilst the above laws and institutional rules have emphasised the importance 
of fairness in the conduct of arbitral proceedings, there is no clear guidance on 
what is considered a violation of fairness or how it relates to other principles 
such as due process or party autonomy.668  
 
455. Thus, ascertaining how to achieve the desired fairness, or determining the 
constituent elements of fairness, remains largely ambiguous.669 The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines the term ‘fair’ as “acceptable and appropriate in a 
particular situation”, and defines fairness as: “the quality of treating people 
equally or in a way that is reasonable”.670 Moreover, the term fair is defined in 
Black’s Law Dictionary as impartial; just; equitable; disinterested.671  
 
456. One finds it apt to endorse the definition used by Filip De Ly, where he 
described procedural fairness in the context of arbitration as: 
 
[R]eferring to standards of reasonable 
procedural conduct which go beyond addressing 
frustrating tactics and also address procedural 
aspects to be solved on the basis of what 
reasonable actors are to expect from one another 
and are to comply with.672 [Emphasis added]. 
 
457. In this regard, it is asserted that the requirement of procedural fairness 
encompasses an obligation to: prohibit procedural misconduct (which includes 
frustrating tactics), preclude any other abuse of right, preserve the integrity of 
the arbitral process, honour the parties’ reasonable expectations; and enhance 
                                                          
667 Article (1464) of the French Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 2011. 
668 De Ly (2016), (note 654) 35. 
669 Sawyer (2011), (note 657) 26. 
670 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, (Seventh Edition), (Oxford University Press 2005), 548-
549. 
671 Black’s Law Dictionary, (Ninth Edition), (West Publishing Co. 2009), 674. 
672 De Ly (2016), (note 654) 37. 
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the efficiency of the proceedings.673 It is of particular interest to mention that 
the depiction of fairness, so as to preclude abusive conduct, equally conforms 
to the requirement of fairness under Shari’a law and is consistent with the 
arbitral process prescribed thereunder.674  
 
458. The interrelation between the notion of fairness and the principle of abuse of 
rights is further fortified by the UNIDROIT Principles, whereby Article (1.7) 
requires parties to act in good faith and fair dealing, and demonstrates that the 
prohibition against abuse of rights constitutes a manifestation of good faith and 
fair dealing.675 By and large, this conforms to the views advocated by other 
learned scholars who confirm that abusive conduct and delaying tactics are 
unfair and thus defy the good administration of arbitral justice.676 
 
459. On a related note, it is suggested that arbitrators’ duty to resolve the dispute in 
a fair manner entails that arbitrators should also preserve the integrity of the 
arbitral system.677 Part of the requirement of fairness is that arbitral tribunals 
not only safeguard and preserve the integrity of the arbitral process “but also 
that the arbitrator give the appearance of doing so”.678 In ascertaining what 
the duty of upholding fairness and preserving the integrity of arbitration 
process entail, it is held that it requires that: “all reasonable efforts must be 
taken by the arbitrator to prevent delaying tactics, harassment of the parties 
or other participants, or any other disruption of the arbitration process”.679 
                                                          
673 Ibid, 37; Tetley (2004), (note 577) 561-563 and 615; Japaridze (2008), (note 657) 1434-1435, 
(drawing a clear link between fairness and the duty to act in good faith, and also providing that the 
notion of fairness encompasses a duty of loyalty). In relation to the meaning of the duty of loyalty, 
see Larry A. DiMatteo, Lucien Dhooge, et al, “The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An 
Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence”, 34 Northwestern Journal of International Law 
and Business 299, 316-317 (2004): “According to the principle [loyalty], the parties to a contract 
have to act in favour of the common goal; they have to reasonably consider the interests of the 
other party”. 
674 Nudrat Majeed, “Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the Shari’a”, 20 Arbitration 
International 97, 108 (2004). 
675 Comment (2) to Article (1.7) of the UNIDROIT Principles of 2010, which provides that a typical 
example of behaviour contrary to the principle of good faith and fair dealing is abuse of rights. 
676 Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 89-92. 
677 Richard L. Garnett “A Practical Guide to International Commercial Arbitration”, (Oceana 
Publications 2000), 83; Japaridze (2008), (note 657) 1435 and 1437; Henry Gabriel and Anjanette 
H. Raymond, “Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic Principles and Emerging Standards”, 5 
Wyoming Law Review 453, 458 (2005). 
678 Gabriel & Raymond (2005), (note 677) 458. 
679 Garnett (2000), (note 677) 83; Gabriel & Raymond (2005), (note 677) 458. 
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460. Equally, one avers that the notion of fairness in arbitration is interrelated to the 
desire to reach a just and an equitable procedural outcome;680 even if such 
outcome does not conform to strict legal rules.681 This interrelation is not 
merely deduced from a vernacular perspective,682 but is equally perceptible 
from a practical point of view. Thus, in extending the arbitration clause to a 
non-signatory, arbitral decisions to that effect are often based on the notion of 
good administration of justice, as encompassing the requirements of fairness 
and equity.683 
 
461. Given that an escalation of costs or time arguably limits one’s access to justice, 
it is generally acknowledged that fairness in the conduct of arbitral proceedings 
also requires procedural efficiency.684 Also without fairness, the arbitral 
proceedings are hardly efficient.685 The interrelation between fairness in the 
conduct of the arbitral proceedings and ensuring an efficient resolution of the 
dispute is evident under established arbitration laws and rules.686 Accordingly, 
the requirement of fairness necessitates resolving the dispute without 
unwarranted delay or costs.687 
 
B. Due process 
 
462. Another important aspect of international arbitration and an integral part of 
good administration of justice is that the arbitral proceedings must comply 
                                                          
680 Waincymer (2010), (note 51) 30. 
681 Interim Award in ICC Case No. 3879 of 1984, XI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 127 (1986); 
Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) 47-48. 
682 As previously mentioned, the term fair is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as impartial; just; 
equitable; disinterested. Black’s Law Dictionary, (Ninth Edition), (West Publishing Co. 2009), 674. 
683 Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) 47-48; Bernard Hanotiau, “Consent to Arbitration: Do We Share a 
Common Vision?”, 27 Arbitration International 539, 554 (2011). 
684 Fortese & Hemmi (2015), (note 662) 116. 
685 William Park, “The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration: Non-Governmental 
Instruments”, in Loukas Mistelis and Julian D. M. Lew (eds), “Pervasive Problems in International 
Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2006), 144. 
686 Article (14.4) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules of 2014, Article (17.1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules of 2013; Sections 33(b) and 41(3)(a) of the English Arbitration Act. 
687 Japaridze (2008), (note 657) 1425 and 1432. 
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with the requirements of due process.688  
 
463. Where parties refer a dispute to international arbitration, they waive their 
sacrosanct constitutional right to have their dispute resolved before a national 
court.689 As this arguably limits one’s access to justice, certain paramount 
procedural standards need to be met by arbitrators.690 
 
464. It is widely recognised that arbitrators are under an obligation to make every 
effort to render an enforceable award.691 For an award to be enforceable, it 
must comply with the requirements of due process.692 
 
465. Most arbitration laws and institutional rules include provisions that pertain to 
the requirements of due process.693 The notion can comprise different 
obligations under different national laws. Some laws endorse a broad 
understanding of due process so as to equate it to the notion of fairness and 
natural justice.694 In this regard, one endorses the requirements of due process 
as those enshrined under international legal instruments. To that effect, Article 
(18) of the UNCITRAL Model law stipulates that parties shall be treated with 
equality and given an opportunity of presenting their case.695 Article (17.1) of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that “the arbitral tribunal may 
conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided 
that the parties are treated with equality and that at an appropriate stage of 
the proceedings each party is given a reasonable opportunity of presenting its 
                                                          
688 Kurkela & Turunen (2010), (note 662); Article (1510) of the French Law on Civil Procedure as 
amended in 2011; Robert Pietrowski, “Evidence in International Arbitration”, 22 Arbitration 
International 373, 392 (2006), (providing that good administration of arbitral justice requires that 
any document presented by one of the parties be known to the other party(ies) and that the latter 
should be given an opportunity to discuss it). 
689 Kurkela & Turunen (2010), (note 662) 2. 
690 Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis & Stefan M. Kröll, “Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2003), 5-34; Kurkela & Turunen (2010), (note 662) 2. 
691 Article (41) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration of 2012; Article (32.2) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules 
of 2014.  
692 Julian D.M. Lew, “Iura Novit Curia and Due Process”, Queen Mary University of London, Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 72/2010, 12; Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention of 1958. 
693 Park (2006), (note 685) 145. 
694 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, “Globalization of Arbitral Procedure”, 36 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1313, 1321 (2003). 
695 Article (18) of the UNCITRAL Model Law as amended in 2006. 
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case”.696 Finally, Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention equally 
emphasises that due process encompasses the requirement that parties be given 
an opportunity to present their case.  
 
466. In delineating the rationale of due process, Bernardo Cremades noted that it 
comprises two fundamental procedural aspects: “access to justice and 
reasonableness of the proceedings”.697 Accordingly, due process in 
international arbitration mandates that arbitral proceedings are fairly 
conducted, that parties are treated equally and that they are given a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard and present their case before an unbiased tribunal.698 
 
467. Although parties often raise or invoke the due process defence to resist 
recognition or enforcement of an award, courts rarely find a violation of due 
process and generally adopt a restrictive approach.699 
 
468. However, there is a growing phenomenon of abuse of due process. This 
denotes the current practice of parties, and their legal counsel, who threaten to 
invoke the defence of due process whenever their procedural requests are not 
complied with.700 This enigma is further fortified by the fact that arbitrators 
regularly fail to limit such abusive conduct and tolerate requests whenever 
cloaked under due process; i.e. due process paranoia.701 Thus, whilst the 
requirements of due process are sacrosanct elements of the administration of 
justice, recent trends demonstrating its regular abuse do not imply good 
                                                          
696 Article (17.1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 2013. 
697 Bernardo M. Cremades, “The Use and Abuse of “Due Process” in International Arbitration”, 
Alexander Lecture 2016, 6, available at: http://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-
source/ciarbdocuments/events/2016/november/use-and-abuse-of-due-process.pdf?sfvrsn=2 
(accessed 01 February 2018). 
698 Fortese & Hemmi (2015), (note 662) 111-112; Park (2006), (note 685) 145; Bernard Hanotiau and 
Olivier Caprasse, “Arbitrability, Due Process, and Public Policy Under Article V of the New York 
Convention”, 25 Journal of International Arbitration 721, 727-728 (2008); Article V(1)(b) of the 
New York Convention of 1958; Generica Limited v. Pharmaceuticals Basics Inc., United States 
Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 96-4004, 29 September 1997, 23 Yearbook Commercial 
arbitration 1076, 1079 (1998). 
699 Hanotiau & Caprasse (2008), (note 698) 727-728. 
700 Cremades (2016), (note 697); Rémy Gerbay, “Due Process Paranoia”, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 
dated 6 June 2016, available at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/06/06/due-process-paranoia/ 
(accessed on 15 September 2017). 
701 Queen Mary University of London and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP: “2015 International 
Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration”, (2015), 10; 
Gerbay (2016), (note 700). 
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administration of justice. This is particularly the case given that requirements 
of due process often conflict with the obligation of procedural efficiency 
(another element of good administration of justice) as shall be discussed 
below.  
 
469. Arbitral tribunals as well as academics are yet to find a tool or principle to be 
utilised to balance due process and efficiency. As shall be discussed below, it 
is posited that the principle of abuse of rights not only advances the 
aforementioned interests that comprise good administration of justice, but may 





470. In the world of business, prevailing in a given dispute primarily entails 
advancing the commercial goals of the business, and this often means winning 
in a timely manner.702 Cost and time efficiency are very important features of 
international arbitration.703 This is often promoted by advocates and supporters 
                                                          
702 Michael McIlwrath & Roland Schroeder, “The View from an International Arbitration Customer: 
In Dire Need of Early Resolution”, 74 Arbitration 3, 3 (2008). 
703 Born (2014), (note 61) 86; Richard Naimark & Stephanie Keer, “International Private 
Commercial Arbitration – Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People”, in 
Christopher Drahozal & Richard Naimark (eds.), “Towards a Science of International Arbitration: 
Collected Empirical Research”, (Kluwer Law International 2005), 49; Francis Higgins, William 
Brown and Patrick Roach, “Pitfalls in International Commercial Arbitration”, 35 The Business 
Lawyer 1035, 1035 (1980); Benjamin G. Davis, “Improving International Arbitration: The need for 
speed and trust”, Liber Amicorum Michel Gaudet, (ICC Publishing S.A. 1998); Curtis E. von Kann, 
“The College of Commercial Arbitrators, Guide to Best Practice in Commercial Arbitration”, (Juris 
Publishing Inc. 2006), 3; Rudolf Fiebinger and Christoph Hauser, “An Arbitrator’s View: Can Party 
Autonomy Hinder Procedural Efficiency”, in Nathalie Voser (ed), “10 Years of Swiss Rules of 
International Arbitration”, (JurisNet 2014), 174; Nathan D. O’Malley, “Rules of Evidence in 
International Arbitration: An Annotated Guide”, (Informa 2012), 315; David W. Rivkin, “Towards 
a New Paradigm in International Arbitration: The Town Elder Model Revisited”, 23 Arbitration 
International 375, 376-377 (2008); Fradella v. Petricca, 183 F. 3d 17, 19 (First Circuit 1999); 
Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F. 2d 108, 111 (Second Circuit 1993); Stolt-Nielsen 
SA v. Animalfeeds Int’l, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1775 (U.S. S. Ct. 2010). 
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of international arbitration.704  
 
471. It is equally an indispensable element for the good administration of arbitral 
justice.705 As stated by one tribunal, procedural economy is required by the 
good administration of justice.706 Additionally, as rightly noted by Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler: 
 
We live in a time when many complain that 
justice, be it judicial or arbitral, is too slow, too 
expensive, and too cumbersome. Furthering the 
efficiency of dispute settlement can obviously 
contribute to improving the administration of 
justice.707 [Emphasis added]. 
 
472. Chester Brown equally emphasised the importance of efficiency to ensure the 
good administration of justice: 
 
One of these is the function of ensuring the proper 
administration of international justice. This is 
distinct from the function of settling disputes, in 
that it emphasizes the need for effectiveness and 
efficiency in judicial decision-making, and it is 
well established in the jurisprudence of 
international courts, as well as in the 
literature.708 [Emphasis added]. 
 
473. Given its importance for the administration of justice, most arbitration laws 
and institutional rules provide for and attempt to achieve procedural 
                                                          
704 Edna Sussman, “Why Arbitrate: The Benefits and Savings”, 7 Transnational Dispute Management 
2 (2010); Thomas Stipanowich, “Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the 'New Litigation'”, 7 
DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal 383 (2009); Gary Born, “International Commercial 
Arbitration: Commentary and Materials”, (Second Edition), (Kluwer Law International 2001); 
Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law of 1985 (with amendments as 
adopted in 2006), 27; E. A. Schwartz, “The Rights and Duties of ICC Arbitrators”, in “The Status of 
The Arbitrator”, ICC Bulletin-Special Supplement (ICC Publishing 1995), 77; M. Rasmussen, 
“Overextending Immunity: Arbitral Institution Liability in the United States, England, and France”, 
26 Fordham International Law Journal 1824, 1834-1836 (2003). 
705 Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 54, 85 and 92. 
706 Canfor Corporation v. United States of America, Tembec et al v. United Stated of America, 
(UNCITRAL), Order of the Consolidation Tribunal dated 7 September 2005, paras 76 and 183; 
Ridhi Kabra, “Has Abaclat v Argentina left the ICSID with a ‘mass’ive problem?”, 31 Arbitration 
International 425, 450 (2015). 
707 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, “When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: Towards a Transnational 
Standard”, 25 Arbitration International 187, 188 (2009). 
708 Brown (2005), (note 24) 231. 
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efficiency.709 Unwarranted delays not only disrupt the arbitral proceedings, but 
can have manifest financial implications to the prejudiced party.710 In some 
cases, unreasonable delay may lead to financial losses that cannot necessarily 
be remedied by awarding interest or allocating costs.711  
 
474. Waste of resources in arbitral proceedings is mostly disadvantageous to the 
parties (or at least one of them) and to the arbitral tribunal, but is not 
necessarily inconvenient to legal counsel.712  
 
475. It is acknowledged that the benefits of arbitration may be thwarted, and 
administration of justice may be brought into disrepute, unless all those 
involved in the arbitration process actively cooperate to effectively resolve the 
disputes in question.713 Although some arbitration laws and rules endeavour to 
limit such inefficiency,714 it is generally acknowledged that such rules are 
inadequate.715 
 
476. The arbitration process is failing to accommodate the level of efficiency 
required by its users.716 In recent surveys and empirical studies, users have 
complained primarily because of the costs, delays and procedural misconduct 
                                                          
709 Section (33.1) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996; ICC Rules of Arbitration of 2012 
(Foreword); Article (14.4) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules of 2014; Article (17) of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (2013). 
710 Redfern, Hunter et al. (2004), (note 51) 244; McIlwrath & Schroeder, (note 702) 4. 
711 Redfern, Hunter et al. (2004), (note 51) 244. 
712 Fiebinger & Hauser (2014), (note 703) 175. Costs of legal representation is often the main 
component of costs in arbitration: Sachs (2006), (note 58) 110-113; ICC Commission Report, ICC 
Dispute Resolution Bulletin, “Decisions on Costs in International Arbitration”, (Issue 2), (ICC 
2015), 3. 
713 Redfern, Hunter et al. (2004), (note 51) paras 1-46. 
714 See for example, setting time-limits for rendering an award, as in Article (45) of the Egyptian 
Arbitration Law; Article (820) of the Italian Law of Civil Procedure; Article (25) of the Ecuadorian 
Arbitration Law; Article (30.1) of the ICC Arbitration Rules; Section (33.1.b) of the English 
Arbitration Act. 
715 Redfern, Hunter et al. (2004), (note 51) 244; the ICSID Arbitration Rules have been amended in 
2006 to enhance the efficiency of ICSID arbitration, and it is generally held that the rules did not 
necessarily succeed in achieving this: Antonio R. Parra, “The 2006 Amendments of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules”, German Arbitration Journal (SchiedsVZ) 247, 248 (2006); Lars Markert, 
“Improving Efficiency in Investment Arbitration”, 4 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 215, 
223 (2011). 
716 Welser & Wurzer (2008), (note 51); Welser & Klausegger (2009), (note 51) 260; Bernardini 
(2011), (note 51); Berger (2008), (note 51) 595; Waincymer (2010), (note 51) 45; Slate II (2010), 
(note 51) 186; Risse (2009), (note 51) 461. 
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during the arbitration process.717 This is also the case in relation to investment 
arbitration proceedings which, according to a recent study, last for an average 
of 3.6 years.718 One must add that these concerns are not new. While 
arbitration users have been expressing their concern for some time,719 the 
arbitration community failed to introduce innovative tools to adequately 
remedy such problems.720 
 
477. The continuation of this trend, which may further increase due to the 
complexity of business transactions and the lack of defined rules/principles to 
limit it, may disincentive users from referring disputes to international 
arbitration, place distrust in the arbitral system,721 and question the legitimacy 
of the arbitration system as a whole.722  
 
478. Procedural efficiency, and precluding procedural misconduct and abuse, is 
directly linked to parties’ expectations.723 Parties are presumed to have agreed 
to arbitrate in good faith and to avoid tactical manoeuvres that may impede 
procedural efficiency.724 
 
                                                          
717 Queen Mary University of London and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP: “2015 International 
Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration”, (2015), 7. 
718 Anthony Sinclair, “ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does it Take?”, 4 Global Arbitration Review 18, 
20 (2009); Markert (2011), (note 715) 217. 
719 This is demonstrated by the similar results of the surveys conducted in 2006 and in 2015: Queen 
Mary University of London and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, “International Arbitration: 
Corporate Attitudes and Practices”, (2006) 6; Queen Mary University of London and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP: “2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and 
Innovations in International Arbitration”, (2015), 7. 
720 While arbitration institutions introduced rules in an attempt to tackle the costs and delay issues, it 
seems that they arguably failed to overcome the problem. For example, while fast-track arbitration 
has been introduced in many arbitration rules to remedy the time and cost issues, it is submitted that 
the “vast majority” of users have not taken advantage of such tool. Queen Mary University of 
London and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, “2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and 
Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process”, 10-15. Also, fast-track arbitration primarily relies on 
the will of all those involved to cooperate to speed up the arbitral process. Redfern, Hunter et al. 
(2004), (note 51) 286. 
721 Queen Mary University of London and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP: “Corporate choices in 
International Arbitration: Industry perspectives”, (2013), 5; Linda Silberman, “Report: 
International Arbitration: Comments from a Critic”, 13 American Review of International 
Arbitration 9, 9 (2002); Fiebinger & Hauser (2014), (note 703) 175; Michael Karrer, “Arbitration 
Saves! Costs: Poker and Hide and Seek”, 3 Journal of International Arbitration 35 (1986); Blue Tee 
Corp. v. Koehring Company and United Dominion Industries, Inc., 999 F. 2d 633, 634 (Second 
Circuit 1993). 
722 Markert (2011), (note 715) 217. 
723 Waincymer (2010), (note 51) 35. 
724 Ibid. 
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III. ABUSE OF RIGHTS: A PRINCIPLE THAT ENSURES THE 
GOOD ADMINISTRATION OF ARBITRAL JUSTICE 
 
479. It is submitted that the application of abuse of rights is vital to ensure the good 
administration of arbitral justice.725 As rightly noted by Peter Barnett, the 
principle advocates that the exercise of rights should be precluded when 
necessary “in the face of unfairness to another party, or to avoid the risk that 
the administration of justice might be brought into disrepute”.726 
 
480. Arbitrators’ right/obligation to prevent any abuse of rights emanates from their 
inherent duty to ensure the good administration of arbitral justice.727 In this 
regard, Chester Brown rightly noted: “[a]nother aspect of the administration 
of international justice is the prevention of any ‘abuse of process’ in 
international adjudication”.728 
 
481. This was confirmed by the House of Lords, now the Supreme Court, in 
England in the context of subsequent proceedings, where Lord Diplock 
provided that: 
 
[T]his is a case about abuse of the process of the 
High Court. It concerns the inherent power which 
any court of justice must possess to prevent 
misuse of its procedure in a way which, although 
not inconsistent with the literal application of its 
procedural rules, would nevertheless be 
manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, 
or would otherwise bring the administration of 
                                                          
725 Brown (2005), (note 24) 231; Martins Paparinskis, “Inherent Powers of ICSID Tribunals: Broad 
and Rightly So”, in Ian Laird & Todd Weiler (eds), “Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
International Law”, (Juris 2011), 16, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1876705 (accessed 1 
February 2018); Chester Brown, “The Relevance of the Doctrine of Abuse of Process in 
International Adjudication”, 7 Transnational Dispute Management 1, 6-12 (2010). 
726 Barnett (2001), (note 283) para. 6.05. 
727 Lauterpacht (1982), (note 21) 165; Paparinskis (2011), (note 725) 16; Andrew Newcombe, 
“Investor Misconduct: Jurisdiction, Admissibility or Merits?” in Chester Brown and Kate Miles 
(eds), “Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration” (Cambridge University Press 2011), 
194; Chester Brown, “A Common Law of International Adjudication”, (Oxford University Press 
2007), 245-250; Brown (2010), (note 725) 6-12. 
728 Brown (2005), (note 24) 231. 
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justice into disrepute among right-thinking 
people.729 [Emphasis added]. 
 
482. Similarly, Canadian and Australian courts regularly provide that the principle 
of abuse of rights operates to prevent unfairness and to ensure the overall 
administration of justice.730 
 
483. This function of abuse of rights is equally upheld by scholars. Thus, it is often 
acknowledged that the application of abuse of rights by arbitral tribunals 
emanates from their duty to ensure the good and fair administration of justice 
and to preserve the integrity of the arbitral system.731 Professor Gaillard 
rightly noted that abuse of rights can “cause significant prejudice to the party 
against whom it is aimed and can undermine the fair and orderly resolution of 
disputes by international arbitration”.732 
 
484. The International Law Association (“ILA”) adopted a report which equally 
emphasised the role of abuse of rights to ensure the good administration of 
justice. It noted that the principle should apply:  
 
[I]f it is necessary for a court to prevent a misuse 
of its procedure in the face of unfairness to 
another party, or to avoid the risk that the 
administration of justice might be brought into 
disrepute.733 [Emphasis added]. 
 
485. Accordingly, it is submitted that the principle of abuse of rights greatly ensures 
the good administration of arbitral justice as it operates to enhance the 
efficiency of the proceedings, safeguards the fairness of the proceedings and 
the equality between the parties, preserves the integrity of the process, and 
upholds parties’ reasonable expectations.734 
                                                          
729 Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] AC 529, 536.  
730 Toronto City v. C.U.P.E., [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77; R. v. Scott, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979, 1007; Rogers v. The 
Queen [1994] HCA 42; Gaffney (2010), (note 60) 515-516. 
731 Topcan (2014), (note 649) 628-629 and 633. 
732 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 18.  
733 International Law Association, “Interim Report: “Res Judicata and Arbitration”, (Berlin 2004), 8. 
734 Taniguchi (2000), (note 118) 167, (providing that Japanese law relies on abuse of rights, in the 
context of substantive and procedural rights, whenever the rigid application of law would 
contravene the sense of fairness and justice). 
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486. It seems in order to examine how the principle assists arbitral tribunals in 
furthering and advancing those paramount elements of the good administration 
of justice in the context of international arbitration. 
 
487. However, prior to embarking on this analysis, one shall first shed light on the 
rising phenomenon of abuse of rights in arbitration. This succinct overview is 
potent given the recent criticism directed at such growing trends of abuse in 
arbitration and due to the effect of such abuse on the administration of justice. 
 
488. Moreover, as the different intrinsic elements of the good administration of 
arbitral justice often compete (fairness, due process and efficiency), where 
tribunals frequently sacrifice one element to preserve another, it is important to 
articulate how the principle may be effective to deal with such tensions. 
 
A. The Rising Phenomenon of Abuse of Rights Obstructs the Good 
Administration of Arbitral Justice 
 
489. While international arbitration offers the prominent scheme for resolution of 
transnational commercial and investment disputes, the arbitration community 
must constantly strive to examine areas of concern. Failing to tackle what may 
affect the good administration of justice may push users away from 
international arbitration.735  
 
                                                          
735 It is worth mentioning that a study of dispute resolution practices in Fortune 1,000 corporations 
convey that many large corporations are relying more on mediation and other mechanisms aimed at 
resolving disputes informally, quickly and inexpensively: Thomas J. Stipanowich and Ryan Lamare, 
“Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict 
Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations”, 19 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 1, 43-44 (2014); 
Siegfried H. Elsing, “Procedural Efficiency in International Arbitration: Choosing the Best of Both 
Legal Worlds”, German Arbitration Journal (SchiedsVZ) 114, 115 (2011); McIlwrath & Schroeder, 
(note 702) 10, (“frustration with the length and expense of the arbitration process is increasingly 
cited as the rationale for favouring court resolution (or at least for no longer favouring 
arbitration”); Bernhard F. Meyer, “The Swiss Rules of International Arbitration – Five Years of 
Experience”, in R. Füeg (ed.) “The Swiss Rules of International Arbitration – Five Years of 
Experience”, (Swiss Chambers’ Court of Arbitration and Mediation 2009), 17. 
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490. Abuse of arbitration related rights is a primary concern shared by arbitration 
users as it generally frustrates the raison d'être of international arbitration: a 
mechanism that ought to be fair and efficient.736 As such, abuse of the arbitral 
process that takes place during the different stages of arbitral proceedings must 
not be tolerated if the arbitral system is ought to prosper. 
 
491. To that effect, Professor Jan Paulsson rightly observes that: 
 
[A]s a matter of social policy, the monopoly of 
international arbitration is not necessarily, as I 
just said, a cause for celebration. It is a 
phenomenon to be evaluated continuously and 
critically. Moreover, as a matter of professional 
pride and self-preservation on the part of those 
who work in the field of international arbitration, 
the monopoly status should be a cause for 
constant concern. If we do not deliver decent 
justice, if we do not close the door to abuse, we 
should understand that sharp reactions are 
likely – sharp reactions which may harm a very 
valuable tool.737 [Emphasis added]. 
 
492. Others have gone further and provided that abuse of rights in arbitration not 
only negatively impacts fairness and justice, but may bring the whole arbitral 
process to naught: 
 
The procedural rules of an arbitration will 
fundamentally influence a perception of both 
fairness and justice; and a procedure which 
offends the principles of a fair hearing will not 
create any confidence that a just result will ensue. 
If the system does not afford recourse against 
procedural abuse such as a breach of natural 
justice or the perpetration of a fraud it will, in my 
view, self-destruct.738 [Emphasis added]. 
 
493. Remarking on the rising perplexity of abuse, Professor Gaillard noted: 
 
                                                          
736 William W. Park, “Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice”, 
(Second Edition), (Oxford University Press 2012); Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 17. 
737 Paulsson (2008), (note 53) 3.  
738 Lane (1999), (note 54) 425. 
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Over the past decades, parties to arbitrations and 
their lawyers have developed an unprecedented 
array of procedural tactics designed to 
undermine and prejudice their opponents and to 
increase the chances that their claims prevail. 
The past five years in particular have witnessed 
the emergence of litigation strategies of the very 
worst kind, which threaten to undermine the 
reputation of international arbitration as an 
effective and reliable means of resolving 
international disputes.739 [Emphasis added]. 
 
494. On a related note, the omnipresence of abusive conduct that arise during 
arbitral proceedings becomes evident if one examines the growing enigma of 
procedural inefficiency in arbitration and that such inefficiency may stem from 
abuse of rights.740 In any procedural issue that may arise which could hinder 
the efficiency of the proceedings, a distinction must be drawn between delays 
and increased costs that emanate as a result of the intricacy of the factual 
and/or legal aspects of the case,741 and cases where such is a consequence of 
procedural misconduct and possible abuse of the arbitration process 
(unwarranted costs and delays).742 
 
495. Many arbitration proceedings involve an escalation of costs and unwarranted 
delays as a result of tactics and procedural misconduct.743 Whilst parties may 
                                                          
739 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 17. 
740 Sachs (2006), (note 58) 113; James Rhodes and Lisa Sloan, “The Pitfalls of International 
Commercial Arbitration”, 17 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 19, 36 (1984). 
741 Born (2014), (note 61) 87; Michael Kerr, “International Arbitration v. Litigation”, 1980 Journal of 
Business Law 164 (1980); Sachs (2006), (note 58) 111-112 Welser & Klausegger (2009), (note 51) 
259; Sachs (2006), (note 58) 114; ICC Commission on Arbitration, “Techniques for Controlling 
Time and Costs in Arbitration”, ICC Publication No. 843 (2007), 15, available at: http://gjpi.org/wp-
content/uploads/icc-controlling-time-and-cost.pdf (accessed 1 February 2018). 
742 L. Yves Fortier, “The Minimum Requirements of Due Process in Taking Measures Against 
Dilatory Tactics: Arbitral Discretion in International Commercial Arbitration – ‘A few Plain Rules 
and a Few Strong Instincts’”, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Improving the Efficiency of 
Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New York Convention”, 
(Kluwer Law International 1999), 406; Waincymer (2010), (note 51) 45-47. 
743 It is interesting to note that the Chairman of the ICC Court of Arbitration in 2005 provided that the 
problem of costs and delays in arbitration is primarily caused by the parties’ counsels. Sachs (2006), 
(note 58) 113; Higgins, Brown & Roach (1980), (note 703) 1042; Rhodes & Sloan (1984), (note 
740) 36; Michael Hwang, “Why is There Still Resistance to Arbitration in Asia?”, in Gerald Aksen 
et al. (eds.), “Global Reflections of International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution – Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner”, (ICC 2005), 401-411; Irene Welser, “Efficiency – Today’s 
Challenge in Arbitration Proceedings”, in Christian Klausegger, Peter Klein, et al. (eds), “Austrian 
Yearbook on International Arbitration 2014”, (Manz’sche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung 
2014) 153; Hanotiau (2011), (note 50) 100. 
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submit extensive submissions and material for legitimate purposes, such as to 
substantiate their claims, in other instances parties make excessive submissions 
and request time extensions “in a strategic effort to delay the proceedings, and 
may produce additional information that is nothing more than a “smoke 
bomb” and is unnecessary for a decision of the case”.744  
 
496. This kind of behaviour is often referred to as a guerrilla tactic, which denotes 
the abuse of the law or a procedural rule by invoking it for a purpose other 
than that for which it was prescribed for.745 
 
497. It is often the case that parties who have no strong legal argument to prevail in 
a given case deviate from the conventional way of presenting their claims and 
any supporting evidence, and resort to such guerrilla tactics to “gradually, 
deceitfully and viciously wear down the other party, opposing counsel or the 
arbitral tribunal”.746 
 
498. It is this kind of delay and escalation of costs, as a result of abusive conduct, 
that is unwarranted and, if left unremedied, may undermine the arbitration 
mechanism and defeats its “conventional mode of operation”.747  
 
499. The significance of this rising enigma is further fortified by the fact that such 
abuse is frequently resorted to.748 Although such abuse can be employed by the 
claimant, it is often the respondent to a claim who is “prepared to employ 
                                                          
744 Welser & Klausegger (2009), (note 51) 260. 
745 Horvath & Wilske (2013), (note 57) 5; Stephan Wilske, “’Internationalisation of Law’ in 
Arbitration: A Way to Escape Procedural Restrictions of National Law?”, in Nedim Peter Vogt 
(ed.), “Reflections on the International Practice of Law: Liber Amicorum for the 35th Anniversary 
of Bär & Karrer”, (Helbing & Lichtenbahn 2004), 259-263; Wilske (2009), (note 59) 204. 
746 Robert Pfeiffer and Stephan Wilske, “An Etymological and Historical Overview”, in Stephan 
Wilske and Günther J. Horvath (eds.), “Guerrilla Tactics in International Arbitration”, (Kluwer 
Law International 2013), 3; Lane (1999), (note 54) 424. 
747 Pfeiffer & Wilske (2013), (note 746) 3; O’Malley (2012), (note 703) 315. 
748 Leahy & Pierce (1986), (note 56) 299; Stephan Wilske, “Cost Sanctions in the Event of 
Unreasonable Exercise or Abuse of Procedural Rights – A Way to Control Costs in International 
Arbitration”, SchiedsVZ 2006, 188-191; the ICSID caseload statistics reveals that 1% of 
proceedings are abusively initiated as they involve claims without legal merit. ICSID caseload 
statistics (Issue 2016-1), 14; Wilske (2009), (note 59) 204; Darwazeh & Rigaudeau (2011), (note 
59) 381. 
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whatever tactics may be available to him to reduce or avoid his prospective 
liability”.749  
 
500. It is said that almost 70% of arbitration practitioners have witnessed such 
abusive conduct, which undoubtedly leads to waste of resources.750 It has been 
rightly provided that international arbitration is becoming plagued by 
procedural abuse and that parties and their counsels have developed “strategies 
of the very worst kind”.751 
 
501. Accordingly, it is advocated that arbitration users’ “discontent aims principally 
at the abuse of otherwise legitimate procedures”.752 Without a defined 
principle tailored to deal with procedural misconduct, abusive tactics may 
increase and be perceived as standard in the arbitral practice.753 
 
502. Abusive conduct not only affects the procedural efficiency of arbitral 
proceedings, but may equally adversely impact the fairness of the procedure 
and the quality of the ensuing justice.754  
 
503. In this regard, the lack of a procedural principle that can limit the abuse of the 
arbitral process755 not only fails to incentivise efficiency but also violates the 
parties’ expectations in resolving their disputes effectively and fairly.756 
Finding a principle to preclude and sanction the abuse of arbitration-related 
rights “would be serving not only the well-assessed interests and expectations 
of the parties, but also the integrity of arbitration itself”.757 
 
                                                          
749 Cedric Harris, “Abuse of the Arbitration Process-Delaying Tactics and Disruptions: A 
Respondent’s Guide”, 9 Journal of International Arbitration 87, 87 (1992). 
750 Edna Sussman, “All’s Fair in Love and War – Or is it? The Call for Ethical Standards for Counsel 
in International Arbitration”, 7 Transnational Dispute Management 1, 2 (2010). 
751 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 17. 
752 Park (2012), (note 736). 
753 Some scholars have circulated guidelines as to how respondents may abuse the arbitral process: 
Harris (1992), (note 749) 87; Rhodes & Sloan (1984), (note 740) 36. 
754 Alexander Price and Stephan Wilske, “Costs and Efficiency in International Arbitration: The 
Arbitrators’ Toolbox for Achieving the “Ideal””, 32 DAJV Newsletter 184, 184 (2007); Wilske 
(2006), (note 748) 188-191. 
755 Queen Mary University of London and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP: “2015 International 
Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration”, (2015), 7. 
756 Leahy & Pierce (1986), (note 56) 293; Darwazeh & Rigaudeau (2011), (note 59) 383. 
757 Wilske (2009), (note 59) 208; Raible & Wilske (2009), (note 59) 269. 
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504. It is in this context that one considers that the principle of abuse of rights may 
operate to limit abusive conduct that impedes the integrity and fairness of the 
arbitration process. The principle of abuse of rights can foster the notion of 
fairness of the proceedings, eliminate the waste of resources precisely in 
relation to unwarranted escalation of costs and inordinate delay, and can limit 
procedural misconduct that aims at frustrating the process. 
 
505. To that effect, Professor Gaillard acknowledged the dire need for the 
arbitration community to develop tools/principles that are specifically designed 
to tackle the abuse of the arbitral process. In considering different tools, he 
provided that: “an abuse of rights principle is the most promising tool to tackle 
the growing instances of procedural misconduct in arbitration”.758 
 
506. Advocating the application of abuse of rights in arbitration to stabilise the 
arbitral system is further strengthened by observing that much of the tactics 
and conduct that renders arbitral proceedings inefficient or unfair largely 
resembles and correlates to the principle of abuse of rights. These tactics 
generally comprise procedural rights that appear a fortiori legal and legitimate: 
“manoeuvres that may on the surface appear legal”,759 however the party 
exercises them maliciously, unreasonably or defeats their purpose.760 
 
B. Abuse of Rights Balances the Competing Interests of the 
Administration of Justice: Due Process and Fairness versus 
Efficiency 
 
507. By its very nature, a strict obedience to the requirements of due process and 
procedural fairness can be at the expense of procedural efficiency.761 To that 
end, it appears that much of the lack of efficiency perceived in arbitral 
                                                          
758 Margaret Ryan, “Gaillard on Tackling Abuse of Process”, Global Arbitration Review; 21 July 
2015, available at: http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/33992/gaillard-tackling-abuse-
process (last accessed 1 February 2018). 
759 Horvath & Wilske (2013), (note 57) 4. 
760 Ibid, 4-5. 
761 Kurkela & Turunen (2010), (note 662) 192; Fortese & Hemmi (2015), (note 662) 111; Price & 
Wilske (2007), (note 754) 184; Waincymer (2010), (note 51) 45-47. 
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proceedings is partly rooted in the due process paranoia.762 This clash has been 
described as the “the never ending battle between efficiency and due 
process”.763 Thus, a question that arises in this context is: what are the limits of 
due process in arbitration?   
 
508. Parties who opt to abuse the procedural rules in order to derail the arbitral 
proceedings typically rely on due process provisions as an abusive tactic. For 
example, they will exploit rules providing that they must be treated fairly and 
afforded an opportunity to present their case to not comply with procedural 
orders, request extensions and make unmeritorious applications.764  
 
509. This paradoxical issue may be intensified given that obstinate delays may not 
only comprise a breach of the arbitrators’ duty to speed the process,765 but may 
equally comprise a claim of denial of justice.766 
 
510. In the English Arbitration Act, Section (33.1) deals with both issues. Part (a) 
provides that a tribunal shall act fairly and give each party a reasonable 
opportunity to present his case; and subsequently, part (b) provides that the 
tribunal shall adopt procedures that avoid unnecessary delay or expense, so as 
to provide a fair means of dispute resolution.767  
 
                                                          
762 Queen Mary University of London and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP: “2015 International 
Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration”, (2015), 10. 
763 Fortier (1999), (note 742) 397; E. D.D. Tavender, “Considerations of Fairness in the Context of 
International Commercial Arbitrations”, 34 Alberta Law Review 509, 512 (1996), (“There is indeed 
a tension or “never-ending battle” between the interests of justice or fairness on the one hand and 
finality and efficiency on the other.”). 
764 Hwang (2005), (note 743) 401-411, (providing examples of how parties may abuse their 
procedural rights to derail the arbitration proceedings); Wilske (2009), (note 59) 203-204. 
765 Philip Fouchard, “Relationship Between the Arbitrator and the Parties and the Arbitral 
Institution”, in “The Status of the Arbitrator”, ICC Bulletin-Special Supplement (ICC 1995), 12; 
Fortier (1999), (note 742) 403. 
766 A. V. Freeman, “The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice”, (Longman 
1938), 242-263; Jan Paulsson, “Denial of Justice in International Law”, (Cambridge University 
Press 2005), 177; Andrew Newcombe & L. Paradell, “Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: 
Standards of Treatment”, (Kluwer Law International 2009), 239; Redfern, Hunter et al. (2004), 
(note 51) 244; McIlwrath & Schroeder, (note 702) 6-7, (providing that in many instances arbitration 
users decide to settle their disputes because of their frustration with the inefficiency of the 
arbitration process); Antoine Fabiani (no.1), France v. Venezuela, 31 July 1905, Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, Volume X, 117, available at: http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_X/83-
139.pdf (accessed 1 February 2018) 
767 Section (33.1) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996; Article (14.4.i) and Article (14.4.ii) of the 
LCIA Arbitration Rules of 2014; Article (17) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 2013. 
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511. Thus, arbitral tribunals faced with this issue seem to be caught between Scylla 
and Charybdis: i.e. on the horns of a dilemma. While it seems flagrant that 
obstinate delays and similar abusive tactics retract from the system’s efficiency 
and its fairness, and may constitute a potential denial of justice, an attempt to 
control such tactics may be a breach of due process. One may go further and 
argue that a situation may involve two conflicting due process assertions: 
unreasonable delay and consequently escalation of costs may equally affect 
one’s access to arbitration, especially financially weaker parties, and thus 
violate fairness and due process.768 To that effect, William Park rightly 
provides that: “Arbitral case management implicates the delicate counterpoise 
between efficiency and fairness. One of the arbitrator’s most difficult tasks is 
to strike the right equilibrium”.769 
 
512. In discussing the tension between due process and efficiency in international 
arbitration, it has been stated that in “managing cases, due process needs to be 
balanced against the arbitrator’s duty to ensure the efficient and timely 
completion of their mandate to resolve the dispute”.770 Although this 
accentuates the problem, it does not enunciate which procedural tool may 
strike that balance. It is often provided that one way of solving this conflict is 
for arbitral tribunals to use the arbitral discretion bestowed upon them by 
arbitration laws and rules.771 Some advocate that “one reaction to arbitration’s 
protean nature has been an emphasis on broad grants of procedural discretion 
to the arbitrators”.772 Again, while it is true that such discretionary power is 
indispensable, and may constitute the legal basis upon which arbitrators can 
apply a given rule/principle, it does not provide arbitrators with a principle or 
rule to use to balance such conflict. 
 
                                                          
768 Fortese & Hemmi (2015), (note 662) 116. 
769 William W. Park, “Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice”, 
(Oxford University Press 2006), 48; Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, “Law and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration”, (2nd ed.), (London 1991) 350. 
770 Fortese & Hemmi (2015), (note 662) 116. 
771 Ibid, 121; Fortier (1999), (note 742) 405; Article (19) of the Model Law; Article (17.1) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article (22.2) of the ICC Rules; Article (19.1) of the SCC Rules. 
772 Park (2006), (note 769) 459; Price & Wilske (2007), (note 754) 187; Fortier (1999), (note 742) 
396. 
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513. Without a legal principle that can form the foundation of the tribunal’s 
decision on such issues, arbitrators may still fear their award being set aside. 
Arbitration users have actually raised this emerging concern. In a recent 
survey, it has been provided that arbitral tribunals are reluctant to act 
decisively to maintain the effectiveness of the proceedings, for fear of the 
award being challenged on grounds of due process.773 
 
514. Thus, there appears to be a dire need to accommodate those ostensibly 
bewildering antinomies.774 This urge stems from the fact that choosing one 
principle over the other will necessarily be contrary to the parties’ expectations 
and contravenes the needs of commerce.775 A flexible tool/principle is thus 
required to strike the right equilibrium and assist tribunals in balancing the 
competing interests of procedural efficiency and the requirements of due 
process, in a way that can satisfy both.776 
 
515. It is in this context that one ventures that this due process paranoia can be 
remedied by applying the principle of abuse of rights in arbitration. Abuse of 
rights, with its balancing factor as a criterion of abuse, may strike the balance 
needed between procedural efficiency, fairness, and due process. It may 
become this very principle to solve the required balancing process; to limit and 
trim the horns of due process when inefficiency emanates from abusive 
conduct. 
 
516. The conflict between efficiency and due process is reflected in the case of 
Caribbean Niquel v Overseas Mining.777 It involved a dispute regarding a joint 
venture to operate a mine. When a dispute arose, one of the parties initiated 
                                                          
773 Queen Mary University of London and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP: “2015 International 
Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration”, (2015), 10. 
774 Karl Pornbacher and Alexander Dolgorukow, “Reconciling Due Process and Efficiency in 
International Arbitration – The Arbitrator’s Task of Achieving The One Without Sacrificing the 
Other”, 2013 Belgrade Law Review 50,  51 (2013). 
775 McIlwrath & Schroeder, (note 702) 4. 
776 Fortier (1999), (note 742) 397. 
777 Paris Court of Appeals, La Societe Commercial Caribbean Niquel v. La Societe Overseas Mining 
Investments Ltd, 25 March 2010, (1st Chamber), Appeal No. 08/23901, confirmed in Cour de 
Cassation, Première chambre civile, La Société Overseas Mining Investments Limited v. La Société 
Commercial Caribbean Niquel, 29 June 2011, Arrêt No 785 (10-23.321), cited in Fortese & Hemmi 
(2015), (note 662) 123-124. 
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arbitration proceedings and requested damages on the basis of “lost profits”. 
The arbitral tribunal awarded damages based on the theory of “lost chance”. 
The award was then set aside as it violated the parties’ right to be heard given 
that it did not give the parties an opportunity to discuss the legal basis for the 
calculation of damages. The conflict here appears to be that if the tribunal has 
granted the parties time to discuss the legal basis of the calculation of damages, 
this would have necessarily delayed the proceedings, increased the costs and 
thus affected the efficiency of the proceedings.  
 
517. In this regard, where abuse of rights is embraced by arbitral tribunals, it shall 
serve as the decisive factor and aids tribunals in reaching a subtle equilibrium: 
the right to be heard and present one’s case is to be safeguarded as long as it is 
not abused. Equally, inefficiency should be limited where it emanates from 
procedural misconduct and tactics, but tolerated when it is vital for the 
resolution of the dispute. If this is achieved, it is possible to have a relative 
efficient management of the arbitral proceedings without risking violating 
requirements of due process and/or fairness.778 This would serve the overall 
requirement of the good administration of arbitral justice. 
 
518. While one shall examine the role of abuse of rights in the good administration 
of justice as a stand-alone general principle to tackle forms of abuse, it is 
submitted that the principle may also crystallise its potent manifestations in 
various specific rules to equally tackle abuse and to balance the competing 
interests of the administration of justice. 
 
519. An example of this is reflected in the enigma of “sleeping dog” arbitrations.779 
This denotes arbitral proceedings that have been initiated then halted due to a 
                                                          
778 It is often held that the clash between inefficiency and due process can only be solved by choosing 
one over the other. Price & Wilske (2007), (note 754) 188; Kann (2006), (note 703) (advocating that 
efficiency is one of the key criteria in the resolution of disputes); Park (2006), (note 769), (providing 
that the prevalence of either principle depends on the stage of the arbitral proceedings). 
779 Thomas Bingham, “The Problem of Delay in Arbitration”, in Julian D. M. Lew and Loukas A. 
Mistelis (eds.), “Arbitration Insights: Twenty Years of the Annual Lecture of the School of 
International Arbitration, Sponsored by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer”, (Kluwer Law 
International 2007), 73. 
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lack of activity from either the claimant, respondent, or the arbitrator(s).780 In 
this regard, the English Arbitration Act empowers the arbitrators the right to 
terminate the proceedings where there has been an inordinate and inexcusable 
delay that may indicate that there can be no fair resolution of the dispute.781 It 
is acknowledged that the power of arbitrators to take such measure is a 
statutory power as it emanates from an explicit provision. However, the 
principle of abuse of rights arguably forms the legal basis for such provision 
and can be further utilised to overcome similar enigmas of procedural abuse in 
arbitration. To that effect, it is widely acknowledged, at least in the civil legal 
systems, that this type of procedural misconduct denotes, and falls under the 
ambit of, the principle of abuse of rights in the specific form of venire contra 
factum proprium.782 
 
520. As shall be discussed herein below, in resorting to abuse of rights, tribunals are 
equipped with a tool that can assist them in discerning the conduct of the 
parties, and their legal counsels, and take into consideration the motives and 
purpose of any request that may affect the fairness of the proceedings or hinder 
the efficient conduct of proceedings. Upon a prudent balance of the competing 
interests, and based on the factual matrix of the case, arbitrators may determine 
whether such procedural request is reasonable (conforming to the requirements 
of procedural due process) or abusive (mere dilatory tactic).  
 
C. The Application of Abuse of Rights Ensures the Good 
Administration of Arbitral Justice  
 
521. In this section, one endeavours to highlight how the application of abuse of 
rights in international arbitration serves the administration of justice. 
 
                                                          
780 Gordon Smith, “Dismissal of Arbitration Proceedings For Want of Prosecution”, 5 Asian 
International Arbitration Journal 190 (2009); Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. 
South India Shipping Corp. [1981] AC 909, 988. 
781 Section (41.3) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996. 
782 Reinhard Zimmermann and Dirk A. Verse, “Case 22: Sitting on One’s Rights - Germany”, in 
Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 515-516; Matthias E. Storme “Case 22: Sitting on 
One’s Rights - Belgium”, in Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 520-521. 
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522. In doing so, one shall examine the application of the principle to limit abuse 
that may take place in relation to three different legal issues that are common 
in international arbitration: corporate/state manoeuvres to access/block arbitral 
proceedings, parallel arbitral proceedings; and the extension of the arbitration 
clause to a non-signatory. 
 
523. While the application of abuse of rights advances the administration of arbitral 
justice in relation to different legal questions as well, for obvious spatial-
temporal considerations, one shall examine its effect in relation to these three 
legal subjects given that they properly illustrate the importance of the principle 
for the good administration of justice. 
 
524. An analysis of the aforementioned legal issues shall be achieved by examining 
the law and practice of commercial and investment arbitration. Emphasis may 
be given to investment arbitration materials in relation to some issues 
(corporate and state manoeuvres and parallel arbitral proceedings) and to 
commercial arbitration materials in others (non-signatories). In doing this, one 
is mandated and restricted by the existence and availability of published 
materials for the relevant issue. However, it is submitted that the principle’s 
operation ensures the administration of arbitral justice in international 
commercial and investment arbitration. 
 
1. Corporate and State Manoeuvres to Access or Block 
International Arbitration Proceedings 
 
525. As previously mentioned, the inherent duty to preserve the integrity of the 
arbitral process emanates from the tribunal’s responsibility to ensure the good 
administration of arbitral justice.783 Arbitral tribunals often apply abuse of 
rights in order to preserve the arbitral integrity and thus ensure the good 
administration of justice.784 
                                                          
783 Paparinskis (2011), (note 725) 18. 
784 Wasteful Management Inc. v. United Mexican States II, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Mexico’s 
Preliminary Objection Concerning the Previous Proceedings, Decision of the Tribunal dated 26 June 
2002, para. 49. 
Page | 180  
 
 
526. One area where the requirements of fairness and the duty to preserve the 
integrity of the arbitral system have urged arbitrators to apply the principle of 
abuse of rights pertains to the act of structuring investments and corporate 
nationality planning for a purpose other than that for which such rights were 
conferred.785 
 
527. The rationale in sanctioning any abuse in such cases emanates from the desire 
to give “effect to the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention and […] 
preserving its integrity”.786 It is widely acknowledged that the purpose of the 
ICSID Convention is not to afford protection to nationals against their own 
State; a contrario, the ICSID system is specifically tailored to resolve disputes 
between foreign investors and states, in order to foster the flow of international 
capital into the Contracting States.787 
 
528. Thus, a regular form of abuse may comprise the act of abusing the structure of 
a company, by altering one of its features enabling it to qualify as an investor 
or an investment covered by the relevant BIT, not for a commercial 
activity/purpose but primarily to gain access to arbitration.  
 
529. If abusive conduct in this regard is not restricted, this may defy the good 
administration of arbitral justice as it may violate the parties’ reasonable 
expectations, undermine the integrity of the arbitral system, demonstrate that 
there is no limit to ICSID jurisdiction: any domestic dispute may become 
                                                          
785 Paul Michael Blychak, “Access and Advantages Expanded: Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela and 
Other Recent Arbitration Awards on Treaty Shopping”, 4 Journal of World Energy Law & Business 
32, 32 (2011). It is submitted that this is a primary reason why Venezuela terminated its BIT with 
the Netherlands: Matthew Skinner, Cameron Miles and Sam Luttrell, “Access and Advantage in 
Investor-State Arbitration: The Law and Practice of Treaty Shopping”, 3 Journal of World Energy 
Law & Business 260, 276-277 (2010); Sergey Ripinsky, “Venezuela’s Withdrawal from ICSID: 
What it Does and Does Not Achieve”, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 13 April 
2012, available at: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-
does-and-does-not-achieve/ (last accessed: 1 February 2018). 
786 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion dated 29 April 2004, 
para. 25; Mobil Corp. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on 
Jurisdiction dated 10 June 2010, para. 184. 
787 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Report of the Executive Directors on the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States”, 
dated 18 March 1965, section 9; ST-AD GmbH v. Republic of Bulgaria, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2011-06, Award on Jurisdiction dated 18 July 2013, para. 408. 
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international if the domestic company merely incorporates a foreign entity that 
subsequently acquires the shares of the domestic entity.788 As stated by one 
tribunal: 
 
The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the 
Claimant’s initiation and pursuit of this 
arbitration is an abuse of the system of 
international investment arbitration. If it were 
accepted that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to 
decide ST-AD’s claim, then any pre-existing 
national dispute could be brought to an 
international arbitration tribunal by an “after the 
fact” transfer of the national economic interests 
to a foreign company in an attempt to seek 
protections under a BIT. Such transfer from the 
domestic arena to the international scene would 
ipso facto constitute a “protected investment” – 
and the jurisdiction of an international arbitral 
tribunal under a BIT would be virtually unlimited. 
It is the duty of the Tribunal not to protect such 
an abusive manipulation of the system of 
international investment protection. It indeed the 
Tribunal’s view that to accept jurisdiction in this 
case would go against the basic objectives 
underlying bilateral investment treaties. The 
Tribunal has to ensure that the BIT mechanism 
does not protect investments that it was not 
designed to protect, that is, domestic investments 
disguised as international investments or 
domestic disputes repackaged as international 
disputes for the sole purpose of gaining access to 
international arbitration.789 
 
530. The act of corporate restructure or nationality planning raises different 
competing interests that may affect the administration of justice. As shall be 
discussed below, the case law fortifies that abuse of rights may effectively 
                                                          
788 Phoenix Action v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award dated 15 April 2009, 
para. 43; Skinner, Miles & Luttrell (2010), (note 785) 260-263; John Lee, “Resolving Concerns of 
Treaty Shopping in International Investment Arbitration”, 6 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 355, 356 and 360 (2015); Pacific Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, dated 1 June 2012, paras 2.37-2.38. On the 
other hand, some argue that allowing access to ICSID arbitration is not contrary to the parties’ 
expectations, as the treaty in question adopted a broad definition of investor and investment. Aguas 
del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s 
Objections to Jurisdiction dated 21 October 2005, para. 332. 
789 ST-AD GmbH v. Republic of Bulgaria, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-06, Award on 
Jurisdiction dated 18 July 2013, para. 423. 
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apply in this regard to: ensure procedural fairness, fulfil requirements of due 
process, safeguard the parties’ reasonable expectations, and preserve the 
integrity of the arbitral process.790 
 
531. Numerous examples exist to show how arbitral tribunals have applied abuse of 
rights in such circumstances. There exists some sort of consensus in terms of 
the essential elements required to find an abuse. The case law evince that while 
corporate planning is a legitimate right and seeking the substantive and 
procedural protection afforded by a specific BIT is not abusive per se,791 it 
may become abusive if such conduct is unfair, defies the object and purpose of 
the BIT and impedes the integrity of arbitration. In assessing the abusive 
nature of the conduct in question, the timing and motive/purpose of the 
exercise of the right (corporate restructuring) is pivotal.792 Arbitral tribunals 
will consider the aforementioned elements as well as other indicative elements 
that may aid the tribunal in discerning the intention of the parties.793 In other 
words, abuse of rights is established where a corporate restructuring is 
“motivated wholly or partly by a desire to gain access to treaty protection in 
order to bring a claim in respect of a specific dispute that, at the time of the 
restructuring, exists or is foreseeable”.794 
 
                                                          
790 Lee (2015), (note 788) 375-376. 
791 Ulrich Klemm, “Investment Through Third Countries: State Practice and Needs of Investors”, 24 
ICSID Review 528, 523 (2009); Lee (2015), (note 788) 358; Christoph Schreuer, “Nationality 
Planning”, in Arthur W. Rovine (ed.), “Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and 
Mediation: The Fordham Papers”, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), 18 and 20; Gus Van Harten, 
“Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law”, (Oxford University Press 2008), 115; HICEE B.V. 
v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award dated 23 May 2011, PCA Case No. 2009-11, 
para. 103; Renée Rose Levy and Gremcitel S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, 
Award dated 9 January 2015, para. 184; Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction dated 21 October 2005, paras 
245 and 330. 
792 Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/5, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 27 September 2001, para. 126, where it was held that 
there was no abuse of rights as the restructuring (establishing a US entity) took place eight years 
before the parties entered into the concession agreement in question, thus the entity was not a shell 
company; Schreuer (2013), (note 791) 34; Diane Desierto, “Arbitral Controls and Policing the 
Gates to Investment Treaty Claims against States in Transglobal Green Energy v, Panama and 
Philip Morris v. Australia”, Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 22 June 2016, 1-2, 
available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/arbitral-controls-and-policing-the-gates-to-investment-treaty-
claims-against-states-in-transglobal-green-energy-v-panama-and-philip-morris-v-australia/ 
(accessed 1 February 2018). 
793 Desierto (2016), (note 792) 2. 
794 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 17 December 2015, under UNCITRAL Rules, para. 536. 
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532. In the seminal case of Phoenix v. Czech Republic, the dispute involved two 
Czech companies owned by a Czech national who was embroiled in domestic 
disputes with the Czech government. Accordingly, the owner of the companies 
transferred their ownership to Phoenix, an Israeli company owned by members 
of his family. Two months after the restructuring, the claimant initiated 
arbitration proceedings. Respondent submitted that Phoenix is nothing short of 
an ex post facto creation of a sham Israeli company, that this conduct 
represents an egregious case of treaty shopping, and thus constitutes an abuse 
of rights.795 
 
533. The tribunal found that the investment made by Phoenix was not made in good 
faith and constituted an abuse of rights. The tribunal stipulated that the 
principle of abuse of rights, which is part of the broader notion of good faith, 
mandates that parties “deal honestly and fairly with each other, to represent 
their motives and purposes truthfully, and to refrain from taking unfair 
advantage”.796 [Emphasis added]. 
 
534. Upon acknowledging that the principle may operate to remedy unfairness, the 
tribunal engaged in a delicate balancing process of the facts and interests at 
stake to determine if there was an abuse of right. The tribunal considered: the 
timing of the investment where it appeared that it was brought while already 
burdened with disputes; the timing of the claim; the substance of the 
transaction which manifested that all transfers were done between family 
members; and the true nature of the operation equally evinced that no true 
economic activity was performed or intended by Phoenix. These 
considerations warranted the finding that the main purpose of the investment 
was an “attempt to render their purely domestic disputes to the protections of 
the BIT rather than to conduct business”.797 The tribunal concluded that the 
investment was merely an artificial transaction, the creation of a legal fiction, 
                                                          
795 Phoenix Action v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award dated 15 April 2009, 
para. 34. 
796 Ibid, para. 107. 
797 Ibid, para. 141. 
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to gain access to ICSID, was made in bad faith and constituted an abuse of 
rights, and ordered the claimant to bear all ICSID costs.798 
 
535. This case is of significance not only for its application of abuse of rights but 
for its enunciation that the principle’s application advances the notion of good 
administration of arbitral justice. Parties have a reasonable expectation that the 
ICSID system is specifically tailored to resolve disputes between foreign 
investors and states.799 Thus, it would be unfair, and a violation of the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, for the arbitral system to afford its 
protection to such abusive conduct. The principle was effectively applied to 
safeguard those reasonable expectations and to preserve the integrity of the 
system.800 
 
536. The above was reinstated and confirmed in the recent case of Philip Morris v. 
Australia.801 Respondent claimed that the principle of abuse of rights forbids 
the claimant from exercising its right to arbitrate.802 The arbitral tribunal held 
that claimant’s restructure of its investment amounted to an abuse of right as it 
was exercised for the purpose of gaining access to arbitration and after the 
dispute was foreseeable. In clarifying the meaning of foreseeability in the 
context of abuse of rights, the tribunal held that foreseeability is established 
where there is a reasonable prospect that “a measure which may give rise to a 
treaty claim will materialise”.803 Moreover, in relation to the motive and 
purpose of the restructuring of the investment, the tribunal acknowledged that 
abuse is not established if restructuring was motivated for reasons other than 
bringing a claim. However, it was held that such restructuring was not 
                                                          
798 Ibid, paras 143 and 152. 
799 ST-AD GmbH v. Republic of Bulgaria, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-06, Award on 
Jurisdiction dated 18 July 2013, para. 408; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
“Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States”, dated 18 March 1965, section 9. 
800 Phoenix Action v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award dated 15 April 2009, 
para. 113. 
801 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 17 December 2015, under UNCITRAL Rules. 
802 Ibid, para. 400. 
803 Ibid, paras 554 and 569; Desierto (2016), (note 792) 1. 
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motivated primarily for tax or other business reasons, but mainly to initiate a 
treaty claim using an entity from Hong Kong.804 
 
537. In this regard, the depiction of the principle of abuse of rights as a principle 
necessary to secure the fairness of the proceedings was unequivocal. Abuse of 
rights was asserted as a principle that ensures that the exercise of rights is 
reasonable and fair: “it should at the same time be fair and equitable as 
between the parties and not one which is calculated to procure for one of them 
an unfair advantage in the light of the obligation assumed”.805 [Emphasis 
added]. That being said, the tribunal held that the initiation of arbitration 
constituted an abuse of rights which rendered the claims raised inadmissible.806 
 
538. On a related note, abuse of rights may operate not only as a requirement of 
fairness, but may be mandated by considerations of due process.807 The duty 
that parties must be treated equally is sacrosanct in international arbitration.808 
As rightly pointed out by one scholar, it “is perhaps the most fundamental rule 
of due process”.809 This is included in most arbitration laws and institutional 
rules.810 
 
539. In this regard, it is submitted that the equality between the parties may equally 
be thwarted where one party foresees the dispute, and subsequently makes an 
investment in the host state without the latter knowing that such an investment 
is made solely to gain access to arbitration. This may defy the fairness of the 
proceedings, infringe upon the equality between the parties, and frustrates their 
reasonable expectations. As asserted in Philip Morris:  
 
                                                          
804 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 17 December 2015, under UNCITRAL Rules, paras 570-584. 
805 Ibid, para. 400. 
806 Ibid, para. 588. 
807 Thomas W. Walde, “‘Equality of Arms” in Investment Arbitration: Procedural Challenges”, in 
Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), “Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to 
the Key Issues”, (Oxford University Press 2010), 162. 
808 Peter Binder, “An International Comparison of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration”, (First Edition), (Sweet & Maxwell 2000), 124-125; Kurkela & Turunen 
(2010), (note 662) 186-187. 
809 Kurkela & Turunen (2010), (note 662) 189. 
810 Article (18) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 (with 
amendments adopted in 2010). 
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[W]here there is a corporate restructur[ing] in 
the knowledge of an actual or specific future 
dispute, and a preconceived BIT claim is then 
brought, there is no longer an equality of 
position between the investor and the host State, 
and the investor benefits from an unfair 
advantage [since] the investor invests knowing 
that it is about to/ready to bring a claim [whilst] 
[t]he host State admits the investment, in 
ignorance of the investor’s intent.811 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
540. This was equally upheld in the case of ConocoPhillips. While the tribunal 
found no abuse of rights given that the restructuring took place prior to the 
foreseeability of the dispute,812 the potency of abuse of rights to ensure the 
equality between the parties was acknowledged. The tribunal explicitly noted 
that:  
 
There is jurisdiction only if the parties to the 
dispute have each consented and throughout the 
process each is treated on an equal footing, as 
indeed the principles of due process and natural 
justice require. That equality of position in the 
present context is, in this Tribunal’s view, a 
further factor supporting the growing body of 
decisions placing some limits on the investor’s 
choice of corporate form, even if it complies with 
the relevant technical definition in the treaty 
text.813 [Emphasis added]. 
 
541. Accordingly, it appears that the application of abuse of rights may be necessary 
not only to restore the fairness of the proceedings and to preserve the integrity 
of the process, but equally as a requirement of due process.814 This is equally 
conspicuous in cases where States exercise their rights, particularly their 
inherent right to investigate criminal wrongdoing, in a manner that may 
                                                          
811 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 17 December 2015, under UNCITRAL Rules, para. 443. 
812 ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V., ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. 
and ConocoPhillips Company v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits dated 3 September 2013, paras 279-280. 
813 Ibid, para 274. 
814 Paparinskis (2011), (note 725) 19; Thomas W. Walde, “‘Equality of Arms’ in Investment 
Arbitration: Procedural Challenges”, in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), “Arbitration Under 
International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues”, (Oxford University Press 2010), 
162. 
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impede the equality of arms, the fairness and integrity of the proceedings, and 
undermine the arbitral process.815 
 
542. From a pure theoretical stance, while States retain an inherent right to 
investigate and prosecute criminal wrongdoing,816 concerns raised by investors 
may appear logical where States use this right for economic or political 
purposes,817 or as an abusive tool to pressure,818 intimidate or induce investors 
and to baulk an ongoing arbitration.819 Such abusive conduct by States may: 
aggravate the dispute,820 defy the purpose of the BIT in question;821 damage 
the purpose of investment arbitration; breach the requirements of due process; 
and become a threat to the development of international rule of law.822 To that 
effect, it has been rightly stated that “tribunals must be on guard to discern 
which requests are legitimate and which requests constitute attempts by 
investors to use investment arbitration to escape answering legitimate criminal 
allegations”.823 
 
543. Again, it seems here that barring any abuse of right emanates from 
considerations of due process and the desire to preserve the integrity and 
fairness of the arbitration process.824 
                                                          
815 Thomas W. Walde, “‘Equality of Arms’ in Investment Arbitration: Procedural Challenges”, in 
Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), “Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to 
the Key Issues”, (Oxford University Press 2010), 162; Sébastien Besson, “Corruption and 
Arbitration”, in Domitille Baizeau and Richard H. Kreindler (eds), “Addressing Issues of 
Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2015), 106. 
816 Francisco Orrego Vicuña, “Regulatory Authority and Legitimate Expectations: Balancing the 
Rights of the State and the Individual under International Law in a Global Society”, ICCA, 15 April 
2009, available at: http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12224293410150/regulatory_authority.pdf (accessed 1 February 2018). 
817 Ruslan Mrzayev, “International Investment Protection Regime and Criminal Investigations”, 29 
Journal of International Arbitration 71, 72 (2012); for e.g. in the famous Yukos arbitration, the 
claimant alleged that criminal proceedings were initiated by Russia for, inter alia, economic and 
political purposes, Yukos International Ltd (Isles of Man) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 
AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 30 November 2009, 48. 
818 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 27. 
819 Henry G. Burnett and Jessica B. Chrostin, “Interim Measures in Response to the Criminal 
Prosecution of Corporations and Their Employees by Host States in Parallel with Investment 
Arbitration Proceedings”, 30 Maryland Journal of International Law 31, 32 (2015). 
820 Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanias S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Provisional Measures dated 8 April 2016, para. 
74. 
821 Burnett, Bees & Chrostin (2015), (note 819) 53. 
822 Mrzayev (2012), (note 817) 82. 
823 Burnett, Bees & Chrostin (2015), (note 819) 54. 
824 Ibid, 52. 
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544. Some of the aforementioned considerations were clear in the case of 
Libananco Holdings v. the Republic of Turkey, where issues of procedural 
fairness as well as requirements of due process were raised and considered by 
the arbitral tribunal. The claimant alleged that the commencement of criminal 
investigations against it breached the equality of arms between the parties and 
breached Turkey’s obligation to arbitrate fairly and in good faith. During the 
criminal investigations, it was alleged that there was surveillance and 
interception of legally privileged communications between the claimant, its 
counsel and witnesses.825 
 
545. The arbitral tribunal recognised the inherent right of States to conduct criminal 
investigations. However, such right is not absolute, it must not be abused and 
must be exercised with regard to the rights of the other party.826 It was also 
mentioned that this brings into question sacrosanct principles such as 
procedural fairness, the equality of the parties and their right to seek advice 
and freely advance their cases.827 Additionally, while not questioning the 
assurances given by Turkey’s counsel that such information was not revealed 
to them nor used in this arbitration, the tribunal noted that “it is not enough 
that justice should be done, it must also manifestly be seen to be done”.828 The 
tribunal then ordered the State not to interfere with the preparation of the case 
in the future.  
 
546. In another case, Quilborax v. Bolivia, the claimants requested provisional 
measures ordering the respondent to discontinue criminal proceedings relating 
to the arbitration as it aggravates the status quo of the arbitration and 
jeopardises the procedural integrity of the arbitral proceedings.829 During the 
arbitration, the Bolivian government reviewed claimants’ corporate 
documentation registered in the Bolivian registry, noted some irregularities, 
                                                          
825 Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Decision on 
Preliminary Issues, 23 June 2008, paras 48 and 72. 
826 Ibid, para. 79. 
827 Ibid, para. 78. 
828 Ibid, para. 79. 
829 Quilborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Provisional Measures, dated 26 February 2010. 
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and initiated criminal proceedings alleging the forgery of the documents. As 
part of the criminal investigation, Bolivia also sequestrated corporate records 
and interrogated persons related to the claimants, including their former legal 
counsel. Thus, it was the claimants’ view that the State abused its right to 
investigate criminal behaviour, as it used its right solely to influence the 
current arbitration; as an abusive tactic to avoid the arbitration on the merits, 
and force claimants to give up their claims.830 
 
547. The tribunal first acknowledged that Bolivia has a right to prosecute conduct 
that may constitute a crime. However, the tribunal emphasised that such a right 
is not absolute, cannot be abused, and must be balanced against claimants’ 
right to pursue the arbitration, and to have their claims fairly considered.831 
Accordingly, abuse was established primarily to restore and maintain the 
procedural integrity of the arbitration. By balancing Bolivia’s interest to pursue 
the investigation against claimants’ fundamental interest in resolving their 
dispute before the tribunal, and their right to have access to evidence and the 
integrity of the evidence (the criminal proceedings had a material effect on 
potential witnesses), the tribunal chose the latter rights and issued provisional 
measures.  
 
548. One submits that any other conclusion would arguably constitute a breach to 
the requirements of due process, as the claimants would be deprived from 
effectively presenting their case and substantiating their claims.832 
 
2. Parallel Arbitral Proceedings 
 
549. The prevailing globalisation trends have affected the practice of international 
arbitration. Accordingly, we have witnessed the development of complex 
arbitrations, which have now become a feature of international arbitration. The 
growing intricacy of transnational disputes and arbitral proceedings has 
                                                          
830 Ibid, para. 46. 
831 Ibid, paras 123 and 148. 
832 It was found that the respondent obstructed claimants’ access to evidence and alienated potential 
witnesses, ibid, paras 139-148. 
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brought about a matter that has truly become a global paradox, that is: parallel 
and overlapping proceedings.833 
 
550. Parallel proceedings generally denote the case where parties initiate the same 
or related proceedings before different courts/tribunals.834 While there is no 
one definition to describe parallel proceedings, as this may differ from one 
jurisdiction or treaty to another, one finds it apt to consider the definition 
adopted by the ILA: proceedings pending before a court/tribunal in which the 
parties and one or more of the issues are the same or substantially the same as 
the ones before the tribunal.835 
 
551. The initiation of parallel arbitral proceedings in commercial and investment 
arbitration is another area of arbitral practice that raises questions regarding the 
administration of justice, and the role of abuse of rights to ensure it warrants 
clarification.  
 
552. In order to demonstrate how the principle of abuse of rights ensures the good 
administration of justice in the context of parallel proceedings, it seems 
necessary to first determine the legal and strategic considerations for pursuing 
parallel and overlapping proceedings. This succinct determination is vital in 
the context of abuse of rights and the good administration of justice. It was 
suggested that the principle of abuse of rights not only ensures the 
administration of justice, but it balances the competing interests of the good 
administration of arbitral justice (fairness, due process and efficiency). In order 
to examine the adequacy of this submission, highlighting the competing 
interests in the context of parallel proceedings warrant a succinct elaboration as 
it shall appear that while some considerations are reasonable and worth legal 
protection, other considerations seem rather unfair and abusive specifically 
when considered in light of the colossal risks involved. Thereafter, the 
operation of abuse of rights to enhance the administration of justice and its role 
                                                          
833 Emmanuel Gaillard and Philippe Pinsolle, “Advocacy in Practice: The Use of Parallel 
Proceedings”, in Doak Bishop and Edward G. Kehoe (eds), “The Art of Advocacy in International 
Arbitration”, (Second Edition), (Juris 2010), 174. 
834 Erk (2014), (note 529) at16 
835 International Law Association, “Final Report on Lis Pendens and Arbitration”, (Toronto 
Conference 2006), paras 5.6 and 5.13; Erk (2014), (note 529) 16. 
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as a mechanism that balances the competing interests shall be discussed by 
reviewing and analysing three important cases that dealt with the matter. 
 
(i) Competing Interests in Parallel Arbitral Proceedings 
 
553. As previously mentioned, a right denotes an interest, recognised and protected 
by the law to fulfil a certain purpose.836 It is well acknowledged that each party 
in international arbitration pursues his/her interests. It is equally recognised 
that in any given dispute, there exists diverse competing interests of the parties 
and it is the decision maker’s role to resolve such conflict.837 The paradoxical 
problem of parallel arbitral proceedings is no exception. It involves a 
multiplicity of interests that primarily rest on those pursued by the party 
initiating the parallel proceedings and those of the party(ies) opposing such 
conduct given the risks and procedural hazards associated thereto.  
 
554. Those competing interests often fall within the ambit of the administration of 
justice, i.e. they involve interests that are part of due process considerations, 
preserving the integrity of the process, protecting parties’ reasonable 
expectations, and interests that affect the efficiency and fairness of the 
proceedings. 
 
555. Understandably, parties in arbitration proceedings have conflicting interests. A 
claimant is usually seeking a fast resolution of the dispute and the respondent 
may attempt to delay or disrupt the proceedings.838 That said, parallel court or 
arbitral proceedings may be initiated primarily as a dilatory tactic.839 In a case 
decided by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, a reference was made to a case where a 
scientist concluded a know-how license agreement with a Swiss 
pharmaceuticals company (Company X). The agreement contained an ICC 
                                                          
836 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 995-996; Hofmann (2009), (note 333) 308; Jenkins (1961), (note 333) 
172. 
837 Gebhard Bücheler, “Proportionality in Investor-State Arbitration”, (Oxford University Press 
2015), 28. 
838 Pfeiffer & Wilske (2013), (note 746) 3; Lane (1999), (note 54) 424; Harris (1992), (note 749) 87. 
839 Gaillard & Pinsolle (2010), (note 833) 174; Swiss Federal Tribunal (1st Civil law division), 14 May 
2001, Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas S.A. v. Colon Container Terminal S.A., 19 ASA 
Bulletin 544 (2001); Erk (2014), (note 529) 11. 
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arbitration clause. Subsequently, the scientist transferred his rights and 
obligations to another company (Company Y). A dispute arose between 
Company X and Company Y in relation to the payment of royalties. The 
arbitral tribunal rendered a partial award recognising the right of Company Y 
to receive the royalties and deferred the quantum issue to a subsequent phase. 
Company X decided to declare that the agreement was void and initiated 
another parallel arbitration proceedings requesting a declaration that the said 
agreement is void. The Swiss Federal Tribunal acknowledged the tactical 
intention for the parallel proceedings, in that it was an invitation to review the 
merits of the rendered award, and provided that “Speaking of claim is 
questionable when dealing with a mere declaratory relief, the only aim thereof 
being, other than deferring the outcome of the pending case regarding 
payment, a case in which the Claimant has lost on the principle of liability”.840 
 
556. On the other hand, parallel proceedings may be triggered by reasons of 
securing the opposing party’s assets located in different places,841 or as a tool 
to multiply one’s chances of recovery.842   
 
557. Parallel arbitral proceedings necessarily increases costs and may accordingly 
defy the good administration of justice in this regard.843 Thus, parties may 
abuse the arbitral system by initiating proceedings as a tool to exert economic 
pressure on another party.844 
 
558. On a related note, one of the principal reasons/motives associated with parallel 
proceedings is forum shopping. It is axiomatic that whenever forum shopping 
is possible, there may exist an interest in choosing the appropriate regime, 
arbitral situs and applicable procedural and substantive rules of law.845 This is 
                                                          
840 X. SA v. Y. Limited, 1st Civil Law Court, 4A_210/2008, 29 October 2008, 27 ASA Bulletin 309, 
319 (2009), translated in Gaillard & Pinsolle (2010), (note 833) 179-180. 
841 Erk (2014), (note 529) 11. 
842 See assertion made by the respondent in Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016, para. 313. 
843 Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 62-63. 
844 Erk (2014), (note 529) 11. 
845 Kreindler (2005), (note 541) 176-178; Bernardo M. Cremades and Ignacio Madalena, “Parallel 
Proceedings in International Arbitration”, 24 Arbitration International 507, 508 (2008). 
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specifically the case where the arbitration agreement does not specify the seat 
of arbitration, and in multi-contract and multi-party disputes.846 
 
559. While the above mentioned discussion reflects the competing interests 
generally shared and advocated by legal scholars, other interests remain 
relevant. In this regard, one anticipates other scenarios that do not necessarily 
imply bad faith or abuse. It is widely acknowledged under many arbitration 
rules that where the respondent fails to appoint an arbitrator within a specific 
time frame, the arbitral institution, or another authority, may appoint the 
arbitrator for the respondent.847 Also in multi-party or multi contract disputes, 
claimant(s) and respondent(s) may have conflicting interests and thus require 
appointing different arbitrators.848 Given that party-appointed arbitrators is 
perceived by many as a sacrosanct right,849 the claimant/respondent, in the 
above examples, may initiate parallel arbitral proceedings, not for tactical 
reasons but for the purpose of safeguarding his right to appoint an arbitrator.850 
 
560. Another example is the case where an arbitration clause does not specify the 
seat of arbitration and the tribunal decides to make the hearings or the seat 
abroad.851 In this regard, one of the parties may initiate parallel proceedings in 
his/her home jurisdiction solely for economic reasons, i.e. he/she cannot bear 
the costs associated with an arbitration held abroad.852  
 
                                                          
846 Kreindler (2005), (note 541) 154. 
847 Article (12) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration (2012); Article (2.4) and Article (7.2) of the LCIA 
Rules of Arbitration (2014) (“Failure to deliver a Response within time shall constitute an 
irrevocable waiver of that party’s opportunity to nominate or propose any arbitral candidate”); 
Article (4) and Article (9) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013). 
848 Eric A. Schwartz, “Multi-Party Arbitration and the ICC”, 10 Journal of International Arbitration 5, 
9, 14 (1993); Siemens AG and BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH v. Dutco Construction Co., 7 January 
1992, Bull. Civ. 1, no. 2, referred to in Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) paras 443-445. 
849 Charles N. Brower and Charles B. Rosenberg, “Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that 
Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded”, 29 Arbitration International 7 
(2013); cf. Jan Paulsson, “The Idea of Arbitration”, (Oxford University Press 2013), 276-283; Jan 
Paulsson, “Moral Hazards in International Arbitration”, 25 ICSID Review 339 (2010); Albert Jan 
van den Berg, “Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration”, in 
Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. (eds), “Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of 
W. Michael Resiman”, (Brill Academic 2011). 
850 Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) paras 381-384 and 443-445; Schwartz (1993), (note 848) 5. 
851 Article (18) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration (2012); Article (16) of the LCIA Rules of Arbitration 
(2014); and Article (18) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013). 
852 Kreindler (2005), (note 541) 178, (providing that considerations of convenience and cost-
effectiveness may be reasons to forum shop); Shany (2003), (note 61) 259-260. 
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561. On the other hand, there are risks, procedural enigmas, and competing interests 
that may ensue in cases of parallel proceedings. As discussed below, this 
include, inter alia, maintaining the efficiency of proceedings, cost-
effectiveness, upholding parties’ common intention, and the need to avoid 
conflicting decisions. Disregarding such vital interests may pose a serious 
threat to the stability and integrity of the arbitral system and thus defy the good 
administration of justice.853 
 
562. Allowing abusive parallel proceedings may lead to an escalation of costs and 
waste of resources.854 Parties have a right (interest) and an expectation to have 
an efficient resolution of the dispute.855 In the case of SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance S. A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the tribunal stipulated that: 
 
It would be wasteful resources for two 
proceedings relating to the same or substantially 
the same matter to unfold separately while the 
jurisdiction of one tribunal awaits determination. 
No doubt the parties have been put to 
considerable expense already.856 
 
563. Moreover, the risk of inconsistent decisions is high when considering the 
continuation of parallel proceedings. The materialisation of such a risk is a 
fissure in the arbitration system and a crisis that has practical legal 
                                                          
853 August Reinisch, “International Courts and Tribunals, Multiple Jurisdictions” in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (Oxford University Press 2008), para. 16; Leboulanger 
(1996), (note 546) 54. 
854 Stephen Bond, “Dépeςage or Consolidation of the Disputes Resulting from Connected 
Agreements: The Role of the Arbitrator”, in Bernard Hanotiau and Eric A. Schwartz (eds), 
“Multiparty Arbitration”, (ICC Publications 2010), 43; August Reinisch, “The Proliferation of 
International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat of Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a 
More Effective System? Some Reflections From the Perspective of Investment Arbitration”, in 
Isabelle Buffard, James Crawford, et al. (eds), “International Law between Universalism and 
Fragmentation”, (Martinus Nijhoff 2008), 114; August Reinisch, “International Courts and 
Tribunals, Multiple Jurisdictions”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
(Oxford University Press 2008), 1. 
855 Michael Pryles and Jeffrey Waincymer, “Multiple Claims in Arbitration between the same 
Parties’”, (2008), 56, available at: http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/4/63529655901040/media012223886747020multiple_claims_in_arbitrations_betwe
en_the_same_parties.pdf (accessed 1 February 2018). 
856 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S. A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Procedural Order No. 2, 16 October 2002, 304; Laurent Levy, “Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Issued by Arbitrators”, in Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), “Anti-Suit injunctions in International 
Arbitration”, (IAI Series on International Arbitration No. 2, 2005), 122. 
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implications.857 In this regard, Philippe Leboulanger rightly provided that “it is 
inadmissible to have contradicting decisions regarding interrelated disputes, 
as this may result in actual denial of justice. The splitting of complex disputes 
leaves the door open to inconsistent decisions and to injustice”.858 
 
564. The need for procedural harmonisation should not only be mandated to prevent 
conflicting decisions, but also because it is directly linked to parties’ 
expectations.859 Parties trust international arbitration as an authoritative 
mechanism to obtain a final and binding determination of their disputes in 
accordance with their expectations.860 Parties’ legitimate expectations would 
be thwarted where their arbitral award conflicts with another award, or where 
the issues resolved in the first arbitration are re-opened in subsequent 
proceedings.861 Thus, in Premium Nafta Products and others v. Fili Shipping 
Company Limited, Lord Hoffmann emphasised the need to uphold the 
commercial purpose of the arbitration clause. The said purpose is, in most 
cases, to refer all disputes to one tribunal and to avoid the duplication of effort, 
expense and possibility of inconsistent decisions associated with parallel 
proceedings.862 
 
565. The initiation of parallel arbitral proceedings may also violate the fairness of 
the proceedings and defy requirements of due process. This is particularly the 
case in relation to complex disputes that are brought before different tribunals. 
In such cases, one of the parties may be deprived from his right to fully present 
his case before the tribunal. An example of this was eloquently described by 
Leboulanger so one quotes him in extenso: 
                                                          
857 Charles N. Brower, Charles H. Brower II and Jeremy K. Sharpe, “The Coming Crisis in the Global 
Adjudication System”, 19 Arbitration International 415, 424 (2003); Sheppard (2005), (note 62) 237; 
Charles N. Brower and Jeremy K. Sharpe, “Multiple and Conflicting International Arbitral 
Awards”, 4 Journal of World Investment 211 (2003). 
858 Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 63. 
859 Gary B. Born, “International Commercial Arbitration”, (Wolters Kluwer 2009), 1074. 
860 Stavros Brekoulakis, “Res Judicata and Third Parties”, 16 The American Review of International 
Arbitration 1, 3-4 (2005). 
861 Ibid, 3-4. 
862 Premium Nafta Products Limited and others v. Fili Shipping Company Limited and others, [2007] 
UKHL 40, para. 13; Nathalie Voser, “The Swiss Perspective on Parties in Arbitration: “Traditional 
Approach with a Twist Regarding Abuse of Rights” or “Consent Theory Plus””, in Stavros 
Brekoulakis, Julian D.M. Lew and Loukas Mistelis (eds), “The Evolution and Future of 
International Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2016), para. 9.21. 
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In some cases, if no link is established between 
the parallel disputes, the fundamental conditions 
of a fair trial may not be met, namely when the 
dispute between the parties involves the exceptio 
non adimpleti contractus principle, for instance 
when one of the parties refrains from performing 
its obligations under an agreement, by retaining 
sums owed, in order to defend its contractual 
rights, that is, only because the other party did 
not perform its obligations under another 
agreement belonging to the same group of 
contracts […] if the arbitral treatment of the two 
agreements is split, the defendant might not be 
able even to raise the argument based on the 
exceptio and consequently may be deprived of its 
right to present its case in an equal position to the 
claimant’s. The ICC Court should pay particular 
attention to a situation like this and should not 
ignore its consequences, which would be contrary 
to the proper administration of justice. The 
concept of “a fair hearing” cannot be 
overlooked.863 
 
566. Parallel arbitral proceedings may also lead to inequality between the parties 
and thus pose a threat to due process. This is particularly the case where a 
party (an investor) initiates multiple arbitral proceedings, through a locally 
incorporated company and through direct and indirect shareholders against a 
State. If different arbitral tribunals are constituted in the different proceedings, 
this means that while the investor has to convince one tribunal in order to 
prevail in the case, the State may have to refute the claims and prevail before 
all the different tribunals.864 
   
567. The above analysis reveals that such competing interests may be effectively 
balanced by resorting to abuse of rights. While the arbitration agreement may 
grant the parties the right to initiate arbitration proceedings, such right should 
be exercised reasonably. As shall be discussed below, the element of 
reasonableness, comprising the crux of the principle of abuse of rights, may 
assist arbitral tribunals in considering questions arising in the context of 
                                                          
863 Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 90-91. 
864 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 24-25. 
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parallel proceedings to ensure the good administration of justice. As rightly 
provided by Bernard Hanotiau:  
 
Arbitral institutions and arbitrators have a 
correlative obligation to make sure that the duty 
of good faith is respected by the parties. 
Consequently, they should, by all means within 
the limits of their rules or prerogatives, make it 
impossible for a party to jeopardize another 
party’s case by abusing its rights and unduly 
opposing the conduct of a single arbitration or 
the joinder of parallel proceedings. It should, 
however, never be overlooked that the parties’ 
agreement is paramount: striking a balance 
between this agreement, the duty of the parties to 
act in good faith, and their right to a fair trial 
[…] is one of the most difficult challenges that 
arbitrators and arbitration institutions face and it 
is their duty to solve it in the best possible way by 
all available means.865 [Emphasis added]. 
 
(ii) Abuse of Rights and Parallel Arbitral Proceedings 
 
568. Whilst deploying the principle of abuse of rights to limit abusive parallel 
proceedings is not new, arbitral awards that dealt with this issue are scarce. 
However, the scarcity in the principle’s use in this regard does not negate its 
importance and effectiveness in ensuring the good administration of justice. 
Additionally, while the examples discussed below pertain to investment 
arbitration, there is no reason why the principle may not apply to similar cases 
in commercial arbitration.866 
 
569. Three cases shall be examined to shed light on the operation of the principle 
and its effect on the administration of arbitral justice. As shall be discussed 
below, in the first case, the arbitral tribunal refused to apply the principle of 
abuse of rights and as a result the administration of justice was seriously 
brought to disrepute. A contrario, in the second and third cases, requirements 
                                                          
865 Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) para. 235. 
866 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 23-24 and 32, (noting that parallel arbitration often takes place in 
commercial arbitration); Hanno Wehland, “The Coordination of Multiple Proceedings in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration”, (Oxford University Press 2013), para. 7.31. 
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of good administration of justice mandated the arbitral tribunals to 
consider/apply the principle. 
 
(a) CME and Lauder Cases 
  
570. In these cases, the arbitration system enabled the investor to initiate two 
arbitration proceedings against the same State, in relation to the same dispute, 
merely for relying on different BITs. The cases pertained to the interference 
with television broadcasting rights granted by the government of the Czech 
Republic to a foreign investor. Mr. Ronald Lauder, a US national, invested in 
the television broadcaster through the company Central European Television 
which is controlled by the Dutch company, CME, of which Mr Lauder was the 
majority shareholder. Following allegations of expropriation, violation of the 
obligation of fair and equitable treatment and others, arbitration proceedings 
were initiated.867  
 
571. Mr. Lauder, relying on his US nationality, initiated arbitration proceedings 
against the Czech Republic in London based on the United States-Czech 
Republic. Subsequently, CME initiated arbitration proceedings against the 
Czech Republic in Stockholm based on the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT. 
Both proceedings related to the same dispute and raised the same legal 
questions, in relation to the liability of the Czech Republic.868  
 
572. The first constituted arbitral tribunal sitting in London found that the investor 
failed to substantiate his claims and thus dismissed the claims.869 A contrario, 
the second constituted tribunal sitting in Stockholm produced an utterly 
conflicting award, whereby it held that the Czech Republic was liable.870 
 
                                                          
867 CME Czech Republic B. V. vs. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Final 
Award of 14 March 2003, paras. 1-33 
868 Yuval Shany, “Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder: Revisiting the Application of Rules Governing 
Jurisdictional Conflicts in the Lauder/CME Cases”, in Arthur W. Rovine (ed.), “Contemporary 
Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation”, (Martinus Nijhoff 2007), 123.  
869 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Award of 3 
September 2001, 74-75. 
870 CME Czech Republic B. V. vs. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Final 
Award of 14 March 2003, para. 620. 
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573. The Lauder/CME saga elucidates that the potential pernicious effects of 
parallel proceedings to the administration of justice are not merely important 
theoretical observations, but have serious legal ramifications. The fact that the 
two arbitral tribunals reached contradictory decisions regarding the same set of 
facts is rightly described as the ultimate fiasco in international arbitration.871 
Reaching conflicting decisions regarding the same legal question thwarts the 
administration of justice, given that it defies the rule of law, due process, legal 
certainty, the efficient administration of justice,872 and may arguably result in 
an actual denial of justice.873 
 
574. It is argued that abuse of rights may operate in this context to temper and limit 
the right to initiate parallel proceedings by the requirements of good 
administration of arbitral justice. That said, the application of the principle of 
abuse of rights was raised albeit rejected by the arbitral tribunals.874  
 
575. While the respondent asserted that its application ensures the administration of 
justice as it eludes the risk of conflicting awards,875  the tribunals 
acknowledged the possibility of conflicting awards but did not apply the 
principle on the grounds that the causes of action and the claimants were not 
identical in both proceedings.876 
 
576. This case is an epitome of how the application of abuse of rights ensures the 
good administration of justice, and how failing to apply it (or misapplying it) 
may disrepute the administration of justice.  
 
577. It is important to note that the decisions rendered by the tribunals should not be 
considered a rejection of applying abuse of rights in the context of parallel 
                                                          
871 Reinisch (2008), (note 854) 116. 
872 Robin F. Hansen, “Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Treaty Arbitration: Responses for 
Treaty-Drafters, Arbitrators and Parties”, 73 The Modern Law Review 523, 529 (2010); 
Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 62-63. 
873 Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 63. 
874 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Award of 3 
September 2001, paras 174-180; CME Czech Republic B. V. vs. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Proceedings, Partial Award of 13 September 2001, para. 412. 
875 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Award of 3 
September 2001, para. 169. 
876 Ibid, para. 177. 
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proceedings. A contrario, the awards recognised the principle, but held that the 
conditions sine qua non for its application were not satisfied. Moreover, the 
tribunal also recognised the competing principles/interests of the good 
administration of justice. Thus, while the tribunal recognised the escalation of 
costs, efficiency and the unfair possibility of conflicting decisions associated 
with the continuation of parallel proceedings,877 it decided that such interests 
could have been equally protected had respondent allowed the consolidation of 
the proceedings. 
 
578. In finding no abuse of rights, both arbitral tribunals emphasised the fact that 
the respondent has refused, on several occasions, to consolidate the 
proceedings and refused to appoint the same arbitrators in the parallel 
proceedings.878 This confirms that remedies based on abuse of rights may 
depend on the reasonable conduct of the aggrieved party.879 It is acknowledged 
that consolidating the parallel proceedings or choosing the same arbitrators in 
both proceedings may be effective in ensuring the good administration of 
justice.880 
 
579. The tribunals erred in applying the principle of abuse of rights in that they 
adopted, for its application, the same conditions of the principles of lis pendens 
and res judicata (triple identity test). The tribunal noted that there is no abuse 
of right as the claimants and the causes of action are not identical in both 
cases.881 While this may be of relevance in the context of lis pendens and res 
                                                          
877 Ibid, para. 178. 
878 Ibid, paras 173-178; CME Czech Republic B. V. vs. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Proceedings, Partial Award of 13 September 2001, para. 412. 
879 Shany (2007), (note 868) 126-136; Wehland (2013), (note 866) para. 7.31; Cremades & Madalena 
(2008), (note 845) 515; Mariel Dimsey, “The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: 
Challenges and Solutions”, (Eleven International Publishing 2008), 94; Charles N. Brower and 
Jeremy K. Sharpe, “Multiple and Conflicting International Arbitral Awards”, 4 Journal of World 
Investment 211, 216 (2003). 
880 Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 85 and 89; Canfor Corporation v. United States of America, 
Tembec et al v. United States of America, and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v. United States of 
America, UNCITRAL, Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, dated 7 September 2005, para. 131. 
881 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Award of 3 
September 2001, para. 177. 
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judicata,882 it should not be a condicio sine qua non for abuse of rights.883 To 
the contrary, the principle of abuse of rights is of greater relevance in relation 
to proceedings that involve similar, but not identical, parties and causes of 
action.884 Additionally, equating abuse of rights to the defences of lis pendens 
and res judicata, which are often dismissed unless the ‘triple-identity’ test is 
satisfied, may encourage the abuse of the arbitral system.885 Thus, abuse of 
rights should be established, not based on any rigid rules, but by considering 
all interests involved.886 
 
580. Accordingly, a material impediment to standards of fairness, requirements of 
due process and the broader notion of administration of justice materialised in 
these cases as a result of not applying, or misapplying, the principle of abuse of 
rights. As rightly recognised by scholars and arbitrators, avoidance of 
conflicting decisions is a requirement of fairness, due process and efficiency, 
and the materialisation of such risk is a serious defiance to the administration 
of justice.887 
 
                                                          
882 Even in the context of lis pendens and res judicata, recent trends, as endorsed in the ILA Report, 
encourage a more liberal definition of parties: International Law Association, “Final Report on Lis 
Pendens and Arbitration”, (Toronto Conference 2006), para. 5.6. (“The recommendation defined 
“parallel Proceedings” in terms of parties and issues that are the same or substantially the same, 
rather than in terms of the triple identity test”). 
883 The principle of abuse of rights is not an alter ego of lis pendens or res judicata but has a different 
and broader sphere of operation. Wehland (2013), (note 866) para. 7.31; Brown (2010), (note 725) 
7;  Cremades & Madalena (2008), (note 845) 538; Filip De Ly and Audley Sheppard, “ILA Final 
Report on Lis Pendens and Arbitration”, 25 Arbitration International 3, 80 (2009); Carlos S. 
Anzorena, “Multiplicity of Claims under BITs and the Argentine Case”, 2(2) Transnational Dispute 
Management, 25 (2005). 
884 Dallal v. Bank Mellat, [1986] Q. B. 441, 452 (where the court applied the principle of abuse of 
process even though the case was not identical to the subsequent case, given that the application of 
abuse of process does not require identical parties, causes of action and relief, unlike the principle of 
res judicata. The court stated that: “the question whether an action is an abuse of the process of the 
court, although closely related to the question whether or not a defence of res judicata exists, is not 
the same question. Thus the legal defence may be subject to or circumscribed by strict legal criteria 
whereas the complaint that an action is an abuse of the process of the court does not solely depend 
on the availability of such a defence and, therefore, broader criteria can be applied”; Shany (2003), 
(note 61) 259. 
885 Cremades & Madalena (2008), (note 845) 538; Ryan (2015), (note 758) 5. 
886 Shany (2003), (note 61) 258-259; Tidewater Inc. et al v. the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 8 February 2013, para. 147 
887 Kabra (2015), (note 706) 450; Canfor Corporation v. United States of America, Tembec et al v. 
United States of America, and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v. United States of America, 
UNCITRAL, Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, dated 7 September 2005, para. 131. 
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(b) Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
581. The recent award in the case of Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al. v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt,888 also demonstrates the importance of the principle as a 
requirement of the good administration of arbitral justice.  
 
582. The case involved the termination of a gas supply purchase agreement, after 
many interruptions in the gas supply as a result of terrorist activity following 
the revolution that took place in Egypt in 2011. 
 
583. This dispute gave rise to four parallel commercial and investment arbitrations. 
Ampal Corporation which is incorporated under the laws of New York, Mr. 
David Fisher who is a German national, and other investors, directly or 
indirectly, own the East Mediterranean Gas company (“EMG”), a company 
incorporated in Egypt. The ICSID dispute pertains to claimants’ investment in 
EMG.  
 
584. Other than the ICSID case being discussed, the dispute gave rise to another 
three arbitration proceedings: an ICC arbitration in Geneva brought by EMG 
against the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) and the Egyptian 
Natural Gas Holding Company;889 EGPC and EGAS initiated arbitration 
proceedings against EMG in Cairo under the auspices of the Cairo Regional 
Centre of International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA);890 and another 
parallel investment treaty arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules brought by a 
Polish-Israeli national, Yosef Maiman, and other three companies including 
Ampal’s subsidiary Merhav Ampal Group Ltd.891 
 
                                                          
888 Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, 
Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016. 
889 ICC Case No. 18215/GZ/MHM (unpublished) referred to in Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 17. An 
award was rendered in this case ordering EGPC and EGAS to pay 1.7 billion dollars to Israeli state 
owned corporation (IEC) and an amount of 288 million dollars to EMG. Douglas Thomson, “Israel 
Wins Gas Supply Claim Against Egypt”, Global Arbitration Review, 7 December 2015, 1, available 
at: http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034988/israel-wins-gas-supply-claim-against-egypt 
(accessed 1 February 2018) 
890 CRCICA Case No. 829/2012 (unpublished), referred to in Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 17. 
891 Summary of the cases in Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016, paras 10-15. 
Page | 203  
 
585. Professor Gaillard, who represented the Egyptian State in the arbitrations, 
noted that the initiation of multiple separate arbitrations is “archetype of 
abusive procedural conduct”.892 To that effect, in the ICSID case, Egypt 
asserted that claimants’ claims were inadmissible as they constituted an abuse 
of right. Egypt further alleged that: parallel proceedings were brought to seek 
to multiply the chances of recovery; part of claimants’ claim relates to the 
same 12.5% indirect interest in EMG for which Ampal subsidiary, Merhav-
Ampal, claims in the parallel proceedings; and that Egypt did not consent to be 
subject to multiple proceedings.893 On the other hand, the claimants asserted 
that there is no abuse of right given that, inter alia, Egypt refused the 
consolidation of the parallel proceedings.894 
 
586. The arbitral tribunal first recognised the principle of abuse of rights and noted 
that the existence of four parallel arbitration proceedings, involving the same 
facts, witnesses and claims, may be abusive.895 The tribunal then noted that 
different investors may pursue different claims in different fora, even if such 
claims arise from the same factual matrix. This is not, per se, abusive. The 
tribunal then stipulated that parallel arbitration “may not be a desirable 
situation but it cannot be characterised as abusive especially when the 
Respondent has declined the Claimants’ offers to consolidate the 
proceedings”.896 
 
587. However, in order to mitigate the risk of contradictory awards and to ensure 
the good administration of justice, the tribunal found that there is an abuse of 
right in relation to a portion of claimants’ claims. In this regard, the tribunal 
found that the claimant Ampal, which is controlled by Mr. Yosef Maiman, 
advances its claims in relation to the same 12.5% indirect interest in EMG for 
which Ampal’s subsidiaries claim in the parallel arbitration proceedings. To 
that effect, it noted:  
 
                                                          
892 Thomson (2015), (note 889) 3. 
893 Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, 
Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016, para. 313. 
894 Ibid, para. 321. 
895 Ibid, para. 328. 
896 Ibid, para. 329. 
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[W]hile the same party in interest might 
reasonably seek to protect its claim in two fora 
where the jurisdiction of each tribunal is unclear, 
once jurisdiction is otherwise confirmed, it 
would crystallize in an abuse of process for in 
substance the same claim is to be pursued on the 
merits before two tribunals.897 [Emphasis added]. 
 
588. Given that both tribunals have decided that they have jurisdiction regarding 
this portion of the claim, there is no risk of denial of justice and accordingly, 
the tribunal ordered Ampal to cure the abuse by pursuing this claim only before 
one tribunal and withdraw it from the other parallel proceedings to avoid 
double recovery or conflicting awards.898 
 
589. This decision confirms the role of abuse of rights in balancing the competing 
interests of the good administration of justice. The tribunal recognised one’s 
right to initiate parallel proceedings and one’s right to be heard before the 
competent tribunal based on the relevant BIT (all requirements of due 
process).899 However, these interests were balanced against respondent’s 
interests to preclude the escalation of costs, safeguard efficiency and avoid the 
risk of inconsistent decisions which greatly affect the fairness of the 
proceedings and ensuing justice.900  
 
590. As previously mentioned, the notion of fairness (as part of the good 
administration of justice) refers to standards of reasonable procedural 
conduct.901 That said, whilst one considers the tribunal to have embraced an 
overly narrow application of the principle,902 it appears that abuse was only 
                                                          
897 Ibid, para. 331. 
898 Ibid, paras 333-334; Sebastian Perry, “Panel Forbids Duplicate Claims in Egyptian Gas Dispute”, 
Global Arbitration Review, 25 May 2016, 2, available at: 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1036361/panel-forbids-duplicate-claims-in-egyptian-gas-
dispute (accessed 1 February 2018). 
899 Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, 
Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016, paras 321(iv) and 329. 
900 Ibid, paras 328 and 330-339. 
901 De Ly (2016), (note 654) 37. 
902 It is submitted that the principle’s application should not generally be limited to this portion of the 
claim, but should extend to prevent claimants from bifurcating their overlapping claims and 
pursuing them before different tribunals. This is prejudicial to the other party as it allows claimants 
to maximise their chances of obtaining a favourable outcome while placing the other party at a 
disadvantageous, unequal, position. Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 25-26. 
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partially established and did not apply to preclude the initiation of parallel 
proceedings in relation to the other claims given the unreasonable conduct of 
the respondent. The tribunal considered that the respondent acted unreasonably 
in that it: refused the consolidation of the proceedings of the two commercial 
and two investment proceedings; challenged the appointment of the same 
arbitrator in the parallel proceedings; and equally initiated parallel proceedings 
in Cairo. Thus, it seems that the tribunal did not ascertain the seriousness of the 
risks associated with parallel proceedings given the unreasonable conduct of 
the respondent.903 One finds it apt to assert that the conduct of Egypt in 
refusing to appoint the same arbitrator may be characterised as an abuse of 
right and conduct which arguably defies the good administration of arbitral 
justice. As rightly noted by Leboulanger: 
 
But, as all rights are susceptible of abuse, a party 
may abuse its right to designate an arbitrator. 
The attitude of a party who refuses to designate 
the same arbitrator in the parallel arbitral panels 
might be considered as a violation of its 
obligation to perform, in good faith, its 
undertakings assumed under the arbitration 
clause.904 
 
591. On a related note, whilst the decision in the CME/Lauder equally recognised 
the importance of the conduct of the aggrieved party in assessing the abuse of 
rights claim, it did not specify that it constitutes a condition for the principle’s 
application. This is confirmed by the fact that while Egypt declined the 
consolidation attempts, the tribunal still found that a portion of the claim 
constituted an abuse of rights. One may deduce from this decision that if the 
claims in the parallel proceedings are, wholly or partly, identical, requirements 
of good administration of justice mandates finding an abuse of right regardless 
of the opposing party’s conduct. On the other hand, if the issues raised are just 
similar, the conduct of the aggrieved party becomes instrumental. 
 
                                                          
903 Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, 
Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016, para. 329. 
904 Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 92. 
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(c) Orascom TMT Investments v. People’s Democratic Republic of 
Algeria 
 
592. In the recent ICSID case of Orascom TMT Investments v. Algeria,905 the 
application of abuse of rights and its proactive role/function in the good 
administration of arbitral justice was more explicit and illustrative. 
 
593. A dispute arose from Orascom’s alleged investment to build a mobile telecom 
network for Algeria. The claimant alleged that Algeria took measures against 
it, mainly through tax reassessments, due to a political vendetta against 
claimant’s Egyptian controlling shareholder as a result of a policy shift against 
foreign investment.  
 
594. The respondent claimed, inter alia, that the claims asserted by the claimant 
were inadmissible as they were tantamount to an abuse of rights. Mr. Sawiris, 
the claimant’s ultimate shareholder, introduced different arbitrations against 
respondent at different levels of the chain of companies under different BITs. 
Respondent submitted that this conduct, aimed at maximising the chances of 
success, was unfair and an abuse to the protection offered by Algeria to foreign 
investors. As stated by respondent, the principle of abuse of rights should 
operate to limit the right of multiple shareholders belonging to the same group 
to initiate proceedings.906 The claimant argued that the principle should not 
extend to limit parallel arbitral proceedings.907 
 
595. The arbitral tribunal found that claimant’s claims were inadmissible and that 
the initiation of the proceedings constituted an abuse of rights. Whilst 
acknowledging that the principle has been mainly applied in cases of 
restructuring of an investment to gain access to arbitration, the tribunal noted 
that as a general principle of law, abuse of rights may equally apply in other 
areas of arbitration law including in the context of parallel proceedings.908 
 
                                                          
905 Orascom TMT Investments S.à.r.l., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/35, Award dated 31 May 2017. 
906 Ibid, paras 417-419. 
907 Ibid, paras 449-450. 
908 Ibid, paras 540-541. 
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596. In delineating the application of the principle in the context of parallel 
proceedings, the tribunal noted that an investor who controls several entities 
may commit an abuse of right where he/she relies on different BITs and seeks 
to impugn the host state for the same measures and claims for the same 
damage at different levels of the chain. While recognising that structuring an 
investment through layers of corporate entities is a right and can be exercised 
to pursue legitimate purposes, the tribunal balanced this against other potent 
interests of the administration of arbitral justice, namely, fairness, waste of 
resources, and the possibility of multiple recoveries and conflicting 
decisions.909 
 
597. It is of particular interest to note that the tribunal explicitly considered the 
decisions rendered in the CME and Lauder cases mentioned above and 
acknowledged that the failure to apply abuse of rights in those cases led to the 
issuance of conflicting awards. Moreover, it is to be mentioned that, unlike the 
cases mentioned above, there were no offers to consolidate the proceedings in 
this case and thus, one may deduce that applying abuse of rights was more 
flagrant as the respondent did not commit any abuse from his side.910 
 
598. Based on the above, it appears that the application of abuse of rights to ensure 
the good administration of arbitral justice is unequivocal. The cases referred to 
above clearly demonstrate how the operation of the principle may effectively 
ensure the fairness and efficiency of the proceedings while safeguarding the 
requirements of due process. 
 
3. The Extension of Arbitration Clause to a Non-Signatory 
 
599. Arbitration is generally consent driven and autonomy oriented. Entering into 
an arbitration agreement is the crucial condicio sine qua non for a party to have 
                                                          
909 Ibid, paras 542-543. 
910 Ibid, para 547. 
Page | 208  
 
a right and/or be compelled to participate in the arbitration process.911 
Accordingly, an arbitration agreement generally only binds its parties in 
accordance with the sacrosanct principle of “privity”.912 
 
600. Arbitration agreements must comply with certain substantive and formal 
requirements to be valid. The degree of stringency of such requirements vary 
from one jurisdiction to another.913 Such pre-requisites of permitting 
arbitration emanates from the fact that arbitration was originally seen as an 
exception to the general sacred right to submit disputes to the competent 
national court.914 It is often overlooked that such conditions may seem unfair 
given that an arbitrator has become, arguably, the “natural judge” in the 
international business world and that arbitration became the ordinary dispute 
resolution mechanism for cross-border disputes.915 
 
601. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, requirements of good administration of 
justice, commanded legislators, courts and arbitral tribunals, in some 
circumstances, to broaden the definition of a “party” and the scope of a 
“contract” and extend the effect of the arbitration agreement, to encompass 
related contracts and non-signatories to the arbitral proceedings based on 
divergent doctrines and/or principles.916  
 
                                                          
911 Stavros Brekoulakis, “Third Parties in International Commercial Arbitration”, (Oxford University 
Press 2010), para. 1.09; Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, Session held on 13 January 2002, 
no. 155, Judicial Year 20; Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, Session held on 3 July 1999, no. 
104, Judicial Year 20; Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, Session held on 6 November 1999, 
no. 84, Judicial Year 19. 
912 Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds.), “Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 1999), 414. 
913 Born (2014), (note 61) 657-658 and 833-834. 
914 Otto Sandrock, “Arbitration Agreements and Groups of Companies”, 27 The International Lawyer 
941, 949-950 (1993). 
915 Hanotiau (2011), (note 50) 103; Julian D. M. Lew, “Applicable Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards”, (Oceana Publications 1978), 413; 
Paulsson (2008), (note 53) 2. 
916 Stavros L. Brekoulakis, “Arbitration and Third Parties”, (PhD Queen Mary University of London, 
2008), 153-154; Paris Court of Appeal, First Chamber, 7 December 1994, Review Arbitrage 2 
(1996), 245-249 (relying on the notion of good administration of justice), referred to in Karim 
Youssef, “The Limits of Consent: The Right or Obligation to Arbitrate of Non-signatories in Group 
of Companies”, in Bernard Hanotiau and Eric A. Schwartz (eds.), “Multiparty Arbitration”, (ICC 
Publications 2010), 90. 
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602. Thus, it is well-established that legal mechanisms and principles that aid 
arbitral tribunals to include non-signatories in international arbitration enhance 
the efficiency and increase the fairness of the arbitral process: 
 
As courts traditionally may be restrictive toward 
inclusion of third parties, Multicontract 
arbitration leads to efficiency, inclusion of all 
relevant parties and facts, subsequent 
improvement in consideration of due process and, 
ultimately, more fairness in arbitral 
proceedings.917 
 
603. The doctrines and principles belying extension are either consent driven or 
founded on equitable considerations.918 While inferring consent in the former 
doctrines is, in many cases, largely specious, consent may be lacking in the 
latter cases. Accordingly, it seems that the concept of consent, in general, is not 
able alone to elucidate and vindicate the notion of extension and that there is a 
dire need for a legal principle to better assist decision makers to join non-
signatories to ensure the good administration of arbitral justice.919 
 
604. It is submitted that the application of abuse of rights to issues of non-
signatories is an effective principle utilised by arbitrators to balance the 
competing interests of fairness, efficiency, due process and serves the 
administration of justice.  
 
605. The operation of abuse of rights in the context of extension of arbitration 
clauses raises an important question regarding the role of the principle. In most 
mentioned applications of abuse of rights, the principle applied to ameliorate 
the rigidity and harshness of an already existing legal/contractual right. 
However, as previously mentioned, the principle of abuse of rights may be 
used to create a new contractual right/obligation to avoid an unfair or an 
                                                          
917 Japaridze (2008), (note 657) 1432. 
918 Born (2014), (note 61) 1433. 
919 Stavros Brekoulakis, “Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v. Commercial Reality”, in 
Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian D.M. Lew and Loukas Mistelis (eds), “The Evolution and Future of 
International Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2016), paras 8.10-8.15. 
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inequitable outcome.920 In such circumstances, the principle appears in its most 
extensive reach and acts more as a sword than a shield. It is suggested that the 
operation of the principle in the context of extension of an arbitration clause 
comprises an epitome of this as it operates to establish jurisdiction against a 
non-signatory. 
 
606. As shall be discussed below, resorting to the principle of abuse of rights is not 
peculiar to the arbitral practice. The principle has been expressly applied in 
some instances as the legal basis for the extension of the arbitration clause, and 
in other cases while not explicitly referred to, the raison d’être of abuse of 
rights remains conspicuous, where it has been utilised primarily to preserve the 
reasonable expectations of the parties and to advance the fairness and 
efficiency of the proceedings. Whilst most cases referring to the principle 
pertain to the theory of piercing the corporate veil or alter ego, other examples 
shall outline the applicability of abuse of rights to other cases of extension. 
 
607. However, prior to embarking on an analysis of how abuse of rights operates to 
ensure the good administration of arbitral justice in relation to issues of 
extension, it seems in order to first succinctly examine the relevant competing 
interests that arise where one requests the extension of the arbitration clause to 
a non-signatory. By and large, these interests are similar to those mentioned in 
relation to parallel arbitral proceedings. 
 
(i) Competing Interests relating to the Extension of an Arbitration 
Clause 
 
608. In the context of extension of arbitration clause to non-signatories, there exists 
diverse competing interests of the parties. It involves a multiplicity of interests 
that primarily rest on those pursued by the party requesting the extension and 
those of the party(ies) opposing such extension. These interests often fall 
within the ambit of the administration of justice, i.e. they involve interests that 
                                                          
920 Quebec Superior Court in Posluns v. Enterprises Lormil Inc., [1990], Quebec 200-05-001584-858, 
J.E. 90-1131 (C.S.), cited in Jukier (1992), (note 28) 235, (where the court applied the principle of 
abuse of rights to create a contractual provision of a guarantee of exclusivity which was not part of 
the contract). 
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are part of due process,921 protecting parties’ reasonable expectations, and 
interests of procedural efficiency and fairness of the proceedings.922  
 
609. Thus, it is well acknowledged that third party mechanisms are designed to 
enhance the procedural harmonisation and efficiency of arbitral proceedings. 
The bifurcation of arbitral proceedings lead to a waste of legal and financial 
resources.923 Moreover, such bifurcation may lead to irreconcilable or 
conflicting decisions regarding the same, or intertwined, matters between 
interrelated parties which is undesirable and may affect the fairness of the 
process.924 
 
610. However, given that consent often remains an important requirement for 
extension of an arbitration clause, considerations of justice, equity and 
efficiency often compete with consent.925 Arbitrators often rely on good 
administration of justice, including the notions of equity, fairness, and that of 
procedural efficiency in assessing whether to extend an arbitration clause.926  
 
611. On the other hand, issues regarding the extension of an arbitration clause and 
multiparty/multi-contract arbitration may raise questions regarding the equality 
between the parties, particularly in relation to the appointment of the arbitral 
tribunal. This fundamental interest was illustrated in the well-known Dutco 
case.927 The dispute involved three parties and the agreement included an ICC 
arbitration clause providing for the appointment of three arbitrators. While 
                                                          
921 Yaraslau Kryvoi, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in International Arbitration”, 1 Global Business 
Law Review 169, 176 (2011). 
922 Thomas (2010), (note 577) 966; Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency LLC, 219 F.3d 524, 528 (Fifth 
Circuit 2000). 
923 Bond (2010), (note 854) 36. 
924 Alfred McAlpine Construction Limited v. Unex Corporation Ltd [1994] 38 Con. L.R. 63, 77; Abu 
Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. v. Eastern Bechtel Corp., [1982] 2 LIoyd’s Rep. 425, 427 (“It is most 
undesirable that there should be inconsistent finding by two separate arbitrators on virtually the 
self-same question, such as causation. It is very desirable that everything should be done to avoid 
such a circumstance”). 
925 Youssef (2010), (note 916) 71-72. 
926 Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization, et al, Interim Award, ICC 
Case No. 3879 of 1984, XI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 127, 132 (1986); Hanotiau (2005), 
(note 151) 47; John M. Townsend, “Non-Signatories and Arbitration”, 3 ADR Currents 19, 23 
(1998); James M. Hosking, “Non-Signatories and International Arbitration in the United States: the 
Quest for Consent”, 20 Arbitration International 289, 303 (2004). 
927 Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) paras 443-457. 
Page | 212  
 
Dutco nominated its arbitrator, the other two respondents were unable to agree 
on one arbitrator given that their interests were not aligned. However, to avoid 
the appointment of the arbitrator by the ICC they jointly nominated an 
arbitrator while reserving their right to challenge such appointment. The 
respondents then challenged the award before the French courts. The French 
Court of Cassation invalidated the award and provided that it violated the 
principle of equality between the parties. It should be noted that while many 
have raised some concerns in relation to the Dutco decision, many arbitral 
institutions have subsequently amended their rules in order to comply with the 
principles laid down by the French Court of Cassation.928 
 
612. Additionally, the question of extension of an arbitration clause may raise other 
issues of due process. This is particularly evident where one acknowledges the 
fact that a decision to extend an arbitration clause to a non-signatory results in 
the latter’s losing his/her proverbial day in court (deprive the non-signatory of 
judicial access).929 Thus, a decision to extend an arbitration clause or to join a 
non-signatory despite the lack of the latter’s clear and unambiguous consent to 
arbitrate may raise questions regarding requirements of due process and fair 
trial.930 
 
613. On a related note, the problem of extension primarily affects the reasonable 
expectations of parties, the preservation of which is an intrinsic element of the 
administration of justice.931 The parties’ reasonable expectations may be 
thwarted where a request of extension is granted or denied depending on the 
factual matrix of each case. Parties have a legitimate and reasonable 
expectation to have an efficient resolution of the dispute.932 Moreover, there is 
an equally reasonable expectation that arbitral proceedings should be 
harmonised and not result in any conflicting decisions.933 It is acknowledged 
                                                          
928 Schwartz (1993), (note 848) 16. 
929 William W. Park, “Non-Signatories and International Disputes: An Arbitrator’s Dilemma” in 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Multiple Party Actions in International Arbitration” (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), para. 1.56; Leboulanger (1996), (note 546) 67-68. 
930 Youssef (2010), (note 916) 73. 
931 De Ly (2016), (note 654) 37. 
932 Pryles & Waincymer (2008), (note 855) 56. 
933 Born (2009), (note 859) 1074. 
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that parties trust international arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism 
that can effectively put an end to a given dispute. This expectation may be 
frustrated where a non-signatory is allowed to bring before another forum a 
question that has been determined by the arbitrators.934 
 
614. Another particularly important interest that appears conspicuous in the context 
of extension of an arbitration clause, and equally linked to parties’ reasonable 
expectations, is the need to bar one’s inconsistent conduct to the detriment of 
another. Such preclusion arguably maintains the fairness of proceedings and 
ensures the good administration of arbitral justice.935 As rightly stated by the 
United States Court of Appeal: “the legal principle [underlying the theory of 
equitable estoppel] rests on a simple proposition: it is unfair for a party to rely 
on a contract when it works to its advantage, and repudiate it when it works to 
its disadvantage”.936 
 
615. Moreover, it is submitted that safeguarding the parties’ reasonable expectations 
constitutes the main rationale behind many of the arbitration decisions 
regarding extension of arbitration, despite the fact that arbitrators justify such 
decisions on other grounds, such as the group of companies. 
 
616. Thus, barring a party from denying or alleging certain facts or course of action 
owing to that party’s previous conduct, which comprises the established 
maxim: venire contra factum proprium, is a fundamental requirement of 
fairness, is recognised as a general principle of law and is applied by arbitral 
tribunals and national courts.937 While this may be often based on the broader 
                                                          
934 Stavros L. Brekoulakis, “Arbitration and Third Parties”, (PhD Queen Mary University of London, 
2008), 144. 
935 Brekoulakis (2010), (note 911) para. 4.03 (noting that arbitral estoppel emanates from the principle 
of venire contra factum proprium which rests on considerations of fairness and equity). 
936 American Bankers Insurance Group v. Richard F. Long and Lillie M. Long, 453 F.3d 623, 627 
(Fourth Circuit 2006); Wachovia Bank, National Association v. Schmidt, 445 F.3d 762, 769 (Fourth 
Circuit 2006). 
937 Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 912) 820; Born (2014), (note 61) 1472-1473; Berger (2009), (note 
577) 233; Berger (1999), (note 576) 221; Park (2009), (note 929) para. 1.51; Bonell (2005), (note 
45) 134; ICC Case No. 12456 of 2004, in Jean-Jacquez Arnaldez, Yves Derains and Dominique 
Hascher (eds), “Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 2008-2011”, (Kluwer Law International 2013) 
811; ICC Case No. 5832 of 1988, in Yves Derains, Sigvard Jarvin and J.J. Arnaldez (eds.), “ICC 
Arbitral Awards 1986-1990”, (ICC Publications 1994) 547. 
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principle of good faith,938 the principle of abuse of rights equally provides that 
“no exercise of rights will be given legal recognition if it is contrary to former 
conduct”.939 No system or court should tolerate such conduct in light of the 
sacred tenet he who attempts to negate what has been maintained shall be 
precluded and estopped. 
 
617. As shall be seen below, the principle of abuse of rights is an effective tool 
utilised by arbitrators to advance, and strike the balance required between, the 
mentioned interests and to serve the overall administration of justice. It 
operates in certain cases to prevent material fraud or injustice, and applies in 
other exceptional cases to safeguard the procedural efficiency of the 
proceedings and to preserve the parties’ reasonable expectations. 
 
(ii) Extension of an Arbitration Clause on the Basis of Abuse of Rights 
 
618. This section examines the application of abuse of rights to decide questions of 
extension. One shall first highlight that the principle is well-recognised as the 
legal basis for extension based on the theory of piercing/lifting the corporate 
veil. Subsequently, it shall be noted that the principle equally applies in other 
cases of extension to safeguard the parties’ reasonable expectations, to ensure 
the fairness of the proceedings, and to enhance the procedural efficiency of the 
proceedings. 
 
                                                          
938 Speidel (1996), (note 555) 540-541; Cheng (2006), (note 190) 141-142. 
939 ICC Case No. 7421 of 2010, 21 ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 64 (2010); Bolgar 
(1975), (note 32) 1027 (German law), and 1033 (providing that Switzerland applies the abuse of 
rights principle to bar parties from contradicting their previous conduct); Born (2014), (note 61) 
1472-1473; Edward Baldwin, Mark Kantor and Michael Nolan, “Limits of Enforcement of ICSID 
Awards”, 23 Journal of International Arbitration 1, 18-19 (2006); Zimmermann & Verse, “Case 22: 
Sitting on One’s Rights - Germany”, in Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 515-516; 
Matthias E. Storme “Case 22: Sitting on One’s Rights - Belgium”, in Zimmermann & Whittaker 
(2000), (note 103) 520-521; Talya Uçaryılmaz, “Equitable Estoppel and CISG”, 3(2) Hacettepe 
Hukuk Fak. Derg. 161 (2013), 161–178; ICC Case No. 6294 of 1991, 118 Clunet 1050 (1991), 
1052, available at: https://www.trans-lex.org/206294 (accessed 1 February 2018); ICC Case No. 
12456 of 2004, in Jean-Jacquez Arnaldez, Yves Derains and Dominique Hascher (eds), “Collection 
of ICC Arbitral Awards 2008-2011”, (Kluwer Law International 2013) 826; ICC Interim Award, 
Case No. 10671 of 2000, (2006) Clunet 1417, 1422, available at: https://www.trans-lex.org/210671 
(accessed 1 February 2018). 
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(a) Piercing/Lifting the Corporate Veil 
 
619. It is widely recognised that in exceptional cases, an arbitral tribunal may rely 
on the principle of abuse of rights to disregard the separate legal personality of 
an entity and extend the arbitration clause pursuant to the theory of 
piercing/lifting the corporate veil or the theory of alter ego.940 
 
620. Extension of an arbitration clause on the basis of piercing the corporate veil is 
directly linked to the notion of good administration of justice. The raison 
d’être of piercing the corporate veil is the notions of equity and fairness.941 In 
demystifying the theory of veil piercing, it is said that it is “an equitable 
remedy aimed to address the abuse of rights and to ensure the exercise of good 
faith in relation to a body corporate.”942 Decisions to pierce the corporate veil 
emanate from the dire need to administer justice by attempting to achieve 
fairness and reach a reasonable and equitable outcome.943 
 
621. In this regard, it is well-established that the principle of abuse of rights 
constitutes the juridical basis for the extension of the arbitration clause on the 
basis of piercing/lifting the corporate veil.944 This is the prevailing approach in 
international law and is not peculiar to national laws.  
 
622. On the international law level, abuse of rights is recognised as the basis for 
piercing the corporate veil and is applied by the International Court of Justice 
                                                          
940 Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) 79-80 and 98; Albert Badia, “Piercing the Veil of State Enterprises in 
International Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2014), 49-50. Sébastien Besson, “Piercing 
the Corporate Veil: Back on the Right Track” in Bernard Hanotiau and Eric A. Schwartz (eds.), 
“Multiparty Arbitration”, (ICC Publications 2010), 149; Born (2014), (note 61) 1433. 
941 Henry W. Ballantine, “Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations”, 14 California Law 
Review 12, 19 (1925); Robert B. Thompson, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study”, 76 
Cornell Law Review 1036, 1045 (1991); Richard Ramberg, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: 
Comparing the United States with Sweden”, 17 New England Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 159, 160 (2011); Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Pension v. Andrew 
Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2003); Bridas S.A.P.I.C., et al. v. Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 
420 (5th Cir. 2006). 
942 Badia (2014), (note 940) 49-50. 
943 Ibid, 57; N. C. Ratiu et al. v. D. P. Conway [2005] EWCA Civ. 1302, para. 75.  
944 Badia (2014), (note 940) 49-50; Voser (2016), (note 862) para. 9.79; ICC Case No. 8163 of 1996, 
16(2) ICC Bulletin 78 (2005); Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd., [2013] 2 A.C. 415 17-18 (“Most 
advanced legal systems recognise corporate legal personality while acknowledging some limits to 
its logical implications. In civil law jurisdictions, the juridical basis of the exceptions is generally 
the concept of abuse of rights”). 
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(“ICJ”). In the seminal case of Barcelona Traction,945 the ICJ provided that 
requirements of fairness and equity mandate that the corporate veil may be 
pierced where the legal personality has been used for a purpose other than that 
for which it was originally intended to serve.946 Additionally, the ICJ stipulated 
that piercing or lifting the corporate veil is warranted, inter alia, to prevent the 
misuse of the privileges of the legal personality, in cases of fraud, malfeasance 
and to protect those dealing with the corporate entity.947 
 
623. On the municipal law level, the principle of abuse of rights is of great 
importance in this regard. In Switzerland, the principle is “omnipresent and 
permeates the Swiss legal tradition”.948 Thus, while Switzerland rejects the 
notion of group of companies, piercing the corporate veil (Theorie des 
Durchgriffs) allows courts and arbitral tribunals to lift and disregard the 
sacrosanct corporate veil in cases of abuse of rights.949  
 
624. In ICC Case No. 3879 of 1984, the arbitral tribunal, applying Swiss law, stated 
that “equity, in common with principles of international law, allows the 
corporate veil to be lifted, in order to protect third parties against an abuse 
which would be to their detriment”.950  
 
625. In Alpha S.A. v. Beta,951 the issues of group of companies and piercing the 
corporate veil were discussed. In this case, the arbitral tribunal pinpointed that 
the group of companies doctrine was not recognised under Swiss law.952 
However, the tribunal decided to pierce the corporate veil in order to bind the 
non-signatory parent. In reaching its decision, it noted that:  
 
                                                          
945 Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 39, Judgment of 5 February 1970). 
946 Ibid, para. 56. 
947 Ibid, paras 56-58. 
948 Tobias Zuberbühler, “Non-signatories and the Consensus to Arbitrate”, 26 ASA Bulletin 18, 30-31 
(2008). 
949 Ad-hoc Interim Award, in the case of F.R. German Engineering Company v. Polish buyer, 9 
September 1983, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), 12 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 63, 72 
(1987).  
950 Westland Helicopters Ltd. V. Arab Organization, et al., Interim Award, ICC Case No. 3879 of 
1984, XI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 127, 132 (1986). 
951 Alpha SA v. Beta and Co., State Company of Ruritanian Law, Ad hoc Award of 1991, 2 ASA 
Bulletin 202, discussed in Brekoulakis (2016), (note 919) para. 8.99. 
952 Zuberbühler (2008), (note 948) 25-26. 
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[P]iercing the corporate veil was only warranted 
where (i) a shareholder had total control over an 
entity, evinced by insufficient capitalization, 
confusion in the administration and management, 
and confusion of assets, and (ii) the totality of 
circumstances constituted an abuse of rights.953 
 
626. Swiss decisions pertaining to lifting the corporate veil “are all based on the 
concept of abuse of rights”.954 As stated by Poudret: 
 
Swiss law ignores the notion of a group of 
companies […] and is resolutely committed to the 
legal independence of the company in relation to 
its sole shareholder or of the subsidiary in 
relation to the parent company. It will only be 
disregarded in exceptional circumstances, where 
the fact of resorting to such a subsidiary to 
escape one's obligations would amount to fraud 
or to a patent abuse of right.955 [Emphasis added] 
 
627. The above is consistent with the prevailing principles under other national 
laws. In ICC Case No. 5721,956 the claimant concluded two sub-contracts with 
X Egypt, which claimed to be a subsidiary of X USA. The sub-contracts were 
signed on behalf of X Egypt by Z, the president and a shareholder of X USA. 
Where a dispute arose, the claimant brought arbitration proceedings against X 
Egypt, X USA and Z. X USA and Z challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The 
tribunal found that it had jurisdiction over X USA, given that X Egypt was not 
a separate legal entity, but was merely a branch office. In assessing whether the 
arbitration clause should be extended to Z, the arbitral tribunal looked into 
Egyptian law, as the substantive law, and Swiss law, as the lex arbitri, and held 
that piercing the corporate veil is warranted in cases of abuse of right.957 
                                                          
953 Ibid, 29. 
954 This is based on Article (2) of the Swiss Civil Code; Ad-hoc Interim Award, in the case of F.R. 
German Engineering Company v. Polish buyer, 9 September 1983, 12 Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration 63, 72 (1987); Swiss Federal Tribunal, 24 November 2006, 4C.327/2005; Ad-hoc 
Award of 1991, in the case of SA v. Alpha Beta & Co, 10 ASA Bulletin 202, (1992); Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, 16 October 2003, 22 ASA Bulletin 364, (2004); Meier (2013), (note 150) 1330; Berger & 
Kellerhals (2015), (note 150) para. 571. 
955 Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) 79-80 citing J.F. Poudret, “L’extension de la clause d’arbitrage: 
approches francais ET Suisse”, 122 Journal Droit International (Clunet) 893, 913 (1995). 
956 ICC Case No. 5721 of 1990, in Yves Derains, Sigvard Jarvin and J.J. Arnaldez (eds.), “ICC 
Arbitral Awards 1986-1990” (ICC Publications 1994), 404-405. 
957 Zuberbühler (2008), (note 948) 28-29. 
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628. Similarly, piercing the corporate veil is possible in Germany in cases of 
fundamental abuse and misconduct.958 Accordingly, the Germen Federal 
Supreme Court provided that the doctrinal foundation of piercing the corporate 
veil is “the parent company’s abuse of the corporate form”.959 Equally, French 
law relies on the principle of abuse of rights to pierce the corporate veil.960 
 
(b) Other Explicit and Implicit Applications of Abuse of Rights to 
Preserve the Parties’ Reasonable Expectations 
 
629. The relevance of the principle of abuse of rights in ensuring the good 
administration of arbitral justice is not limited to cases of lifting/piercing the 
corporate veil, but is equally extended to other cases of extension. This is 
primarily the case where the principle operates to safeguard the parties’ 
reasonable expectations.  
 
630. In such cases, arbitral tribunals sometimes explicitly refer to abuse of rights in 
extending the arbitration clause to a non-signatory. In other cases, while 
tribunals do not expressly refer to the principle, the reasoning of the tribunals 
and the rationale of their decisions evince an implicit application of the 
principle rather than any other principle/doctrine. 
 
631. In a recent case decided by the Swiss Federal Tribunal,961 a dispute arose out 
of three contracts concluded between Party A and Party B, member of a group 
of companies. Party B initiated arbitration proceedings against Party A. Party 
A brought counterclaims against Party B and against a non-signatory member 
                                                          
958 ICC Case No. 8163 of 2005, 16 ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 77 (2010); 
Mohamed S. Abdelwahab, “Extension of arbitration agreements to third parties: A never ending 
legal quest through the spatial-temporal continuum”, in Franco Ferrari and Stefan Kröll (eds.), 
“Conflict of Laws in International Arbitration”, (Sellier 2010), 161; Klaus J. Hopt, “Legal Elements 
and Policy Decisions in Regulating Groups of Companies”, in Clive M. Schmitthoff & Frank 
Wooldridge (eds.), “Groups of Companies”, (Sweet & Maxwell 1991), 104. 
959 René Reich-Graefe, “Changing Paradigms: The Liability of Corporate Groups in Germany”, 37 
Connecticut Law Review 785, 802 (2005); Carsten Alting, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in 
American and German Law – Liability of Individuals and Entities: A Comparative View”, 2 Tulsa 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 187, 201 (1995). 
960 William W. Park, “Non-Signatories and the New York Convention”, 2 Dispute Resolution 
International 84, 100 (2008). 
961 Swiss Federal Tribunal, 7 April 2014, 4A_450/2013. 
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of the group, Party C. The arbitral tribunal decided that it does not have 
jurisdiction over the non-signatory party. Upon a challenge of the award before 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal, it partially set aside the award and decided that the 
arbitral tribunal should have accepted jurisdiction over the non-signatory Party 
C. 
 
632. The Swiss Federal Tribunal provided that where there is confusion between the 
activity of the signatory company and the non-signatory company member of 
the group, it may be justified to ignore the legal independence of the different 
entities, not necessarily based on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, but 
to preserve the legitimate expectations of third parties who relied on the 
appearance of the non-signatory and believed that the non-signatory is a party 
to the contract and the arbitration agreement enshrined therein.962 
 
633. In partially setting aside the arbitral award, the Swiss Federal Tribunal invoked 
Article (2) of the Swiss Civil Code which enshrines the principle of good faith 
and the prohibition against abuse of rights. It provided that given the conduct 
of the signatory member and the non-signatory member of the group, Party A 
could have relied in good faith that the non-signatory was a genuine party. 
Additionally, the relevant members of the group, and specifically the non-
signatory member should have extinguished any doubt and made it crystal 
clear that the non-signatory did not wish to become a party to the agreement. A 
contrario, the non-signatory intervened in the performance of the contract and 
thus contributed to the confusion of Party A. The Court decided that the 
arbitral tribunal should have extended the arbitration agreement to the non-
signatory.963 
 
634. This is a clear manifestation of the abuse of rights principle.964 The court 
decided that extension of the arbitration clause is warranted to protect the 
legitimate and reasonable expectations of the party, which have been created 
as a result of the non-signatory’s conduct, and that the law should not protect 
                                                          
962 Ibid, grounds 3.2 and 3.5.5.1. 
963 Ibid. 
964 Voser (2016), (note 862) paras 9.73-9.74 and 9.80-9.81. 
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the abusive inconsistent conduct of the non-signatory to the detriment of the 
counter party.  
 
635. This case is of particular relevance as it is one of the few cases where the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal decided to partially set aside an arbitral award. The 
case represents an abuse of rights analysis in cases not related to piercing of 
the corporate veil. Scholars note that the aforementioned case reflects a novel 
application of abuse of rights in relation to non-signatories. Precisely, it is 
submitted that in considering the question of extension of the arbitration 
clause, abuse of rights may be established to safeguard the reasonable 
expectations of the party, particularly if the non-signatory creates an 
appearance of being bound and/or “based on the creation of confusion 
between a parent and its daughter companies”.965 
 
636. On a different note, one posits that the essence of abuse of rights has been 
implicitly applied in other cases of extension. This is particularly the case in 
relation to cases falling within the ambit of the group of companies doctrine. A 
review of the conditions sine qua non of the group of companies doctrine, and 
how arbitrators apply it reveal that the main element justifying extension is not 
‘implied consent’, but rather the generation of an expectation of the party 
requesting the extension and assessing the reasonableness of such an 
expectation. This greatly resembles the role and function of abuse of rights as 
evidenced from the Swiss case discussed above. In this regard, compelling a 
non-signatory to arbitrate based on its contested or lacking consent is want of 
legal reasoning, and a fallacy that should not be maintained as it does not 
                                                          
965 Ibid; Wilske, Shore & Ahrens (2006), (note 152) 3. 
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advance the good administration of justice.966 This is succinctly illustrated in 
the following paragraphs. 
 
637. Arbitral tribunals have long used the ‘group of companies’ doctrine as an 
indirect criterion for vindicating consent and establishing jurisdiction.967 
However, it was not before the leading case of Dow Chemical v. Isover-Saint-
Gobain968 that established the doctrine, carefully addressed its scope and the 
necessary conditions for its application.969 The Dow Chemical award 
demonstrates that the theoretical foundation of the doctrine is based on the lex 
mercatoria and usages of international trade.970 Moreover, it appears that the 
operation of the doctrine is warranted in cases where: (a) the signatory and the 
non-signatory constitute one economic reality (une realité économique 
unique); are parts of the same group;971 (b) the factual matrix of the case 
manifests an active role by the non-signatory third party in the negotiation, 
                                                          
966 Parties’ intention to arbitrate should only be upheld where there is a “clear and unmistakable intent 
by [it] to arbitrate”. Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corporation, 404 F. 3d 657 (2nd Cir. 2005); Park 
(2008), (note 960) 86. In some cases, the non-signatory may not even be aware of the existence of 
the arbitration clause. Thus, it is questionable how one can consent to an unknown fact. Brekoulakis 
(2010), (note 911) para. 6.28. Some case law which rely on the non-signatory’s active involvement 
in the performance of the contract as basis for extension reveal that two presumptions emanate from 
the active involvement of the non-signatory: a presumption that the non-signatory is aware of the 
arbitration clause, and a presumption of acceptance thereof. Both presumptions lack sound legal 
basis, fail to ascertain the existence of the parties’ consent and their mutual intention to include the 
non-signatory in the arbitration process, and equally fail to ascertain the non-signatory’s consent to 
be joined in the arbitration proceedings. Korsnas Marma v. Durand-Auzias, Review of Arbitration 
(1989); and Court of Cassation, Alcatel Business Systems, Alcatel Micro Electronics and AGF v. 
Amkor Technology et al, 11 JCP I 168, (2007), cited in Poudret & Besson (2007) (note 5) para. 256; 
Andrea M. Steingruber, “Consent in International Arbitration”, (Oxford University Press 2012), 
paras 9.40-9.42. 
967 Brekoulakis (2010), (note 911) para. 5.04. Whilst the principle gained recognition in France, it has 
been challenged and set aside, either explicitly or implicitly, by other leading arbitration 
jurisdictions such as England, Switzerland and the USA: Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, et al., 
“Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration”, (Fifth Edition), (Oxford University Press 2009), 
102; Born (2014), (note 61) 1431; Sarita Patil Woolhouse, “Group pf Companies Doctrine and 
English Arbitration Law”, 20 Arbitration International 435, 441 (2004). 
968 ICC Case No. 4131 of 1982, Interim Award in Dow Chemical v. Isover-Saint-Gobain, IX 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 131, (1984). 
969 Pietro Ferrario, “The Group of Companies Doctrine in International Commercial Arbitration: Is 
There any Reason for this Doctrine to Exist?” 26 Journal of International Arbitration 647, 663 
(2009). 
970 ICC Case No. 4131 of 1982, Dow Chemical v. Isover-Saint-Gobain, IX Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration 131, 133-134 (1984). 
971 The more significant the degree of control, financially or managerially, the more inclined a tribunal 
will be to exercise jurisdiction. ICC Case No. 5894 of 1991; ICC Case No. 7155 of 1993; ICC Case 
No. 8910 of 1998; ICC Case No. 6000 of 1988, discussed in Brekoulakis (2010), (note 911) 154-
155; Kis France SA, Kis Photo Industrie SA v. SA Société Générale, Sogelease Pacifique SA and 
others, Cour d’ Appel, Paris, 31 October 1989, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), XVI Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 145 (1991). 
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conclusion, performance and/or termination of the contract;972 and where (c) 
the common intention of the parties warrant the extension of the arbitration 
clause.973  
 
638. The presumed parties’ common intention, and the non-signatory’s consent, in 
the context of the group of companies is established where two essential 
elements are present: if: (a) the party dealing with the group genuinely 
believed that the non-signatory is a party to the agreement (the subjective 
element); and (b) that its belief is justified and reasonable. The latter pertains to 
the non-signatory’s appearance as a genuine party (the objective element), 
evidenced through the corporate structure of the group, its relation to the non-
signatory, and the latter’s active involvement in the negotiation, execution 
and/or termination of the contract.974 
 
639. Thus, it seems peculiar to infer, from the above, the non-signatory’s consent, 
or the parties’ common intention. Particularly, it is blatant that all conditions 
relate, directly or indirectly, to the intention of the party requesting the 
extension and his/her expectations. Elements that seem, prima facie, pertaining 
to the group and the non-signatory entity, are actually used to determine, 
objectively, whether the party dealing with the group reasonably believed that 
the non-signatory member of the group is a party to the contract including the 
arbitration clause.  
                                                          
972 John Gaffney, “The Group of Companies Doctrine and the Law Applicable To The Arbitration 
Agreement”, 19 Mealy’s International Arbitration Report 1, 2 (2004); Wilske, Shore & Ahrens 
(2006), (note 152) 74; Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 912) 284-285; Serge Gravel and Patricia 
Peterson, “French Law and Arbitration Clauses – Distinguishing Scope from Validity: Comment on 
ICC Case No. 6519 Final Award”, 37 McGill Law Journal 510, 531 (1992); Kis France SA, Kis 
Photo Industrie SA v. SA Société Générale, Sogelease Pacifique SA and others, Cour d’ Appel, 
Paris, 31 October 1989, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), XVI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
145, 147 (1991). 
973 ICC Case No. 4131 of 1982, Dow Chemical v. Isover-Saint-Gobain, IX Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration 131, 136 (1984); Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 912) 283-285, (“Clearly, however, it 
is not so much the existence of a group that results in the various companies of the group being 
bound by the agreement signed by only one of them, but rather the fact that such was the true 
intention of the parties […] The existence of the parties’ consent is thus clearly the key issue”); 
Born (2014), (note 61) 1447-1148, (“it is those intentions, as reflected in the terms of the parties’ 
agreements, that are the cornerstone of the group of companies doctrine”). 
974 ICC Case No. 4131 of 1982, Dow Chemical v. Isover-Saint-Gobain, IX Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration 131, 134-135 (1984); Brekoulakis (2010), (note 911) paras 5.47-5.52; Youssef (2010), 
(note 916) 81; Philipp Habegger, “Arbitration and Groups of Companies – The Swiss Practice”, 3 
European Business Organization Law Review 517, 535 (2002). 
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640. This proposition is further confirmed by the fact that tribunals often extend the 
arbitration clause to the non-signatory, based on ‘the common intention of the 
parties’, where the conduct of the non-signatory has confused the counter 
party as to who is the genuine party to the agreement.975 
 
641. Such confusion may be a result of the non-signatory’s sheer negligence and 
their lack of awareness about the repercussions thereof. Confusion may even 
be deliberately induced in mala fide.976 In both cases, justifying the extension 
of the arbitration clause based on the intention of the non-signatory or its 
consent seems hollow and vacuous in content. 
 
642. Accordingly, it is submitted that the above indices constitute a sound basis for 
establishing an expectation, of the party requesting the extension of the 
arbitration clause, and assessing its reasonableness.977 The latter being 
objectively examined based on the structure of the group, its relation to the 
non-signatory member, and the latter’s conduct throughout the contractual 
                                                          
975 As stipulated by Professor Brekoulakis, “the tribunal will examine the conduct and behaviour of 
the whole group that led the other party to legitimately believe that the non-signatory member of 
the group was a genuine party to the contract. Here, tribunals will focus on the conduct of the non-
signatory member of the group to determine whether it adopted the behaviour of a ‘genuine party’ 
that confused and misled the co-contractor” Brekoulakis (2010), (note 911) para. 5.52; ICC Case 
No. 5730 of 1988, 117 Journal du Droit, (1990), 1029 cited in Redfern & Hunter (2009), (note 967) 
101; Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) 44-45; ICC Case No. 6000 of 1988 and ICC Case No. 5103 of 
1988, discussed in Brekoulakis (2010), (note 911) 155-156. The Egyptian Court of Cassation held 
that “[t]he fact that one of the parties to the arbitration is a company within a group of companies 
with one parent contributing in its capital is not proof that the latter is vested with the contractual 
obligations entered into by the former, which include an arbitration agreement unless it was proven 
that it had taken part in their execution or created confusion regarding the party vested with the 
obligations where its own will is mixed with the will of the other company”. Egyptian Court of 
Cassation, Hearing held on 22 June 2004, Challenges No. 4729 and 4730, Judicial Year 72. 
976 Brekoulakis (2010), (note 911) paras 5.52-5.57. 
977 Youssef (2010), (note 916) 81, (providing that a prudent and logical analysis of the group of 
companies case law reveals that concepts such as ‘legitimate expectations’ and ‘protection of 
appearances’ are relevant to establish jurisdiction over non-signatories. 
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matrix of the case.978 
 
643. In this regard, one asserts that the argument advocating that examining the 
related parties’ conduct manifests their common intention is ‘ignoratio 
elenchi’: it does not evince the parties’ presumed common intention, but may 
determine if there is an abuse of rights. 
 
644. The examination of the factual matrix of the case and the relevant parties’ 
conduct, including that of the non-signatory, shall be undertaken to frustrate 
one’s attempt to contradict its previous conduct to the detriment of another and 
to “correct mistaken subjective assumptions or understandings at the time of 
contracting”.979 Gary Born acknowledged the relevance of abuse of rights and 
provided that in such circumstances the doctrine of group of companies can be 
applied in a manner similar to “abuse of right, relying on principles of good 
faith, equity and objective intent to supplement or correct subjective intentions 
of the parties to an arbitration agreement”.980 
 
645. In conclusion, it appears that the principle of abuse of rights is vital in the 
context of extension of an arbitration clause to ensure the good administration 
of arbitral justice. The principle is explicitly endorsed in cases of 
piercing/lifting the corporate veil and in other cases to safeguard the parties’ 
reasonable expectations and to maintain the fairness of the proceedings. 
Finally, while arbitral tribunals often extend an arbitration clause to a non-
signatory on grounds of the group of companies doctrine by relying on the 
                                                          
978 Brekoulakis (2010), (note 911) para. 5.47; Ferrario (2009), (note 969) 651; ICC Case No. 11405 of 
2001, (unpublished), cited in Hanotiau (2005), (note 151) 77-78. In ICC Case No. 1160 of 2002, the 
tribunal extended the arbitration clause by inferring consent from the corporate group structure and 
the active involvement of the non-signatory. It is worth noting that the non-signatory interfered in 
the contractual relationship prior to the conclusion of the contract, yet decided not to sign it, at the 
time of concluding the contract. This makes the rebuttable presumption that it did not consent to be 
a party or to be compelled to arbitrate even stronger, which further fortifies that extension may not 
be based on the non-signatory’s consent. However, it is submitted that given the parent company’s 
conduct, the counter party may have reasonably inferred that he is dealing with one contractual unit, 
and believed the non-signatory is indeed a party. Thus, it would be abusive to allow the non-
signatory to hide behind the cloak of its separate legal personality and certainly inequitable to 
tolerate its inconsistent conduct that is contrary to the legitimate expectations of the counter party. 
ICC Case No. 11160 of 2002, (2005) 16(2) ICC Bulletin 99, cited in Brekoulakis (2010), (note 911) 
paras 5.28-5.29. 
979 Born (2014), (note 61) 1455. 
980 Ibid. 
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parties’ common intention, arbitrators’ decisions appear to reveal that the main 
enquiry is the existence of an expectation to one of the parties, and assessing 
the reasonableness of such an expectation, which greatly resembles the 




646. It would be a fallacy to claim that the principle of abuse of rights is alien or 
foreign to the law and practice of international arbitration. As evident from the 
above discussion, the principle is omnipresent. While the principle is not 
novel, its application in international arbitration is slowly gaining momentum 
given arbitrators’ desire to search for genuine justice and to ensure the good 
administration of arbitral justice. As provided by one arbitral tribunal:  
 
The principle [abuse of right] is old; one need 
only recall Cicero’s summum jus, summa injuria. 
To say that the blind application of a rule may 
lead to iniquitous results is to recognise that the 
search for justice would fail if the law could do no 
more than validate relative positions of strength, 
or consolidate the status quo indefinitely. Thus, 
the exercise of a particular right may be inhibited 
if it would abase the law.981 
 
647. Arbitral tribunals have effectively relied on abuse of rights to tackle different 
forms of abuse to ensure the good administration of justice. It provides 
arbitrators with a flexible tool to tackle various forms of procedural 
misconduct. A discussion of its application to different legal problems 
demonstrates its indispensability to international arbitration due to the interests 
that it advances.  
 
648. It is acknowledged that there are classic tools and existing legal rules at the 
disposal of arbitrators that can be utilised to administer arbitral justice. For 
example, treaties may include provisions regarding denial of benefits for 
                                                          
981 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Final Award of 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11, 92 (2000). 
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entities that have no material economic activity.982 Article 41(5) of ICSID and 
Article (39) of the new Rules of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, which are 
manifestations of the abuse of rights principle,983 may limit claims that lack 
legal merit and abusive claims/requests.984 Provisions in arbitration 
statutes/rules may prevent inordinate delay and tactics in arbitration.985 Arbitral 
tribunals may answer a party’s abusive conduct by allocating the costs.986 The 
doctrines of lis pendens and res judicata could apply to limit abusive parallel 
or subsequent proceedings.987 In such cases, a stand-alone general principle of 
abuse of rights may appear superfluous. However, although these sanctions 
may comprise palliative tools, practice proves that they only tackle certain 
forms of abuse and remain largely inadequate to compensate/remedy the 
aggrieved party.  
 
649. Whilst arbitrators often award and allocate costs against parties who engage in 
abusive conduct,988 it is generally recognised that this practice fails to deter 
parties and their legal counsel from abusing their rights and engaging in 
procedural misconduct.989 
 
                                                          
982 Lee (2015), (note 788) 366-367; Pacific Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, dated 1 June 2012. 
983 Eric de Brabandere, “The ICSID Rule on Early Dismissal of Unmeritorious Investment Treaty 
Claims: Preserving the Integrity of ICSID Arbitration”, 9 Manchester Journal of International 
Economic Law 23, 24 (2012); Markert (2011), (note 715) 234-235. 
984 Yunus Emre Akbaba, “Summary Procedure in the SCC Arbitration Rules of 2017: Shifting the 
Paradigm of Preliminary Objections in International Arbitration”, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 1 
February 2017, available at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/02/01/summary-procedure-in-
the-scc-arbitration-rules-of-2017-shifting-the-paradigm-of-preliminary-objections-in-international-
arbitration/ (accessed 1 February 2018). 
985 Section (41) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996. 
986 Jenny Power and Christian Konrad, “Costs in International Commercial Arbitration – A 
Comparative Overview of Civil and Common Law Doctrines”, in Gerold Zeiler, Irene Welser et al. 
(eds.), “Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 2007”, (Manz’sche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung 
2007), 261 et seq; Welser (2014), (note 743) 165; Markert (2011), (note 715) 241; Park (2006), 
(note 769), 454. 
987 August Reinisch, “The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural Tools to 
Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes”, 3 Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 37 (2004).  
988 For example Phoenix Action v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award dated 15 
April 2009, para. 152; Cementownia S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, 
Award dated 17 September 2009, para. 171. 
989 Price & Wilske (2007), (note 754) 184; Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 27; Redfern, Hunter et al. 
(2004), (note 51) 244. 
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650. It is true that the doctrine of lis pendens may be applied to preclude the risks 
associated with parallel arbitral proceedings.990 For this doctrine to apply, the 
parties must be the same, the relief sought must be identical, and the facts and 
legal grounds must be the same.991 The application of lis pendens in 
international arbitration is controversial.992 Moreover, given the rigid 
requirements of the ‘triple identity’ test, it is submitted that it fails to remedy 
the enigmas associated with parallel proceedings, particularly in cases where 
the parties, causes of action and relief sought are not identical.993 The 
inadequacy of lis pendens to tackle abuse of rights is reflected exempli gratia 
in the CME and Lauder cases discussed above.994 One ventures that endorsing 
a general principle of abuse of rights comprises a more comprehensive and 
effective principle to deal with abusive conduct, including issues of parallel 
proceedings.995 
 
651. Similarly, whilst the doctrine of res judicata operates to prevent the specific 
form of abuse associated with subsequent proceedings, the triple identity test 
mentioned above must be met.996 It is thus acknowledged that the prevalent997 
strict application of the triple identity test fails to remedy manifest abuse of 
                                                          
990 Cremades & Madalena (2008), (note 845) 509; Pierre Mayer, “Conflicting Decisions in 
International Commercial Arbitration”, 4 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 407, 413 
(2013). 
991 Miguel Temboury Redondo, “Preliminary Judgments, Lis Pendens and Res Judicata in Arbitration 
Proceedings”, in M. A. Fernandez-Ballesteros and David Arias (eds), “Liber Amicorum Bernardo 
Cremades”, (La Ley 2010), 1138-1139; Cremades & Madalena (2008), (note 845) 509-510. 
992 Born (2014), (note 61) 3793. 
993 August Reinisch, “International Courts and Tribunals, Multiple Jurisdictions” in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (Oxford University Press 2008), para. 26; International 
Law Association, “Final Report on Lis Pendens and Arbitration”, (Toronto Conference 2006), para. 
5.6, whereby a broader definition of the triple identity test was endorsed. 
994 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Award of 3 
September 2001, para. 177. 
995 Cremades & Madalena (2008), (note 845) 538; McLachlan (2009), (note 61) 420-432 (providing 
that procedural formalities associated with the triple identity test may lead to an abuse of process). 
996 Wehland (2013), (note 866) para. 6.113; Wasteful Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Decision dated 26 June 2002, para. 39; Malicorp Limited v. The 
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Award dated 7 February 2011, para. 103; ICC 
Case No. 6363 of 1991, XVII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 186, 198 (1992). 
997 Norah Gallagher, “Parallel Proceedings, Res Judicata and Lis Pendens: Problems and Possible 
Solutions”, in Julian D.M. Lew and Loukas A. Mistelis (eds), “Pervasive Problems in International 
Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2006), 349; Wehland (2013), (note 866) para. 6.117; 
Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, “International Investment 
Arbitration: Substantive Principles”, (Oxford University Press 2010), 122-125. 
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rights in this regard.998 The application of the principle of abuse of rights is 
more effective as it may remedy any abuse pertaining to subsequent 
proceedings and its application does not rely on satisfying any rigid or formal 
requirements.999 
 
652. Given that a true abuse of rights does not breach any hard legal rule, “it cannot 
be tackled by the application of classic legal tools”.1000 As the principle’s 
operation presumes that the act is consistent with black letter law, it is an 
adequate remedy to tackle all forms of abuse that are not necessarily in breach 
of hard laws/rules. The importance of endorsing a general principle of abuse of 
rights to ensure the good administration of justice is not only appealing owing 
to its comprehensiveness and its ability to remedy forms of abuse that other 
rules fail to remedy. Its potency equally stems from the fact that it is a general 
principle that can equally remedy any form of abuse that is not currently 
regulated by a specific rule:1001  
 
The principle also plays a role in the promotion 
of legal change. In an international society that 
itself continues to experience rapid and far-
reaching change, longstanding general principles 
of law such as abuse of rights help to extend legal 
controls to previously unregulated areas, and to 
fill new gaps as they appear. As international 
lawyers rush forward to meet the challenges of 
the twenty-first century, they would be wise not to 
leave abuse of rights, one of their most basic 
tools, behind.1002 
 
653. Thus, a principle of abuse of rights is of paramount importance to ensure the 
good administration of arbitral justice. While it may crystallise its most potent 
manifestations in various principles and rules to tackle specific forms of abuse, 
                                                          
998 Dimsey (2008), (note 879) 96; Bernardo M. Cremades, “Introduction”, in Bernardo M. Cremades 
and Julian D.M. Lew, “Parallel State and Arbitral Procedures in International Arbitration”, (ICC 
Publications 2005), 10; Wehland (2013), (note 866) paras 6.114-6.115. 
999 Shany (2003), (note 61) 259; McLachlan (2009), (note 61) 420-432; Sheppard (2005), (note 62) 
235. 
1000 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 18. 
1001 Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 765-767. 
1002 Byers (2002), (note 10) 431. 
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654. Upon acknowledging the importance of abuse of rights in international 
arbitration, it becomes imperative to discern the nature and function of abuse 
of rights. Thus, in this chapter, one endeavours to first discern the legal basis 
of abuse of rights in international arbitration. In other words, if arbitrators 
choose to rely on abuse of rights to enforce or refuse the recognition of a given 
right, do they apply it as a general principle of arbitration law or only as part of 
the applicable substantive and/or procedural law?  
 
655. Secondly, if one acknowledges the transnational nature of abuse of rights and 
the generality of its application, it becomes imperative to elucidate how the 
principle operates in the context of international arbitration; is its application 
restricted to cases where it is part of the applicable substantive 
national/transnational law; or is it regarded as a principle of transnational 
public policy? 
 
656. Many transnational norms and standards that became omnipresent in 
international legal doctrine and practice are derived from municipal norms and 
private-law principles.1003 A question raised in this regard is whether the 
principle of abuse of rights elevates to a transnational principle. 
 
657. In order to ascertain the transnational nature of the abuse of rights principle, 
and whether it comprises a general principle of law, this chapter shall adopt the 
methodology used in previous chapters, and that is often relied upon in 
ascertaining general principles of law. In this regard, the criterion mostly used 
to identify general principles of law, acknowledged and accepted in 
                                                          
1003 Ellis (2011), (note 64) 950; Harold C. Gutteridge, “Comparative Law and The Law of Nations”, 
21 British Year Book of International Law 1, 1-2 (1944); Gaillard (2011), (note 66) 162. 
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jurisprudence, is examining the acknowledgment of the principle in different 
families of legal systems. 
 
658. Moreover, one shall equally shed light on the perception of the principle of 
abuse of rights as acknowledged by prominent scholars; as reflected in 
international legal instruments such as uniform laws; and as applied by arbitral 
tribunals.1004 This methodology is particularly used in the arena of 
international arbitration: “in the arbitration context, the best indication of the 
acceptance of a proposition as a general principle is its frequent invocation by 
arbitral tribunals and its recognition by scholars”.1005 
 
659. The analysis of the above shall be attained by examining arbitration doctrine 
and practice in commercial and investment arbitration. However, emphasis 
may be given to investment arbitration cases solely for the existence of 
material to that effect. It is submitted that any conclusion reached in relation to 
the nature of the principle should extend to, and apply in, international 
commercial arbitration. 
 
660. Prior to discussing the nature of abuse of rights and how it operates as a 
general principle, it is necessary to elaborate on the meaning of a principle in 
the context of general principles of law. 
 
II. THE DEFINITION OF A PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
 
661. In deciding cases, decision makers may resort to, and rely on, different 
standards. Some of these function as rules, while others operate as principles. 
In his seminal work entitled ‘Taking Rights Seriously’, Ronald Dworkin noted 
that a principle is:  
 
                                                          
1004 Note (1988), (note 68) 1824-1825. 
1005 Ibid. 
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[A] standard that is to be observed, not because it 
will advance or secure an economic, political, or 
social situation deemed desirable, but because it 
is a requirement of justice or fairness or some 
other dimension of morality.1006 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
662. To illustrate the meaning of principles, Dworkin referred to the following 
example: In the case of Rigs v. Palmer,1007 an heir named in a will murdered 
his grandfather for the purpose of receiving the inheritance. The court first 
acknowledged that if the provisions of the law regulating the making and effect 
of wills are interpreted in a strict manner, the murderer should receive the 
property. However, the court refused to recognise the right to inherit 
established by the statute and relied on some fundamental legal principles. The 
court provided that:  
 
[A]ll laws as well as all contracts may be 
controlled in their operation and effect by 
general, fundamental maxims of the common law. 
No one shall be permitted to profit by his own 
fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or 
to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to 
acquire property by his own crime.1008 
 
663. This case is of particular importance as it not only demonstrates the meaning 
of principles, but may equally be used to clarify the nature and function of 
abuse of rights as a legal principle. The case fortified that a right conferred by 
a legal instrument such as a statute or a contract (right to inherit) is not 
absolute and does not apply irrespective of the circumstances. It may be 
controlled or modified in light of other broader principles. By considering the 
conduct of the heir, the court rightly found that giving effect to the right in 
question would be inequitable. 
 
664. A prudent reading of the above entails that a principle often involves a broad 
standard, required by moral norms or other considerations of fairness and 
                                                          
1006 Ronald Dworkin, “Taking Rights Seriously”, (Bloomsbury 2013), 39. 
1007 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889), referred to in Dworkin (2013), (note 1006) 
39. 
1008 Ibid. 
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justice, and that it may operate to control or modify a given rule.1009 This 
greatly resembles the nature and function of abuse of rights: a broad principle 
that has a remedial function1010 formed on moral grounds,1011 as well as on 
considerations of justice and fairness.1012 It is a principle that operates as a 
corrective mechanism to soften and ameliorate the rigidity of strict legal 
rules.1013 It is particularly interesting to note that the principles referred to in 
the mentioned case partially demonstrate manifestations of the abuse of rights 
principle. Thus, the principle that ‘no one shall be permitted to profit or take 
advantage of his own wrong’ is often perceived as an application of abuse of 
rights.1014 
 
665. In drawing a line of demarcation between legal rules and principles, it is 
rightly noted that unlike rules, a principle does not mandate reaching a 
particular decision but is to be merely considered in light of other competing 
principles.1015 In case of conflicting principles or interests, it is resolved by 
choosing the outcome “supported by the principles that have the greatest 
aggregate weight”.1016 As expressed by Dworkin: 
 
[I]t [a principle] states a reason that argues in 
one direction, but does not necessitate a 
particular decision […] There may be other 
principles or policies arguing in the other 
direction […] If so, our principle may not prevail, 
but that does not mean that it is not a principle of 
our legal system, because in the next case, when 
                                                          
1009 Dworkin (2013), (note 1006) 39. 
1010 Voyame, Cottier and Rocha (1990), (note 26) 48. 
1011 James B. Ames, “Law and Morals”, 23 Harvard Law Review 97, 110 (1910); Gutteridge (1935), 
(note 18) 22; the case of Colmar, 2 May 1855, D.P. 1856.2.9, 10, cited in Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 
30) 965; Gordley (2011), (note 31) 34; Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. International Harvester Co., 368 
So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979). 
1012 Cueto-Rua (1975), (note 30) 996-997; Trushinger v. Pak, 513 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1987); 
Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. 521 So. 2d 481 (La. 1988); Ouachita National Bank in 
Monroe v. Palowsky, 554 So. 2d 108 (La. 1989); Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220 (La. 1989); 
Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. Hammons, 540 So. 2d 461 (La. 1989). 
1013 Yiannopoulos (1994), (note 29) 1195. 
1014 Duarte G. Henriques, “Pathological Arbitration Clauses, Good Faith and the Protection of 
Legitimate Expectations”, 31 Arbitration International 349, 357 (2015). 
1015 Dworkin (2013), (note 1006) 42; Scott J. Shapiro, “The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide 
for the Perplexed”, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 77 
(2007), 9. 
1016 Scott J. Shapiro, “The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed”, Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 77 (2007), 9. 
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these contravening considerations are absent or 
less weighty, the principle may be decisive. All 
that is meant, when we say that a particular 
principle is a principle of our law, is that the 
principle is one which officials must take into 
account, if it is relevant, as a consideration 
inclining in one direction or another.1017 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
666. This depiction of principles equally confirms and fortifies the nature and 
function of abuse of rights. As previously mentioned, in determining if there is 
an abuse of right, courts/arbitrators are to utilise the balancing factor to 
carefully weigh the competing interests. While some of the mentioned interests 
and/or principles may direct decision makers in one direction, other competing 
interests and principles may prevail in other cases, given the different 
circumstances. 
 
667. Having succinctly defined principles, it is important to discuss the meaning of 
general principles of law. As a term of art, general principles of law may have 
different meanings and functions.  
 
668. General principles of law may be used, specifically in a transnational context, 
to denote those principles that are rooted in, and accepted by, different legal 
systems. In this regard, general principles of law function as a conflict of laws 
method: the non-selection method of conflict of laws or the conflict avoidance 
method,1018 and reflect principles that are generally acknowledged by different 
states. Unlike the lex mercatoria, which are generated by the community of 
merchants, general principles of law pertain to principles that originate from, 
and exist in, national legal systems, and are identified by a comparative law 
analysis.1019 
 
669. General principles of law may be also viewed as a source of law. This is 
specifically the case in civil legal systems. Given that case law only enjoys 
persuasive authority, general principles of law may be used to create legal rules 
                                                          
1017 Dworkin (2013), (note 1006) 42. 
1018 De Ly (1992), (note 578) paras 295 and 476. 
1019 Gaillard (2011), (note 66) 162. 
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in order to fill a lacuna that exists in statutes and customs.1020 Others advocate 
that general principles of law constitute guiding principles rather than a source 
of law as they provide a basis for the establishment of specific legal rules.1021 It 
appears that general principles of law function in a manner that develop legal 
systems by constantly filling gaps that appear in the decision-making 
process.1022 
 
670. Finally, these principles have an equally important role in international law. 
Article (38) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to general 
principles of law as a source for adjudication before the court. These principles 
usually denote principles and standards that are derived from the municipal 
laws of states.1023 James Crawford referred to them as “principles of municipal 
jurisprudence, in particular of private law, in so far as they are applicable to 
relations of States”.1024 
 
III. ABUSE OF RIGHTS: A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
671. Owing to the sacrosanct principle of party autonomy in international 
arbitration, arbitral tribunals generally honour the choice of law chosen by the 
parties.1025 If parties fail to designate the law to govern the dispute, arbitrators 
                                                          
1020 De Ly (1992), (note 578) 194. 
1021 Ibid, 194. 
1022 Ibid, 194-195. 
1023 Ellis (2011), (note 64) 954-955, citing Verdross, “Les principes généraux du droit dans la 
jurisprudence internationale”, III RCADI 195, 204 (1935); De Ly (1992), (note 578) 199 (providing 
that the majority of scholars take a comparative view and hold that Article (38) refers to principles 
that exist in national legal systems). 
1024 James Crawford, “Public International Law”, (Oxford University Press 2012), 34-35; Robert 
Jennings and Arthur Watts, “Oppenheim’s International Law”, (Ninth Edition), (Volume 1), 
(Oxford University Press 1992) 29; Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, Nigel Blackaby and Constantine 
Partasides, “Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration”, (Sixth Edition), (Oxford University 
Press 2015), para. 3.134. 
1025 Lew, Mistelis & Kröll (2003), (note 690) 417-418; Note (1988), (note 68) 1817; Partial Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility in ICC Case No. 6474 of 1992, XXV Yearbook of Commercial 
Arbitration 278, 282 (2000); Interim Awards and Final Award of 1983, 1984 and 1986 in ICC Case 
No. 4145 of 1983, XXI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 97, 100 (1987). 
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have to ascertain the applicable rules and/or principles.1026 Rather than 
designating a national substantive law, parties often choose, or the arbitral 
tribunal may decide,1027 to apply transnational substantive standards or 
principles to govern their relationship.1028 These a-national principles offer 
parties the opportunity to subject their contractual relationship to standards that 
are independent of the particularities of any national legal system and take into 
consideration the particular needs of international commerce.1029 
 
672. The possible application of general principles of law, or other a-national rules 
of law, is fortified by the reference to “rules of law” that can be found in many 
modern arbitration statutes and rules.1030 Moreover, it is of particular interest to 
mention that the ILA adopted a resolution in 1992 noting that awards based on 
transnational rules and principles, such as general principles of law, are 
enforceable.1031  
 
                                                          
1026 Linda Silberman and Franco Ferrari, “Getting to the Law Applicable to the Merits in International 
Arbitration and the Consequences of Getting it Wrong”, in Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kroll (eds), 
“Conflict of Laws in International Arbitration”, (Sellier 2011), 264. 
1027 Arbitration Chamber of Paris, Case No. 9246 of 1996, XXII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
28, 31 (1997), (where the parties failed to choose an applicable law, and the arbitral tribunal applied 
the lex mercatoria); ICC Case No. 6500 of 1992, 119 Journal du Droit International 1015 (1992), 
(noting that arbitral tribunals may resort to transnational rules where the connecting factors are not 
capable of being clearly identified) referred to in Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 912) 879-880. 
1028 Lew, Mistelis & Kröll (2003), (note 690) 448-449 and 451; Michael Mustill, “The New Lex 
Mercatoria: The Next Twenty-five Years”, 4 Arbitration International 86, 98 (1988); Note (1988), 
(note 68) 1819. 
1029 ICC Case No. 8385 of 1995, 124 Clunet 1015, 1061-1066 (1997), available: https://www.trans-
lex.org/11 (accessed 1 February 2018). 
1030 Lew, Mistelis & Kröll (2003), (note 690) 452; Born (2014), (note 61) 2662; Article (28) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law; Article (27) of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce of 2017; Article 
(21) of the ICC Arbitration Rules of 2012; Article (31) of the ICDR Arbitration Rules of 2014; 
Article (35.1) of the Rules of the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre of 2013; Article 
(39.2) of the Egyptian Arbitration law No. 27 of 1994; Article (1054) of the Netherlands Code of 
Civil Procedure of 1986; Article (187.1) of the Swiss Private International Law allows the parties to 
choose a national substantive law or other rules of law. This may be construed to recognise the 
application of general principles of law, lex mercatoria or uniform international instruments such as 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts; Ole Lando, “The Lex Mercatoria 
in International Commercial Arbitration”, 34 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 747, 
748 (1985); ICC Case No. 3380 of 1980, VII Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 116 (1982); ICC 
Case No. 3131 of 1979, IX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 109, 110 (1984) (applying lex 
mercatoria); ICC Case 3540 of 1980, VII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 124, 128 (1982), 
(applying lex mercatoria). 
1031 Lew, Mistelis & Kröll (2003), (note 690) 455. 
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673. The recognition and application of general principles of law is neither peculiar 
to, nor inconsistent with, international arbitral case law.1032 Given that these 
principles represent an epitome of existing transnational contract law,1033 there 
are reported cases where arbitrators have applied these principles even without 
an express reference to them by the parties.1034 The view that arbitrators may 
resort to general principles of law where parties fail to designate an applicable 
law is not subject to consensus in arbitration doctrine.1035 
 
674. Ascertaining a new general principle of law necessitates examining the 
existence of the principle in question in different legal systems of the world. 
That said, is it necessary that the principle be recognised in all legal systems?  
 
675. Such an overly restrictive approach is neither necessary nor practical, as it 
hinders the arbitrator’s ability to resort to a principle found in private law.1036 
Thus, the method adopted should be ascertaining the prevailing trend within 
national laws, rather than establish unanimous recognition.1037 To that effect 
Gutteridge noted:  
 
It would seem that the more generous of these 
criteria is to be preferred because to insist on 
precise similarity of rule in all systems of law 
would be to demand the impossible and so to 
destroy – or at least, seriously diminish – the 
                                                          
1032 ICC Case No. 8385 of 1995, 124 Clunet 1015, 1061-1066 (1997), available: https://www.trans-
lex.org/11 (accessed 1 February 2018); ICC Case No. 8365 of 1996, in Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Yves 
Derains and Dominique Hascher, “Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1996-2000”, (Wolters Kluwer 
2009), 1078-1079; Klaus Peter Berger, “The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria”, 
(Second Edition), (Kluwer Law International 2010), 108; Klaus Peter Berger, “The New Law 
Merchant and the Global Market Place: A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law”, 
available at: https://www.trans-lex.org/2  (accessed 1 February 2018); Michael Joachim Bonell, “A 
‘Global’ Arbitration Decided on the Basis of the UNIDROIT Principles: In re Andersen Consulting 
Business Unit Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen Business Unit Member Firms and Andersen 
Worldwide Societe Cooperative”, 17 Arbitration International 249, 249 (2001); Article (1.101) of 
the Principles of European Contract Law of 2002. 
1033 Lew, Mistelis & Kröll (2003), (note 690) 463. 
1034 ICC Case No. 9797 of 2000, 15(8) Mealey’s International Arbitration Reports A1 (2000); Bonell 
(2001), (note 1032) 249. 
1035 Gaillard (2011), (note 66) 164-166; Emmanuel Gaillard, “Transnational Law: A Legal System or 
a Method of Decision Making”, 17 Arbitration International 59 (2001). 
1036 Nolan (2009), (note 67) 510.  
1037 Gaillard (2010), (note 65) 48-52; Emmanuel Gaillard, “Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards 
the Selective Application of Transnational Rules”, 10 ICSID Review 208 (1995). 
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value of any resort to private-law sources and 
analogies.1038 
 
676. Thus, prior to finding a general principle of law, and before transposing such a 
private-law principle to international arbitration, an arbitrator must examine 
the principle’s recognition in different legal systems. This should be no 
different from the position adopted and applied in international law.1039 Article 
(38) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides that it 
shall apply “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”.1040 
In commenting on this Article, it is widely accepted that the term ‘general’ 
denotes the principle’s recognition in most, and not all, legal systems, and that 
for a principle to be elevated to a general principle, its application should not 
defy the “fundamental concepts of any of those systems”.1041 
 
677. It is often held that a given principle is considered a general principle of law. 
However, it is usually overlooked that the term ‘general principle of law’ 
normally denotes substantive principles and not procedural principles.1042  
 
678. Given that this thesis addresses abuse of substantive and procedural rights, it is 
important to examine whether the abuse of rights principle is considered to be 
a general principle of substantive law (A) within the context of international 
arbitration, as well as a general principle of arbitral procedure (B).  
 
679. One shall then examine whether the principle of abuse of rights enjoys any 
mandatory nature, i.e. if it may apply as a principle of transnational public 
policy that overrides the applicable law, or if it can only apply as a general 
principle where arbitrators are entitled to resort to such principles (C). 
 
                                                          
1038 Gutteridge (1944), (note 1003) 4-5. 
1039 Gaillard (2010), (note 65) 48. 
1040 Article (38) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2 (accessed 1 February 2018). 
1041 Gutteridge (1944), (note 1003) 4-5; Green (1968), (note 66) 61-62; Lenaerts (2010), (note 36) 
1124. 
1042 Charles Molineaux, “Applicable law in arbitration: The coming convergence of civil and Anglo-
Saxon law via Unidroit and Lex Mercatoria”, (2000) 1 Journal of World Investment and Trade 127, 
130 (2000); Kurkela & Turunen (2010), (note 662) 5-8. 
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A. General Principle of Substantive Law 
 
680. It is submitted that the principle of abuse of rights has elevated and developed 
as a general principle of law. As shall be discussed below, this submission is 
confirmed by the principle’s recognition in most legal systems; its acceptance 
as a general principle of law by scholars; and by virtue of its application as a 
general principle by arbitral tribunals in the domain of national and 
international law.  
 
681. Moreover, it was previously mentioned that the equitable nature of the 
principle as well as the element/criterion of reasonableness is widely 
acknowledged in the application of abuse of rights in national legal systems. 
As shall be discussed below, it appears that the equitable character of the 
principle remains conspicuous in the transnational context where the principle 
is applied as a general principle of law. Furthermore, the criterion of 
reasonableness equally emerged as an equally key factor in the transnational 
application of the principle to limit the abuse of substantive contractual/treaty 
rights. 
 
682. An overview of different legal systems was undertaken to examine the 
recognition and application of abuse of rights. Such review testified that many 
legal systems endorse a general principle of abuse of rights.1043 
 
683. It is submitted that the “general principle of abuse of rights has been applied 
by the courts in every department of the law”,1044 and that “the prohibition of 
abuse of rights is a general principle of law. In view of its general recognition 
by almost all systems of law”.1045 Thus, the generality of the principle, as 
required in general principles of law, is satisfied.1046 
 
684. Moreover, in discussing the principle’s application across diverse legal 
systems, it was suggested that the criterion of reasonableness (balancing factor) 
                                                          
1043 Walton (1933), (note 46) 87; Kiss (1992), (note 22) paras 9 and 34. 
1044 Walton (1909), (note 42) 505. 
1045 Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 306. 
1046 Ibid, 300-305. 
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was elevated to a transnational element of the principle. This criterion of the 
principle has gained the widest support in civil law jurisdictions,1047 is equally 
endorsed by the CJEU as part of EU law and in international law,1048 and is not 
peculiar to the depiction/perception of the exercise of rights under common 
law.1049 
 
685. Based on the above, arbitrators have resorted to the principle of abuse of rights 
to resolve diverse substantive issues. In doing so, arbitrators have explicitly or 
implicitly applied it as a general principle of law. Some examples are discussed 
to illustrate the above. 
  
686. In ICC Case No. 3267,1050 the question of whether the termination of an 
agreement may constitute an abuse of right was raised. The case related to the 
construction of a building project. The claimant terminated the contract 
because of the respondent’s default in the payment terms. The question before 
the tribunal was whether the termination of the contract was legitimate. The 
                                                          
1047 Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 1027-1028; Brunner (1977), (note 277) 731; Trushinger v. Pak, 513 So. 
2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1987); Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. 521 So. 2d 481 (La. 1988); 
Ouachita National Bank in Monroe v. Palowsky, 554 So. 2d 108 (La. 1989); Addison v. Williams, 
546 So. 2d 220 (La. 1989); Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. Hammons, 540 So. 2d 461 (La. 1989); 
210 Baronne St. Ltd. Partnership v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 543 So. 2d 502, 507 (La. App. 
4th Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1219 (1989); Des Cheneaux v. Morin Inc. (1987), 20 Q.A.C. 157; 
Caisse populaire de Baie St-Paul v. Simard, Sup. Ct. Saguenay, No. 24005000043845, 9 September 
1985; Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122; Egyptian Court of Cassation, 
Session held on 24 March 1991, Challenge No. 1238, Judicial Year 56; Egyptian Court of 
Cassation, Session held on 4 April 1985, Challenge No. 1244, Judicial Year 54; Sanhouri (2010), 
(note 195) 760-761; Morcos (1988), (note 192) 372-373; Article (3.13) of the Dutch Civil Code; 
Article (7) of the Spanish Civil Code; ICC Case No. 12456 of 2004, in Jean-Jacquez Arnaldez, Yves 
Derains and Dominique Hascher (eds), “Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 2008-2011”, (Kluwer 
Law International 2013) 826; Nicholae Gradinaru, “Abuse of Rights”, 4 Contemporary Readings in 
Law and Social Justice 1010, 1011 (2012), (discussing the law of Romania); Betul Tiryaki, “The 
Legal Results of the Abuse of Rights in Case of Contradiction to the Formal Rules of Contracts”, 1 
Ankara Bar Review 30, 36 (2008) (discussing Turkish law); Article (30) of the Kuwaiti Civil Code. 
1048 CJEU, 23 Mar. 2000, Case C-373/97, Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1705, para. 43; Cheng (2006), 
(note 190) 129; Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 764-765; Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1075th Meeting (23 June 1970) vol. 1 (New York: United Nations, 1971) 185 para. 
40. 
1049 Mattei (2000), (note 251) 149; Zimmermann & Whittaker (2000), (note 103) 696; Robilant 
(2010), (note 9) 698; Byers (2002), (note 10) 410-415; Fletcher (1985), (note 250) 953; Reid (1998), 
(note 88) 134; Campbell (2010), (note 255) 523, (providing that the English law of nuisance which 
is based on a balancing of competing legitimate interests, partially achieves the purpose of abuse of 
rights); Armstrong & LaMaster (1986), (note 245) 14; Prosser & Dobbs (1984), (note 255), (noting 
that unreasonable interference is the basis for the law of nuisance); Mitchell (2006), (note 598) 371. 
1050 Partial Award, ICC Case No. 3267 of 1979, VII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 96 (1982). 
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claimant sought a declaration that the contract was legitimately terminated and 
that the issued advanced guarantee and the performance guarantees became 
extinguished. The respondent, however, raised a counterclaim and requested a 
declaration that such termination, and all consequences thereof, was not 
legitimate: as the termination “was without a legitimate cause”.1051 
 
687. There was no explicit choice of the applicable law in the agreements. After 
considering the terms of the agreement, the tribunal decided that it shall not 
apply the laws of a specific legal system, but shall decide the case with 
reference to general principles of law. In assessing the abusive nature of the 
termination, the tribunal considered the factual matrix of the case, balanced the 
competing financial and contractual interests at stake, and examined the 
legitimacy of the termination. The tribunal decided that the termination did not 
amount to an abuse of right. In relying on the principle of abuse of rights, the 
tribunal explicitly noted that the principle may be applied as part of national 
law (where the principle is recognised and regulated); as a general principle of 
law; and in cases where arbitrators are acting as amiable compositeur. In the 
words of the tribunal: 
 
In addition to the power to decide on the dispute 
before him on the basis of generally accepted 
legal principles, without being fettered by the 
technicalities of a particular legal system, the 
arbitrator sitting as ‘amiable compositeur’ is 
entitled to disregard legal or contractual rights of 
a party when the insistence on such right amounts 
to an abuse thereof. This authority is of a 
particular importance in legal systems that have 
not developed an extensive theory of ‘abuse of 
right’, such as Swiss law under Art. 2 of its Civil 
Code.1052 
 
688. This case is of particular interest, as it not only proves that abuse of rights is 
regarded and applied as a general principle of law, but it also reveals that the 
element/criterion of reasonableness is inherent to the general principle of abuse 
of rights. The arbitral tribunal has engaged in a balancing exercise to assess if 
                                                          
1051 Ibid, 97.  
1052 Ibid, 105. 
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the exercise in question was abusive or reasonable, even though this was not 
mandated by a specific national law, but as part of the general principles of 
law.1053 
 
689. The arbitral awards in the cases of Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. 
(Persero) PLN1054 and Patuha Power v. PT. (Persero) PLN,1055 confirm that 
the principle of abuse of rights comprises a general principle of law. Whilst 
these cases are discussed in subsequent sections, it suffices here to mention 
that the arbitrators not only acknowledged abuse of rights as a general 
principle of law, but went further and applied it as a principle of transnational 
public policy, applicable regardless of the governing lex causae or lex arbitri. 
 
690. The reasonableness, or abusive nature, of terminating agreements was 
discussed again in ICC Case No. 13184 of 2011.1056 In this case, a Mexican 
company established two entities (respondents). Respondents subsequently 
concluded contracts with the claimant (US distributor A) and similar contracts 
with another distributor (US Distributor B). When concluding the fourth 
contract with the distributors, the respondents introduced certain differences in 
the contract with the claimant, as they lacked complete faith in the claimant. 
These new changes included a right to terminate the contract without a cause 
and to have a midterm review meeting. Subsequently, the claimant realised that 
these differences were introduced only to his contract and not for the US 
Distributor B. Respondents then unilaterally terminated their agreements with 
the claimant. Claimant initiated arbitration proceedings alleging, inter alia, that 
the respondents abused their right in terminating the agreement and in 
concealing the differences in the contracts with both the claimant and the US 
distributor B. The law applicable to the merits was the CISG and supplemented 
by Mexican law. 
                                                          
1053 Ibid, 105-106. 
1054 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Final Award of 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11 (2000); Jan 
Paulsson, “Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals”, 23 ICSID Review Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 215, 223 (2008). 
1055 Patuha Power Ltd. (Bermuda) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (Indonesia), 14 
Mealey’s Int'l Arb. Rep. B-1, B-44 (Dec. 1999). 
1056 Distributor Z (US) v. Company A (Mexico), Subsidiary B (US), Final Award, ICC Case No. 13184 
of 2011, XXXVI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 96 (2011). 
Page | 243  
 
 
691. In dismissing the claim, the arbitral tribunal recognised that the respondents 
acted in bad faith as they misrepresented and concealed the differences in the 
contracts. However, it was held that such misrepresentation was not relevant to 
the formation of the contract as it took place after its execution. The tribunal 
found that the respondents’ exercise of their right to terminate the contract did 
not amount to an abuse of right, given that it was not maliciously exercised, 
and was exercised for a legitimate and reasonable purpose, because the 
termination was motivated by commercial considerations.1057 The tribunal 
engaged in a balancing process as it weighed the allegation of abuse against the 
express terms of the contract, and that the respondents were exercising a 
contractual right. They also considered the fact that after being made aware of 
the differences in the agreements, the claimant did not initiate proceedings, but 
instead, sought to seek the preservation of the contractual relationship.1058 
 
692. It is submitted that the application of abuse of rights in this case clearly 
demonstrates the equitable nature of the principle. This is due to the fact that 
the tribunal explicitly took into consideration the adage: he who comes to 
equity must come with clean hands, as they considered the conduct of the 
aggrieved party in evaluating the abusive nature of the termination. However, 
this case does not necessarily support the proposition that abuse of rights is a 
general principle of law. The arbitral tribunal referred to Mexican law and 
applied the principle as regulated and embodied under Mexican law.1059 This 
arguably defies the generality and transnational status of the principle 
particularly given the tribunal’s approach to resort to national law in order to 
apply abuse of rights. However, one may argue that this does not necessarily 
negate the transnationality of abuse of rights given that: (i) the contract 
directed the arbitrators to refer to Mexican law if an issue is not covered under 
the CISG; (ii) pursuant to Article (7.2) of the CISG, arbitrators must resort to a 
specific kind of general principles, i.e. “general principles on which it [the 
                                                          
1057 Ibid, paras 55-56. 
1058 Ibid, paras 61-62. 
1059 Ibid, paras 55-56. 
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CISG] is based” in matters not expressly covered under the CISG,1060 and, 
failing to ascertain those principles, arbitrators are to resort to national law;1061 
(iii) finally, it is the general practice within the domain of CISG to 
automatically resort to national law where the issue is not explicitly regulated 
under the CISG.1062 
 
693. When arbitrators attempt to identify general principles of law, they often rely 
on the UNIDROIT Principles, or other transnational principles,1063 as a 
reflection of those principles.1064 Given that the UNIDROIT Principles may be 
considered as a restatement of general principles of law,1065 any reference to 
abuse of rights may prove helpful in this regard. The UNIDROIT Principles 
clearly recognise that abuse of rights is a general principle of law, as an 
application of the broader principle of good faith and fair dealing.1066 The 
Principles, after providing the overarching principle of good faith and fair 
dealing, go on to demonstrate certain manifestations and narrower general 
principles that fall within the purview of good faith and fair dealing, including 
abuse of rights.1067 It is of particular interest to note that the provision 
regarding abuse of rights was originally going to be a separate provision under 
the Principles, but it was decided to locate it under the good faith principle, as 
one of its important applications.1068  
 
                                                          
1060 It is worth mentioning that some scholars hold the view that the prohibition against abuse of 
rights, as an application of the broader concept of good faith, is considered a general principle upon 
which the CISG is based as per Article (7.2): Jorge O. Alban, “The General Principles of the United 
Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods”, 4 Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 
165, 167 (2012), note 7.  
1061 Article (7.2) of the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods (1980). 
1062 Camilla B. Andersen, “General Principles of the CISG – Generally Impenetrable?”, in Camilla B. 
Andersen and Ulrich G. Schroeter (eds.), (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 2008), 16-17. 
1063 In this regard, the principles identified by Professor Klaus-Peter Berger and published by the 
Center for Transnational Law, equally comprise a restatement of general principles of law. 
Waincymer (2010), (note 51) 49. These principles include the principle of abuse of rights: the 
TransLex-Principles available at: https://www.trans-lex.org/principles/of-transnational-law-(lex-
mercatoria) (accessed 1 February 2018). 
1064 Redfern & Hunter (2015), (note 1024) para. 3.171; Molineaux (2000), (note 1042) 130. 
1065 Redfern & Hunter (2015), (note 1024) para. 3.178. 
1066 Michael Joachim Bonell, “The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice”, (Second Edition), 
(Transnational Publishers 2006), 84. 
1067 Comment (2) to Article (1.7) of the UNIDROIT Principles of 2010 provides that a typical 
example of behaviour contrary to the principle of good faith and fair dealing is abuse of rights.  
1068 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Report by the Working Group for the 
Preparation of Principles of International Commercial Contracts,  6 June 2003, 58-60; Bonell 
(2005), (note 45) 58. 
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694. The transnational nature of abuse of rights may also be deduced from its 
recognition in other international legal instruments. Article (300) of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognises a general principle of 
abuse of rights: “States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations 
assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and 
freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not 
constitute an abuse of right”.1069 
 
695. Moreover, Article (17) of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1953, as amended in 1998, 
equally includes a general provision on abuse of rights.1070 
 
696. Applying the general principle of abuse of rights as part of the UNIDROIT 
Principles is equally reflected in arbitral decisions. Moreover, the element of 
reasonableness and endorsing the balancing factor is equally palpable in the 
application of abuse of rights from the standpoint of the UNIDROIT 
Principles. Thus, in ICC Case No. 8547 of 1999,1071 a dispute arose out of a 
sale contract. Article (15) of the contract provided that any claim in relation to 
the quantity and quality of the products must be communicated within 15 days 
upon arrival and to be considered only against presentation of supporting 
documents issued by a neutral surveyor within 30 days of arrival. The law 
applicable to the contract was the Hague Convention of 1964 and 
supplemented by the UNIDROIT Principles. The buyer (respondent) received 
bad quality goods and informed the claimant. However, the claimant did not 
take any steps to remedy this. 
 
697. While acknowledging that the respondent failed to abide by the requirements 
of Article (15) in case of non-conformity, the arbitral tribunal provided that the 
strict adherence to this Article by the claimant constitutes an abuse of right. In 
the words of the tribunal:  
                                                          
1069 Article (300) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). 
1070 Article (17) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of 1953 (as amended in 1998). 
1071 ICC Case No. 8547 of 1999, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), “Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
2003 Volume XXVIII”, (Kluwer Law International 2003), 27-38. 
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The arbitral tribunal is convinced of the non-
conformity of the goods […] The strict adherence 
to the requirement of provision No. 15 now by 
claimant amounts to an abuse of rights […] If 
claimant could rely on this provision, defendant 
would have lost any rights in regard to the non-
conformity. It is relevant that according to 
defendant, claimant did have the opportunity to 
examine the goods.1072 
 
698. The corrective function of abuse of rights, and the element of fairness 
advanced by its application, appears conspicuous in this case. The principle 
was used to cure unfairness as a result of the rigidity of a contractual right, 
as the strict adherence to it would have been greatly damaging to one of the 
parties. The tribunal weighed the competing interests: those of legal certainty 
and the principle of pacta sunt servanda, against fairness and the fact that the 
goods were not in conformity with the quality agreed upon. The tribunal 
emphasised the element of fairness and decided that setting aside the 
requirements of Article (15) is the only way the respondent can have a claim 
regarding the non-conformity.1073 
 
699. The universal status of the abuse of rights principle is equally recognised in 
international law jurisprudence and practice. It is recognised and applied as a 
general principle of law.1074 It was mentioned by Bin Cheng as a general 
principle of law applied by international courts and tribunals.1075 James 
Crawford equally referred to the principle of abuse of rights as an epitome of 
general principles of law.1076 Moreover, in emphasising the universality of the 
principle, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht examined the existence of abuse of rights in 
major legal systems and advocated that, notwithstanding the divergent 
terminology employed by different systems, “there is inherent in every system 
of law the general principle of prohibition of abuse of rights”.1077 
                                                          
1072 Ibid, para. 19. 
1073 ICC Case No. 8547 of 1999, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), “Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
2003 Volume XXVIII”, (Kluwer Law International 2003), para. 19. 
1074 Kiss (1992), (note 22) paras 9 and 34; Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 765-766. 
1075 Cheng (2006), (note 190) 121. 
1076 Crawford (2012), (note 1024) 36. 
1077 Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 305-306. 
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700. The above is confirmed by the practice of international courts and tribunals. In 
the seminal Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ referred to abuse of rights as: 
“enshrined in a general principle of law which emerges from the legal systems 
of all nations”.1078 
 
701. As a general principle of law, abuse of rights is applied in the context of 
myriad legal matters, ranging from limiting the host state’s sovereign authority 
to the preclusion of the abusive interpretation of treaty rights.1079 The 
application of abuse of rights is particularly evident in investment disputes. 
One scholar advocated that most international investment law disputes before 
arbitral tribunals could be resolved by the “repudiation of abuses of right”.1080 
Thus, the tribunal in the case of Phoenix v. The Czech Republic recognised that 
abuse of rights constitutes a general principle of law,1081 and stipulated that 
“nobody shall abuse the rights granted by treaties, and more generally, every 
rule of law includes an implied clause that it should not be abused”.1082 
 
702. Abuse of rights has also been applied as a general principle of law by the 
World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) panels and WTO Appellate Body to 
prevent the abusive interpretation and application of treaty rights.1083 In the 
case of United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, the tribunal applied the principle and provided that any abuse of 
GATT Article XX (on General Exceptions)1084 is tantamount to an abuse of 
right and thus a violation of the treaty. The tribunal explicitly stipulated that: 
                                                          
1078 Barcelona Traction Case, [1970] I. C. J. I, (Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun), 324; Jerome B. 
Elkind, “Interim Protection: A Functional Approach”, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981), 5. 
1079 Todd Weiler, “The Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, Discrimination and 
Minimum Standards of Treatment in Historical Context”, (Martinus Nijhoff 2013), 306; the Lalanne 
and Ledour Case, in Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Volume X, 17-18 (1903-1905); the 
Trail Smelter Case (United States and Canada), (1941) in Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 
Volume III, 1965; ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic 
of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal, 2 October 2006, paras 423-424. 
1080 Weiler (2013), (note 1079) 305. 
1081 Phoenix Action v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award dated 15 April 2009, 
paras 106-107. 
1082 Ibid, paras 107-108. 
1083 Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, WTO Appellate Body Report, 17 December 2007, 
224-226; Weiler (2013), (note 1079) 306. 
1084 Article XX provides that Member States have the right to exceptionally take certain measures as 
long as they are not applied arbitrarily or in a discriminatory manner.  
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The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one 
expression of the principle of good faith. This 
principle, at once a general principle of law and 
a general principle of international law, controls 
the exercise of rights by states. One application 
of this general principle, the application widely 
known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits 
the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins 
that whenever the assertion of a right “impinges 
on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it 
must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, 
reasonably.” […]. [Emphasis added].1085 
 
703. This decision not only confirms the nature of abuse of rights, but it equally 
strengthens the above proposition regarding the universal/transnational status 
of the element of reasonableness in the context of abuse of rights. The tribunal 
provided that finding an abuse requires a delicate exercise of marking the line 
of equilibrium between the competing rights and interests of the member 
States in order to assess the abusive nature of the measure applied.1086 This was 
also confirmed in other cases decided by the Appellate Body of the WTO.1087  
 
704. Finally, it is worth mentioning that abuse of rights is equally recognised by 
eminent scholars and by the CJEU as a general principle of EU law. It is often 
held that the principle was transposed to EU law by virtue of its recognition by 
the Members States and its application by the CJEU: 
 
[T]he principle amounts to a general principle of 
Union law. First, a common concept of abuse of 
rights exist in the legal traditions of the Member 
States. Second, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has gradually built a Union concept of 
abuse of rights.1088 
 
                                                          
1085 Decision rendered by the WTO Appellate Body in the case of United States – Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, para. 158. 
1086 Ibid, para. 159. 
1087 WTO Appellate Body in the case of US: Standard for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 
and Like Products of National Origin, WT/DS2/AB/R, 35 ILM 603, 626 (1996). 
1088 Lenaerts (2010), (note 36) 1121; CJEU case of Hans Markus Kofoed v. Skatteministeriet, 5 July 
2007, Case C-321/05, [2007] ECR I-5795, para. 38. 
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705. Notwithstanding the above, some question the transnational nature of abuse of 
rights. Whilst acknowledging that many scholars and courts/tribunals advocate 
the generality and universality of the principle, Gutteridge noted that this is 
questionable given that the principle remains in a formative stage, is rejected 
by England and Italy, and that it may be used by debtors to evade their 
obligations.1089  
 
706. One does not concur with the reasons mentioned by Gutteridge, and therefore, 
with his conclusion questioning the transnationality of the principle. The 
principle of abuse of rights has unequivocally developed since these particular 
concerns were raised.1090 Moreover, not only is the principle currently 
recognised and accepted in Italy,1091 but as it was previously mentioned, 
English law endorses equivalent principles and standards that function in a 
similar manner and achieve the same purpose as the aims of abuse of rights.1092 
Finally, while one acknowledges that the principle’s utilisation may allow one 
to evade from its obligation, it was previously highlighted that the principle 
must be applied with utmost prudence and that decision makers must resort to, 
and utilise it in exceptional cases where abuse is flagrant. 
 
B. General Principle of Arbitral Procedure 
 
707. A specific procedural principle may equally become a general procedural 
principle if it is recognised and accepted in many legal systems and constantly 
upheld in international arbitral practice.1093 
 
708. In this section, one endeavours to discuss abuse of rights as a general 
procedural principle in international arbitration.  
 
                                                          
1089 Gutteridge (1944), (note 1003) 7. 
1090 The concerns shared by Gutteridge were raised in 1944. 
1091 Article (833) of the Italian Civil Code recognises the aemulatio principle. 
1092 Lenaerts (2010), (note 36) 1125. 
1093 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, “Research on the General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilized 
Nations” , 51 The American Journal of International Law 734, 736 (1957). 
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709. One shall, first, succinctly highlight the possible application of general, or 
transnational, principles of procedure in international arbitration (1); and 
subsequently discuss the status of abuse of rights (2). 
 
1. The Application of Transnational Principles of Procedure in 
International Arbitration 
 
710. The recognition and application of transnational procedural principles is 
neither peculiar to, nor inconsistent with, international arbitration law and 
practice.1094 The Institute of International Law adopted a resolution in 1989, 
which provided that:  
 
[T]he parties have full autonomy to determine 
the procedural […] rules and principles that are 
to apply in the arbitration […] these rules and 
principles may be derived from different national 
legal systems as well as from non-national 
sources such as principles of international law, 
general principles of law […].1095 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
711. Thus, it is widely acknowledged that there are transnational procedural rules 
and principles in international arbitration.1096 
 
712. Arbitral procedures are generally subject to the sacrosanct principle of party 
autonomy.1097 Thus, they are governed by the procedural framework adopted 
                                                          
1094 It is submitted that while English law does not generally recognise the theory of delocalisation of 
arbitration, it recognises the existence and application of transnational procedural principles in 
international arbitration: Stewart C. Boyd, “The Role of National Law and the National Courts in 
England”, in Julian D.M. Lew (ed.), “Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration”, 
(Springer 1987), 160; Martin Hunter and Anthony C. Sinclair, “Aminoil Revisited: Reflections on a 
Story of Changing Circumstances”, in Todd Weiler, “International Investment Law and Arbitration: 
Leading Cases from the ICSID, Nafta, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law”, 
(Cameron May 2005), 355. 
1095 Article (6) of the Resolution adopted by the International Law Institute, “Arbitration between 
States, State Enterprises, or State Entities, and Foreign Enterprises”, Session of Santiago de 
Compostela, 1989, available at: 
http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1989_comp_01_en.PDF (accessed 1 February 
2018). 
1096 Fortese & Hemmi (2015), (note 662) 114-115; Kohler (2003), (note 694) 1320-1322; Anna 
Mantakou, “General Principles of Law and International Arbitration”, 58 RHDI 419 (2005); Berger 
(2009), (note 577) 217. 
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by the parties.1098 This framework comprises the rules of law of the arbitration 
statute designated by the parties or the rules of law determined by the 
arbitrators, the pre-established arbitration rules (those of an institution or ad-
hoc), and any applicable international convention.1099 
 
713. However, owing to the non-comprehensive nature of the aforementioned 
procedural framework, lacunas exist that need to be supplemented.1100 In this 
context, it is submitted that an autonomous set of transnational or general 
principles have emerged, and continue to emerge, in international arbitration in 
order to ensure the administration of arbitral justice.1101 
 
714. The extent of role played by such generally accepted procedural principles is 
not subject to consensus in arbitration practice and jurisprudence. One argues 
that this variation emanates from the different conceptions and representations 
of international arbitration; i.e. the extent of its autonomy from national legal 
systems.1102  
 
715. In arbitration doctrine, international arbitration is mainly represented either as: 
a component of the national legal order of the place of arbitration (monolocal 
or territorial vision);1103 anchored in a plurality of national legal systems 
(Westphalian or pluralistic vision); or as an autonomous legal order 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1097 Daniel Girsberger and Nathalie Voser, “International Arbitration: Comparative and Swiss 
Perspectives”, (Third Edition), (Kluwer Law International 2016), para. 889. 
1098 Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 912) 633. 
1099 Born (2014), (note 61) 1528-1529; Park (2006), (note 685) 141. 
1100 Lew, Mistelis & Kröll (2003), (note 690) 524; Park (2006), (note 685) 143 and 148. 
1101 Stavros Brekoulakis, “International Arbitration Scholarship and the Concept of Arbitration Law”, 
36 Fordham International Law Journal 745, 777-782 (2013); Henri Alvarez, “Autonomy of 
International Arbitration Process”, in Loukas Mistelis and Julian D. M. Lew (eds), “Pervasive 
Problems in International Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2006), 119; Fortese & Hemmi 
(2015), (note 662) 114-115; Kurkela & Turunen (2010), (note 662) 8-9; Hans Smit, “Proper Choice 
of Law and the Lex Mercatoria Arbitralis”, in Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed.), “Lex Mercatoria and 
Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law Merchant”, (Juris Publications 1990), 59. 
1102 Emmanuel Gaillard, “International Arbitration as a Transnational System of Justice”, in Albert 
Jan van den Berg (ed.), “Arbitration – The Next Fifty Years”, (Kluwer Law International 2012), 66.  
1103 Francis A. Mann, “The UNCITRAL Model Law – Lex Facit Arbitrum”, in Pieter Sanders (ed.), 
“International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke”, (Martinus Nijhoff 1967), 159-161, 
reprinted in 2 Arbitration International 241, 244- 245 (2014), (providing that every arbitration is 
subject to a specific system of national law which should be the law of the arbitral seat). 
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(transnational vision).1104 The aforementioned representations differ in that: 
the monolocal view advocates that the source of legitimacy is the law of seat of 
arbitration, the Westphalian view considers that international arbitration’s 
legitimacy stems from the acknowledgment of such legitimacy by a number of 
legal systems; and according to some scholars, the transnational view 
advocates that the source of legitimacy is the collective acknowledgment by 
the community of nations as reflected in international instruments and 
practices.1105 
 
716. Based on the above, while some limit the application of such principles to 
situations where the parties agree to endorse them, and some advocate their 
application where there is a gap in the otherwise applicable arbitration rules 
and the law of the seat,1106 others advocate the necessity to grant greater weight 
to transnational principles as their application is a reflection of the consensus 
of nations, which is consistent with their transnational conception of 
international arbitration.1107 The latter school of thought asserts that whenever 
the issue is not regulated under the arbitration rules, transnational norms and 
principles should apply.1108 
 
717. Unlike domestic arbitration which is often conducted on the basis of rules and 
principles similar to judicial procedures, international arbitration is arguably a 
stand-alone mechanism that operates in a separate sphere from the 
particularities of parochial national laws and courts.1109 It is peripatetic, given 
that it often permeates two or more different jurisdictions, it involves an 
international dispute between parties, and is decided by arbitrators from 
                                                          
1104 Gaillard (2010), (note 65); Jan Paulsson, “Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of 
its Country of Origin”, 30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 358, 362 (1981); for a 
critique of the mentioned theories of international arbitration, see Jan Paulsson, “Arbitration in 
Three Dimensions”, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 2/2010. 
1105 Gaillard (2012), (note 1102) 67-68; but cf. W. Michael Reisman and Brian Richardson, 
“Tribunals and Courts: An Interpretation of the Architecture of International Commercial 
Arbitration”, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), “Arbitration – The Next Fifty Years”, (Kluwer Law 
International 2012), 17-18, (who discusses the transnational view as a rejection of national legal 
systems). 
1106 Georgios Petrochilos, “Procedural Law in International Arbitration”, (Oxford University Press 
2004), 174-176. 
1107 Gaillard (2012), (note 1102) 69-70. 
1108 Julian D.M. Lew, “Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration”, 22 Arbitration International 
179, 181 (2006). 
1109 Ibid, 202. 
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different parts of the globe. Parties opt for international arbitration to avoid the 
application of national legal procedures that may not be fit for international 
disputes.1110  
 
718. Moreover, the place of arbitration usually designated by the parties should not 
be perceived as an unequivocal reflection of the parties’ will to subject their 
arbitration to the rules of procedure of the country of the seat.1111 As advocated 
by Professor Julian Lew, arbitration is a sui juris mechanism, invariably 
governed by a-national or transnational norms and internationally accepted 
procedural principles, and that national laws have no interest to govern 
international arbitral procedures.1112 Thus, one may argue that there is a 
transnational arbitral order whereby general principles of law serve as its lex 
arbitri.1113 
 
719. Advocating the transnational conception of international arbitration, or the 
existence of an autonomous arbitral legal order, is also of paramount 
importance to the study of abuse of rights as a transnational principle in 
international arbitration. This is particularly so, given that this view accepts 
that the convergence of national legal principles, as well as emergence of 
principles constantly applied by international arbitrators, allows the 
identification of transnational principles,1114 such as that of abuse of rights. 
 
                                                          
1110 Jan Paulsson, “Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why it 
Matters”, 32 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 53, 59-60 (1983); Lew (2006), (note 
1108) 179-180. 
1111 Petrochilos (2004), (note 1106) para. 1.46; Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 912) 635-636; Lew 
(2006), (note 1108) 202; Renata Brazil-David, “Harmonization and Delocalization of International 
Commercial Arbitration”, 28 Journal of International Arbitration 445, 445 and 455 (2011); Paulsson 
(1983), (note 1110) 54; Paulsson (2010), (note 1104) 7-8; General National Maritime Transport Co. 
v. Société Gotaverken Arendal A.B., Paris Court of Appeal, Decision dated 21 February 1980, 20 
I.L.M. 884 (1981), (where the French Court held that the arbitral proceedings were delocalised 
despite the fact that the parties chose Paris as the seat of arbitration); and Societe AKSA S.A. v. 
Société Norsolor S.A., Paris Court of Appeal, Decision dated 9 December 1980, 20 I.L.M. 887 
(1981), (recognising the delocalisation of international arbitration and advocating the irrelevance of 
the seat of arbitration); but cf. Bank Mellat v. Helliniki Techniki S.A., [1984] Q.B. 291, 301; Naviera 
Amazonica Peruano S.A. v. Compania Internacional de Seguros del Peru, [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
116, 120, (both English decisions rejecting the delocalisation theory and emphasising the role of the 
arbitral seat). 
1112 Lew (2006), (note 1108) 180-181, 195-196; Kohler (2003), (note 694) 1318-1320. 
1113 Paulsson (1981), (note 1104) 381. 
1114 Gaillard (2010), (note 65) 104-105; Brekoulakis (2013), (note 1101) 777-779. 
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720. In this regard, it is submitted that international arbitration should not be 
restricted by the application of parochial national rules of procedure, but 
should rather be conducted in accordance with principles that are universally, 
or generally accepted as suitable for the administration of international 
arbitration. This is particularly the case where the governing arbitration rules 
are silent or not explicit regarding the matter in question.  
 
721. However, it is suggested that the application of transnational principles is of 
paramount importance and remains inevitable notwithstanding which 
conception of international arbitration is endorsed.1115 This is precisely the case 
given the incomprehensiveness of the various established arbitration rules, as 
well as modern arbitration statutes, and the few mandatory rules found in such 
statutes.1116 Thus, it is submitted that arbitrators must continuously strive to 
ascertain and apply generally accepted procedural principles.1117 This is noted 
by one author who emphasises the role of the lex arbitri:  
 
[I]t is only recently that arbitrators have started 
to fill gaps in arbitration rules by relying upon 
general rules of procedure adopted in the 
practice of international tribunals or generally 
accepted in the laws of states. This is, doubtless, 
the right approach – again, within the bounds of 
the lex arbitri.1118 
 
722. The legal basis for applying transnational procedural principles, and its source 
of legitimacy, is evidenced by the fact that most modern arbitration statutes 
and arbitration rules grant the arbitrators, in the absence of parties’ choice, the 
                                                          
1115 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, “Identifying and Applying the Law Governing the Arbitration 
Procedure – The Role of the Law of the Place of Arbitration”, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), 
“Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Award: 40 Years of Application of the 
New York Convention”, ICCA Congress Series No. 9, (Kluwer Law International 1999), 354; 
Gaillard (2010), (note 65) 99-100; Paulsson (1983), (note 1110) 57. 
1116 Park (2006), (note 685) 143. 
1117 Petrochilos (2004), (note 1106) para. 5.16. 
1118 Ibid, para. 5.22. 
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power to conduct the arbitral procedures in light of the principles and rules of 
law they deem appropriate.1119  
 
723. The above submission is also confirmed by the practice of arbitrators. In an 
arbitration initiated under the Arbitration Rules of the Geneva Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry that took place in Switzerland. The dispute was 
between an Italian company and a German company. The issue raised before 
the arbitral tribunal was whether the tribunal can order security for costs. The 
issue was not covered under the Geneva Rules or the Swiss Private 
International Law Act. The claimant maintained that the tribunal lacked the 
authority to issue such security given that the prevailing view in Switzerland is 
that courts and arbitrators should not order security for costs. The arbitral 
tribunal first provided that Article 182(2) of the Swiss Private International 
Law Act grants it the autonomy to determine the arbitral procedures. The 
tribunal provided that international arbitration is not restricted to the 
particularities of Swiss law, and it then established its authority to order 
security for costs by considering the prevailing general principles applied by 
other tribunals in international arbitration.1120 
 
724. Another particularly interesting example of the above is reflected in the well-
known case of Dallah v. Pakistan. In this case, Dallah, a Saudi trading group, 
won an ICC arbitration seated in Paris against Pakistan. Given that the contract 
was concluded between Dallah and a Pakistani trust created by Pakistan, which 
was later dissolved, the issue raised before the tribunal was if the contract and 
the arbitration clause were extended to the government of Pakistan. Dallah 
requested the application of Saudi law and Pakistan requested Pakistani law to 
                                                          
1119  Article (1509) of the French Arbitration Law of 2011; Article (182) of the Swiss Private 
International Law Act; Article (25) of the Egyptian Arbitration Law No. 27 of 1994; Section (4) of 
the English Arbitration Act of 1996; Article (17) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013); 
Article (19) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration of 2012; Article (23) of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce of 2017; Article (44) of the ICSID Convention (1965); Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 
912) 635-650; Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, “Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy”, 
20 Arbitration International 333, 336 (2004); Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, “Major Criteria for 
International Arbitrators in Shaping an Efficient Procedure”, in ICC Bulletin Special Supplement, 
“Arbitration in the Next Decade”, (1999), 50. 
1120 A. S.p.A. v. B AG, Decision of 25 September 1997, 19 ASA Bulletin 745 (2001), para. 8.  
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decide on this procedural issue. The arbitral tribunal held that the question 
should be decided in light of general or transnational procedural principles:  
 
Judicial as well as Arbitral case law now clearly 
recognise that, as a result of the principle of 
autonomy, the rules of law, applicable to an 
arbitration agreement, may differ from those 
governing the main contract, and that, in the 
absence of specific indication by the parties, such 
rules need not be linked to a particular national 
law […] but may consist of those transnational 
general principles which the Arbitrators would 
consider to meet the fundamental requirements of 
justice in international trade.1121 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
725. Finally, in the leading case of Dow Chemical v. Isover-Saint-Gobain,1122 the 
issue before the tribunal was whether the arbitration clause may extend to a 
non-signatory entity part of the group of companies. Arbitration proceedings 
were initiated in Paris on the basis of an ICC arbitration clause. The defendant 
raised a jurisdictional challenge providing that the tribunal has no jurisdiction 
in relation to the non-signatory subsidiary and the non-signatory parent 
company. The arbitral tribunal issued an interim award rejecting the 
defendant’s jurisdictional challenge and upholding its jurisdiction based on the 
‘group of companies doctrine’. In doing so, the tribunal noted that the ICC 
Rules grant it the power to decide such procedural questions without referring 
to any specific national law.1123  
 
726. It appears that the theoretical foundation of the group of companies doctrine, as 
stated by the arbitral tribunal and nurtured by the French court, was based on 
transnational principles, the lex mercatoria and usages of international trade. It 
was explicitly held that, owing to the autonomous nature of the arbitration 
                                                          
1121 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
Government of Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46, para. 33. It is to be noted that the UK Supreme Court 
refused to enforce the award. 
1122 ICC Case No. 4131 of 1982, Dow Chemical v. Isover-Saint-Gobain, IX Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration 131 (1984). 
1123 Interim Award, ICC Case No. 4131 of 1982, Dow Chemical v. Isover-Saint-Gobain, IX Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 131, 133 (1984), but c.f. Peterson Farms, Inc. v. C & M Farming Ltd. 
[2003] EWHC 2298 (Comm) 44-45. 
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clause, and in application to the overarching principle of separability, the 
arbitral tribunal should not be restricted to a given national law when deciding 
such procedural matters. A contrario, it was held that ICC Rules allow the 
application of transnational principles of international commerce or the lex 
mercatoria to such issues including, inter alia, the possible extension of the 
arbitration clause.1124 The tribunal is free to opt for such principles as long as 
no principle or any rule of international public policy is infringed.1125 
 
727. Thus, in the absence of a contrary choice made by the parties, the autonomy 
granted to arbitrators by virtue of all modern arbitration laws and rules may 
allow arbitrators to refer to and apply transnational principles of arbitral 
procedure.1126 
 
2. Abuse of Rights is a Generally Accepted Procedural Principle in 
International Arbitration 
 
728. In the first chapter, the analysis of abuse of rights under various legal systems 
revealed that there is a general recognition of abuse of procedural rights.1127 It 
was evidenced that the different legal systems either rely on the principle of 
abuse of right, or on abuse of process (under common law),1128 which is a 
manifestation of abuse of rights,1129 to limit the abuse of procedural rights.1130 
                                                          
1124 Ibid. 
1125 Ibid, 137. 
1126 Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 912) 649-650; Kohler (2003), (note 694) 1323; ICC Partial 
Award in Case No. 14208/14236 of 2013, 24 ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 62 
(2013). 
1127 Article (32.1) of the French Code of Civil Procedure provides that one who acts in a dilatory or 
abusive manner, may be ordered to pay a civil fine and to the reparation of damages. 
1128 For an analysis of the recognition of the principle of abuse of process, as an application of abuse 
of rights, in the common law systems (Canada, Australia, England and Wales, and the United 
States), see Gaffney (2010), (note 60) 515-517. 
1129 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 17 December 2015, under UNCITRAL Rules, para. 554; 
Brabandere (2012), (note 60) 619. 
1130 Kolb (2006), (note 9), para. 65; Taniguchi (2000), (note 118), (discussing the recognition of abuse 
of rights to limit abuse of procedural rights in Japan); Michele Taruffo, “Abuse of Procedural 
Rights: Comparative Standards of Procedural Fairness”, (Kluwer Law International 1999), 
(discussing the recognition of abuse of rights in different legal systems). 
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The principle of abuse of rights is also sometimes raised before the ICJ to 
preclude the abuse of procedural rights under international law.1131 
 
729. The transnational nature of abuse of rights, in the context of procedural rights, 
does not only stem from its recognition in the different legal systems, but may 
equally be deduced from its recognition in international legal instruments, its 
recognition by prominent scholars, and by its constant application, as such, by 
international courts and tribunals in order to limit procedural abuse. 
 
730. The UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure comprise a 
statement of internationally accepted procedural principles dealing with 
international disputes. The Principles, which may extend to the sphere of 
international arbitration unless incompatible thereto,1132 equally endorsed the 
prohibition of abuse of procedural rights as a principle of a transnational 
nature.1133  
 
731. Similar provisions can be found in other international conventions. For 
example, Article (294.1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea provides that: 
 
A court or tribunal provided for in article 287 to 
which an application is made in respect of a 
dispute referred to in article 297 shall determine 
at the request of a party, or may determine 
proprio motu, whether the claim constitutes an 
abuse of legal process or whether prima facie it is 
well founded. If the court or tribunal determines 
that the claim constitutes an abuse of legal 
                                                          
1131 Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, [1991] I.C.J. 
Reports 53, 63; Gaffney (2010), (note 60) 519-521; Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat, et 
al. “The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary”, (Oxford University Press 
2006), 831 (providing that while the ICJ did not hitherto apply abuse of rights to preclude the abuse 
of procedural rights, it did not reject its application, but merely never found the principle’s 
conditions of application to be fulfilled). 
1132 The American Law Institute, “UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure”, 
(Cambridge University Press 2006), 17. 
1133 Principle (11) of the American Law Institute, UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure, (Cambridge University Press 2006), 30-31. 
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process or is prima facie unfounded, it shall take 
no further action in the case.1134  
 
732. Article (35.3) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of 1953, as amended in 1998, provides that: 
 
The Court shall declare inadmissible any 
individual application submitted under Article 34 
if it considers that: (a) the application is 
incompatible with the provisions of the 
Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly 
ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual 
application. 
 
733. It is generally acknowledged by distinguished scholars that abuse of procedural 
rights constitutes a general procedural principle, owing to the fact that it exists 
in most, if not all, legal systems as well as under international law.1135 As 
noted by one scholar: “[abuse of procedural rights] is common to all the major 
legal systems, and may be properly applied by a tribunal in any legal system, 
including the international legal system, in the exercise of the tribunal's 
competence to regulate its own proceedings”.1136 
 
734. The renowned Hersch Lauterpacht rightly noted that abuse of rights is a 
general principle of law, as it exists in the administration of justice of most 
systems of law, and indeed, that “there is no legal right, however well 
established, which could not, in some circumstances, be refused recognition on 
the ground that it has been abused”.1137 
 
735. In the context of international arbitration, Yuval Shany noted in relation to 
procedural rights that by virtue of the “extensive practice of international 
bodies and the near consensus in the writing of jurists on the matter, the theory 
                                                          
1134 Article (294.1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982); Article (300) 
which recognises a general principle of abuse of rights in relation to the exercise of all rights, 
substantive and procedural, under the Convention (“States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the 
obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms 
recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right”). 
1135 McLachlan (2009), (note 61) 429-430; Gaffney (2010), (note 60) 518; Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 
765-766; Kotuby & Sobota (2017), (note 64) 108. 
1136 Lowe (1999), (note 61) 202-203. 
1137 Lauterpacht (1982), (note 21) at. 162-164; Lauterpacht (2011), (note 10) 300-305. 
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[abuse of rights] can probably be viewed as […] a general principle of 
law”.1138 Professor Jan Paulsson equally acknowledged that it constitutes a 
general procedural principle and emphasised its transnational nature: “[I]t may 
be confidently said that the principle of abuse of rights (abus de droit, 
Rechtsmissbrauch) is universal”.1139 Other scholars acknowledge that whilst 
the arbitral framework does not provide for the principle of abuse of rights, the 
principle is common in national legal proceedings in civil and common legal 
systems, and thus, it constitutes a general procedural principle common to all 
legal systems.1140 
 
736. Similarly, Andreas Zimmermann equally confirmed that abuse of procedural 
rights is a general principle of law under international law as well as under 
municipal laws: 
 
[Abuse of process is] a special application of the 
prohibition of abuse of rights, which is a general 
principle of international law as well as in 
municipal law. It consists of the use of procedural 
instruments or rights by one or more parties for 
purposes which are alien to those for which the 
procedural rights were established.1141 
 
737. While the principle is constantly applied by arbitrators and international courts 
as discussed below, some have questioned the normative basis of its 
application.1142 Scepticism regarding the application of abuse of rights in 
international arbitration emanates from the fact that the framework of 
arbitration, comprising national arbitration laws, institutional rules, and any 
applicable convention, does not recognise or provide for the abuse of rights 
principle.1143 
                                                          
1138 Shany (2003), (note 61) 257. 
1139 Jan Paulsson, “The Expectation Model”, in Yves Derains and Richard H. Kreindler, “Evaluation 
of Damages in International Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law International 2006), 73-74. 
1140 Brabandere (2012), (note 60) 618-619. 
1141 Zimmermann & Tomusch (2006), (note 1131) 831. 
1142 Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 782-783; Wasteful Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Decision on Preliminary Objections Concerning the Previous Proceedings 
dated 26 June 2002, para. 49. 
1143 Brabandere (2012), (note 60) 621. Equally, the Statute of the ICJ does not provide for the 
application of abuse of rights. Gaffney (2010), (note 60) 518-519. An exception of this can be found 
in Article (294) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
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738. To that end, while the principle has been regularly referred to and applied in 
international arbitration, tribunals apply the principle without referring to any 
legal provision/rule in the applicable rules of law as the legal basis for their 
decisions.1144 
 
739. Questioning the principle’s normative basis was manifested in the case of 
Rompetrol v. Romania. The respondent alleged that the proceedings were 
abusive as it was initiated by the claimant for the purpose of blocking criminal 
investigations against the claimant’s shareholders.1145 
 
740. While this issue became moot as the claimant provided that it did not challenge 
the criminal investigations but merely the manner in which the investigations 
were conducted, and thus the respondent no longer maintained its objection,1146 
the case remains interesting as the tribunal questioned the legal basis of abuse 
of rights in international arbitration. The tribunal noted:  
 
Marshalled as it is as an objection at this 
preliminary stage, this is evidently a proposition 
of a very far-reaching character; it would entail 
an ICSID tribunal, after having determined 
conclusively (or at least prima facie) that the 
parties to an investment dispute had conferred on 
it by agreement jurisdiction to hear their dispute, 
deciding nevertheless not to entertain the 
application to hear the dispute. Given that an 
ICSID tribunal, under the Washington 
Convention as interpreted, is bound to exercise a 
                                                          
1144 Phoenix Action v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award dated 15 April 2009; 
Cementownia S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, Award dated 17 
September 2009; Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award dared 30 June 
2009, para. 161; Lao Holdings N.V. v. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/6, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 21 February 2014; Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award dated 22 September 2014, paras 
231-233; Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 17 December 2015, under UNCITRAL Rules, paras 
538-554; ST-AD GmbH v. Republic of Bulgaria, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-06, Award on 
Jurisdiction dated 18 July 2013, paras 408-423; Transglobal Green Energy LLC and Transglobal 
Green Panama S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/28, Award dated 2 June 2016, 
paras 100-119. 
1145 The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on Respondent’s 
Preliminary Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, dated 18 April 2008, para. 111. 
1146 Ibid, para. 115. 
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jurisdiction conferred on it, so far-reaching a 
proposition needs to be backed by some positive 
authority in the Convention itself, in its 
negotiating history, or in the case-law under 
it.1147 [Emphasis added]. 
 
741. By reviewing the approach employed by arbitral tribunals, it appears that 
arbitrators resort to abuse of rights and apply it as a general principle of 
law,1148 and that their power/basis to resort to such principle emanates from 
their inherent power to regulate, and preserve the integrity of, the arbitral 
procedures, as well as to ensure the good administration of arbitral justice.1149 
As articulated by one tribunal:  
 
Nor does the Tribunal doubt for a moment that, 
like any other international tribunal, it must be 
regarded as endowed with the inherent powers 
required to preserve the integrity of its own 
process […]The Tribunal would express the 
principle as being that parties have an obligation 
to arbitrate fairly and in good faith and that an 
arbitral tribunal has the inherent jurisdiction to 
ensure that this obligation is complied with; this 
principle applies in all arbitration, including 
investment arbitration, and to all parties.1150 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
742. As opposed to the case of applicable substantive law, where arbitrators may 
often decide on the basis of the law governing the contract, as regards 
procedure, arbitrators decide under a-national procedural rules. These are 
mainly the rules of the arbitration institution, or ICSID Convention. None of 
the provisions in the ICSID Convention, arbitration statutes or rules provide 
                                                          
1147 Ibid, para. 115. 
1148 ICC Partial Award in Case No. 14208/14236 of 2013, 24 ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin 62 (2013), (while the contract was governed by the laws of State X, the arbitral tribunal 
applied abuse of rights as a transnational principle of law to pierce the corporate veil and extended 
the arbitration clause to the non-signatory parent company). 
1149 Brown (2007), (note 727) 245; Gaffney (2010), (note 60) 521; Paparinskis (2011), (note 725) 16; 
Brown (2010), (note 725) 6-12; International Law Association, Interim Report on Res Judicata and 
Arbitration, (Berlin Conference 2004), 8; Ascensio (2014), (note 60) 783; Topcan (2014), (note 
649) 633; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Separate Opinion of Judge 
Higgins, [2004] I.C.J. Reports 279, para. 10; Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] 
AC 529, 536. 
1150 Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Decision on 
Preliminary Issues, 23 June 2008, para. 78. 
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for the abuse of rights principle, yet arbitrators rely on it in order to ensure the 
good administration of justice. It is in this context that arbitrators function in a 
manner to preserve the integrity of the arbitral process and that a general 
principle of abuse of rights has emerged owing to the dire need to safeguard 
the arbitral process, enhance the fairness and efficiency of the proceedings, and 
ensure the overall administration of arbitral justice. 
 
743. In many instances, arbitrators explicitly refer to abuse of rights as a general 
principle of law and apply it to a myriad of procedural arbitration-related 
rights.1151 However, it is argued that even where arbitrators do not refer to it as 
a general principle of law, the way they utilise the principle in the context of 
the current legal framework of arbitration provides material evidence that the 
principle constitutes a general principle of arbitral procedure. 
 
744. In the case of Mobil Corporation, Mobil Cerro et al, v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, the respondent claimed that the Exxon Mobil’s corporate 
restructuring through the creation of a Dutch holding company “constituted an 
abuse of right”,1152 and thus requested the tribunal to decline jurisdiction under 
the BIT. The arbitral tribunal first acknowledged the principle of abuse of 
rights as a general principle of law and explicitly provided that all systems of 
law, whether domestic or international, adopt the principle of abuse of rights, 
or similar concepts, to preclude the misuse of the law.1153 
 
745. In applying abuse of rights, the tribunal recognised that the corporate planning 
and treaty shopping, even if aimed to gain access to arbitration, can be either 
legitimate or an abuse of right depending on the factual matrix of the case. 
Given that the dispute was foreseeable to the respondent, as complaints were 
sent prior to the restructuring, and the respondent replied to such complaints, 
the tribunal drew a distinction between pre-existing disputes at the time of the 
corporate structuring and future disputes. It was held by the tribunal that 
                                                          
1151 Orascom TMT Investments S.à.r.l., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/35, Award dated 31 May 2017, para. 
541. 
1152 Mobil Corp. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction 
dated 10 June 2010, para. 167. 
1153 Ibid, paras 169-172. 
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claimants’ restructuring of their investments to protect such investments and 
gain access to ICSID was “a perfectly legitimate goal as far as it concerned 
future disputes”. A contrario, in relation to the pre-existing disputes, it was 
held that restructuring of investments to gain access to ICSID, constituted an 
abuse of right.1154 
 
746. The above depiction of the abuse of rights principle was subsequently 
confirmed in the case of Pacific Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El 
Salvador, and  in the case of ConocoPhillips, where the arbitrators provided 
that the principle of abuse of rights is universal owing to its recognition in all 
domestic legal systems and under international law, in order to preclude 
procedural misconduct and the misuse of law.1155 
 
747. In the ICSID case of Cementownia v. Turkey, the claimant initiated arbitration 
against Turkey alleging that the latter has taken measures against two 
companies which the claimant asserts to have acquired a percentage of their 
shares. The claimant alleged that the respondent has breached its duties under 
the applicable Energy Charter Agreement. However, in their last submissions, 
both parties requested the arbitral tribunal to dismiss the case. Claimant 
requested the dismissal based on its lack of standing to sue. While it alleged 
that it acquired a shareholding interest in the two companies, it asserted that it 
cannot prove such acquisition, and thus requested the dismissal of the claim 
but without prejudice. On the other hand, respondent requested an award that 
deals with the issue of claimant’s standing to sue, as well as dismissing the 
claim with prejudice and an award of damages and costs in its favour.1156 
 
748. In its request for damages and costs, the respondent argued that the arbitral 
proceedings were initiated solely to inflict harm on Turkey.1157 After 
                                                          
1154 Ibid, paras 204-206. 
1155 Pacific Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, dated 1 June 2012, para. 2.44; ConocoPhillips v. The Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits dated 3 September 
2013, paras 273-274;  
1156 Cementownia S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, Award dated 17 
September 2009, para. 109. 
1157 Ibid, para. 165. 
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acknowledging that the claimant has brought the arbitration proceedings in bad 
faith, the tribunal provided that this conduct violated the general principle of 
abuse of rights.1158 The tribunal also held that the claimant abused its rights 
throughout the proceedings by engaging in dilatory tactics and procedural 
misconduct, including: several requests of time extension, change of its legal 
counsel and finding a new legal representation, constantly changing its prayers 
for relief, and increasing the costs of the arbitration.1159 Finally, while 
explicitly acknowledging that “compensation for moral damages may indeed 
aim at indicating a condemnation for abuse of process”,1160 the tribunal 
decided to sanction the claimant and to make him bear all costs related the 
proceedings. 
 
749. Another case that confirms that the principle of abuse of rights functions as a 
transnational principle in international arbitration that is applied to ensure the 
good administration of justice, is the case of Saipem v. Bangladesh.  
 
750. In this case, a contract was concluded between Saipem, an Italian company, 
and Petrobangla, a state-owned company of Bangladesh. The contract was for 
building a gas pipeline in Bangladesh. It was governed by Bangladeshi law and 
contained an ICC arbitration clause.1161 After building the gas pipeline, 
Petrobangla refused to pay the retention money agreed upon in the contract. 
Saipem initiated ICC arbitration in Bangladesh. During the arbitration 
proceedings, Petrobangla made a number of procedural requests regarding the 
conduct of the proceedings, which were rejected by the arbitral tribunal. 
Consequently, Petrobangla decided to resort to the courts in Bangladesh, 
notwithstanding the arbitration clause and the pending arbitration proceedings, 
and requested the revocation of the authority of the ICC tribunal and also 
requested an injunction restraining Saipem from the ICC proceedings. The 
court of Dhaka in Bangladesh confirmed Petrobangla’s allegation of 
arbitrators’ misconduct, decided to revoke the ICC tribunal’s authority, and 
                                                          
1158 Ibid, paras 153-.159 and 170. 
1159 Ibid, para. 158. 
1160 Ibid, para. 171. 
1161 Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award dated 30 June 2009, paras 7-10. 
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issued the injunction. The ICC tribunal continued and rendered an award on 
the merits which found Petrobangla liable.1162 
 
751. In a request to set aside the award before the court in Bangladesh, the court 
held that: “there is no Award in the eye of the law, which can be set aside […] 
A non-existent award can neither be set aside nor can it be enforced”.1163 
 
752. Based on the above, Saipem relied on the BIT between Italy and Bangladesh 
and initiated ICSID arbitration proceedings. In resorting to the Bangladeshi 
court and hindering the ICC arbitration proceedings, Saipem claimed that its 
right to arbitrate and its rights determined by the ICC award comprise 
investments that were expropriated.1164 The ICSID tribunal held that Saipem’s 
investment reflected in the ICC award was expropriated, and that Bangladesh 
has abused its rights. 
 
753. The ICSID tribunal examined the factual matrix of the case and the procedural 
orders rendered by the ICC tribunal and found that such a decision lacked any 
sound legal or factual grounds.1165 After acknowledging that national courts 
may have the right to revoke arbitral tribunals’ authority in cases of 
misconduct, and that courts are bestowed with a discretionary power in this 
regard,1166 the tribunal found that such a discretionary power has been 
exercised for a purpose other than that for which it was conferred. In 
establishing abuse of rights, the tribunal did not rely on any positive legal rule 
found under the arbitration rules or the ICSID Convention, but rather relied on 
the transnational nature of abuse of rights and that it functions to ensure the 
good administration of justice.1167 The tribunal stated that:  
 
                                                          
1162 Ibid, paras 31-50. 
1163 Ruth Teitelbaum, “Case Report on Saipem v. Bangladesh”, 26 Arbitration International 313, 314 
(2010); Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award dated 30 June 2009, para. 
50. 
1164 Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 21 
March 2007, para. 122. 
1165 Ibid, para. 155. 
1166 Ibid, para. 159. 
1167 Ibid, para.149. 
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[T]he Tribunal is of the opinion that the Bangladeshi 
courts exercised their supervisory jurisdiction for an end 
which was different from that for which it was instituted 
and thus violated the internationally accepted principle 
of prohibition of abuse of rights.1168 [Emphasis added]. 
 
754. Equally, in the cases of Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. (Persero) 
PLN1169 and Patuha Power v. PT. (Persero) PLN,1170 the tribunal applied the 
principle of abuse of rights on the issue of request and quantification of 
damages. The tribunal confirmed that abuse of rights is a universal principle of 
law, that it constitutes a general principle of law, and provided that it must 
apply, notwithstanding the applicable rules of law.1171 
 
755. The above confirms the nature of abuse of rights as a general principle of 
law.1172 It is submitted that the rising phenomenon of abuse in international 
arbitration urged arbitrators to find a curative tool that tackles the different 
forms of abuse that take place during arbitral proceedings. This growing 
conundrum undermines the status of the international arbitral system as a fair 
and effective means to settle international disputes.1173 As a result, it appears 
that a general principle of abuse of rights has emerged in international 
arbitration to tackle different forms of procedural abuse. This submission is 
corroborated by the principle’s wide recognition as a general procedural 
principle by distinguished scholars, and owing to its constant application to 
limit the abuse of different arbitration related rights.1174 
 
                                                          
1168 Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award dared 30 June 2009, para. 161. 
1169 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Final Award of 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11 (2000); Jan 
Paulsson, “Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals”, 23 ICSID Review Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 215, 223 (2008). 
1170 Patuha Power Ltd. (Bermuda) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (Indonesia), 14 
Mealey’s Int'l Arb. Rep. B-1, B-44 (Dec. 1999). 
1171 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Final Award of 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11, 91-92 (2000). 
1172 Nolan (2009), (note 67) 505, (providing that transnational principles are resorted to where there is 
no adequate rule in the applicable law). 
1173 Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 17. 
1174 Transglobal Green Energy LLC and Transglobal Green Panama S.A. v. Republic of Panama, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/28, Award dated 2 June 2016, para. 102 (noting that there is a line of 
consistent decisions regarding objections to jurisdiction based on abuse of rights). 
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756. Nothing in the legal framework of international arbitration precludes 
arbitrators from resorting to and applying abuse of rights. As previously 
mentioned, most, if not all, modern arbitration statutes, institutional rules, as 
well as the ICSID Convention, grant arbitrators wide powers to regulate the 
proceedings, to safeguard the integrity of the arbitral system, and to ensure the 
good administration of arbitral justice. In order to achieve this, most laws and 
rules grant arbitrators the right to resort to generally accepted legal principles 
to decide procedural issues. Whilst it is true that the current 
commercial/investment arbitral framework does not provide a positive legal 
rule/provision relating to abuse of rights, the above discussion provided 
material evidence that arbitrators have frequently resorted to the principle of 
abuse of rights to limit procedural abuse and misconduct in international 
arbitration. In doing so, arbitrators perceive and apply abuse of rights as a 
general principle of law.1175 In resorting to abuse of rights, tribunals often base 
its application on the tribunal’s inherent power to safeguard the integrity and 
fairness of the proceedings, and to ensure the good and fair administration of 
justice.1176 
 
C. Is it an Overriding Principle of Law? 
 
757. The above confirms the proposition that abuse of rights is applied as a general 
substantive and procedural principle of law. A rational corollary of this entails 
that arbitrators are to apply the principle of abuse of rights either as part of the 
applicable national law (subject to the principle’s scope of application and 
national characteristics under the national law) or as a transnational principle 
where arbitrators are entitled to resort to general principles of law, i.e. where 
parties refer to transnational standards, or in the absence of a choice.1177 
 
                                                          
1175 Topcan (2014), (note 649) 627. 
1176 Ibid, 628-629 and 633; Paparinskis (2011), (note 725); Mobil Corp. v. Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 10 June 2010, para. 184; Wasteful 
Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Decision on 
Preliminary Objections Concerning the Previous Proceedings dated 26 June 2002, para. 48. 
1177 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, “Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration”, 
(Sweet & Maxwell 1986), 76; Note (1988), (note 68) 1820 (“When the parties clearly designate the 
substantive law of a particular jurisdiction, there is little room for the application of general 
principles of law”); Waincymer (2010), (note 51) 49; Gaillard (2011), (note 66) 163. 
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758. The only exception to this is if the principle in question constitutes an 
overriding principle or a principle of transnational public policy. This is due to 
the fact that despite the application of any principles or rules of law (national 
or anational), certain principles of transnational public policy remain 
applicable.1178 
 
759. This is consistent with uniform principles found in international legal 
instruments, such as Article (1.103) of the Principles of European Contract 
law,1179 and Article (1.3) of the UNIDROIT Principles.1180 
 
760. In this regard, where parties designate a choice of law or rules of law, and 
where the principle of abuse of rights is not part of the designated rules of law, 
are arbitrators still entitled to resort to the principle of abuse of rights as a 
matter of transnational public policy? 
 
761. In this context, it is worth mentioning that transnational, or truly international 
public policy, denotes those “fundamental rules of natural law; principles of 
universal justice; jus cogens in public international law; and the general 
principles of morality accepted by what are referred to as 'civilised 
nations'”.1181 
 
                                                          
1178 Alexis Mourre, “Arbitration and Criminal Law: Reflections on the Duties of the Arbitrator”, 22 
Arbitration International 95, 116 (2006); Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 912) 860. 
1179 Article (1:103) of the Principles of European Contract Law: “Effect should nevertheless be given 
to those mandatory rules of national, supranational and international law which, according to the 
relevant rules of private international law, are applicable irrespective of the law governing the 
contract”, available at: http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.principles.parts.1.to.3.2002/1.103.html 
(accessed 1 February 2018). 
1180 Article (1.3) of the UNIDROIT Principles: “nothing in these Principles shall restrict the 
application of mandatory rules, whether of a national, international or supranational origin, which 
are applicable in accordance with the relevant rules of private international law”; Comment (4) of 
Article (1.4) of the UNIDROIT Principles of 2010. 
1181 Pierre Mayer and Audley Sheppard, “Final ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement 
of International Arbitral Awards”, 19 Arbitration International 249, 259 (2003); Pierre Lalive, 
“Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration”, in Pieter 
Sanders (ed.), “Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law 
International 1987), 295; Martin Hunter and Gui Conde E Silva, “Transnational Public Policy and 
its Application in Investment Arbitrations”, 4 The Journal of World Investment 367, 368 (2003); 
Bernard Hanotiau and Olivier Caprasse, “Public Policy in International Commercial Arbitration”, 
in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Petro (eds), “Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and 
International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice”, (Cameron May 2008), 794-
796. 
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762. In its Interim and Final Reports on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards, the ILA acknowledged that abuse of rights is a 
“fundamental principle of law”,1182 and recommended that it be considered a 
principle of international public policy. The Report first pinpointed that 
international public policy comprises those fundamental substantive and 
procedural principles, which pertain to justice and morality, ought to be 
protected by the State even if the State is not concerned with or directly 
connected to the dispute.1183 The Report then mentioned the prohibition of 
abuse of rights as an epitome of those fundamental principles of international 
public policy.1184 
 
763. One need not emphasise the value of ILA reports, the level of sophistication of 
their content, and the international stature of ILA committee members. Indeed, 
such reports depict best practices and prevailing approaches to the issues 
scrutinised thereunder. 
 
764. The above depiction of abuse of rights as a principle of transnational public 
policy is not peculiar or alien to the views of scholars and established practices 
of distinguished arbitrators.1185 As one scholar noted in the context of the 
public policy exception under the New York Convention: 
 
The courts generally have construed this public 
policy exception narrowly, drawing a clear 
distinction between domestic and international 
public policy […]. The provision’s requirements 
will only be satisfied where the most basic of 
notions of morality and justice are infringed. 
Examples of the interests protected by 
international public policy are the efforts to 
                                                          
1182 International Law Association, “Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards” London Conference (2000), Part I.V.B.2.a., 20. 
1183 Mayer & Sheppard (2003), (note 1181) 255.  
1184 Ibid, 255. 
1185 Stavros Brekoulakis, “Transnational Public Policy” (forthcoming Article), (providing that the 
prohibition of abuse of rights constitutes a transnational public policy principle); Karl-Heinz 
Böckstiegel, “Arbitration and State Enterprises: Survey on the National and International State of 
Law and Practice”, (Kluwer 1984), 25; Gaillard (2017), (note 55) 34, (discussing its mandatory 
nature in relation to substantive and procedural matters); Swiss Federal Tribunal, dated 8 March 
2006, in the case of Tensaccia S.P.A v. Freyssinet Terra Armata R.L., 4P.278/2005, 24 ASA 
Bulletin 550, 553 (2006). 
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combat drug smuggling, child pornography, 
bribery, corruption […] the prohibition of the 
abuse of rights, and the protection of the 
incapacitated.1186 [Emphasis added]. 
 
765. While arbitral awards dealing with the mentioned enquiry are indeed scarce, 
some cases may be mentioned to elucidate the issue.  
 
766. It is well-acknowledged that a form of state manoeuvre that may constitute an 
abuse of right, is the principle of ex re sed non ex nomine (evasion of the law); 
where a state manipulates and abuses its regime or domestic procedures to 
evade its obligations.1187 Thus, where a state, or a state-owned entity, agrees to 
refer a given dispute to international arbitration, the principle of abuse of rights 
may operate, as a principle of transnational public policy, to preclude the state 
from relying on its national law to evade arbitration.1188  
 
767. In the case of Benteler v. Belgium, the principle was applied to prevent such 
abusive conduct, and was described as a fundamental rule “the observance of 
which is obligatory in international arbitration”.1189 Similarly, in the case of 
Millicom and Sentel v. Republic of Senegal, the tribunal provided that it is an 
established principle in international arbitration that a State is precluded from 
relying on its domestic law to avoid arbitration or its capacity to arbitrate. The 
tribunal further confirmed that this comprises a principle of transnational 
public policy.1190 A similar decision was rendered in ICC Case No. 1939 of 
1971, where the tribunal also held that the international community cannot 
sanction the abusive conduct of States or State-owned entities that attempt to 
evade their obligations by relying on their laws, and that such conduct is 
                                                          
1186 Dimitri Santoro, “Forum Non Conveniens: A Valid Defense under the New York Convention”, 21 
ASA Bulletin 713, 721 (2003). 
1187 Paulsson (2006), (note 1139) 73; Cheng (2006), (note 190) 122; Jan Paulsson, “May a State 
Invoke its Internal Law to Repudiate Consent to International Commercial Arbitration? Reflections 
on the Benteler v. Belgium Preliminary Award”, 2 Arbitration International 90 (1986). 
1188 Böckstiegel (1984), (note 1185) 25 and 45; Paulsson (2006), (note 1139) 73. 
1189 Ad-hoc arbitration case of Benteler v. Belgium, Award of 18 November 1983, 1 Journal of 
International Arbitration 184, 188 (1986; also referred to in Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. 
PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules, Final Award of 4 May 1999, XXV 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11, 91 (2000). 
1190 Millicom and Sentel v Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB-08-20, Decision on Jurisdiction 
dated 16 July 2010, para. 103(b). 
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contrary to transnational public policy.1191 The depiction of abuse of rights, or 
venire contra factum proprium, as an application thereof, was again used as a 
principle of transnational public policy in ICC Case No. 10947 of 2002.1192  
 
768. The arbitral awards in the seminal cases of Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. 
PT. (Persero) PLN1193 and Patuha Power v. PT. (Persero) PLN,1194 fortify and 
confirm that the principle of abuse of rights is not only a general principle of 
substantive and procedural law, but that it may also apply as an overriding 
principle, notwithstanding the applicable rules of law. 
 
769. In these cases, Himpurna and Patuha, two subsidiaries of an American 
company, entered into energy sale contracts with PLN (the Indonesian State 
Electricity Corporation). Pursuant to the contracts, Himpurna and Patuha were 
obliged to supply electricity to PLN and invest in wells and other 
infrastructure. Following the Indonesian financial crisis in 1997, presidential 
decrees were issued to the effect that PLN could not perform its contractual 
obligations. Accordingly, the investments of Himpurna and Patuha were 
suspended. Himpurna initiated arbitration proceedings and sought damages of 
2.3 billion US Dollars. Patuha also relied on its contract and initiated 
arbitration proceedings and sought 1.4 billion US dollars in damages. Given 
that both cases are almost identical, except for the amount of damages 
requested, reference herein below, is made to the Himpurna award.1195 
 
770. Applying Indonesian law, the arbitral tribunal found that PLN was in breach of 
its contractual obligations, performed the contractual obligations in bad faith, 
and held that Himpurna was entitled to damages, including lost profits. 
                                                          
1191 ICC Case No. 1939 of 1971, [1973] Review Arbitrage 145, referred to in Millicom and Sentel v 
Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB-08-20, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 16 July 2010, 
para. 103(b). 
1192 ICC Case No. 10947 of 2002, 22 ASA Bulletin 308 (2004), para. 30. 
1193 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Final Award of 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11 (2000); Jan 
Paulsson, “Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals”, 23 ICSID Review Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 215, 223 (2008). 
1194 Patuha Power Ltd. (Bermuda) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (Indonesia), 14 
Mealey’s Int'l Arb. Rep. B-1, B-44 (Dec. 1999). 
1195 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Final Award of 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11, 14 (2000). 
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However, in relation to awarding lost profits, the tribunal limited the amount to 
less than 10 percent of the amounts claimed. 
 
771. In reaching its decision regarding the damages, the tribunal relied on the 
principle of abuse of rights. The tribunal explicitly acknowledged that the 
principle is universal, constitutes a general principle of law, and ensures the 
legitimacy of the international arbitral process.1196 Given that Indonesian law 
does not include an express reference to abuse of rights, the tribunal provided 
that “it will apply the principle as an element of overriding substantive law 
proper to the international arbitral process”, Thus, the tribunal held that: 
 
In such circumstances, it strikes the Arbitral Tribunal as 
unacceptable to assess lost profits as though the claimant 
had an unfettered right to create ever-increasing losses 
for the State of Indonesia (and its people) by generating 
energy without any regard to whether or not PLN had 
any use for it. Even if such a right may be said to derive 
from explicit contractual terms […] To extract the full 
benefit of the hard terms of the ESC with respect to 
investments not yet made, in a situation where that 
benefit will clearly exacerbate the already great losses of 
the co-contractant, strikes the Arbitral Tribunal as likely 
to constitute an abuse of right […] this is a case where 
the doctrine of abuse of right must be applied in favour 
of PLN to prevent the claimant’s undoubtedly legitimate 
rights from being extended beyond tolerable norms.1197 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
772. This case is of particular interest and importance as it highlights the possible 
application of the principle of abuse of rights in international arbitration, in 
relation to the phase of awarding and quantifying damages, not only as a 
general principle of law, but as an overriding principle of law.1198 
 
                                                          
1196 Ibid, 91-92 (2000).  
1197 Ibid, 90. 
1198 Others have equally advocated that abuse of rights constitutes a transnational public policy 
principle: Santoro (2003), (note 1186) 721: “Examples of the interests protected by international 
public policy are the efforts to combat drug smuggling, child pornography, bribery, corruption and 
other generally condemned practices, as well as the notions of good faith, pacta sunt servanda, the 
prohibition of the abuse of rights, and the protection of the incapacitated”; Gui Conde Silva, 
“Transnational Public Policy in International Arbitration”, (PhD, Queen Mary University of 
London, 2007), 136-137. 
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773. This may suggest that abuse of rights operates as an overriding principle of 
law, and is to be given effect irrespective of the governing law and the will of 
the parties.1199 
 
774. Moreover, a review of the award shows that in endorsing abuse of rights as an 
overriding substantive/procedural principle of law, the underlying criterion 
arguably adopted by the tribunal was that of reasonableness and balancing of 
the competing interests.1200 This further confirms the endorsement of this 
criterion in the transnational/universal context of abuse of rights. Precisely, the 
tribunal’s award is premised on the view that an abuse of right may be 
established, notwithstanding the absence of fault on the side of the right 
holder,1201 given the unreasonable amount of damages to the counter party: 
“beyond tolerable norms”.1202 This is an application of the balancing factor as 
stated in the previous chapters: where courts/tribunals find an abuse given the 
gravity of damages caused to an individual from the exercise of a right, 
notwithstanding the absence of fault. Moreover, the tribunal’s engagement in 
the balancing of the competing interests is evident as it has found an abuse of 
right despite the fact that such finding arguably conflicts with the principles of 
pacta sunt servanda1203 and legal security,1204 which are acknowledged 
interests in contractual arrangements. 
                                                          
1199 Abdulhay Sayed, “Corruption in International Trade and Commercial Arbitration”, (Kluwer Law 
International 2004), 286, (providing that the application of overriding principles limits the parties’ 
choice). 
1200 Similarly, the decision rendered by the WTO Appellate Body in the case of United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, 
para. 158, (where the tribunal used good faith as a synonym of reasonableness). 
1201 The tribunal acknowledged that the right holder has “undoubtedly legitimate rights”, Petrova 
(2004), (note 187) 456, (“However, without finding any liability or bad faith by the project 
companies, the Arbitral Tribunal awarded less than ten percent of the amount each company had 
claimed in lost profits”). 
1202 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Final Award of 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11, 93 (2000). 
1203 Michael Pryles commented on the tribunal’s decision and provided that the decision arguably 
disregarded the principle of pacta sunt servanda, Michael Pryles, “Lost Profit and Capital 
Investment”, 1 World Arbitral & Mediation Review 1, 14 (2007); Henrik M. Inadomi, “Independent 
Power Projects in Developing Countries: Legal Investment Protection and Consequences for 
Development”, (Kluwer Law International 2010), 259 (“the Himpurna/Patuha tribunals limited the 
doctrine of Pacta Sunt Servanda because full expectation damages would constitute an abuse of 
right”). 
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775. Qualifying abuse of rights as a fundamental overriding principle of law is not 
subject to unanimity in international arbitration, specifically given its defiance 
to the overarching principle of pacta sunt servanda.1205 The dissenting opinion 
of arbitrator De Fina further testifies to the mandatory nature of abuse of rights 
as perceived by the majority, and that it constituted a transnational principle. 
He  stipulated:  
 
I am particularly troubled by the novel 
proposition adopted by my colleagues that the 
claimant’s reliance upon its contractual rights to 
establish quantum amounts to an abuse of rights 
thus leading to and permitting a substantial 
reduction of what might otherwise be awarded. 
My concern is that such a questionable 
proposition and the manner of its application in 
this Award prejudices notions of legal security 
and basic principles of private law […] the 
imposition of a concept described as ‘abuse of 
rights’ in the absence of findings of malicious 
intent or lack of good faith on the part of the 
claimant to further reduce the entitlement to 
damages is in my opinion an inappropriate and 
unwarranted penalising of the claimant.1206 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
776. Subjecting the application of the principle of abuse of rights to a finding of bad 
faith or malicious intent testifies to the different perception of the principle 
between the majority and the dissenting arbitrator; i.e. national principle versus 
a transnational principle. Given that Indonesian law includes a provision 
regarding good faith, but does not expressly provide for abuse of rights,1207 the 
dissenting arbitrator opined that abuse of rights can only apply where there is 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1204 The dissenting arbitrator provided that applying abuse of rights prejudices the notion of “legal 
security”. Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under 
UNCITRAL rules, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator De Fina, XXV Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration 13 (2000); BIICL, “Case Note: Karaha Bodas and Himpurna Arbitrations”, 6 (2008), 
at: http://www.biicl.org/files/3931_2000_himpurna_and_karaha_bodas_arbitrations.pdf (accessed 1 
February 2018). 
1205 Pryles (2007), (note 1203) 14-15; John Y. Gotanda, “Recovering Lost Profits in International 
Disputes”, 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law 61, 104-105 (2004). 
1206 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator De Fina, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11, 108 
(2000). 
1207 Article (1338) of the Indonesian Civil Code. 
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proof of bad faith. On the other hand, the majority perceived and applied the 
principal as a mandatory transnational principle of law,1208 as they (i) did not 
restrict themselves to the particularities of Indonesian law; (ii) they endorsed 
the criterion of reasonableness which is not part of Indonesian law; (iii) the 
principle was applied to prevent awarding unreasonable damages, 
notwithstanding the absence of fault, which is an application not found under 
the applicable law; (iv) they went beyond the contract and the positive law; 
they explicitly endorsed and applied the principle as a general and overriding 
principle of law. 
  
777. On a related note, it is submitted that in some cases abuse of rights may 
function as a principle of transnational public policy (substantive and 
procedural) even if not explicitly expressed as one.1209 
 
778. In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention ICC Case No.1803 of 1972,1210 
where a dispute arose out of a contract concluded between a corporation 
wholly owned by the Pakistan government (EBIDC) and a French company 
(SGTM) regarding the construction of a pipeline for the transport of gas in 
East Pakistan (which became Republic of Bangladesh in 1971). The contract 
was subject to Pakistani law and provided for arbitration in Geneva under the 
rules of ICC. Upon the failure to settle a claim of 12 million French Francs, 
arbitration proceedings started in Geneva. The then President of Bangladesh 
issued a decree establishing a corporation (BIDC) and transferred the shares, 
board of directors, and employees of EBIDC to BIDC. Additionally, the decree 
provided that the debts incurred are deemed to have been incurred by BIDC. 
Finally, the decree provided that any arbitration against EBIDC before the 
issuance of the order is deemed abated and no award shall be binding or 
enforceable. Subsequently an order was issued to dissolve EBIDC, and another 
order dissolving BIDC was issued. 
 
                                                          
1208 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator De Fina, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11, 91-92 
(2000). 
1209 Silva (2007), (note 1198) 135-137. 
1210 ICC Case No. 1803 of 1972, V Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 177-185 (1980). 
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779. The arbitral tribunal agreed to SGTM’s request to join the Bangladeshi 
Government and to the substitution of BIDC for EPIDC to the arbitration. The 
tribunal rendered an award to the effect that BIDC and the Government of 
Bangladesh are jointly and severally liable. In this regard, it is of particular 
interest to mention that the tribunal held that: 
 
Be that as it may, the tenor and intended effect of the 
Disputed Debts Order is wholly repugnant to Swiss 
conceptions of natural justice, fair dealing and the 
standards of morality binding upon sovereign 
Governments. The notion that a debt should become void 
and indeed non-existent ab initio for no better reason 
than that the debtor has chosen to put it in dispute is an 
extreme example of what natural justice abhors - the 
person or the public authority setting itself up as judge of 
its own cause. The lex fori certainly does not require me 
to recognize and apply the Disputed Debts Order. It is a 
flagrant abuse of right and a measure which is quite 
irreconcilable with Swiss “ordre public”; it should not 
be recognized or applied by any Swiss judge or in any 
arbitration which is proceeding in Switzerland and is 
governed by Swiss procedural law.1211 [Emphasis added]. 
 
780. While the arbitrator’s decision was based on Swiss law, being the lex arbitri, 
the decision is instructive on the nature of abuse of rights and its possible 
status as a principle of transnational public policy. The conduct of the debtor, 
constituting abuse of rights, was characterised as contrary to natural justice, 
fairness and standards of morality. These potent interests and norms generally 
reflect a transnational conception of public policy.1212 Thus, while the 
arbitrator applied abuse of rights to safeguard the most fundamental Swiss 
                                                          
1211 Ibid, 181. It is to be mentioned that this award was set aside by the Cour de justice in Geneva and 
this was further upheld by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. The Court provided that the arbitrator 
lacked the jurisdiction to order the joinder of the Government of Bangladesh and the substitution of 
BIDC for EPIDC as the former does not exist. Société des Grands Travaux de Marseille v. People's 
Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Industrial Development Corporation, Swiss Federal Tribunal, 
5 May 1976, V Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 217-219 (1980). 
1212 Mayer & Sheppard (2003), (note 1181) 259; Lalive (1987), (note 1181) 295; Hunter & Silva 
(2003), (note 1181) 368. 
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norms of fairness and justice, the reasoning employed seems to reflect 
transnational public policy.1213 
 
781. This is consistent with the views of scholars who view this decision as 
revealing the interrelation between the principle of abuse of rights and 
transnational public policy. In commenting on this case, one academic noted 
that while transnational public policy was not explicitly relied on, it was, 
nevertheless, applied in essence.1214 
 
782. Based on the above, abuse of rights is considered a fundamental transnational 
principle of law. Moreover, some go further and apply it as a principle of 
transnational public policy. This recognition entails that whenever the 
conditions sine qua non of the principle’s application are satisfied, arbitrators 
are to apply it, notwithstanding the choice of law.1215 In this regard, given the 
procedural framework of international arbitration, where existing laws and 
rules grant arbitrators the power to resort to, or abide by,1216 generally accepted 
procedural principles, and due to the constant application of the principle to 
prevent abuse of procedural rights, it is submitted that abuse of rights should 
operate as a principle of transnational public policy to prevent the abuse of 
arbitration related rights. Thus, it should apply in the context of procedural 
rights, notwithstanding the applicable rules and the lex arbitri. 
 
783. In the context of substantive rights, while one agrees with depicting the 
principle as fundamental given the potent interests it aims to secure, one 
cannot, hitherto, stipulate that it comprises an established principle of 
                                                          
1213 ICC Case No. 6474 of 1992, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 279 (2000), para. 36, 
(where the tribunal relied on the broader notion of good faith, as a principle of transnational public 
policy, to prohibit the State from relying on its own non-recognition by the international community 
to preclude its obligation to arbitrate. In its reasoning, the tribunal noted that the “denial of 
jurisdiction in the circumstances would be contrary to that clear principle of transnational public 
policy which is the principle of good faith; it would defeat the legitimate expectations of the Parties 
to the agreements and finally compel the claimant to go before the Courts of the territory, as 
suggested by the defendant – all results which do not seem, to say the least, to be in keeping with the 
requirements of international public policy and of natural justice”). 
1214 Silva (2007), (note 1198) 135. 
1215 Lew, Mistelis & Kröll (2003), (note 690) 419-420. 
1216 Some submit that arbitrators must abide by fundamental general procedural principles in 
international arbitration: ICC Case No. 1512 of 1971, I Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 128, 128 
(1976). 
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transnational public policy owing to the immaturity of such proposition. This is 
particularly the case given that any deviation from the applicable substantive 
law, lex causae, is generally frowned upon as it violates the sacrosanct 
principle of party autonomy, unless the principle is clearly of international 
public policy.1217 Thus, it is ripe for consideration as a principle of 
transnational public policy from the perspective of de lege lata – but the 
principle’s potency demonstrates its suitability and appropriateness to be 
elevated to such status, i.e. de lege ferenda.  
 
784. On a different note, from a practical perspective, whether the principle elevates 
to, and operates as, a principle of transnational public policy in relation to 
substantive rights is not necessarily material to the outcome of cases, 
particularly given the omnipresence of the principle in national legal systems 
and its recognition as a general principle of law. Arbitrators shall apply the 
principle whenever it is part of the applicable substantive law or as part of the 
general principles of law where he/she is entitled to apply those principles. 
However, unlike the principle’s application as a general principle of law, 
applying abuse of rights as a national principle necessitates adhering to its 
specific scope of application under the relevant applicable law, as outlined in 




785. The growing panoply of various forms of abuse that take place during the 
arbitration proceedings required the international community, and particularly 
arbitrators, to develop non-classic tools to remedy such procedural misconduct. 
A scrutiny of the principle’s application in international arbitration not only 
demonstrates the omnipresence of the principle in most legal systems as well 
as under international law, but provided compelling evidence that a general 
principle of abuse of rights has emerged in international arbitration. 
 
                                                          
1217 Gaillard & Savage (1999), (note 912) 785 and 841-842; Lew, Mistelis & Kröll (2003), (note 690) 
419-420; ICC Case No. 1512 of 1971, I Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 128, 129 (1976); 
Gaillard (2011), (note 66) 163. 
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786. A review of different legal systems testify that the principle is recognised as a 
general substantive and procedural principle of law. This is further confirmed 
by the views of renowned scholars and by the constant application of abuse of 
rights as a general principle of law. 
 
787. While the principle reflects fundamental interests that decision makers should 
safeguard and enforce, its depiction as part of transnational public policy is 
controversial.  
 
788. It is one’s submission that it should apply as a principle of transnational public 
policy in relation to procedural rights, given the current arbitral framework that 
grants arbitrators wide discretionary powers. Thus, it should apply regardless 
of the lex arbitri. However, although the principle is fundamental with regard 
to substantive rights, it should apply only where the arbitrators are allowed to 
resort to general principles of law, or as part of the national applicable law. 
  





789. There is a dire need to prevent the transformation of international arbitration to 
a process profoundly tainted with procedural misconduct and abuse. The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the recognition and development of abuse 
of rights as a general principle of law applicable in international arbitration to 
prevent the abuse of substantive and procedural rights.  
 
790. Further, the thesis examines the role and function of abuse of rights in 
international arbitration and reveals how its application ensures the good 
administration of arbitral justice. 
 
791. The results produced from this thesis comprise remarks on existing views and 
also a number of suggestions that mainly cover the following issues: (1) 
whether the principle of abuse of rights constitutes a general, or transnational, 
principle of law; (2) the core elements of abuse of rights and its scope of 
application; (3) concerns and limitations of the principle; (4) the importance of 
applying abuse of rights in international arbitration and its role in ensuring the 
good administration of arbitral justice; and (5) the nature of the principle and 





792. As discussed above, in order to examine whether abuse of rights can be 
considered a general principle of law, the principle’s recognition in all systems 
of law is not required. The methodology employed was to ascertain the 
prevailing trend within legal systems and establish the wide recognition of the 
principle. It is recognised that a principle that gains wide recognition can 
constitute a general principle of law, despite the fact that it is not recognised in 
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a number of legal systems.1218 However, whilst the principle may not be 
readily recognised in some national laws, it remains important that its 
application does not defy the fundamental concepts of the main systems of 
law.1219  
 
793. A comparative examination of abuse of rights was undertaken in order to 
ascertain its wide recognition, identify its nature, analyse its application in 
national legal systems, and establish elements of commonality across different 
legal systems. 
 
794. Based on a prudent synthesis of different legal systems, it was suggested that 
abuse of rights is an equitable principle in the Aristotelian sense, in that it 
clearly reflects equitable considerations, and primarily operates to ameliorate 
the harshness and rigidity of strict legal rules and contractual terms. 
 
795. As a legal principle, its recognition and application naturally varies from one 
jurisdiction to another. Whilst its recognition is omnipresent, its legal basis and 
the manner in which it is applied is not the same. Thus, it was evident that the 
principle was formulated on statutory grounds in some jurisdictions, as in the 
case of Switzerland, Germany and Egypt. A contrario, in France the courts 
arguably had a primary role in the principle’s recognition, development and 
application. 
 
796. Similarly, the manner in which the principle is regulated and applied by courts 
may vary. Some jurisdictions sought to carefully define the principle and 
delineate its scope of application, such as the approach of Egyptian law and the 
law of Louisiana, where the principle is carefully defined and the criteria of 
abuse clearly set out. Other laws opted for a mere recognition of the principle 
and granted the courts the discretionary power to adopt the appropriate criteria 
of abuse.  
 
                                                          
1218 Gaillard (2010), (note 65) 48-51. 
1219 Gutteridge (1949), (note 66) 65. 
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797. The evolution of abuse of rights and its extension to limit the abuse of different 
rights is palpable. Although the principle originated in the arena of property 
law, it clearly extended to other areas of law, and is now considered by many 
jurisdictions as a general principle applicable in every department of law. This 
is equally evident with regards to the abuse of procedural rights, whereby some 
jurisdictions rely on the broad principle of abuse of rights to tackle any form of 
procedural abuse and other jurisdictions sought to include more defined 
statutory provisions to preclude procedural abuse. 
 
798. The study also examined the recognition and application of abuse of rights in 
the common law systems. It was asserted that a general principle of abuse of 
rights is not acknowledged in the common law. However, it was argued that 
the common law has implemented other rules and principles, the operation of 
which may equally preclude different forms of abuse. Given the different 
rules/tools utilised to tackle substantive and procedural abuse, a distinction was 
made between substantive rights and procedural rights. It was argued that the 
operation of abuse of process in the common law parallels the principle of 
abuse of rights, and that the common law may limit other forms of substantive 
abuse if the conduct in question falls under the scope of a pre-existing tort. 
 
799. Upon reviewing the principle’s application in different legal systems, a 
delineation of the core elements of abuse of rights was embarked upon. As 
analysed, abuse of rights assumes the existence of an acknowledged legal right, 
presupposes that the act in question is made within the formal limits of the 
right, and that such right ceases legal protection given that it has been abused 
by the right holder.  
 
800. The thesis discussed the concept of a right in the context of abuse of rights and 
endorsed the interest theory of rights, which advocates that a right denotes an 
interest recognised and protected by the law. It was argued that such an 
ideology of rights prohibited abusive exercise of rights and led to the formation 
of the abuse of rights principle. 
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801. One endeavoured to examine the different criteria adopted to find an abuse of 
right, and highlighted the inherent limitation of each criterion. The study 
illustrated that the different criteria used by courts and tribunals are interrelated 
and overlap manifestly, which renders some of them superfluous. 
 
802. The study concluded that the criterion of reasonableness comprises an effective 
criterion of abuse, given that: (1) it covers certain applications of abuse of 
rights which may not necessarily be covered if other criteria are adopted; (2) it 
is widely used in civil law countries and international law; (3) it effectively 
encompasses other criteria; (4) it is not alien to the common law depiction of 
rights; and (5) it comprises an objective standard of abuse. 
 
803. On a different note, the role of other principles in precluding abusive practices 
was examined. In this regard, the interrelation between abuse of rights and the 
broader principle of good faith clearly demonstrated that abuse of rights is an 
application of the principle of good faith. The vertical interrelation between the 
principle of good faith and abuse of rights, and the perception that the former 
embodies the latter, suggested that jurisdictions that do not explicitly endorse 
the principle of abuse of rights, or adopt a restrictive application thereof, may 
still limit the exercise of rights on the basis of the principle of good faith. This 
was manifested by an examination of German law,1220 as well as US law.1221 
Arbitral tribunals have also utilised the principle of good faith in order to 
preclude different forms of abuse.1222 
 
804. Drawing on the analysis of the first two chapters, the study examined the 
application of abuse of rights in international arbitration and its role in tackling 
the rising phenomenon of abuse. The purpose of this chapter was to 
demonstrate that the application of abuse of rights is not foreign to the practice 
of international arbitration, and to suggest that a general principle of abuse of 
                                                          
1220 Judgment of 29 November 1956, 22 BGHZ 226, 230 (1957) translated in Bolgar (1975), (note 32) 
1029-1030. 
1221 Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (Mass. 1977), 1252-1253. 
1222 Decision rendered by the WTO Appellate Body in the case of United States – Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, para. 158; Himpurna 
California Energy Ltd v. PT. PLN (Persero), ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules, Final 
award of 4 May 1999, XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 11 (2000). 
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rights has emerged and developed owing to its paramount importance in 
ensuring the good administration of arbitral justice. 
 
805. The notion of administration of arbitral justice is largely ambiguous owing to 
the lack of any detailed study that delineated its meaning or its inherent 
elements. That said, prior to embarking on the interrelation between abuse of 
rights and the administration of arbitral justice, a clear demarcation of the latter 
was indispensable.  
 
806. It was argued that the notion refers to the fairness of the proceedings, 
requirements of due process and procedural efficiency. The study outlined how 
the application of abuse of rights balances the competing interests of due 
process, fairness and procedural efficiency and then demonstrated how it 
ensures the good administration of arbitral justice.  
 
807. It was submitted that abuse of rights strikes the balance needed between 
procedural efficiency, fairness, and due process. In recognising abuse of rights 
as a general principle in arbitration, tribunals are equipped with a tool that can 
assist them in discerning the conduct of the parties and take into consideration 
the motives and purpose of any request that may affect the fairness of the 
proceedings or hinder the efficient conduct of proceedings. Upon a prudent 
balance of the competing interests, and based on the factual matrix of the case, 
arbitrators may determine whether such procedural request is reasonable. 
 
808. The above submission was then tested and confirmed by an analysis of the 
application of abuse of rights to prevent common forms of procedural abuse, 
particularly in the context of: corporate and state manoeuvres to gain access to, 
or block, arbitral proceedings, parallel arbitral proceedings, and the extension 
of the arbitration clause to non-signatories.  
 
809. This analysis demonstrated how the failure to apply the principle may 
seriously prejudice the opposing party and bring disrepute to the administration 
of justice. Thus, as the tribunals in the CME/Lauder cases failed to effectively 
apply abuse of rights, a material impediment to standards of fairness, 
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requirements of due process and the broader notion of administration of justice 
materialised, which was manifested by the conflicting awards rendered in the 
parallel proceedings. 
 
810. The existence of other classic rules/principles that may tackle some forms of 
abuse in international arbitration was equally highlighted. An analysis of these 
rules and how arbitrators determine their scope of application evinced that they 
tend to be palliative rather than curative. Thus, whilst arbitral tribunals may 
answer a party’s abusive conduct by allocating the costs, it is generally 
recognised that this practice fails to deter parties and their legal counsel from 
abusing their rights and engaging in procedural misconduct. Similarly, 
although the doctrines of lis pendens and res judicata may apply to limit 
abusive parallel or subsequent proceedings, the rigid requirements of the ‘triple 
identity’ test may fail to remedy the conundrums associated with such 
proceedings, particularly in cases where the parties, causes of action and relief 
sought, are not identical.  
 
811. Moreover, the various rules that attempt to tackle abusive conduct fragment 
and compartmentalise the approach to abusive practices, where different 
abusive behaviours will have to fit under different rules or doctrines. 
 
812. In such cases, a stand-alone general principle of abuse of rights is far from 
being superfluous. The virtue and efficacy of a single theory with a wide scope 
of application and an overarching premise, is that it can be used to address 
different abusive behaviours, and equally enjoys the flexibility of general 
principles of law. It may remedy any abuse and its application does not rely on 
satisfying any rigid or formal requirements. 
 
813. The thesis suggested that the importance of endorsing a general principle of 
abuse of rights is not only mandated by its role in ensuring the administration 
of justice, but also owing to its comprehensiveness and its ability to remedy 
forms of abuse that other rules fail to remedy. Its potency equally stems from 
the fact that it is a general principle that can equally remedy any form of abuse 
that is not currently regulated by a specific rule. While it may crystallise its 
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potent manifestations in various specific principles and rules to tackle specific 
forms of abuse, endorsing it as a general principle remains indispensable to 
remedy all forms of abuse. 
 
814. Drawing on the analysis of the abovementioned and based on the findings of 
the first three chapters, this study endeavoured to examine how abuse of rights 
is applied in international arbitration. Accordingly, chapter four focused on 
discerning the legal basis of abuse of rights and examining its nature in 
international arbitration. Owing to the scope of the thesis, which focused on 
both substantive and procedural rights, a determination of the nature of abuse 
of rights in relation to substantive and procedural rights was warranted. 
 
815. To that end, applying abuse of rights as a general principle of substantive law 
was demonstrated by an analysis of the views shared by scholars and its 
endorsement as a general principle by arbitrators. Tribunals recognise the 
application of the principle, not only as part of the applicable national law, but 
as a generally accepted legal principle.  Moreover, the recognition of abuse of 
rights as a general principle of substantive law in international legal 
instruments was equally discussed.  
 
816. The discussion was not limited to the nature of abuse of rights from the 
perception of private law. Examining the principle’s application in the domain 
of public international law was also achieved. Thus, one highlighted the fact 
that the principle is recognised as a general principle of law by prominent 
scholars, is endorsed as such by international courts and tribunals (including 
the ICJ, CJEU, WTO panels, and ICSID tribunals), and is applied in the 
context of a wide array of legal matters. 
 
817. The thesis then provided a study on abuse of rights as a general principle of 
arbitral procedure. First, one provided a general overview on the application of 
transnational principles of procedure in international arbitration, and 
emphasised the non-comprehensive nature of the procedural framework of 
international arbitration. Additionally, it was argued that an autonomous set of 
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transnational principles have emerged in order to ensure the administration of 
arbitral justice. 
 
818. Whilst the different representations of international arbitration were succinctly 
mentioned, the existence of an autonomous arbitral legal order was recognised 
and the transnational depiction of international arbitration was endorsed in this 
thesis. It was argued that international arbitration should be governed by 
transnational norms and procedural principles that emerge owing to their 
acceptance in different legal systems and as a result of their frequent 
application by international arbitrators. 
 
819. Based on the above, it was submitted that abuse of rights constitutes a general 
principle of arbitral procedure given that: (1) its application to tackle different 
forms of procedural abuse is generally recognised in most legal systems, 
including the common law and international law; (2) it is recognised as such in 
international legal instruments and by distinguished scholars; and (3) it is 
constantly applied by arbitral tribunals as a general principle of law. 
 
820. On a different note, an examination of how abuse of rights operates and applies 
as a general principle of arbitral procedure demonstrated that the element of 
reasonableness comprises the raison d’être and depicts the basis of abuse of 
rights. 
 
821. A prima facie review of the principle’s application may reveal that arbitral 
tribunals do not restrict themselves to a strict criterion of abuse but rather 
assess all the factual matrix of the case and endorse the same criteria used by 
national courts (intention,1223 reasonableness and purpose of rights).1224 Some 
hailed the principle of abuse of rights as an effective remedy, but flagged that 
the lack of “unifying criteria” of abuse appears as a disadvantage.1225 
                                                          
1223 Pacific Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, dated 1 June 2012, para. 2.41; but see Tidewater Inc., Tidewater Investment SRL, 
Tidewater Caribe, C.A., et al, v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, 
para. 183. 
1224 Mobil Corp., v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction 
dated 10 June 2010, paras 184-185; Lee (2015), (note 788) 376. 
1225 Lee (2015), (note 788) 376. 
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822. One submits that the different conclusions reached by tribunals demonstrate 
the implementation of the balancing factor in applying abuse of rights as a 
general principle of law. As provided by one tribunal, the criterion of abuse 
should strike a fair balance between the need to safeguard one’s rights and the 
need to deny protection to abusive conduct.1226 
 
823. In applying the balancing factor, a contextual analysis of the different 
competing interests at stake is conducted. Whilst it is true that there exists no 
abstract rule on how the balancing exercise is to be undertaken, or what the 
competing interests involved are, it is submitted that this conforms to the 
nature and function of abuse of rights: a principle that ameliorates the rigidity 
of the law and ensures the good administration of justice. Thus, the operation 
of this principle must be left as a flexible tool to be utilised by arbitrators given 
the specificities of the dispute in question. Accordingly, finding an abuse of 
right is a fact-based inquiry that demands arbitrators to balance all factors and 
interests involved in the case. 
 
824. It was clear that utilising this criterion necessitated considering different 
interests depending on the nature of the dispute. Thus, evaluating the abusive 
nature of changing the corporate structure to gain access to ICSID arbitration 
raised different interests from those raised in the context of parallel 
proceedings, and the weight given to each interest differed based on the factual 
matrix of the case. 
 
825. However, it is important to note that examining various disputes that raise the 
same or similar questions provided sufficient evidence that the same legal and 
personal interests are examined to establish an abuse of right, which may assist 
in predictability and reliance on similar decisions. 
 
826. Exempli gratia, in the context of the initiation of parallel arbitral proceedings, 
the adoption of the balancing factor was apparent. In considering the existence 
                                                          
1226 Renée Rose Levy and Gremcitel S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, Award 
dated 9 January 2015, para. 185. 
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of any abuse, tribunals balanced the competing interests involved which often 
included: the right to pursue different claims in different fora, against the risk 
of contradictory awards, preclusion of extra costs, the interest of procedural 
efficiency and ensuring the overall administration of justice, and also 
considered the conduct of the aggrieved party.1227 
 
827. It was also highlighted that in balancing the competing interests, tribunals 
regularly consider the conduct of the aggrieved party and whether it was 
equally tainted with any abuse, in application of the principle of he who comes 
to equity must come with clean hand. Thus, in the case of Ampal-American 
Israel Corp. v. Egypt discussed above, the tribunal explicitly relied on the fact 
that the respondent refused the consolidation of the arbitral proceedings, and 
also refused appointing the same arbitrator in the parallel proceedings to 
conclude that the initiation of the parallel proceedings were not abusive per se: 
“it cannot be characterised as abusive especially when the Respondent has 
declined the Claimants’ offers to consolidate the proceedings”.1228 
 
II. CONTRIBUTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
828. In an attempt to contribute to the legal debate on abuse of rights, and as a 
relatively novel study on its role in international arbitration, this thesis presents 
the following recommendations and considerations, the adherence to which 
may limit the rising phenomenon of abuse in international arbitration: 
 
829. Firstly, the application of the general principle of abuse of rights presumes the 
existence of an acknowledged right and should operate to limit the exercise of 
any right conferred upon the parties by the applicable arbitration rules or laws. 
 
830. Secondly, arbitrators’ right/obligation to prevent procedural misconduct and 
abuse in international arbitration should emanate from their inherent duty to 
                                                          
1227 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Award of 3 
September 2001, para. 178; Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016, paras 321(iv) and 328-339. 
1228 Ampal-American Israel Corp., et al v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, 
Decision on Jurisdiction dated 1 February 2016, para. 329. 
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ensure the good administration of arbitral justice. Abuse of rights operates to 
enhance the efficiency of the proceedings, safeguards the fairness of the 
proceedings and the equality between the parties, preserves the integrity of the 
process, and upholds parties’ reasonable expectations.  
 
831. Thirdly, abuse of rights should be treated and applied as a general principle of 
law in international arbitration. Whilst it is true that the principle exists and can 
be applied as a national legal construct, its wide recognition, significance to the 
arbitral process, and its frequent application by arbitrators testify to the effect 
that it should be considered and approached as a general principle of law.  
 
832. More importantly, employing it as a general principle confers upon arbitrators 
a corrective tool of a clear equitable nature, and dispenses them with the 
restrictions and rigidity of parochial national rules, the application of which 
may defy the transnational perception of international arbitration. 
 
833. Fourthly, it is suggested that rights cannot be unreasonably exercised, and that 
such unreasonableness is not to be decided by any rigid rule or test, but by a 
flexible balancing exercise of the existing competing interests involved. Such 
balancing and compromise of competing interests creates a proper limit on 
each right and further advances the proper functioning of the legal system.  
 
834. Accordingly, it is recommended that the balancing factor should be utilised by 
arbitrators as a criterion of abuse. The significance of the balancing factor 
emanates from its function, which seeks and maintains a fair balance between 
the competing interests of the parties involved, and from its wide recognition 
in the civil and common law legal systems, and in international law.  
 
835. It is suggested that the balancing factor should contain sub-factors to guide 
decision makers, including inter alia the indices applied by courts as criteria of 
abuse (malice, the purpose of the right, the legitimate interest, and the 
comparative impairment test). The sub-factors shall also comprise all 
competing interests at stake, which will necessarily vary from one legal dispute 
to another. 
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836. Fifthly, given the flexibility and extensiveness of its application, it is advocated 
that abuse of rights must be applied with utmost prudence and must be resorted 
to in exceptional circumstances where abuse is flagrant. Whilst it may 
introduce some uncertainties and may arguably impede legal certainty, it 
remains significant in order to reach an equitable and fair outcome.  
 
837. Moreover, the study did not advocate an open-ended application of abuse of 
rights with no restraints, but rather suggested that by endorsing the element of 
reasonableness, one should be able to ascertain his/her respective 
rights/obligations by examining the legal instrument in question 
(law/contract/treaty), and also recognise that rights are not absolute, but must 
be exercised reasonably. 
 
838. Finally, while arbitrators may apply abuse of rights either as part of the 
applicable national law or as a general principle, where arbitrators are entitled 
to resort to general principles of law, it is propounded that abuse of rights 
should apply as an overriding principle of law, or a transnational public policy 
principle, in the context of procedural rights. This suggestion entails that 
whenever the conditions sine qua non for the principle’s application are 
satisfied, arbitrators are to apply it notwithstanding the seat of arbitration, or 
the applicable law. 
 
839. Given the procedural framework of international arbitration, where existing 
laws and rules grant arbitrators the power to resort to generally accepted 
procedural principles, and due to the pivotal role of abuse of rights in ensuring 
the good administration of arbitral justice, it is submitted that it should operate 
as a principle of transnational public policy to prevent the abuse of arbitration 
related rights. Thus, it should apply in the context of procedural rights, 
notwithstanding the applicable rules and the lex arbitri. 
 
840. Based on the above findings and recommendations, it is truly hoped that this 
study could serve as a moderate contribution to this new and developing area 
of law, and fuel additional studies for further development.  
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